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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this thesis is to analyse the conceptual foundations of the doctrine 
of humanitarian intervention and scrutinise the pertinent practice within the 
identified lego-philosophical framework. 
The present study is organised into three major sections. The first section 
contains the theory of humanitarian intervention and it has been subdivided 
into four chapters which represent the main legal theories. The pursued 
analysis is, thus, manifold. It proceeds with a theoretical appraisement of 
natural law, positivism, realism, and critical legal studies by presenting and 
evaluating their main dispositions, inadequacies and interrelations. 
Additionally, those trends in the practice of humanitarian intervention which 
coincide with the identified theoretical tenets are also appraised. 
The thrust of the pursued analysis is, we hope, to rationalise the contradiction 
in legal doctrine which stems from the different philosophical stances adopted 
by legal t heorists. These contradictions could be surmised in the antithetical 
poles of peace/justice; human rights/sovereignty. 
The next section could be introduced as the praxis of humanitarian 
intervention and contains two chapters. Having identified the arguments and 
contradictions, two articles of the United Nations Charter which attempt to 
control the notion of humanitarian intervention by legal means are analysed. 
That is, Article 2(4) on the non-use of force and Article 51 on self-defence. 
The diversified effectuation of humanitarian intervention renders the 
identified contradictions and opposing theoretical trends more evident. 
However, our aim is not merely to deconstruct the legal and philosophical 
milieu relating to humanitarian intervention but also to present a new 
framework for analysis. Consequently, the last two chapters contain our 
phronesis. They deal with the assumption of human dignity which 
transgresses the compartmentalisation of legal doctrine and its unreflective 
actualisation in the praxis of humanitarian intervention. 
\1 
At this point, the aim of the present research is to substitute a sterile leýgo- 
philosophical dogmatism and to submit under scrutiny a vision whereby the 
critical parameters of any humanitarian action are evaluated and accounted 
for. This, we hope, consists of the innovative aspect of this research. The 
existing lego-philosophical approach to humanitarian intervention 
- 
negative 
or positive 
- 
suffers from an unreflective automation. The negative approach 
submits any relevant action to strictly defined criteria compliance with which 
is conditio sine qua non for legality. On the other hand, the positive approach 
encounters greater difficulties. It weighs any humanitarian action according to 
certain criteria but disguises its value choices within the legal context. The 
fear of incommensuration in legal argument invites indecisive and restrained 
attitudes. 
In contradistinction, our approach entails an explicit aim of attaining human 
dignity which redirects our reflective nature towards distinguishing and de- 
concretising the manifold aspects which humanitarian actions contain. Instead 
of monolithic evaluations, one should see in any humanitarian action the 
values which are at stake and what should be done in order to ameliorate the 
situation. 
xii 
INTRODUCTION 
I. THE ROLE OF INITIAL ASSUMPTIONS IN LEGAL 
ARGUMENTATION 
I. 1 My initiation with the problem. Whilst carrying out research into the legal 
framework for humanitarian intervention and protection of nationals, two 
controversial concepts in international law, I became aware that there exists, 
principally, a dichotomy in international legal argument concerning these 
concepts. The legal argument is bifurcated mainly into two schools. On the one 
hand, some legal scholars advocate a permissive attitude towards such actions, 
invoking considerations of humanity, whereas their theoretical opponents 
reprove of such actions. The latter arrogate their arguments from the prevalent 
legal framework as it is represented by the United Nations Charter. Between 
these two extremes, a third, mediatory approach attempts to reconcile a 
humanitarian interest with the requirements of the legal order. 
Each theoretical arrangement presents its legal arguments quite convincingjy 
until one becomes acquainted with the "opponent" school's line of reasoning 
which may exert some appeal or, at least, discard the certainty of the embraced 
argument. Consequently, the dilemma of choosing between normatively 
opposing theses emerges in perplexed issues such as humanitarian actions. 
Thus, and in order to reach a justifiable result, one should demonstrate his 
affiliation to one of the above positions. In a nutshell, the law on the use of force 
which encapsulates an essential and decisive aspect of humanitarian actions, 
peregrinates between a restrictive, a permissive, or a relatively 
permissive/restrictive interpretation of the pertinent legal rules, confining thus 
the argument solely to the legal justifiability of each position. 
Although the theoretical logomachy concerning the "correct" interpretation 
flourishes, it originates from a common point, namely the legal propositions. 
The invocation of rules has been ensnared with cynicism which is based on the 
assumption that rules can be manipulated and provide rationalisation and 
justification to any state action. 
1 
1.2 The initial assumptions. The feeling of disappointment which surrounds the 
supposed interpretative manipulation of legal rules evolves from the scantiness 
of a demonstrative explication of the initial assumptions which generate 
different legal arguments. They are implicit in legal reasoning, hidden in the 
arguments, though dominant in the manipulation of those same arguments. The 
initial assumptions, existing though not visible, control legal reasoning and 
predetermine the outcome. 
Consequently, the recognition and exposition of their existence palliates the 
ferocity of legal argumentation by elucidating the conditions and causes of 
disagreement. The explicit demonstration of these assumptions remedies the 
sterility and simplicity of legal debate. It does not, however, conclude or close 
the debate because it refers to those presupposed foundations where agreement 
cannot be obtained. The dispute becomes interminable by alluding to those 
fundamental premises, the initial assumptions, which are not reasoned or 
provable but stand as the ulterior reasons. 
The assertion that law has a point of derivation, that is, an initial assumption 
which accounts for its interpretational definition is not novel. That "essential" 
source of law has varied in the history of law, from God, nature and natural law 
to the command of the sovereign or the will of the people. It could hardly be 
denied that, irrespective of those variations, the foundational assumption is 
present in providing the ideological context to the legal system. It is external to 
legal argument and unific though implicit; it is abstract in all legal systems, 
therefore not readable. It could be compared to a veil through which we 
construct and interpret the legal world. This comparison refers mainly to the 
interpreter's point of view who, rather unconsciously, assimilates the premises of 
a particular assumption. From the legal viewpoint, the initial assumption is the 
foundation of the law even if mythical or notional in its premises. 
The Jews derived their legal rules from God who became the conceptual basis of 
their system. Justice, as revealed by right reason or conformity with the dictates 
of nature was for the Greeks the ultimate unifying principle. For the Romans it 
2 
was nature, as articulated by Cicero: "True law is right reason in agreement with 
nature; it is of universal application, unchanging and everlasting; 
..... 
". 
1 
Theistic natural law which prevailed until the Enlightenment gave impetus to 
the rationalisation of law. The ideological source of law does not wane, although 
its initial assumption changes and becomes the "will of the people" or the 
"sovereign command". The reason for its longevity is that it provides the 
unifying mechanism to the legal system. 
"Secularisation of the law has consisted not in doing away 
with the `incomprehensible nature of authority', but in 
censoring any mention of this. When formerly it was divine in 
its origins authority `resounded', and its voice was heard like 
Biblical thunder, unassailable, irrefutable and unintelligible. 
Today, in its secularised form, authority still derives its 
effectiveness from being incomprehensible, with the 
centralised state installed on the Papal throne". 2 
Resort to this initial assumption cannot produce definite answers. It only 
transfers the dispute to a higher level of abstraction. Facing the threat of being 
condemned to indefinite oscillation and the potentiality of being substituted by 
philosophy and social sciences, legal discourse regressed in the extent of its 
debate. It maintained the distinction between theory and doctrine, between 
prescription and description as a means of preserving the distinctive nature of 
law. Legal professionals should only be concerned with proper law or doctrine 
because engaging in theory, that is, with the extralegal environment, jeopardises 
the presumed objectivity of legal norms by injecting subjective assumptions. 
Theory is suspected of producing indeterminacy. When lawyers initiate a 
theoretical debate, they become frustrated with the inability of theory to 
determine the result definitely. Instead, it extends the area of discord to 
abstractions which become incomprehensible. Any theoretical position 
determinative of outcomes is vulnerable to the constructions of opposing 
theories. In the end, it was deemed necessary to confine legal argument within 
Cicero, De Re Publica, Bk. III, XXIL33, trans. C. W. Keyes, Loeb Classical Library, 
(Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1928), p. 211 
2 A. Glucksmann, The Master Thinkers, (Brighton, 1980), p. 58 
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its doctrinal boundaries in order to avoid experiencing the frustration of vague 
theoretical dispositions. 
At the same time, doctrinal argument has failed to provide the anticipated sense 
of security and clarity. There are instances where doctrinal outcomes seem either 
irrelevant or controversial. The area on the use of force provides us with an 
example. The rule on the non-use of force has been meagrely reflected in state 
practice and at its best it was attributed with antagonistic interpretative courses 
promoted as correct doctrinal answers. Restrictionists and relativists are vying to 
prove the accuracy of their position and employ in their arguments conflicting 
principles such as justice or peace. Their particular arguments yield an aura of 
dejä vu, their principles are familiar and they can only "cheer or jeer, label [the] 
opponent a moral leper or a disingenuous romantic". 3 
Legal professionals themselves, incapable of solving the disputes among equally 
valid arguments, resort to theory as the final arbiter. Theory, as it was said 
above, only brings into the debate incomprehensible abstractions. It was 
graphically described by A. M. Honore that: "Decade after decade Positivist and 
Natural Lawyers face one another in the final of the World Cup 
..... 
Victory 
goes now to one side, now to the other, but the enthusiasm of players and 
spectators alike ensures that the losing side will take its revenge". 4 
The argument, then, appears to be circular. Legal theory resorts to abstraction 
and to avoid this we confine ourselves to doctrine. However, this produces 
problems of definition which could only be resolved by reliance on theory. In 
the end, the exercise is self-referential. Legal professionals, therefore, choose the 
security of the doctrinal world, suppressing the theoretical initial assumptions. 
Because this device cannot produce clarity, we need to disentangle the debate. 
This happens by explication of the initial theoretical assumptions inherent in the 
different doctrinal conclusions as well as by presenting new assumptions to 
achieve optimum results. 
3 A. M. Honore, Making Law Bind: Essays Legal and Philosophical, (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 1987), p. 33 
` A. M. Honore, "Groups, Laws and Obedience", in A. W. B. Simpson (ed), Oxford Essays in 
Jurisprudence, Second Series, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1973), p. 1, at pp. 1-2 
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H. AN ATTEMPT AT RECONSTRUCTION 
11.1 Human dignity as a reconstructive device. In the process of this work a new 
assumption will be submitted, that of human dignity, which is probably equally 
unprovable by ulterior reason as all the other concurrent assumptions. We can 
only present the reasons for adhering to this assumption and how it could mould 
the present line of legal discourse or attribute to an effective protection of 
human values. Adherence to this particular assumption is induced by our 
effective nature and predisposition, it is rather subjective and, therefore, total 
agreement is not expected. It is merely judged on the evaluative contribution to 
human or state activity. It cannot provide certainty but even the dominant 
assumptions are less finite and perceptible than they tend to admit. Although it 
diminishes certainty, it increases the knowledge and possibilities of how things 
may be, expands our perceptive field and liberates our thought from uncritical 
adoption of supposed stable assumptions. 
II. 2 Beyond the closed argument. Human dignity as the new assumption 
entreats human appreciation, creativity, edification and multi-instructionism. It 
induces lawyers to look at problems in a comprehensive manner and appreciate 
their more complex multi-meaning. Thus, it transgresses the traditional 
occupation of the lawyerdom which is mainly concerned with the legal 
argument. In international law, conditions and situations, ideals, politics and 
rules interweave; they have their own significance and arise when the 
practitioner is dealing with a certain incident. Humanitarian intervention has, for 
example, multiple dimensions: legal, political, moral, personal, human or 
psychological. Overlooking the multidimensional scope forces the practitioner 
to deal only with the legal argument which in its turn becomes self-restrictive. 
However, aseptisation is not feasible and, consequently, we end up with an 
interchange of arguments which externalise that which has been described as the 
oscillation between apology and utopias The argument which contains 
interpretative deductions from state practice is apologetic, whereas one which 
upholds standards is utopian. Consequently, an argument contingent to state 
S M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia. The Structure of International Legal Argument, 
(Helsinki, Finnish Lawyers' Publishing Company, 1989) 
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practice concerning humanitarian intervention is apologetic, whereas the one 
based on principle such as the principle of non-intervention is utopian. There is 
also a third strand which attempts to balance utopia and apology but it results in 
self contradiction. 
The above portrayal of legal discourse directs us towards trailing a missing 
element: the personal stigma, which is devoured by the practice and the 
structure. International law is concerned with producing structural arguments 
and not with the significance of the argument; the responsibility of the 
discussants; the significance of the incidence and of its consequences. We share 
the opinion that human dignity as it is elucidated in this work addresses these 
issues. It encounters the phenomena and bears responsibility for its findings. 
Furthermore, it is liberating because it is not resistant to revision as the main 
legal arguments are but it provokes, promotes and substantiates dialogue. 
We shall proceed then with a presentation of the international legal argument as 
a balancing act between naturalism and positivism, along with realism's 
challenge and the deconstruction performed by the Critical Lawyers. Having 
also presented the realisation of these arguments in specific cases, we shall leave 
aside the dogmatic knowledge and embrace the dialogic knowledge of human 
dignity. 
Before proceeding with the main "corps" of this work, some clarifications 
should be made concerning the different terms used to describe our topic and 
their aim. 
In this work the terms humanitarian action and humanitarian intervention are 
used denoting different things. Our preferred term is humanitarian action 
which includes unilateral or multilateral, institutional or not actions which 
protect the human dignity of threatened individuals. Hence, the term 
humanitarian action fully defined includes the traditional humanitarian 
interventions and what is considered as protection of nationals. The use of the 
word "action" instead of "intervention" describes the multifaceted character of 
the genre of researched material and also, mentally and psychologically, 
discharges the connotations which the word intervention gives rise to. 
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On the procedural field, the description of cases and the legal argumentation 
which accompanies them follows their traditional explication as humanitarian 
interventions or protection of nationals. Additionally, there is deliberation of 
their legal and philosophical assumptions. However, their evaluation and 
reconstruction refers to their being humanitarian actions. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
NATURAL LAW THEORY AND HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
The origins of natural law theory: Greek and Roman 
- 
Medieval Christian 
articulation of the theory: Thomas Aquinas 
- 
Hugo Grotius: his natural law 
theory; the three arguments for humanitarian intervention: (i) importance of the 
individual; (ii) humanity's reaction; (iii) preservation of international peace 
- 
Modern doctrine of humanitarian intervention based on the three Grotian 
arguments 
- 
Contract theories: John Rawls 's "Theory of Justice" 
I. THE ORIGINS OF NATURAL LAW: THE GREEK WORLD 
1.1 Introduction. Natural law is coeval with the evolution of human knowledge, 
and recognises different stages in the advancement of human perceptions of the 
world. It would not be immoderate, thus, to trace the inception of man's 
philosophical entanglement in the physical world which always stupefied 
human beings with its normative order. The Greeks have attributed to that 
normative order different names such as moira (fate), dike (justice), kosmos 
(order) orphysis (nature). The names portray the same concept but differ in their 
interpretative potential. 
It seems appropriate for our understanding that the natural law theory should be 
presented in its different formulations as ascribed to particular philosophical, 
political and scientific developments from ancient to modem times. 
1.2 Nature, morality and law in the tragedies. The Greek deity has a humanistic 
persona and that trait differentiated it from the intimidating figures of previous 
theocracies. They are projections of human beings, though more powerful than 
the latter. In Homer, human and divine actions intermingle to procure both 
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teleology and responsibility. The "will of Zeus"' is the superseded necessity, a 
certain order, and it is man's fate (moira) to satisfy his "portion" of that order, or 
else Zeus will. Man does not show a libertarian choice or approval but a 
subjection to his moira. 2 What is more striking in the epics is that the 
explanation of events is simultaneously external and internal. These two 
perspectives are interwoven3 and the superseded order is intermingled with 
human responsibility for human actions. Zeus, or the interpersonal necessity, is 
superimposed on individuals; but it appears, because everything pursues its 
natural course, as complementary to that course. 4 Human responsibility could be 
regarded as the development of moral understanding. The dual, human and 
divine, explanation of events is acknowledged by Agamemnon in The Iliad. For 
Agamemnon, the natural occurrence which caused Achilles' anger, setting in 
motion the events of The Iliad, is attributed to divine intervention, though his 
acts accomplished the schema. 5 The necessary order and human choice are not 
irreconcilable or inconsistent. On the contrary, they are infused in the notion of 
moira (order) which contains both an "ought" and a "must". This is the 
normative and real order in a casuistic relation for the ascription of 
responsibility. 6 
Homer, The Iliad, trans. R. Fitzgerald, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1984), I. 5 
Z Hugh Lloyd-Jones, The Justice of Zeus, 2nd ed., (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of 
California Press, 1971), pp. 4-5: "[Zeus] exercises a vague general control over events, and since 
his thought is identical with future happenings, the future can be known by him or by whoever 
knows his mind. Moira, one's "portion", is in the last resort identical with the will of Zeus". 
' C. H. Whitman, Homer and the Heroic Tradition, (Cambridge Mass., Harvard University 
Press, 1958), p. 248: "There were few places indeed where an ancient Greek could fail to see, not 
the work of God, but a god, and this is why everything in the Iliad happens twice, once on earth, 
and once in the timeless world of deity". 
W. F. Otto, The Homeric Gods: The Spiritual Significance of Greek Religion, trans. Moses 
Hadas, (N. Y., Pantheon, 1954), p. 7: "In their world, the divine is not superimposed as a 
sovereign power over natural events; it is revealed in the forms of the natural, as their very 
essence of being". 
s "But I am not to blame. 
Zeus and Fate and a nightmare Fury are, 
for putting savage Folly in my mind 
in the assembly that day, when I wrested 
Achilleus' prize of war from him. In truth, 
what could I do? Divine will shapes these things" 
Homer, Iliad, supra note no. 1, I, 9.86-90 
6 "[The concept of moira] is in fact an early attempt to solve the age-old problem of free 
- 
will 
and determinism. Moira fixes some things but not all. Moira provides the framework within 
which man is free to act. But revolt against that framework is conceived...... It is here that a 
moral element enters the concept. The man who accepts his destiny, who, so to speak, elects to 
work within the framework, who bows to the will of heaven and does not set himself up against 
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A subsequent development was the replacement of divine necessity with divine 
justice, its moralisation and its reconciliation with natural order. This was 
achieved by integrating both natural and divine order in the concept of cosmos. 
The rational unity that the universe displays is the basis of both spirit and matter. 
That is also the main point of difference between Christian and Greek ethics. 
For the Christians, the moral law has appeal because it is promulgated by God, 
an idea taken from the Jewish theocracy, whereas for the Greeks, its appeal is 
based on its reasonableness. 7 Theirs was a comprehensive idea of cosmos or a 
cosmos which signified order and beauty. 8 The universe for the Greeks was a 
living organism consisting of spirit and matter imbued with the divine. 
Consequently, it consisted of moral and physical laws. Heraclitus explains the 
sun's rotation by using the notion of justice: "Sun will not overstep his 
measures; otherwise the Erinyes, ministers of Justice, will find him out. "9 
Human action is integrated in that cosmos and respectively those philosophies 
are more descriptive than evaluative. 
Later, in the 5th century BC, the balance of observation moved from the 
cosmics and universe to that of human beings. In Aeschylus' tragedies, Zeus is 
still the overmastering will. In Sophocles' Antigone, the conflict of human laws 
and morality is apparent. Antigone defies Creon's dictum and buries her brother 
Polyneces, animated by her moral beliefs. 10 Antigone's submission to the divine 
it, is enaisimos, and this is a term of definite approbation. Here is a concept of morality closely 
similar to, though not identical with, that which the Stoics were later to evolve 
- 
right action 
consists in acceptance of that which destiny lays upon you. But it is not a truly fruitful concept, 
for it is at best of limited (and very difficult) application, and it is incapable of much 
development, except negatively". J. Ferguson, Moral Values in the Ancient World, (London, 
Methuen & Co., 1958), pp. 15-16 
E. Hatch, The Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages upon the Christian Church, A. M. Fairbairn 
(ed. ), 7th ed., (London, Williams & Nordgate, 1988), p. 158 
8 C. H. Kahn, Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmology, (N. Y., Columbia University 
Press, 1960), p. 222: "The peculiar richness of the term lies in its capacity to denote a concrete 
arrangement of beauty or utility, as well as the more abstract idea of moral and social order". 
9 G. S. Kirk, J. E. Raven, M. Schofield, The Presocratic Philosophers, 2nd ed., (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 201 
' °"For me it was not Zeus who made that order. 
Nor did that Justice who lives with the gods below 
mark out such laws to hold among mankind. 
Nor did I think your orders were so strong 
that you a mortal man, could over-run 
the gods' unwritten and unfailing laws. 
Not now, nor yesterday's, they always live, 
and no one knows their origin in time. 
So not through fear of any man's proud spirit 
10 
law whilst Creon's violation thereof is a manifestation of the conflict between 
positive and natural law in its modem interpretation. Iniquitous laws are non 
- 
laws according to naturalist die-hards to whom Antigone belongs or according 
to its milder Thomistic or Finnisian interpretation they are defective laws, 
though obligatory. According to the inflexible Creontian or Austinian 
positivism, those laws would be enforced however unjust because they emanate 
from the right authority, whilst the milder approach coincides with that of 
naturalism, as will be presented below. However, the conflict in that tragedy is 
also the manifestation of an inescapable normative order. As in the previous 
teleological period, there is a prearranged order which in this play is the doom of 
the Theban royal house. The actors show choice, liberty, personal responsibility, 
but eventually they submit to that impersonal force. Their destruction restores 
the order of the impersonal world which has been waived by human action. ' 1 
In addition, in Oedipus Rex, it is the purposive order that determines the course 
of action. Sophocles in this play affirms the order of the human condition. He 
shows the limitations of human vision in conceptualising the moral order of the 
world "exhibited in certain fundamental human feelings and aspirations for 
lasting value. " 12 Euripides was influenced by the sophistic movement of his time 
and his work displays inconsistency concerning the existence of moral order, 
which is attributed to his personal philosophical bewilderment. ' 3 
1.3 The Sophists. During the same period and under the influence of the sophists, 
the conflict between nomos and physis emerged. Nomos refers to custom, 
convention, rule or law, an artificial work, a creation of human effort. Physis 
connotes nature or the real. The antithesis alludes to the sources of evaluative 
would I be likely to neglect these laws, 
drawn on myself the gods' sure punishment". 
Sophocles, Antigone, in D. Grene, R. Lattimore (eds. ), The Complete Greek Tragedies, vol. 11, 
(Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1959), p. 157, at p. 174,450-460 
" "Man is a toy in the hands of superhuman forces. It is the gods' rule over man that it is called 
"fate", and man's reactions against it, which make human life great as well as tragic. Man is born 
into a world which is the work of the gods, in its good as well as its evil things...... His fate is 
bound up with the divine order of the world and tragedy occurs by the clash between that divine 
order and human disorder". Victor Ehrenberg, Sophocles and Pericles, (Oxford, Blackwell, 
1954), p. 24 
12 R. F. Goheen, The Imagery of Sophocles' Antigone, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 
1951), p. 95 
"W 
. 
C. Greene, Moira: Fate, Good and Evil in Greek Thought, (Cambridge Mass., Harvard 
University Press, 1944), p. 174 
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standards, 14 in particular the identification of authoritative sources for Homos 
which, lacking authority "by nature", should nonetheless not be ignored. 
Protagoras argues that societies promulgate laws in their process towards 
civilisation and that laws are necessary for social life. Thus, they are acquired 
and not given by nature; they have human origin. ' 5A person can achieve his 
development only within a community and only laws and customs hold a 
community together. This statement indicates an acknowledgement of the 
sociability of human nature which in its different manifestations as social 
contract or altruism has represented one crucial aspect for legal evolution. The 
opposite view of individualistic egoism and sanctification of might is presented 
in Gorgias' 6 and by Thucydides in the notorious dialogue between Athenians 
and Melians: "the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept 
what they have to accept...... Our opinion of the gods and our knowledge of 
men lead us to conclude that it is a general and necessary law of nature to rule 
whenever one can". " 
As it is presented by Plato and Aristotle, the Sophists and Socrates disagreed on 
the matter concerning the nature of man. The Sophists, dragging their 
conclusions from a pure natural law theory or rather from a descriptive natural 
envision, presented man as an egoistically, selfishly and antisocially motivated 
creature. Their views are echoed in Plato's Gorgias by Callicles: "But I think we 
only have to look at nature to find evidence that it is right for better to have a 
greater share than worse, more capable than less capable. " 18 Callicles believes 
that conventional determination of justice is not compatible with true justice 
because the latter's governance stems only from might. He denies the existence 
of objective moral standards, an idea repeated also in the Laws: "Some people 
assert 
..... 
that the principles of justice have no existence at all in nature, but that 
14 G. B. Kerferd, The Sophistic Movement, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981), 
pp. 112 
- 
114 
15 W. K. C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, vol. II1, (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1969), pp. 63-84 
16 Plato, Gorgias, trans. R. Waterfield, The World's Classics, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
1994), pp. 65-66,483 c, d, e 
" Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, trans. R. Warner, (Harmondsworth, Penguine, 1954), 
Bk. V, pp. 360,363 
is Plato, Gorgias, supra note no. 16, p. 66,483 c-d 
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mankind are always disputing about them and altering them,,. 19 On the other 
hand, Socrates presented man as a social being who can achieve his fulfilment 
only in a social context. Plato's writings are concurrent with the decline of the 
Greek polis whose morality and laws were exploited in the hand of particular 
majorities promoting their self-interests. Those contradictory human motives, 
altruistic and individualistic, which determine human and institutional evolution 
have been adhered to as philosophical premises by Critical Lawyers. 
An area where the sophists also ventured was to determine whether there exists 
an objective basis for morality or whether it is pure convention. Physis displays 
permanence and encompasses reality, that is, objectivity. It is also prescriptive, a 
source of values. Hence it serves as the source for objectivity in ethics because 
the ontological realm is provable and hence objective. The pattern of thought 
which permeates the philosophical debate since then has been set. There is, on 
the one hand, Protagoras who defends law as a human achievement and, on the 
other, those like Antigone who defend a divine prescription. The "is" 
- 
"ought" 
distinction, a recurrent theme in the positivist 
- 
naturalist debate, has been 
accomplished but not in the realm of the foundational standard. The objective 
standard for both moral and conventional rules has not been repudiated yet. 
1.4 Plato and Aristotle. Plato tries to restore the moral analogy of laws with the 
ordained world. For him, knowledge and reason can fulfil human nature. They 
guide human action to achieve justice. For Plato, justice is that trait in human 
nature which delimits the spheres of human psyche. Reason becomes a guide to 
legal principles. Laws are reasoned thoughts (logismos) embodied in 
convention. 20 The capacity of man to reason, which distinguishes him from 
other creatures and helps him to form his will accordingly, inspired the 
subsequent development of legal and political philosophy. After a period of 
religious universalism, reason is re-established by Grotius as we shall see later. 
It should also be emphasised that the duality of natural law, initiated by Plato, 
Aristotle and the Stoics as rationally found principles or as an expression of a 
way of life, has been a permanent feature of the latter. 
19 Plato, Laws, 10.889-890, in B. Jowett, The Dialogues of Plato, vol. V, 3nd ed., (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1931), p. 274 
'0 Plato, Laws, ibid., 9.875, pp. 259-260 
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Aristotle in his Rhetoric says that "particular law 
..... 
which each community 
lays down and applies to its own members is partly written and partly 
unwritten. " He refers to universal law, the law of nature, and says that " 
..... 
there 
really is 
..... 
a natural justice and injustice that is binding on all men, even on 
those who have no association or covenant with each other". 21 Plato initially 
attributed the function of maintaining the moral reason to some enlightened 
people. He promulgated later a metaphysical idea of Forms. The Forms were 
immutable, unchangeable and therefore real. They were particularised, whereas 
the aggregate whole comprised an organic unity with the Form of God as the 
final expression. This organic system is the source and explanation of the 
Forms, the source of the actual world. Human things are included in the Forms 
and can thus reach God. Justice is that which is appropriate to one's nature. 
Everyone has a position in the order of things and justice is determined by 
observing the harmony of the parts to the whole. 22 The harmony of the parts and 
their direction towards their proper end constitutes justice in the individual as in 
the state. 23 Plato's contribution to the natural law theory is his articulation of 
ontological natural law. He derives his ethical principles from a normative 
natural order giving it human and cosmic significance. 24 
Aristotle's vision of nature is ontological and teleological, but not metaphysical 
and abstract as in Plato's Forms. Our world is the real one and its purposiveness 
is realised in the Form of things. Each thing has an unchanged element which is 
the formal element. That element which can be called the essence of the object 
is teleological, that is, it describes the function of the object by nature. For 
Aristotle, there is an external, unmoved person who stimulates any change, the 
21 W. D. Ross (ed. ), The Works of Aristotle, "Rhetorica", vol. XI, (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 1924), 1373b 
22 Plato, Republic, trans. R. Waterfield, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1993), ch. 5,6, pp. 131- 
156,427-444 
2 Plato, Laws, supra note 19, p. 290: "The ruler of the universe has ordered all things with a 
view to the excellence and preservation of the whole and each part, as far as may be, has an 
action and passion appropriate to it...... and you (man) do not seem to be aware that this and 
every other creation is for the sake of the whole...... And you (men) are annoyed because you 
are ignorant how what is best for you in the universal scheme is also best for you singly, by the 
law of the common creation". 
24 L. L. Weinreb, Natural Law and Justice, (Cambridge Mass., Harvard University Press., 1987), 
p. 32; J. P. Maguire, "Plato's Theory of Natural Law", 10 Yale Classical Studies, (1947), p. 151 ff; 
John Wild, Plato's Modern Enemies and the Theory of Natural Law, (Chicago, The University 
of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 62,134-156 
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inclination of the latter, though, will be towards the direction of its formal 
essence. That stimulus does not provoke change in a mechanical manner but 
only by its projection as the "desire" of the particular formal essence. Thus, it is 
at the top of the teleological universe but also has nothing to do with it. 
Aristotle's schema avoids the relativism of ethics by upholding a teleological 
interpretation of the universe. Human beings have a formal essence which 
procures changes in the pursuit of that highest essence. Ethical principles 
emanate from nature and are thus objectively valid. The conflict between nature 
and convention is solved by the distinction between potential and actual being. 
Virtue, being potential or natural, is received by human beings and becomes 
actual only by habit, education and training. Consequently, customs, laws, and 
conventions are imposed on human beings as the actualisation of the potential- 
natural virtue. 25 His philosophical achievements will become more evident later 
with St. Thomas Aquinas and the modem reformulation of natural law by 
Finnis; particularly with their insistence on the moral aspiration of law in 
promoting the common good and the self-evident values deducted from their 
telos. 
II. THE HELLENISTIC AND ROMAN CONCEPT OF NATURAL LAW 
II.! Stoicism and the Hellenistic Period. It was the cosmopolitanism of the 
Hellenistic world that attributed natural law with its definition and 
purposiveness. The Stoics wrote in a period when Athens and the Greek polls 
were in retreat and philosophical or scientific research was conducted in other 
parts of the world. It was a period also of intellectual inquiry which emphasised 
human intelligence. Stoicism's internationalism and its adaptation to the Roman 
world has contributed to the establishment of the natural law theory and 
provided the medium for integrating the ancient and the Christian worlds. 
Stoics perceive the universe as a unified organic substance which is infused with 
logos. Nature and man partake of logos. This active force is described with 
2S W. K. C. Guthrie, supra, note 15, vo1. V, p. 344 
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different terms which tend to identify with each other: Fire; Breath; Nature; 
Reason; Law; God; Providence; Fate. 26 
The identification of the immanent principle with nature or God meant that 
Nature had both a descriptive and normative connotation, an infusion of "is" and 
"ought". "Nature embraces both the way things are and the way they should 
be. "27 Another aspect of Stoic philosophy is a pervasive causality. The universe 
is a perplexed pattern of causes and effects because that is the logos by which 
God's plan is effected. The advocacy of a mundane casuistic order provides the 
justification for a teleological system where everything is attributed to divine 
purpose. 28 Ethics were also central to the Stoics, the highest objective being the 
conduct of good life. A teleological perception of law for the reformation of 
society is a recurrent theme in legal theory, culminating in the apparent 
purposiveness of the policy school. 
In that ordained system, the position of human liberty, choisism and human 
responsibility is questioned. Human action could be a "dictate of nature" in a 
deterministic sense, that is, the rule of causes and effects. On the other hand, it 
could also mean what one ought to do in pursuing life according to nature. In the 
latter sense we have moral responsibility but life is also determined. Probably, 
this is so because Stoics believed that Nature as logos is always bringing about 
good things. 29 They offered a double evaluation of the same act, one of the 
determined world, the other of the free qualities of man. In addition to the 
external causes, it was also the self-will which was evaluated, and, thus, a man 
could be responsible concerning his attitude towards an act, whereas the 
physical act itself might be evaluated differently. Stoicism emphasised moral 
responsibility as a consequence of free will. That conflicted with the other pillar 
26 W. C. Greene, supra note no. 13, p. 338 
27 A. A. Long, Hellenistic Philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, Skeptics, 2nd ed., (London, 
Duckworth, 1986), p. 169 
28 A. A. Long, "The Freedom and Determinism in the Stoic Theory of Human Action", in A. A. 
Long (ed. ), Problems in Stoicism, (London, Athlone Press, 1971), p. 173, at p. 178; J. M. Rist 
(ed. ), The Stoics, (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1978), p. 204: "The cosmos of the 
Stoic philosophers was a vast dynamic continuum. It was conceived as a unified whole in which 
"all things are bound together with one another" through myriad relationships of cause and 
effect. These causal connections were thought to be pervasive and without exception, 
permeating Nature at all levels from the lowest inorganic matter to the highest forms of life". 
`9 A. A. Long, supra note 27, p. 165 
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of their philosophy which is the ordained monist world. The Stoics' concern 
with ethics and the identification of Nature and Reason conflates the question of 
"ought" and "is" which is central to natural law theory 
Cicero gave only the name to the essentials of a theory which already existed. 
He is not an original thinker but his achievement is the infusion of Greek 
philosophy to Roman and Latin terminology. The statement of the doctrine of 
Natural Law is contained in the Republic: "True law is right reason in agreement 
with nature; it is of universal application, unchanging and everlasting; it 
summons to duty by its commands...... And there will not be different laws at 
Rome and at Athens or different laws now and in the future, but one eternal and 
unchangeable law will be valid for all nations of all times, and there will be one 
master and ruler, that is, God, over us all, for he is the author of this law, its 
promulgator, and its enforcing judge. 1130 It is important therein, the statement 
that there is a standard of conduct in nature which can be known by reason if 
properly employed. Therefore, laws and customs can be validated by reference 
to nature. 
11.2 The Romans. The Stoics played a fundamental role in the transfusion of 
Greek cosmopolitanism to Roman law and in concretising natural law theory. 
For the Stoics, mankind is a cosmopolis, and law as its expression is universal, 
because it is based upon the common nature of men. All men partake of reason 
for the identification of that law and therefore they are equal. Equality then 
becomes a tenet of natural law31 and the dividing line between ancient and 
modern political thought with the stigma of the French and American 
Revolutions. 32 However, the contention of both freedom and equality contains a 
certain tension which has been accommodated in the hypothetical construction 
of the social contract. Transmuting the principle of equality into international 
30 Cicero, De Re Publica, Bk. III, XXII. 33, trans. C. W. Keyes, Loeb Classical Library, 
(Cambridge Mass., Harvard University Press, 1928), p. 211 
31 "For no single thing is so like another, so exactly its counterpart, as all of us are to one 
another...... For those creatures who have received the gift of reason from Nature have also 
received right reason, and therefore they have also received the gift of law, which is right reason 
applied to command and prohibition. And if they have received law, they have received justice 
also. Now all men have received reason, therefore all men have received justice". Cicero, De 
Legibus, ibid., Bk. I, X. 29, XII. 33, pp. 329,333 
'2 R. W. Carlyle, A. J. Carlyle, A History of Medieval Political Theory in the West, vol. l, 
(Edinburgh, W. Blackwood & Sons, 1903), p. 9 
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law, it supports a view of non-intervention. If states are equal, either as 
participants in the original position according to Rawls or by comparison to 
individuals as articulated by early positivists such as Wolff and Vattel, then 
intervention is precluded because it will destroy the trait of equality. The full 
extent of this construction will be presented in subsequent sections of this work 
but a preliminary observation into the contemporary legal framework as it is 
formulated by the U. N. Charter supports the view of a background equality and 
a derivative principle of non-intervention. 33 
Another feature of the natural law doctrine is the reconciliation of the ideal 
perception of society as a component of natural law and its imperfect 
actualisation in positive institutions. The equality of all men propagated by 
nature is confronted with actual inequalities. The problem is not new and 
derives from the Greek distinction between nomos and physis. How does the 
theory then survive the infractory actualisation? The exegesis was twofold: 
either the human decline from the ideal world, an explanation that furnished the 
Christian accommodation of natural 
- 
ideal world and human actualisation, or a 
progress towards an ideal future. Seneca, for instance, justified the disharmony 
of empirical institutions with the law of nature as a degeneration from an 
original state of innocence. 34 
II. 3 The emergence of international law. Natural law has acquired a variety of 
interpretative perorations during all periods because it conceals abstruse 
concepts. It is however a standard of derivation for evaluating human conduct. 
Regarding international law, it is commonly believed that it is the evolution of 
the Romanjus gentium concept. The Romans required a trait of citizenship, for 
their legal system applied only to Roman citizens which was the jus civile. The 
expansion of Rome and the inclusion within its empire of diverse nations 
necessitated a law that would apply to Roman and foreigners alike. This law was 
in essence Roman law imbued with foreign principles and institutions. Jus 
gentium as domestic law came to signify the common practices in the Empire 
but eventually it transplanted jus civile as the core of Roman law. Jus gentium 
" See Chapters Two and Five 
R. W. Carlyle, supra note 32, vol. 1, pp. 23-25 
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did not have the meaning of law among nations but it was applied as national 
Roman private law. 35 
There is disagreement concerning the relation of jus gentium to jus naturale. 
Thus, Gaius wrote: "Every people that is governed by statutes and customs 
observes partly its own peculiar law and partly the common law of all mankind. 
That law which a people establishes for itself is peculiar to it, and is called the 
civil law (jus civile) as being the special law of the civitas (State), whilst the law 
that natural reason establishes among all mankind is followed by all peoples 
alike, and is called jus gentium (law of nations or law of the world). " 36 Gaius 
posits a dual division of law between jus civile and jus gentium identified with 
jus naturale. The linkage is the universality37 of jus naturale and jus gentium, 
the former referring to its source and the latter to its application. The reduction 
of natural law and jus gentium to a single concept solves also the problem of its 
practical and theoretical existence, each contributing to those particular 
aspects. 38 
Ulpian provides a tripartite division of law between jus civile, jus gentium and 
jus naturale, incorporated into Justinian's Digest and Institutes of the Corpus 
Juris Civilis. Civil law borrows its precepts from the law of nations, from nature 
and the law of the city, whereas "Natural law is that which nature has taught all 
animals...... The law of nations is that law which mankind observes. "39 Jus 
35 A. Nussbaum, A Concise History of the Law of Nations, (N. Y., Macmillan, 1947), p. 19 
36 Gaius, Institutes I. I, trans. Francis de Zulueta, The Institutes of Gaius, (Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1946-1953), pt. I, p. 3; "..... it tacitly identifies jus gentium with jus naturale: it is the law 
common to all mankind as being the product of reason 
- 
common human reason or the divine 
reason ordering the world". Ibid., pt. II, p. 12 
37 For Cicero "...... the universality of a principle is a proof of its naturalness and hence of its 
validity, for the law of Nature is no mere ideal, it is a binding law and no enactment of the 
people or senatus-consult can prevail against it...... [if] all races of mankind acknowledge a 
practice it must be because it has been taught them by their universal mother, Nature. Cicero 
thus identifies the law of Nature with the jus gentium, in the sense of law common to all 
peoples...... ". H. F. Jolowicz, B. Nicholas, Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman Law, 
3nd ed., (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1972), pp. 104-105 
38 "The notion (of jus naturale) is of small importance in legal discussion, for though various 
institutions are referred to it, they are all equally referable, and referred, to jus gentium, and it 
was as jus gentium that they were law. But while the jus gentium steadily superseded the old jus 
civile, it must not be forgotten that its supposed universality was a great force to this end, and 
this was its point of contact with jus naturale". W. W. Buckland, A Textbook of Roman Law 
From Augustus to Justinian, 3nd rev. ed. by P. Stein, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1963), pp. 54-55 
39 Institutes, I, ii, pr. and 2, Digest, I, i, 1,4 
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gentium is distinguished from natural law and the divergence could be attributed 
to the different periods to which these writers belong. Those scattered reflections 
make it difficult to construct a coherent doctrine. 
III. CLASSICAL CHRISTIAN NATURAL LAW AND ITS MODERN 
RESTATEMENT: ST. THOMAS AQUINAS AND JOHN FINNIS 
111.1 Early Church. The Christian theory of natural law could be explained as a 
combination of Greek and Hebrew doctrines: the philosophy of nature as 
impersonal and orderly and the theology of creation attributed to a divine 
legislator. 40 Christianity transplanted the Stoic premise that man and nature 
partake of reason, with the redeeming role of Christ. For the Stoics, moral laws 
as natural laws are also laws of God, whereas for the Christians, natural law is 
identified with the will of God. St. Paul is responsible for the incorporation of 
natural law to the Christian world. The early Christian writers, like the Stoics 
before them, contemplated the divergences between the ideal law of God and 
actual law. They constructed a dogmatic theology of the Fall which explained 
the divergence and provided coherence and continuity to the doctrine. The 
actual imperfections are due to the Fall. That invention was more propitious in 
acknowledging the status quo by harmonising the "absolute natural law", that is, 
the law of human beings in their initial position of innocence, and "relative 
natural law", after the Fall. 41 The harmonisation was achieved by subordinating 
the relative to the absolute natural law; however, they did not claim that state 
42 law is invalid if it is against the natural law of God. 
°0 H. Koester, "NOMOS PHYSEOS, The Concept of Natural Law in Greek Thought", in Jacob 
Neusner (ed. ), Religion in Antiquity, (Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1968), p. 520, at p. 540 
4' E. Troeltsch, The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches, trans. Olive Wyon, vol. 1, 
(London, Allen & Unwin, 1931), pp. 153-155 
42 An exception is Origen who admits that the natural law of God invalidates any contrary civil 
law. It is argued though that Origen's supremacy of natural law refers mainly to the source of the 
secular ruler's authority at a time when Christianity was criticized as a subversive movement. 
W. A. Banner, "Origen and the Tradition of Natural Law Concepts", 8 Dumbarton Oaks Papers, 
(1954), pp. 71-77 
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The early Christian fathers adopted a relative or pragmatic attitude towards 
social institutions, retreating from doctrinal obstinacy and thus "gained the 
opportunity of controlling Christian society, just because the relative standard 
which it adopted was capable of application to actual life. "43 
111.2 St. Thomas Aquinas. St. Thomas Aquinas is credited with the integration 
of the Aristotelian, Stoic and Christian teachings in propounding his doctrine of 
natural law. Although his immediate influences and in particular St. Augustine's 
are identified with "theological jurisprudence", his encounter is with the 
philosophical and realistic branches of natural law. St. Thomas channelled the 
ancient Greek and Roman philosophical traditions into Christian doctrine, but he 
believed more in the permeation of Christian teachings in the realms of law and 
philosophy. 44 
St. Aquinas distinguishes four categories of law: eternal law; natural law; human 
law; and, divine law. The lex aeterna is the sublime, objective a priori, the 
universal rational orderliness similar to the Stoic logos in the Christian version: 
"the very idea of the government of things in God, the Ruler of the Universe. "45 
Lex naturalis moralis is the participation of man into lex aeterna. Positive laws 
are necessary in order to rectify human deviations from lex naturalis. They are 
just and right only when they derive from lex naturalis and consequently from 
lex aeterna. 
St. Aquinas attempted the unification in a coherent whole of intellectual and 
methodological aspects which relate to human essence by arrogating the 
singularity of the Christian outlook with Aristotelian teachings on Reason. He 
contested the distinction between faith and reason and tried to reconcile divine 
and human thought. That was perhaps implied in the Decretum Gratiani: 
"Mankind is ruled by two laws: Natural law and Custom. Natural law is that 
which is contained in the Scriptures and the Gospel. " The inclusion of natural 
law into the religious sources implied their reconciliation. Nature 
- 
Reason and 
" L. L. Weinreb, supra note 24, p. 49 
44 A. H. Chroust, "The Philosophy of Law of St Thomas Aquinas: His Fundamental Ideas and 
Some of his Historical Precursors", 19 Am. J. of Jurisprudence, (1974), p. 1, at p. 2 
's Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologia, (London, Blackfriars, 1964), la, 2ae, 91.1, hereinafter 
cited as Summa 
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Revelation are therefore integrated. 46 The rediscovery of Aristotle has shaken 
the moral pessimism of the Middle Ages which is mirrored in the doctrine of the 
Fall. Natural law presented a limited unattainable ideal at that time. St. Thomas 
Aquinas delivered a natural law theory with discrepancies and amplitudes, not 
deviatory, but integrated into the ideal and providential natural law through 
reason. Thus, the metaphysical and the actual are reconciled in his thinking. 
The definition that Aquinas gives to law is "an ordinance of reason for the 
common good, made by him who has care of the community, and 
promulgated. "47 This definition is reminiscent of modem legal semantics. 
Enactment and promulgation is the "positive" content of law necessitated by the 
need for identification. Rationality and good intent are the naturalistic aspects. 
Law as a prescriptive formulation evaluates human acts through reason. Reason 
itself induces law towards its natural inclination, which is the common good. 
As stated above, St. Thomas reconciled faith and reason, and lex naturalis 
performs that function. Lex naturalis is the manifestation of, or, concerning 
man, the participation in the universal reason, in the providential order of God, 
the lex aeterna. The latter is the yardstick for moral evaluation of all acts. God is 
the final and infallible arbiter of ethics and morals. Man knows some of the lex 
aeterna through his participation therein, or by virtue of his reflection. Within 
natural law there is vitalistic order, a natural inclination which must be followed, 
and human beings should act according to their being and purpose. Hence, 
eternal law is also a moral law for humans, not sheer necessity. Humans 
exercising their free will ought to follow their natural inclination, that is, natural 
law, and should not submit only to natural necessity like other living creatures. 48 
46 A. P. D'Entreves, Natural Law. An Introduction to Legal Philosophy, (London, Hutchinson 
University Library, 1970), p. 40; T. Gilby, The Political Thought of Thomas Aquinas, (Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 104: "Aquinas worked on the assumption that although 
there might be many forms of truth, because they were truth, all were ultimately reconcilable. It 
was not for him to accept one form and reject the others as necessarily incompatible: it was 
taken for granted that all had a certain if unequal degree of validity". 
°' Summa, 1 a, 2ae, 90.4, p. 17 
48 Summa, la, tae, 91.1,2: "It is clear that the whole community of the universe is governed by 
the divine reason. This rational guidance of created things on the part of God 
...... 
we can call the 
Eternal Law. Now, since all things which are subject to divine Providence are measured and 
regulated by the Eternal Law 
..... 
it is clear that all things participate to some degree in the 
Eternal Law, in so far as they derive from it certain inclinations to those actions and aims at 
which are proper to them. But, of all others, rational creatures are subject to divine Providence 
in a very special way; being themselves made participators in Providence itself, in that they 
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This needs more elaboration in order to understand what was described as 
"Christian humanism". 49 As in Aristotle, everything had an essence; for St. 
Thomas Aquinas, the essence of man is reason, and therefore he is the only 
creature who participates intellectually in eternal law. Reason reveals man's 
ends and inferentially he can work towards them. 50 Those ends are dual. For the 
nature he shares with other creatures, he is subjected to the same physical laws 
as them and is a passive participant in Eternal Law. However, exclusively 
endowed with reason and will, he can direct himself and participate in Eternal 
law actively. His natural law, however, is moral and not physical. 51 Endowed 
with distinct qualities, man is in a communicative position with God. The 
dignity and intellectual power of man affirmed his moral standing. 
Another point where Thomas Aquinas differs from previous writers is that he 
liberates man from the pessimistic and vindicatory interpretation of human 
fallibility. Contrary to the belief that defective institutions are the divine remedy 
for human sin, he argued that sin interferes only with the realisation of natural 
values, not with acquiring knowledge of them. "It is in this sphere that the 
foundation of social and political institutions must be assessed. "52 
111.3 Lex iniusta non est lex: St. Thomas Aquinas' and John Finnis' repudiation. 
From his perception of sin originates his theory of human or positive law which 
accomplishes both a complementary and corrective function. Positive laws are 
indubitable and particularised ascertainments of matters proceeding from natural 
law. Moreover, the coercion of positive law is required in order to force 
53 compliance with and implementation of natural law, inhibited due to the Fall. 
control their own actions and the actions of others. So they have a certain share in the divine 
reason itself, deriving therefore a natural inclination to such actions and ends as are fitting. This 
participation in the Eternal Law by rational creatures is called the Natural law". ti ipation 
A. P. D'Entreves, supra note 46, p. 44 
50 Summa, I 
-II, q. 71, a. 2c: "And so whatever is contrary to the order of reason is contrary to 
the nature of human beings as such; and what is reasonable is in accordance with human 
nature as such. The good of the human being is being in accord with reason; and human evil 
is being outside the order of reasonableness..... ". 
s' W. Farrel, A Companion to the Summa, vol. 11, (N. Y., Sheed & Ward, 1945), p. 372 
52 A. P. D'Entreves, supra note 46, p. 45 
53 "Man has a natural aptitude for virtue; but the perfection of virtue must be acquired by man by 
means of some training...... But since some are found to be deprived, and prone to vice, and not 
easily amenable to words, it was necessary for such to be restrained from evil by force and fear, 
in order that at least, they might desist from evil doing, and leave others in peace, and that they 
themselves by being habituated in this way, might be brought to do willingly what hitherto they 
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Positive law derives its legal appellation from natural law. Positive laws which 
do not comply with the dictates of natural law are not law at all but a 
perversion. 54 The consequence of such a statement concerning the obligation to 
obey has profound ramifications for the theory of natural law, which 
inadvertently motivated its repudiation. The recurrent argument is the threat a 
subjective evaluation of morality may represent for the coherence of a legal 
order. For Aquinas, reasonable calculations would enforce obedience to such 
laws in order to avoid civil disobedience and scandal. 55 Aquinas was in no doubt 
that an iniquitous law is law in an Austinian manner, that is, the command of the 
superior towards his subordinates. 56 The misconception concerning this 
argument was perpetuated successfully by positivism57 and is located in the 
distinction between the morality to obey and the morality to promulgate or 
enforce the law. 58 
Finnis challenges the verity of this supposedly mainstream argument of natural 
law, and re-appraising Aquinas, restates natural law to attain the reconciliation 
of law and morality. The methodological device for circumventing the position 
that contrariety to natural law renders positive law void is the distinction 
between the focal and penumbral meaning of law. The focal meaning is the ideal 
purpose law should serve towards the achievement of the common good. The 
legal order existing in societies, through manipulation, does not always satisfy 
that ideal order. The legal criteria of validity attribute the quality of law to rules 
which are outside the fringes of the focal meaning. The focal meaning has a 
moral element and aims at facilitating the achievement of the common good. 
However, unjust laws in the secondary meaning are not equated with invalidity. 
Finnis rejects the definitional role of natural law and accepts the evaluative one. 
did from fear, and thus become virtuous. Now this kind of training which compels through fear 
or punishment is the discipline of laws". Summa, I 
-H, q 90, a3 ad 2; q 95, a1c 54 Summa, la 2ae 92.114 
55 Summa, 1 a2ae, 96.4; 2a2ae, 104.6 
56 Summa, I- II, q 92, a. I ad 4. see bellow, Chapter Two, p. 64 S' The explication of that proposition by positivists who also concentrate their criticism thereof 
is the following: "The only concept of validity is validity according to natural law, i. e., moral 
validity. Natural lawyers can only judge a law as morally valid, that is, just or morally invalid, 
i. e., wrong. They cannot say of a law that it is legally valid but morally wrong. If it is wrong and 
unjust, it is also invalid in the only sense of validity they recognise". J. Raz, "Kelsen's Theory of 
Basic Norm", 19 Am. J. Juris., (1974), p. 94, at p. 100 q H. McCoubrey, The Development of Naturalist Legal Theory, (London, Croom Helm. 
1987), p. xii 
24 
The rapprochement of the two orders, natural and positive, is hence complete 
because the debate is reduced to tautology. 59 
Finns' definition of law concords with that of analytical jurisprudence, as a 
promulgation of a certain authority coupled with sanctions towards the 
realisation of the common good. 60 The disparities produced in attaining this aim 
introduce the distinction between the focal and penumbral meaning, which 
alludes to the consideration of extra-legal elements. Mainstream positivists, 
Austin or Kelsen, have propagated a distinct legal quality, logically 
unresponsive to social features, whereas for Finnis, "[T]he subject-matter of the 
theorist's description (law) does not come neatly, demarcated from other 
features of social life and practice. , 61 This definitional aspect of law 
approximates to McDougal's theoretical approach to legal systems. Law for him 
is an authoritative decision which encompasses a panorama of societal 
expectations, experiences and formalities, assimilated to Finnis' focal meaning. 
Also, for both McDougal and Finnis, law is an instrument for societal 
transformation. 62 The function of law is to promote the realisation of the basic 
goods which within a communal life are transformed to the common good, 
whereas for McDougal, law promotes certain pre-moral values. 63 
The positivist jurisprudence, on the other hand, remains to a considerable degree 
unconcerned with this. Hart admits an "internal point of view" but it could not 
be assimilated to the focal meaning because of moral inequality. For Finnis: 
59 N. MacCormick, "Natural Law and the Separation of Law and Morals", in R. P. George (ed. ), 
Natural Law Theory, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992), p. 105, at p. 109: " But the positivist 
theory I have in view yields just the same conclusion 
- 
the law is a valid law, but if the duties it 
imposes are duties in violation of the demands of justice, it will follow that the moral issue 
whether or not to comply is prima facie an open one...... Finnis has put it beyond denial that the 
mainstream of the natural law tradition 
...... 
affirms the possible existence of such (unjust) laws, 
while denying or downgrading their morally compelling quality and insisting on their essential 
defectiveness as law". 
60 J. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1980), pp. 276- 
280,359-360, hereinafter cited as NLNR 
61 NLNR., p. 4 
62 M. S. McDougal, H. D. Lasswell, W. M. Reisman, "The World Constitutive Process of 
Authoritative Decision", 19 Journal of Legal Education, (1966), p. 253 
63 NLNR., chs. IV, VI. "..... a theorist cannot give a theoretical description and analysis of 
social facts, unless he also participates in the work of evaluation, of understanding what is 
really good for human persons, and what is really required by practical reasonableness". 
Ibid., p. 3 
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"If there is a point of view in which legal obligation is treated as at least 
presumptively a moral obligation, 
..... 
a viewpoint in which the 
establishment and maintenance of legal as distinct from discretionary or 
statistically customary order is regarded as a moral ideal if not a 
compelling demand of justice, then such a viewpoint will constitute the 
central case of the legal viewpoint. For only in such a viewpoint is it a 
matter of overriding importance that law as distinct from other forms of 
social order should come into being, and thus become an object of the 
theorists' description. , 64 
This description of the focal point addresses the siccative reference made by 
Hart to the differentiation within the internal point. Peripheral elements such as 
self-interest or tradition within the internal point of view do not amount to what 
is valued for law and also they do not address what is counted as important by 
those "actors in the field". 65 The consequences for humanitarian intervention are 
considerable. If the law on the non-use of force does not carry the sense of moral 
obligation, but it adheres to the peripheral cases of the internal point, then it is 
defective in the focal meaning, whereas humanitarian intervention, when 
enjoying the viewpoint of moral ideal, should be elevated to law. Additionally, 
"practical reasonableness" would highlight the reasons for the debasement of the 
law concerning the non-use of force. If their explanation contains considerations 
of its rigidity or moral indifference, the reconstruction should be accomplished 
accordingly, towards ameliorating its content. Consequently, we could reverse 
the statement made by Franck and Rodley concerning the Bangladesh case. 
There, they maintain that humanitarian intervention resides in the realm of 
morality, whereas the law is the non-use of force. As we have proved above, a 
more rigorous reading of Hart coincides with Finnis's focal point of which 
humanitarian intervention partakes, that is the central case of the internal point 
of view. 66 
114 NLNR, pp. 14-15 
°S NLNR, p. 13, H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1961), 
pp. 198,111,226, hereinafter cited as CL 
T. M. Franck and N. S. Rodley, "After Bangladesh: The Law Humanitarian Intervention by 
Military Force", 67 A. J. I. L., (1973), p. 275, p. 304: "..... belongs in the realm not of law but of 
moral choice, 
..... 
" CL, p. 198; NLNR, pp. I 1-18 
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III. 4 The distinction between "is " and "ought. ". Another defect of natural law is 
the deduction of norms from their ontological environment. This misconception 
is founded on the confusion between the ontological and transcendental world, 
the latter being also existential according to natural law. This further generates 
the confusion between the deontological and ontological. 
For Thomas Aquinas, there is a universal order which permeates the natural, 
ethical or social structure. That order is unitary. It is integrated from part to part, 
part to whole, whole to its final end, which is God. Divine providence is the 
source and the end of that concatenation and this methodology is reminiscent of 
Kelsen's logical cells of imputation. Moral order springs from the intersection of 
deontological (divine) and ontological order. It is simultaneously an ascending 
argument whereunder ontological order terminates in God, and a descending 
one, because moral order originates from Him. In this dual argument he 
reconciles reason and faith. Natural order as reason is part of the universal order 
which is providential. The two are complementary because reason leads to faith, 
that is, God, whereas faith, descending in the explication of the particular order, 
recognises reason. 67 The affirmation of human moral freedom and the 
atonement of human institutions from the providential sublime order are 
considerable achievements. Hence, Thomistic natural law is the intermediate for 
the attainment of providential order and shares an Aristotelian teleology, which 
neutralises the fusion of "is" and "ought". 
Although it is a harmonisation of man's reason and faith, the ethical system 
based on these precepts cannot be characterised as rational or human-centred in 
a modern context. It does not recognise human personality or human rights, 
though Aquinas acknowledges the dignity of human reason. The merit of his 
67 "Human values and truths are not necessarily obliterated by revelation of higher ones; 
however modest and low, they deserve to be considered as possible tools for the great task of 
building up Christian civilization. In St. Thomas's assertion, gratia non tollit naturam, sed 
perficit, there is the recognition of the existence and dignity of a purely "natural" sphere of 
rational and ethical values. This essentially "human" standard of justice is not vitiated by sin nor 
absorbed in the glare of absolute and divine justice; it is rather the first and necessary step in the 
long ascent towards the fulfillment of the Christian ideal. This sphere of natural and human 
values fords its complete expression in the idea of natural law, which thus appears as the proper 
ground upon which social and political relations can be secured and comprehended". A. P. 
D'Entreves, The Medieval Contribution to Political Thought: Thomas Aquinas. Marsilius of 
Padua. Richard Hooker, (London, Oxford University Press, 1939), p. 21 
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exposition is in its function of disentailing ethics from the tight grasp of 
theology and presenting a natural system of ethics, which later acquired its own 
development, far from Christian revelational doctrines. This is an important 
contribution to natural law theory, because the latter had a tradition of deducing 
moral principles from speculation about the human condition, and that involved 
an arbitrary transition from "is" to "ought". 
Finnis is categorically negative about the suggestion that natural law deducts 
moral values from facts. 68 His methodology is to work from self-evident 
principles which, in this case, are the seven pre-moral values of life, knowledge, 
play, aesthetic experience, sociability or friendship, practical reasonableness and 
religion, 69 to subsequent inferences. Therefore, there is no need for factual 
observation in order to achieve normative conclusions. He avoids empirical 
reasoning by inward meditation of values as goods, by understanding that 
natural inclinations are towards desirable objects. Finnis is concerned with the 
focal meaning of law which is the law deduced from certain postulates through 
inner speculation, and that position needs more elaboration. 
111.5 Finnis on the self-evident "basic forms of human good". Finnis explicitly 
rejects ontology and articulates a theory of objective and normative precepts 
which positive law should conform with. Using human reason, we can 
adumbrate through an inner process of internal meditation the basic goods 
which are, hence, demonstrable and self-evident. This coincides with Aquinas' 
articulation of the first principles of natural law as a united conception of certain 
ends. 70 However, the precepts on which Aquinas based his theory are dissimilar 
to those of Finnis' and therefore distort his argumentation. The crucial 
ingredient in Aquinas' philosophy is the Eternal Law of God, which attributed 
self-evidence to the principles of natural law. The argument is descending from 
the highest point of Eternal Law to the individual elements of the project. 
Finnis, on the other hand, formulates an ascending argument whereby one 
recognises God from the premises of secular ratiocination. This is a salient point 
in Finnis exposition, because his values are presented as objective, 
6° L. L Weinreb, supra note 24, pp. 33,66,86; NLNR, p. 34 
69 NLNR, pp. 85-89 
70 Summa, 1-II, q. 94, a. 6c; q. 99, a. 2 ad 2; q. 100, aa. 5 ad 1,1 1c 
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comprehensive and self-evident; however, the foundation of their being so is not 
articulated and is in fact based on the subjective intuition of the author. What is 
missing is the so called "Argument from Queerness". " Queerness in this sense 
is the inductive premises of particular arguments, concerning, for instance, 
values in Finnis' interpretation. These postulates are so queer that they are 
unproved; nonetheless, ontology is presupposed in our particular arguments. In 
the Platonic Forms, knowledge of the Form of Good provides the participant 
with direction towards instantiating a particular good. That good is objective and 
pursued because the pursuer is acquainted therewith and not because it is 
desired. To prove his case, Finnis takes the value of Knowledge and by using a 
retorted argumentation, proves its self-evidence. Eventually, it develops into 
what MacCormick said: "Why should 
...... 
anyone 
..... 
care to know that 
knowledge is not worth having unless, after all, at least that knowledge is worth 
having? "72 Whereas his argument on knowledge is convincing, he fails to 
present the "self-evident" arguments concerning the other values. 73 
Consequently, the burden of subjectivity is commonly shared with Hart's 
"minimum content of natural law" and McDougal's postulation of human 
dignity values. They all invoke the assistance of empirical anthropological 
surveys in order to infer a reductionist list of essential values. The argument 
between them is circular. Hart and McDougal emphasise an external 
examination of trends from which they intuitively deduct certain values, 
whereas Finnis emphasises an internal aspect of intelligent practical reasoning. 
The fusion of internal and external modes of reasoning is inescapable and 
practical reasonableness could not demonstrate the basic categories of human 
goods in a vacuum. Even John Rawls's primary goods are primary "..... since 
they are in general necessary for the framing and the execution of a rational 
plan of life. , 74 It requires, therefore, a certain concept of necessity and a certain 
concept of rationality whose essence or "hard core" would most probably be 
" J. L. Mackie, Ethics. Inventing Right and Wrong, (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1977), pp. 38-42 
72 N. MacCormick, "Natural Law Reconsidered", 1 Oxford J. of Legal Studies, (1981), p. 99, at 
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subjective. Additionally, the primary goods are "all-purpose means" which 
assist in selecting the principles of justice. 75 
111.6 Finnis' theory of natural law and humanitarian intervention. His natural 
law theory is, hence, latently purposive because his ethical pandect has also a 
practical dimension. Reflection on ethics has the purpose that "...... one's 
choices, actions and whole way of life will be good, worthwhile. "76 According 
to Finnis, practicality, however debatable, does not mean the mere investigation 
into human action, but that the selection and instantiation of particular choices is 
"...... the very objective primarily envisaged as well as the subject matter about 
which I hope to be able to affirm true propositions. "77 Consequently, his natural 
law theory is "the set of principles of practical reasonableness in ordering human 
life and human community. "78 Human reason can show us the "basic values of 
human existence" or "basic forms of human good" which are objective and self- 
evident that is, non inferential. 79 He lists seven values, one of which is life. 
Those values are pre-moral and through the interface of the methodological 
requirements of practical reasonableness we achieve morality. 80 Accordingly, 
his method has affinities with the intellectual requirements for the attainment of 
human dignity in the policy framework elaborated in Chapter Three. As we shall 
see, the policy school as it is represented in international law by McDougal, 
projects in a similar manner the basic values of human dignity. These values are 
also fundamental and self-evident: they are "beyond ethics. "g' Having said this, 
the conceptual artifice employed is that the participants have also been formed 
within the value of human dignity. 82 
's J. Rawls, "The Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good", 17 Phil. and Publ. Af 
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Returning now to Finnis, moral judgement is the compagination 
(interrelationship) of methodological requirements with the basic goods. Finnis 
is confident that this procedure has the capacity of producing moral principles, 
whereas incorrect moral principles are merely faulty applications of his 
method. 83 However, because the basic values and the methodological 
requirements are generally stated, his method does not avoid the arbitrariness of 
the chosen moral principle. 
Human rights emanate from his self-evident basic values. Finnis says that one 
should not make choices between the basic goods and proceeds in saying that 
respect for the basic goods generates exceptionless human rights, with the right 
"not to have one's life taken directly as a means to any further end"84 as the most 
obvious. We are going to contemplate this right in conjunction with 
humanitarian intervention. 
Finnis' rights are confluent with his ethical and moral standing. He does not 
claim that his rights are substantially consensual85 because the requirements of 
practical reasonableness may lack consensus. However, rights are absolute 
because they generate from self-evident basic values in the sense that people 
ascribe to them as being non-inferential. Those values are experiences of one's 
nature which manifest instances of basic goods. 86 Rejecting inference from 
outside observation, the inner, esoteric meditation of basic goods makes them 
obvious. 87 Though compelling his argumentation as a methodological 
development, the conclusions one may reach by his perplexed interweaving of 
moral meanings and applications are not satisfactory. The right not to be 
deprived of life as a means to an end is such an example. Consider the case of 
humanitarian disaster caused either by physical events or instigated from the 
policies of a particular regime. Any action to alleviate that human tragedy and 
save lives may involve loss of life among the intervenors. Should people act? 
Presumably not, according to the exceptionless right to life. But the impasse is 
obvious. Intervention will be life-threatening for the intervenor but the 
83 NLNR., p. 127 
84NLNR, p. 225 
85 NLNR, p. 225 
86 NLNR, pp. 31-34 
87 NLNR, pp. 85-86 
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continuation of the situation is also life threatening for the intended recipients of 
that intervention. The unhappy conclusion is that in such circumstances morality 
condemns human beings into passivity by precluding action. A similar 
contention could be raised also against the Hartian treatment of survival as the 
"central indisputable element" in human striving. 88 The attribution of absolute 
character accentuates the individualistic motives within human beings, which 
may become self-defeating. This position was long ago repudiated by Thomas 
Aquinas when he said that the captain would be indefinitely moored at the port 
if the highest aim was the survival of the ship. 89 
This entanglement could be solved by the criterion of reasonableness but the 
discernment is difficult. From these criteria, the sixth and seventh are of 
particular interest to our case. Criterion six is that "one brings about good in the 
world (in one's own life or the lives of others) by actions that are efficient for 
their (reasonable) purpose(s)" and criterion seven is that "one should not choose 
to do any act which of itself does nothing but damage or impede a realisation or 
participation of any one or more of the basic forms of human good. "90 This is a 
rejection of consequentialism, that one should pursue an act which has 
beneficial consequences, because consequentialist reasoning is arbitrary. Thus, 
the sacrifice of life when saving many other lives is not morally correct 
according to those requirements. 
Finnis, in his endeavour to optimise human good, fell victim to an unbearable 
rigidity, capable of negating the whole structure of his values by logically 
producing adverse results. The requirement of non-consequentialism prophesies 
that under no circumstances should someone choose an act that damages 
directly one of the incommensurable values, notwithstanding that such act in its 
consequences can indirectly promote either the same value or aspects thereof. 
He rejects the insertion of personal feelings or sympathy because reason requires 
that the basic values should be respected in toto. Concerning humanitarian 
actions with human casualties, this is for Finnis an affront to the basic value of 
B8 CL, pp. 189-195 
89 Summa, Pt. I-II, q. 2, art. 5; L. L. Fuller, The Morality of Law, (New Haven, Yale University 
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90 NLNR, pp. 111,118 
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life and therefore impermissible. The consequence of saving innumerable lives 
is irrelevant to the characterisation of the act. 
What is intriguing is that he is mainly concerned with the action, although 
inaction or omission of action is equated to action in its practical and legal 
signification. In a situation of humanitarian crisis, inaction entails direct human 
loss in the same manner as action provokes it. As such, it is disrespectful to the 
incommensurable value of life and impermissible. Finnis focuses his attention 
on the plain, "naked" act and rejects consequentialism as a distinct, subsequent 
act. 91 Hence, in the first paradigm, rescuing lives (consequence) is a distinct act 
separate from the initial act of risking peoples' lives in order to save others, and 
it is this which becomes the primary act for evaluation. In the second paradigm 
though, the initial act is that of killing people following our "omission = action", 
unless someone characterises the latter as accumulative or secondary to the 
initial action which triggered the killing. Consequently, because action and 
inaction damage the value of life both are reprovable, irrespective of the 
beneficial effects the first paradigm may have. This conclusion, if true, is 
illogical. Condemnation of inaction presumes or directs towards affirmative 
action but the latter is also condemned. The question "what should be done? " is 
still unanswered. If Finnis' theory is to avoid irrelevance, he should allow our 
"feelings, sympathy and generosity" to be implicated in the articulation of the 
value of life. 
There is probably a window of hope in his discussion of ethics. We have 
characterised his ethics as practical on the assumption that there is no inference 
from facts to values but that through practical reasoning one can understand the 
objects of his inclinations. According to Finnis: 
"Reflection on practical reasoning and human action is truly empirical 
when it seeks to understand human capacities by understanding human 
acts and to understand those acts by understanding their object(ive)s. Thus 
the revealing question is the question "Why? ", 
...... 
[as] humanly and 
intelligently as "What for? " Only thus will one be able to describe one's 
actions as they really are, and oneself as the agent one really is. And only 
°1 NLNR, p. 119 
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thus will the relations between desire and understanding in the 
identification and pursuit of human goods be accurately known....... when 
one pursues the question "What for? " to the point where no further such 
question is intelligent 
...... 
one arrives at the perception (i. e. the 
understanding or intelligent discernment) of a basic form of human 
flourishing in which, not one human being on one occasion, but somehow 
all human beings in appropriate circumstances can participate". 92 
Following this dialectic, the pertinent question is "What is any humanitarian 
action for? ", why should one pursue such action? Then we arrive at one of the 
basic values of human flourishing, which is life and its protection. Yet again, the 
purposiveness of this question prompts the necessary comparisons with 
McDougal's evaluation of humanitarian actions through the sieve of promoting 
human dignity. 
A concluding remark which would also provide the link with our discussion of 
Grotius' theory is the place of God in his exposition of natural law. As Grotius 
before him, Finnis suspends the philosophical presumption of a deity which 
explicates the nature of things, distancing himself from the object of his 
reconstruction, St. Aquinas. God, instead of the initiator, is the conclusion of 
reasonable investigation. 
°2 J. Finnis, The Fundamental of Ethics, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1983), pp. 51-52 
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IV. HUGO GROTIUS' THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
IV. 1 The identification and secularisation of natural law. Grotius' contribution 
to natural law was its secularisation and also the methodological and analytical 
exposition of international law. He was acquainted with the Scholastic tradition 
and in particular with Thomas Aquinas who synthesised "nature" and "grace" 
whereby the ratio of lex aeterna as the highest law is the divine providence. 
Grotius deserted the Scholastic tradition and, influenced by natural nominalism, 
founded his natural law theory on human reason. 93 Thus, law is immutable and 
unchangeable because it is the product of man's reason and it would be so "even 
if we should concede that 
..... 
there is no God, or that the affairs of men are of no 
concern to Him. " 94 
The rejection of metaphysical explanations allowed the evolution of natural 
sciences which installed man as the dominant creature in nature. This, however, 
has procured an antithesis between nature and man as the bearer of free will. If 
natural sciences adopt a casuistic model under which rules are formations of 
observable factuality, it causes the usurpation of human will and freedom. 
Consequently, it is irreconcilable with human rational personality. Descartes 
solved the inherent antinomy between nature and reason by using geometric and 
mathematical methods of evaluation. Human reason, pronounced as the 
founding principle in Grotius' natural law, was given a mathematical aspect (res 
extensa) which assists in the identification of natural law. 
The latter is facilitated by an a priori and an a posteriori method. The first 
alludes to a deduction concerning the concordance of a rule with the rational 
nature of man. The second proceeds from a simple theorem that a universal 
effect should have a universal cause95 and infers through empirical investigation 
93 H. van Eikema Hommes, "Grotius on Natural and International Law", 30 Neth. I. L. Rev., 
(1983), p. 61, at p. 65 
°, Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli Ac Pacis libri tres, (Amsterdam 1646), trans. F. W. Kelsey, 
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the naturalness of a principle. This differentiation establishes the legal 
distinction between natural law and the law of nations (jus gentium). Only a 
priori proven principles can be true natural law principles because they are 
deducted from human reason. The a posteriori principles are not immutable 
because they belong to human will, formed by general agreement. In 
international law, the a priori method refers mainly to the inclusion of natural 
law principles whereas the a posteriori to positive law. 96 The conceptual 
confusion concerning the source of international law as residing either in natural 
law or consent or vacillating between the two97 is perpetuated by Grotius and 
evidenced in the prior writings of Vittoria and Suarez. It demarcates the 
inception of the positivistic thinking. 
Having said that, we will attempt to present Grotius' natural law theory and then 
elucidate his position in relation to humanitarian intervention either as a 
principle directly derived from his writings or inductively, from his 
philosophical disposition. 
First, it is deemed appropriate to illustrate his attitude towards jus (law). He 
proceeds in distinguishing three compartments in the notion of jus. First, jus 
means justness, that is, an attribute to facts (attributum actionis). Second, jus is a 
subjective attribution to human moral agents (qualitus moralis personae). As 
such it is subdivided into facultas or aptitude (aptitudo) which denotes to a 
perfect and imperfect jus respectively. Finally, jus signifies that which today is 
called law. 98 
Grotius does not draw any distinctive conclusion from this categorisation but 
integrates it into a system whereby the objective and subjective aspects of jus 
are founded on justice. The panorama of diverse elements interwoven into the 
concept of law could be attributed to his project of moderating and humanising 
the conduct of state affairs. Although unintentional, the significance of such 
°6 T. Tadashi, "Grotius's Concept of Law", in Onurna Yasuaki (ed. ), A Normative Approach to 
War. Peace, War, and Justice in Hugo Grotius, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1993), p. 32, at pp. 41- 
43 
97 P. E. Corbett, Law and Society in the Relations of States, (N. Y., Harcourt, Brace & Co., 
1951), pp. 21-23 
98 T. Tadashi, supra note 96, pp. 32-35 
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differentiation is not modest, because it prompted the enunciation of natural 
rights, as well as the intellectual and social developments of subsequent years. 
IV. 2 The emergence of "right" as a concept. Grotius was unable to follow the 
distinction of law and right so he treats the term "De Jure Belli" 
comprehensively as the justness of war: the right of war and the law of war. 
Hobbes made the distinction prevalent: 
"Though they that speak of this subject use to confound jus and lex, rights 
and law: yet they ought to be distinguished; because RIGHT consisteth in 
liberty to do, or to forbear: whereas LAW determineth, and bindeth to one 
of them: so that law and right differ as much, as obligation and liberty. "99 
The shift of emphasis to natural rights is of immense importance because it gave 
the impetus to the American and French Revolutions. Nevertheless, the concepts 
of right and law are not so compartmentalised. There is a necessary infusion of 
the two, a complementarity, acknowledged by Wolff. "Whenever we speak of 
natural law (jus naturae), we never intend the law of nature, but rather the right 
which belongs to man on the strength of that law, that is naturally. " 100 Such 
combination of natural law and rights is contained in the American Constitution. 
Concerning the third interpretation of jus as the modern semantic of law, 
Grotius follows Aristotle and Gaius before him in dichotomising the concept 
into natural law (jus naturae/naturalis) and volitional law (jus 
voluntarium). Volitional law is the law emanating from the will of God or man. 
It includes municipal law, the law of nations (jus gentium) and divine law. 
IV. 3 Human sociability as the basis of natural law. In order to comprehend the 
interrelation of jus gentium and natural law it is necessary to explain Grotius' 
idea of "societas humana". The societal nature and interdependence of human 
beings has been an indispensable assumption for the explication of the legal 
systems. The appetitus societatis is the ratio for natural law as it was Aristotle's 
sociability of man. Acceptance or denial of the engulfing magna societas 
°° Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, R. Tuck (ed. ), (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991), 
ch. XIV, p. 91, para. 64 
10° Ch. Wolff, Jus Gentium Methodo Scientifica Pertractatum, (1741), trans. J. H. Drake, 
Carnegie Classics, (New York, 1964), tom. I, Prol., para. 3 
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defines the process towards positivism as it is evidenced in Wolffs and Vattel's 
writings. Grotius distinguished between contractual societies and the universal 
society of mankind. Contractual societies are the product of human will, a 
moulding of social reality. The state is the highest contractual society and we 
will subsequently explain Grotius' perception of social contract. The universal 
natural community of mankind is a bond of kinship between men who have 
common descent. ' °' Grotius combines the Stoic perception of a world-wide 
community with that of Christian common descent. 102 The universal community 
of mankind embraces the inter-individual and inter-state relations in a status 
naturalis whereunder individuals and states enjoy equality in their mutual 
relations. 103 Natural law, being comprehensive, is the foundation of both civil 
and international law (jus gentium). The latter should be directed towards the 
good of all states, and this good is founded on natural law, which applies both to 
individuals and states in the societas humana. l°4 
The appetitus societatis is the axiom which generates in a society the natural law 
principles. The deduction of principles from axioms105 could be described as the 
more geometrico because it does not involve inquiry but reliance on 
ipsedixitims. The axiomatic premise of sociability becomes the basis of natural 
law because the latter, as it was presented above, contains self-evident principles 
having an a priori character. Reliance on axioms is a prevalent and recurrent 
theme in legal theory since Aristotle, who introduced human sociability. Later 
theorists such as Wolff and Vattel constructed their legal systems on the 
assumption of human social character. That assumption was considerably 
altered in later years but its axiomatic character was not made redundant and 
reappears emphatically in the policy-school as the deliberation of 
interdependence or the Critical Legal Studies' contradiction between communal 
and individual human character. 
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102 H. van Eikema Hommes, "Grotius on Natural and International Law", 30 Neth. I. L. Rev., 
(1983), p. 61, p. 64 
103 Ibid., p. 64, 
104 Ibid., p. 65 
pos Ibid., p. 67; B. P. Vermeulen, "Grotius' Methodology and System of International Law", 30 
Neth. 1. L. Rev., (1983), p. 375, 
38 
IV. 4 The social contract. Grotius' exposition of social contract theory is 
rudimentary and different from the contract theories of subsequent years. He has 
been severely criticised by other writers for offering an empirical justification of 
the actual state of affairs. Rousseau described his method of arguing as deriving 
"toujours le droit par le fait. " 106 The social contract concept is not accounted as 
an intellectual device whereby the state function is legitimised on a democratic 
basis. On the contrary, he vindicates the status quo. His social contract, by 
legitimising the existing power, is an attempt for the philosophical 
rationalisation of the status quo, 107 whereas for the contractual philosophers it is 
a means for scrutinising legislative and executive power. They employ the 
contract in order to reform and reconstruct the state whereas Grotius employed it 
in a historical context for conceptualising an existing fact. 
His static method could be compared with positivism, as the conceptual 
formulation of past experience into legal propositions, but writing in a period 
where natural law is dominant, he colours his statements with natural law 
insights. 
IV. 5 The Age of Enlightenment. Having presented the basic tenets of Grotius' 
theory of law and law of nature, we will explore the inherent intellectual 
qualities and philosophical significance which his system embodies. More 
specifically we will try to appraise his influence on the development of human 
rights and humanitarian intervention. 
The theory of natural rights emanating from natural law has been conspicuous in 
juridical and political thinking ever since the momentous events of the French 
Declaration of the Rights of Man (1789) and the American Declaration of 
Independence (1776), which signalled the advent of modernity. In this context 
we shall explore three traits in that theory: its rationalism; its individualism and 
its radicalism, including Grotius' influence. 
106 J. J. Rousseau, Du contrat social, (Paris, F. Rieder et Cie, 1914), 2e ed., livre I, ch. 11 "Des 
remieres societes", p. 122 07 "Mais Grotius, preoccupe seulement d'etablir l'obligation de l'obeissance chez les sujets, 
attribue une valeur absolue au pretentu fait du contrat social qui, comme tel, n'existe pas. 
L'hypothese du contrat na donc, dans son systeme, aucune valeur rationnelle. Elle represente 
uniquement un expedient, ou une fiction destine ä valoriser et ratifier le fait etabli". G. Del 
Vecchio, Lecons de philosophie du droit, (Sirey, Paris, 1936), p. 64 
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The French Declaration spoke of "the natural and imprescriptible Rights of 
Man". 108 whereas the American: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all 
men are created equal, that they are endowed by the Creator with certain 
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, the pursuit of 
Happiness". 109 
Radicalism is the end result of the other two traits which invigorated natural 
law. It is evidenced in the events of the 18th century and in the revival of natural 
law and human rights following the horrors of World War II. Be that as it may, 
we are going to deal more in-depth with the other two elements. 
IV. 6 Rationalism. Rationalism ascribes to human power and is one of the 
persistent ramifications of natural law theory. Its initial dormant condition was 
due to the fact that it had to be established on some other evidence. During the 
age of Enlightenment, it was sufficient by itself, it was what was said in the 
American Declaration "self-evident". Grotius' contribution was the 
emancipation of natural law from the grip of theology, its rationalisation and 
secularisation. It was the end of a tradition and Grotius appears ambivalent by 
making references also to God as another source of law. However, Grotius 
distinguishes between the grounds of the existence of natural law and the 
grounds of its knowledge. God is the creator of human creatures and therefore of 
natural law. Knowing or recognising the law of nature can be done 
independently of believing in God. Here, human ratio comes into play as the 
source of that knowledge. Therefore, natural law has legal validity per se. His 
definition of natural law is that it is a command of good reason (recta ratio) 
"which points out that an act, according as it is or is not in conformity with 
rational nature, has in it a quality of moral baseness or moral necessity, and that, 
in consequence, such an act is either forbidden or enjoined by the author of 
nature, God....... I 10 The independence of human reason from God is evident. It 
delimits God's authority by delineating the forbidden or permitted acts according 
to their consonance with good reason. 
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Having detached natural law from divine ordinance, Grotius' second 
contribution to its rationalisation is the construction of a coherent system of law. 
In this field we can trace his reformist outlook by denying historicism and by 
constructing a system based on principles rather than on facts. As noted above, 
this was not a persistent characteristic of Grotius, who living in a transitional 
period, vacillated between justifying the status quo and adopting novel 
philosophical ideas. In order to achieve this, he employs the mathematical 
method initiated by Descartes: 
"I have made it my concern to refer the proof of things touching the law 
of nature to certain fundamental conceptions which are beyond question; 
so that no one can deny them without doing violence to himself. For the 
principles of that law, if only you pay strict heed to them, are in 
themselves manifest and clear, almost as evident as are those things which 
we perceive by the external senses". l 11 
He deduces principles from axioms as the mathematicians deduce propositions 
from axioms. Consequently, his system of law is deduced from the above 
mentioned axiom of appetitus societatis. Abstraction from the facts enables 
Grotius to lay a system of universal and eternal value. 112 The emphasis on legal 
coherence and comprehensiveness initiated by Grotius which refers also to the 
procurement of general principles unattained by events became a tradition in 
legal philosophy, in particular with Kelsen's logical system. 
IV. 7 Individualism. The second aspect of modem human rights doctrine is that 
of individualism. The origins of this trait perhaps goes back to Protagoras' 
dictum that man is the measure of all things. 113 The significance of the 
individualistic trait is its transformation into a political theory which has 
disrupted the ancient social structure and induced social and political changes. 
The social contract is the configuration of individualism into a political force. 
By social contract we mean the contract for the initiation of society not the 
"' JBP, Prolegomena, para. 39, p. 23 
112 B. P. Vermeulen, supra note 105, p. 376, quoting Fruin: "He wished to place his doctrine 
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terms of governing an existing society. As such, it is connected with natural law 
and the rationalisation and secularisation of the latter. The social contract 
provides justification for the institutions which the reason of man evaluates as 
necessary. If man is rational, born free under nature, the formation of society is 
explained only through his free will implied in the social contract. 
The fact that the social contract had different interpretations and inspired diverse 
societal structures is explained by the different perceptions of human nature. The 
egotistical or benevolent nature of man conduces contrasting determinations of 
societal structure. In general, the social contract presupposes a philosophical 
rather than a theological attitude towards the state and, as Hegel said, it afforded 
"..... the overthrow of all existing and given conditions within an actual major 
state and the revision of its constitution from first principles and purely in terms 
of thought. " 114 That would be impossible if natural law had not detached itself 
from its theological grasp. In this respect, Grotius' influence is considerable in 
the drive for the secularisation of natural law, even though his rudimentary 
contract theory lacks the innovation of the contractual philosophers. 
IV. 8 Individual and humanitarian intervention. Leaving the philosophical 
exposition aside, we would like to concretise this theory by exploring the 
position of the individual in Grotius' work and in particular in De Jure Belli Ac 
Pacis libri tres. In this, Grotius argued that, in his system, the individual is 
fundamentals 15 as the ultimate unit in either national or international law. His 
legal system is not based on an anthropomorphic notion of the state but on the 
fact that "states are composed of individual human beings. "' 16 The analogy 
between states and individuals is attributed by Sir Hersch Lauterpacht to the 
patrimonial character of the European States at the time of Grotius and the 
"realisation of the true nature of rules of international law as addressing 
114 G. W. F. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, para. 258, in A. W. Wood (ed), 
Elements of the Philosophy of Right, trans. H. B. Nisbet, (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1991), p. 277 
"s "The law of nature as conceived by Grotius (based on the 'rational and social human nature') 
can thus serve as the basis of a true universal order embracing all human relations and binding 
each man in whatever capacity he is acting". P. P. Remec, The Position of the Individual in 
International Law According to Grotius and Vattel, (The Hague, M. Nijhoff, 1960), p. 239 
116 H. Lauterpacht, "The Grotian Tradition in International Law", 23 B. Y. B. I. L., (1946), p. 1, at 
p. 27 
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themselves to individual human beings acting on behalf of the state. "' 17 Again 
Grotius does not reach the end of the web in his philosophy of individualism 
which would be the legal emancipation of the individual. Throughout his work, 
he is both idealistic and realistic, making illuminating insights, yet on the other 
hand, minimising the political repercussions. 
He is reluctant to approve any general right of resistance. The qualification he 
attaches, though, is of immense importance. According to Grotius, there is a 
right of resistance when a ruler "shows himself the enemy of the whole 
people. "' 18 This is coupled with asserting the permissibility of just war pursued 
by a foreign sovereign in the circumstance that "a ruler inflict[s] upon his 
subjects such treatment as no one is warranted in inflicting, the exercise of the 
right vested in human society is not precluded. " 119 If we read these statements in 
conjunction, humanitarian intervention, according to Grotius, appears realistic 
and coherent. The instances of internal resistance and external interposition 
involving maltreatment of citizens are identical and Grotius is consistent in 
permitting both. 
One could also deduct a doctrine of humanitarian intervention from the 
responsibility Grotius attaches to humankind. Grotius used the concept of war as 
an instrument for punishment, what Van Vollenhoven calls the "Grotius' 
theorem". 120 If a state commits a crime, it makes itself inferior to any other 
nation, not only to the recipient of the injury. Any nation which in this sense 
represents the whole society of mankind is authorised individually or 
collectively to punish the culprit. The maltreatment of people is such a crime 
and intervention by one or more states appears to be the punishment. 
A third extrapolation from Grotius' work supporting humanitarian intervention 
is his obsession with peace. He negated any general right to rebellion in the 
pursuit of his wider plan for order and tranquillity because such actions are 
disruptive. Consequently, he also sanctions actions by princes against threats to 
"' Ibid., p. 29 
18 JBP, Bk. I, ch. IV, para. xi, p. 157 
119 JBP, Bk. II, ch. XXV, para. viii, p. 587 
120 C. Van Vollenhoven, Grotius and Geneva, Bibliotheca Visserianum, VI, (Leyden, 1926), 
p. 13, at p. 21; P. H. Kooijmans, "How to Handle the Grotian Heritage: Grotius and Van 
Vollenhoven", 30 Neth. I L. Rev., (1983), p. 81 
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public order. Grotius defends the bellum publicum solemne in order to prevent 
the extension of war. ' 21 War for him is "undertaken in order to secure peace". 1 22 
Transmuting those notions into modern-day significance, abuses of human 
rights are considered threats to international peace and security and therefore 
could be met with measures under Chapter VII, the collective security system. 
To surmise, we can discern three arguments from Grotius' work which support 
humanitarian actions: (i) the dominant position of the individual in his thesis; 
(ii) a cosmopolitan argument of societas humana whereunder the whole of 
humanity, abhorred by the maltreatment of subjects within a domestic 
jurisdiction, interposes with the aim of restoring the forfeited standard of 
humanity; and (iii) an argument of world order concerning the maintenance of 
peace. 
V. MODERN JUSTIFICATION OF HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION ON GROTIAN PREMISES 
V. 1 Intervention from religious solidarity. Since Grotius, humanitarian 
intervention has followed the same doctrinal and practical pattern. It would be 
appropriate now to demonstrate its modem signification. The first and second 
arguments which show interconnectedness are contemplated concurrently, 
whereas the third argument, that is of preserving peace, follows because it has 
acquired momentum only recently. 
At the beginning, it should be stated that intervention was initially triggered 
from religious solidarity, whereby human considerations were assimilated to 
religious ones. The religious character of humanitarian intervention was 
prominent in a period when ethnicity was an inconspicuous political force. Faith 
was both the unitary principle beyond the local jurisdiction and the distinctive 
feature among nations. The Crusades could be regarded in this sense as the 
precursors of humanitarian interventions. In Vindicae Contra Tyrannos, the 
'Z' JBP, Bk. III, ch. IV, para. iv, p. 644 
122 JBP, Bk. I. ch. I, para., p. 33 
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author, writing in the 16th century, justifies intervention "...... in behalf of 
neighbouring peoples who are oppressed on account of adherence to the true 
religion, or by any obvious tyranny", ' 23 defending the unity of Christianity and 
the unity of humanity. During the 19th century, most interventions by the Great 
Powers in the Ottoman Empire were concerned with the plight of the Christian 
populations. ' 24 These interventions, provoked by exigent humanitarian 
considerations, put an end to the savageries and carnage carried out by the 
Turkish authorities. They share in common the religious affiliation between the 
intervening powers and the persecuted populations. Probably the most 
frequently cited case was the intervention of France, Great Britain and Russia in 
Greece (1827-1830) which culminated in Greek independence. The three 
European Powers and the Sublime Porte signed the Treaty of London on July 6, 
1927 which aimed primarily at the protection of Greeks but was dishonoured by 
Turkey thus prompting their intervention. 125 In 1860 France was delegated the 
task of intervening in Syria to protect the Maronite Christians from being 
massacred by the Turks. 126 That intervention was effectuated by the Protocol of 
Paris (1860) which contemplated "l'amelioration du soit des populations 
123 W. A. Dunning, A History of Political Theories: From Luther to Montesquieu, (N. Y., 
Macmillan, 1931), p. 55-56: "And as the doctrine of popular sovereignty is the outcome of the 
one undertaking, so an enlightened view of international solidarity is strongly presented in the 
other". The Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos was published under the pseudonym of Stephanus Julius 
Brutus and written probably by either Hubert Languet or Duplessis 
- 
Mornay. Ibid., p. 47 
124 M. Ganji, International Protection of Human Rights, (Geneva, Librairie E. Droz, 1962), ch. 1, 
pp. 9-45; J-P. L. Fonteyne, "The Customary International Law Doctrine of Humanitarian 
Intervention: Its Current Validity Under the U. N. Charter", 4 Cal. W. I. L. J., (1974), p. 203; T. E. 
Behuniak, "The Law of Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention by Armed Force: A Legal 
Survey", 79 Mil. L. Rev., (1978), p. 157, in part. pp. 157-171 
125 Treaty between Great Britain, France, and Russia, for the Pacification of Greece. 
- 
Signed 
at London, July 6,1927. The three powers were urged: "..... no less by sentiments of 
humanity, than by interests for the tranquillity of Europe". 14 British and Foreign State 
Papers, (1826-27), p. 632, at p. 633. Under Article V of the same Treaty, they declared that 
they "..... will not seek, 
....., 
any augmentation of Territory, any exclusive influence, or any 
commercial advantage for their subjects, 
..... 
". Ibid., p. 636. Turkey emphasised that: 
..... I'affaire Grecque est une affaire interne de la Sublime Porte, et que c'est ä eile seule ä s'en 
occuper; que desormais aucune Puissance ne doit plus se meler de cette affaire......... 
Manifesto of the Sublime Porte, declining the Pacification with the Greeks, proposed by the 
Mediating Powers. 
-9th June, 1827., 14 British & For. St. Pap., (1826-27), p. 1042, at p. 1043. 
See also the Proclamation of the Ottoman Porte, declining the Mediation of the Allied 
Powers, and the Proposed Armistice with the Greeks. 
-20th December, 1827., Ibid., p. 1052 126 See conflicting views concerning the nature of the incident between I. Brownlie, 
International Law and the Use of Force by States, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1963), p. 340 (in 
favour) and T. M. Franck and N. S. Rodley, "After Bangladesh: The Law Humanitarian 
Intervention by Military Force", 67 A. J. I. L., (1973), p. 275, at pp. 281-283 (against). I. Pogany. 
"Humanitarian Intervention in International Law: The French Intervention in Syria 
Reexamined", 35 I. C. L. Q., (1986), p. 182 
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chretiennes de tout rite dans l'Empire Ottoman. " 127 The European intervention in 
Bosnia, Herzegovina and Bulgaria (1876-1878) was provoked by the harsh 
treatment of Christians. The Porte rejected the establishment of an International 
Commission whose mandate was to supervise the amelioration of conditions for 
the Christian population. 128 The Concert of Europe then signed the London 
Protocol (March 31,1877) according to which Turkey should have adopted the 
necessary administrative measures for the protection of Christians, while the 
Concert retained its right to take any action should Turkey fail to retain the 
minimum standards. 129 Turkey rejected the provisions of the Protocol "en sa 
qualite d'Etat independant". ' 30 This situation was terminated with the 
declaration of war against Turkey by Russia which was sanctioned as aiming "ä 
mettre un terme a la deplorable situation des Chretiennes sous la domination des 
127 A. Rougier, "La theorie de l'intervention d' humanite", 17 R. G. D. I. P., (1910), p. 468, at p. 474 
note 2; Protocol of a Conference held at Paris, August 3,1860: "..... les Puissances 
Contractantes n'entendent poursuivre ni ne poursuivront dans 1'execution de leurs engagements, 
aucun avantage territorial, aucune influence exclusive, ni aucune concession touchant le 
commerce de leurs sujets, et qui ne pourrait etre accorde aux. Sujets de toutes les autres nations". 
51 British & For. St. Pap., (1860-61), p. 279 
128 General Treaty between Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia, and 
Turkey, for the Re-establishment of Peace. 
-Signed at Paris, March 30,1856. In Article VII, it 
guaranteed the independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. 46 British & 
For. St. Pap., (1855-56), p. 8, at p. 12. In Article IX, it made provision for certain fundamental 
civil and political rights for the benefit of the Christians which would be realised by Firman. 
It also attached the non-intervention principle on the implementation in "good faith" of the 
firman. See Firman and Hatti-Sherif by the Sultan, relative to Privileges and Reforms in 
Turkey. 
-February, 1856.47 British & For. St. Pap., (1856-57), pp. 1363-1369. Due to 
Turkey's disregard of her obligations, the Russian Government communicated to the British 
that: "We seem therfore to have an undoubted right formally to intimate to the Porte that we 
shall not hold ourselves bound to abstain from interference till the reforms promised by the 
Hatt Houmayoun are fully carried out". Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby 
- 
(Recd. Nov. 4, 
1876). He recorded his conversation with the Russian General Ignatiew. 67 British & 
For. St. Pap., (1875-1876), p. 289, at p. 290. Pursuant to this, a Conference in Constantinople 
was held between December 1876 and January 1877 which provided for the establishment of 
the International Commission. Protocols of Conferences between Great Britain, Austria- 
Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, and Turkey, respecting the Affairs of Turkey. 
(Servia; Montenegro; Bulgaria; Bosnia; Herzegovina; Reforms, & c. ). 
-Constantinople, 
December 1876-January 1877.68 British & For. St. Pap., (1876-77), pp. 1114-1207 
129 
"...., d'affirmer de nouveau ensemble l'interet commun qu'elles prennent ä l'amelioaration 
du sort des populations Chretiennes de la Turquie...... ". Protocol of Conference between the 
Plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, Austria, France, Germany, Italy and Russia, relative to the 
Affairs of Turkey. (Christian Population, Reforms in Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Bulgaria. Serbia. 
Montenegro, & c) 
- 
Signed at London, March 31,1877.68 British and Foreign State Papers, 
(1876-77), p. 823 
"o 
"La Turquie, en sa qualite d'Etat independant, ne saurait se reconnaitre comme placee sous 
aucune surveillance, collective ou non". Turkish Note, in reply to the Protocol relative to the 
Affairs of Turkey, signed at London, March 31,1877 
- 
Constantinople, April 9,1877.68 British 
& For. St. Pap., (1876-77), p. 826, at p. 831 
46 
Turcs et aux crises permanentes qu'elle provoque. " 131 The Russian government, 
in a communication to the Turkish before the commencement of war, said: "His 
Imperial Majesty does not want war 
..... 
but is determined not to hesitate as long 
as the principles that have been recognised as equitable, human, necessary by 
the whole of Europe 
..... 
have not received full execution in effective 
guarantee". 132 Another instance is that of Macedonia (1903-1908,1912-1913). 
In this case, Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia took action to terminate the 
programme of Turkification of the Christian population. In a "Note Verbale" to 
the British Government, Greece explained that the three Governments "..... ne 
pouvant plus tolerer les souffrances de leurs congerieres en Turquie". ' 33 
Consequently, these interventions attach primacy to their humanitarian motives 
but are also explicit in their religious pre-emption. They presume connotations 
of civilised and non-civilised standards whereby intervention in the affairs of so 
called uncivilised nations such as Turkey is justified. 134 
V. 2 Humanity's reaction and the protection of individuals. Having dealt with 
this type of intervention with mixed motives, we should now consider those 
interventions provoked merely by humanistic considerations for the plight of 
individuals. To put it in another way, we will now be concerned with humanity's 
reaction to savage acts. The pertinent actions consolidate Grotius' natural law 
arguments concerning individuals and the conscience of human society. 
Contemplating the case of war for the subjects of another ruler Grotius said: 
"This too is a matter of controversy, whether there may be a just cause for 
undertaking war on behalf of the subjects of another ruler, in order to 
protect them from wrong at his hands. Now it is certain that, from the time 
when political associations were formed, each of their rulers has sought to 
131 A. Rougier, supra note 127, p. 475, note 6 
' 32 The Note of the Russian Government was sent on November 13,1876.47 British and 
Foreign States Papers, (1856-57), p. 321 in Fonteyne, supra, note 124, pp. 208-212 
"' 106 British and Foreign State Papers, (1913), pp. 1059-60 
", "..... 1' intervention des puissances civilisee est legitime en principe, quand la population 
chretienne de ces pays est exposee ä des persecutions ou ä des massacres. Dans ces 
circonstances, elle est justifiee par la communaute des interets religieux et par des considerations 
d 'humanite, c'est-ä-dire par les principes du droit naturel d'apres lesquels les Etats civilises se 
dirigent generalement dans leurs relations aver les Etats barbares". (italics added). F. De 
Martens, Traue de droit international, t. 1, traduit du Russe par A. Leo, (Paris, Librairie Marescq 
Aine, 1883), p. 398 
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assert some particular right over his own subjects...... In conformity to 
this principle Constantine took up arms against Maxentius and Licinius, 
and other Roman emperors either took up arms against the Persians or 
threatened to do so unless these should check their persecutions of the 
Christians on account of religion. "135 
Vattel, the theoretical founder of sovereignty, recognises a right to intervention 
on the above pattern of Grotius. "If a prince, attacking the fundamental laws, 
gives his people a legitimate reason to resist him, if tyranny becomes so 
unbearable as to cause the Nation to rise, any foreign power is entitled to help 
an oppressed people that has requested its assistance. "36 The concept of 
intervention on grounds of humanity was crystallised during the 19th century. 
At that time, the emerging prevalence of the state in international relations, 
engendered also the opposite view, which negates any such right. However, 
those who defend such interventionist actions continue the Grotian tradition. 
The proponents of humanitarian action have ingrained their reasoning into 
natural law theory as it was interpreted by Grotius. They follow his tradition by 
recognising individual rights which the state cannot arbitrarily abuse and also 
regard the community of states as guardians of this minimum requirement of 
humanity when the threshold is crossed. They argue against the state which was 
sovereign, dominant and autonomous. Humanitarian intervention as an assault 
on sovereignty could only be legitimised if it is integrated in the wider theory of 
natural law. The arguments of individualism and human solidarity, part and 
parcel of natural law, can explain humanitarian actions. They proffer the 
medium for integrating humanitarian intervention into natural law. The friction 
between sovereignty and humanitarian precepts is conceded by Arntz who shifts 
the emphasis onto the latter: 
"When a government, even acting within the limits of its rights of 
sovereignty, violates the rights of humanity, either by measures contrary 
"S JBP, Bk. II, ch. XXV, para. viii (2), p. 584 
'36 E. de Vattel, Le Droit des Gens ou Principes de la loi naturelle", The Classics of 
International Law, J. B. Scott (ed), (Washington, Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1916), 
livre II, ch. iv, para. 56, p. 298: "Mais si le Prince, attaquant les lois fondamentales, donne ä son 
peuple un legitime sujet de lui resister; si la Tyrannie devenue insupportable, souleve la Nation; 
toute Puissance etangere est en droit de secourir un peuple opprime, qui lui demande son 
assistance" 
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to the interests of other states, or by excessive injustice or brutality which 
seriously injure our morals and civilisation, the right of intervention is 
legitimate. For, however worthy of respect the rights of sovereignty and 
independence of states may be, there is something even more worthy of 
respect; namely the law of humanity, or of human society that must not be 
violated. In the same way as within the state freedom of the individual is 
and must be restricted by the law and the morals of society, the individual 
freedom of the states must be limited by the law of human society. " 137 
In the same spirit, Rougier identifies humanitarian intervention as the control a 
state exercises "au nom de la Societe des nations" over the internal sovereign 
acts of another which are "contraire aux Lois de Phumanite". 138 Other writers 
such as Oppenheim, 139 Wheaton, 140 and Bluntschli, 141 are identified with the 
same reasoning. 
The American action in Cuba (1898) which assisted in its independence resorted 
to the same line of argumentation. ' 42 In response to the atrocities committed 
there, the American Congress prompted a resolution on 20 April 1898 in which 
it was stated that "The abhorrent conditions 
...... 
have shocked the moral sense of 
the people of the United States. "143 President McKinley prior to the intervention 
stated: "If it shall hereafter appear to be a duty imposed by ourselves, to 
civilisation and humanity to intervene with force, it shall be without fault on our 
137 Lettre de M. Arntz A M. Rolin-Jacquemyns, "Note sur la theorie du droit d'intervention", 8 
Rev. Dr. Int'1 & Legisl. Comp., (1876), p. 673, at p. 675. The translation in Fonteyne, supra note 
124, p. 220 
138 A. Rougier, supra note 127, p. 472 
39 " when a state renders itself guilty of such cruelties against and persecution of its 
nationals in such a way as to deny their fundamental human rights and to shock the conscience 
of mankind, intervention in the interest of humanity is legally permissible". L. Oppenheim, 
International Law: A Treatise, H. Lauterpacht (ed. ), vol. I, "Peace", 7th ed., (London, Longmans, 
Greens & Co., 1948), p. 280, para. 137 
Sao H. Wheaton, Elements of International Law, 8th ed., (Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1866), 
p. 95, para. 69: "The interference of the Christian powers of Europe in favour of the Greeks 
...... 
affords a further illustration of the principles of international law authorising such an 
interference 
..... 
where the general interests of humanity are infringed by the excesses of a 
barbarous and despotic government". 
141 J. C. Bluntschli, Le droit international codifie, trans. M. C. Lardy, 4eme ed., (Paris, Librairie 
Guillaumin et Cie, 1886), p. 281, art. 478: "On sera autorise ä intervenir pour faire respecter les 
droits individuels reconnus necessaires, ansi que les principes generaux du droit international.. 
. 
142 D. S. Bogen, "The Law of Humanitarian Intervention: United States Policy in Cuba (1898) 
and in the Dominican Republic (1965)", 7 Harv. 1. L. Club 1, (1966), p. 296 
143 E. C. Stowell, Intervention in International Law, (Washington, Byrne, 1921), p. 122 
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part and only because the necessity of such action will be so clear as to 
command the support and approval of the civilised world. "1`4 The American 
action according to the Resolution authorising it appears to be initiated purely 
by altruistic motives: "The United States hereby disclaims any disposition or 
intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island, except 
for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination when that is 
accomplished to leave the government and control of the island to its people. " 145 
The notion of humanity and the interposition of foreign states in order to restore 
those principles within a state is supported in the writings of Basdevant146 and 
Borchard147 just before World War II. H. Hodges appears visionary when he 
says that: 
"As the feeling of general interest in humanity increases, and with it a 
world 
- 
wide desire for something approaching justice and an international 
solidarity, interventions undertaken in the interests of humanity will also 
doubtless increase. 
...... 
We may therefore conclude that future public 
opinion and finally international law will sanction an ever increasing 
number of causes for intervention for the sake of humanity. " 48 
The British Chief Prosecutor in the Nuremberg Trials, Sir Hartley Shawcross, 
witnessed his sympathy towards humanitarian actions: "The right of 
humanitarian intervention in the name of the Rights of Man, trampled upon by 
the state in a manner offensive to the feeling of Humanity, has been recognised 
long ago as an integral part of the Law of Nations. "149 
144 For. Rel. U. S (1898), p. 759 
145 T. Behuniak, supra note 124, p. 163 
146 
L'Etat 
..... 
qui ne remplit par sa fonction de justice meme ä 1'egard de ses nationaux, perd 
son droit au respect et les autres puissences sont, 
..... 
autorisees ä substituer leur action ä la 
sienne". J. Basdevant, "Chronique des faits internationaux", 11 R. G. D. I. P, (1904), p. 105, at 
110 
°' "...... where a state under exceptional circumstances disregards certain rights of its own 
citizens, over whom presumably it has absolute sovereignty, the other states of the family of 
nations are authorised by international law to intervene on grounds of humanity". E. Borchard, 
The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad, (N. Y., The Banks Law Pub. Co., 1915), p. 14 
148 H. G. A. Hodges, The Doctrine of Intervention, (Princeton, The Banner Press, 1915), p. 91 
149 Speeches of the Chief Prosecutors at the close of the case against the individual defendants, 
(Cmd 6964), p. 63; L. Le Fur, Intervention pour cause d'humanite, (Paris, Pedone, 1935), p. 38: 
"L'intervention, a pour but d'assurer aux individus qui en sont injustement prives, les libertes 
considerees aujourd'hui comme essentielles chez les peuples civilises: liberte individuelle, 
liberte religieuse, droit d'usage de la langue maternelle. C'est ä dire que l'oppression dont ils 
50 
In a nutshell, this right of intervention is based on the "theorie du droit humain 
et du pouvoir-fonction" according to Rougier. ' 50 The people live in a triple 
social organisation: national; international and in "societe humaine" which is 
more profound and is regulated by the "droit humain". Therefore, a political 
society should satisfy, beyond the national and international interests of its 
members, those which are universal and comprise of all the human activities: 
physical, moral and social. Human solidarity determines the "droit humain" and 
can be summarised in the "droit a la vie"; "droit a la liberte"; "droit ä la 
legalite". If there exists a certain "detournement de souverainte", governments 
possess the power "pouvoir-ministere ou pouvoir-fonction" to intervene in order 
to substitute this sovereignty. 151 
V. 3 Peace and Human Rights. The third trait in Grotius' extrapolation of 
humanitarian intervention is that of preserving peace. He sanctions war against a 
recalcitrant member of the international community in order to limit its 
repercussions and preserve peace. In modern terminology it would be 
interpreted as the prominent objective of maintaining international peace and 
security envisaged in the U. N. Charter. Thus, according to contemporary 
construction, violations of human rights in a country could threaten international 
peace and security. In this instance, collective action to preserve peace is 
justified as institutionalised reaction under Chapter VII of the U. N. Charter. As a 
preliminary observation, we should emphasise the fact that the lack of precision 
in what constitutes a "threat to international peace and security" allows a certain 
souffrent est en general imputable ä l'Etat meme dont ils sont ressortissants et que l'intervention 
emanera donc d'Etats tiers...... Rejeter en principe l'intervention, serait une prime accordee ä la 
violence et toute securite assuree ä l'injustice". E. Aroneanu, "L'intervention d'humanite et la 
declaration universelle des droits de l'homme", 33 Rev. Dr. Int'1 Sc. Dipl. & Pol., (1955), p. 126 
ISO A. Rougier, supra note 127, pp. 489-497 
S' A. Pillet, "Le droit international public: ses elements constitutifs, son domaine, son 
object", 1 R. G. D. I. P., (1894), p. 1, at p. 13: "Il existe un droit veritable en dehors des societes 
nationales et de leurs institutions jurisdiques, en dehors et au dessus de la societe 
internationale et du droit qui lui correspond, droit inseparable de 1'homme et qui merite bien 
le nom de droit commun de l'humanite..... 
...... 
un droit dont 1'observation puisse etre 
reclamee de chacun Etat ou individu, et imposee ä chacun, 
..... 
" 
. 
"Les divers groupes, Etat, 
communaute internationale ont quelque chose d'artificiel et de voulu: le bien de 1'homme est 
leur dernier objet". Ibid, p. 19. "Si la volonte et la force lui manquent, d'autres, de simple 
tiers, les rempliront ä sa place dans les limites de leur interet". Ibid, p. 26; 
51 
discretion to the Security Council in delivering its function. ' 52 The Security 
Council's recent practice indicates that it will not shy away and there are 
precedents in this demand for international order. This was the first time that 
humanitarian concerns were invoked along with wider concerns for the stability 
and security of Europe. The doctrinal substance of this position was elucidated 
by Fiore in the last century but is still applicable: 
"La violation du droit international peut etre aussi la consequence de faits 
qui s'accomplissent a 1'interieur d'un Etat, et qui ont pour resultat la 
violation directe du droit international...... Le laisser-faire et l'indifference 
des autres Etats constitueraient une politique egoiste, et contraire aux 
droits des tous, car celui qui viole le droit international au detriment de 
qui que ce soit, le viole au prejudice non seulement de celui qui est atteint 
directement, mais a l' encontre de tous les Etats civilises. " 153 
The intervention of the Great Powers in the Greek Revolution was dictated "..... 
no less by sentiments of humanity than by the interest for tranquillity in 
Europe. "154 The intervention in Bosnia, Herzegovina (1876-78) also invoked 
"les interets de la paix generale. " 155 Making a leap forward, the assimilation of 
human rights violations and threats to the peace was effectuated with the 
imposition of sanctions on South Rhodesia in 1968156 and the imposition of an 
arms embargo on South Africa in 1977.157 A more recent demonstration of this 
1sx G. Gaja, "Reflexions sur le role du Conseil de Securite dans le nouvel ordre mondial", 97 
R. G. D. I. P., (1993), p. 297, at pp. 302; P-M. Dupuy, "Securite collective et organisation de la 
raix", ibid, p. 617 
s3 "Il est, en effet, une chose indubitable, qu'une societe ne pouvant etre imagine en l'absence 
de lois, l'observation de lois naturelles de la societe des Etats est une chose d'un interet si capital 
pour la tranquillite de tous, que s'il etait permis ä Fun d'eux de les violer impunement, et que les 
autres fussent obliges de rester indifferents ä cette violation, sans avoir le droit d'y mettre 
obstacle, la societe des Etats ne pourrait pas subsister". P. Fiore, Nouveau Droit International 
Public, trad. par Charles Antoine, vol. I, (Paris, A. Durand et Pedone-Lauriel, 1885), 
ýaras. 596,600, pp. 521,522,524 S4 Treaty between Great Britain, France, and Russia, for the Pacification of Greece, (6 July 
1827), 14 British and Foreign State Papers, (1827), p. 632, at p. 633 iss See London Protocol (31/3/1877), 68 British & For. St. Pap., (1876-77), p. 823, at p. 824: " 
Si leur (contracting states) espoir se trouvait encore une fois decu et si la condition des sujets 
Chretiens du Sultan n'etait pas amelioree 
..... 
elles se reservent d'aviser en commun aux 
moyens quelles jugeront le plus propres ä assurer le bien-etre des populations Chretiennes et 
les interets de la paix generale". 
'56 S. C. Res. 253,23 U. N. SCOR, Res and Doc., at 5 (1968); M. S. McDougal, W. M. Reisman, 
"Rhodesia and the United Nations: the Lawfulness of International Concern", 62 A. J. I. L., 
(1968), p. 1 
157 S. C. Res. 418,32 U. N. SCOR, Res. and Doc., 5 (1977) 
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attitude is Resolution 688 of 1991 responding to the Iraqi abuses against the 
Kurds. 158 This resolution is regarded as the first time that the Security Council 
"stated a clear and explicit linkage between human rights violations materially 
within a state (although there were indeed international repercussions) and a 
threat to international security". 159 It is on the basis of this resolution that 
Western powers have created safe havens in Northern Iraq. 
Another such action is Resolution 794 of 1992 concerning Somalia. ' 60 This 
resolution is different from the previous one because it confines itself solely to 
internal human rights violations without international repercussions as a threat 
to international peace, whereas the former resolution was less explicit on that 
issue. Resolution 794 said: "the magnitude of the humanitarian tragedy caused 
by the conflict in Somalia, further exacerbated by the obstacles being created to 
the distribution of humanitarian assistance, constitutes a threat to international 
peace and security". In such circumstances and "in order to restore peace, 
stability and law and order with a view to facilitating the process of a political 
settlement under the auspices of the U. N., aimed at national reconciliation of 
Somalia..... ", it authorised the Secretary-General and co-operating member 
states to "use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure 
environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia". This resolution 
expresses concern for the internal order in a state, 161 and acknowledges that 
massive human rights violations, even strictly confined within a state, can cause 
a threat to the peace. 
' S. C. Res. 688, U. N. Doc. S/RES/688 (1991), reprinted in 30 I. L. M, (1991), p. 858: "The 
Security Council, Mindful of its duties and its responsibilities under the Charter of the United 
Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security, 1. Condemns the repression of 
the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish populated 
areas, the consequences of which threaten international peace and security in the region; 2. 
Demands that Iraq, as a contribution to removing the treat to international peace and security in 
the region, immediately end this repression...... ". 
159 K. K. Pearse, D. P. Forsythe, "Human Rights, Humanitarian Intervention, and World Politics", 
15 Hum. Rts Q., (1993), p. 290, at p. 303; J. Delbrück, "A Fresh Look at Humanitarian 
Intervention under the Authority of the United Nations", 67 Indiana L. J., (1992), p. 880; R. B. 
Lillich, "Humanitarian Intervention through the United Nations: Towards the Development of 
Criteria", 53 ZaÖRV, (1993), p. 557 
160 S. C. Res. 794, U. N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3145th mtg., at 3, U. N. Doc. S/RES/794 (1992) 
161 See U. S. Permanent Representative to the Security Council: "the international community is 
also taking an important step in developing a strategy for dealing with the potential disorder and 
conflicts of the post 
- 
Cold War world". U. N. Doc. S/PV. 3145, p. 36, (Dec. 3,1992) 
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It should be maintained at this point that a more comprehensive evaluation of 
the Somali case will be pursued later. ' 62 However, this incident is included in 
this section because it is considered as an important indication of the 
interconnectedness of peace with the internal respect for human rights. Having 
presented this aspect of the case, its legal character or its trials and tribulations 
will be evaluated later. 
V. 4 Evaluation of Grotius' contribution and its modern relevance. Grotius' 
contribution to international theory is ineluctable and lasting because it is not 
confined merely to those traits we presented above which formulated the human 
rights heritage. Of equal importance is his spirit that is, the intellectual 
concretisation of an emerging world. We often speak of the Grotian moment, the 
Grotian tradition or the Grotian quest. 163 In our own age of transition the 
similarities with Grotius' world are large. Grotius explored the shadowland. He 
perceived with enlightenment the world emerging on the horizon. He 
systematised it using his legal and intellectual capabilities and offered his 
contemporaries what they were striving for. This explains why Grotius' work is 
idealistic and conservative at the same time. He was caught in a transitional 
period of human history and tried to combine the emerging principles, the 
shadowland, with the established ones. That exercise is not always successful 
but it does not lack intellectual quality. The world of Grotius was transforming 
from a medieval to a modem society with the emergence of the state. The world 
society was compartmentalised into state units. In our time, things are travelling 
in the opposite direction. The state is on the defensive, having run its full circle 
of development and having discarded the fabricated understanding that it is a 
panacea. On the contrary, statism is viewed with suspicion for the numerous 
deprivations it has caused. The development of human rights law was of 
immense importance in facilitating the passage to a world community. The U. N. 
Charter is caught in the middle of all this by putting emphasis both on state 
X62 See Chapter Five and Eight 
163 H. Lauterpacht, "The Grotian Tradition in International Law", 23 B. Y. B. I. L., (1946), p. 1; 
R. A. Falk, "The Grotian Quest", in R. A. Fallt, F. Kratoschwill, S. H. Mendlovitz (eds. ), 
International Law. A Contemporary Perspective, (Boulder, Westview Press, 1985), p. 36; R. J. 
Vincent, "Grotius, Human Rights, and Intervention", in H. Bull, B. Kingsbury, A. Roberts 
(eds. ), Hugo Grotius and International Relations, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992), p. 241 
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insights and on human rights, though the balance has long rested in favour of the 
first. If we see human beings tout court and not as citizens submerged in a local 
authority, if we consider state action and evaluate its prominence in the field of 
protecting human beings from cruelty, then from the shadowland of the 
contemporary world we could extrapolate the rules which correspond to the 
future, to the horizon. The denial of humanitarian intervention is due rather to 
intellectual timidity, for, though we can see the horizon, the cast of tradition is 
deeply inherent in us. We acknowledge that the burden of the present order is 
heavy but also we deny the new order which is synthesised in the shadowland to 
enlighten our present order. Grotius was the man who discerned the new and 
structured a system based on the continuity of the old and the potency of the 
new. 
VI. THE CONTRACTUAL JUSTIFICATION OF HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION: JOHN RAWLS'S "A THEORY OF JUSTICE" 
VI. 1 An outline of Rawls 's Theory of Justice 
- 
the principles of Justice. In the 
preceding sections we have adumbrated the influence that natural law thinking 
has exerted on the development of humanitarian intervention. The crucial tenet 
in the different articulations of naturalist thinking is that there exist certain 
inalienable rights, the "droit humain", which are not conceded when people 
form societies. The centrifugal dynamics of the societal structure and of these 
rights is accommodated and stabilised by a hypothetical device, the social 
contract. In international law, these rights should be satisfied before the 
contingent interests of the particular political formations. The emergent 
association of different groups now is auto-regulated. Thus, in the absence of 
hierarchy, it is states which re-establish the essentials of this association, 
individually or collectively. Humanitarian intervention has been justified hence, 
as a restoration of the traits of humanity or of peace and order. ' 64 
164 A more explicit reference to the notion of an existent contract between states to afford the 
protection of natural law to people within their respective territories is a Report drawn up by the 
League of Nations in 1926. Accordingly: "Some rights are not rights created by states for the 
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One of the modem contractual philosophers is Rawls with his seminal book A 
Theory of Justice. '65 He elaborated a theory of justice in the tradition of natural 
law philosophers who based their theory on the equality of human beings as 
rational entities. As mentioned above, it was with Grotius that rationalism 
became the ineluctable trait in natural law. The social contract was used as a 
rhetorical device which would eventually justify the authority, obligation and 
expectations of law in an era of secularisation and disapprobation of a 
purposive, universal law. The correlation between Rawls's theory and natural 
law resides, consequently, on a general supposition that questions and ideas 
about justice are prominent within considerations concerning social living, 
individual and collective claims, social peace and distribution of goods. Justice 
is for Rawls "the first virtue of social institutions" 166 and thus it is not merely an 
attribution but an exploration or deduction from good reason. His principles of 
justice for the structure of society are those that "free and rational persons 
concerned to further their own interests would accept in an initial position of 
equality as defining the fundamental terms of their association. "' 67 The initial 
position of equality, in the allusion of contract theories, is that of the original 
position where participants choose the principles of justice under their veil of 
ignorance, that is, ignorant of their special circumstances. 168 Rationality is an 
essential component of the original position which assists together with the veil 
of ignorance, the circumstances of justice169 and the formal constraints on the 
concept of right170 in formulating the principles of justice. Rationality assists the 
benefit of their nationals or for foreigners, namely the right to life, the right to liberty and the 
right to own property. The community has simply recognised the existence of these rights. 
States have mutually undertaken to ensure the possibility of enjoying them....... Before these 
rights nationality sinks into the background, because they belong to the man as a human being 
and are not, accordingly subordinate to the will of the State". Report of the Subcommittee of the 
League of Nations Committee of Experts for the Progressive Codification of International Law 
on "Responsibility of States for Damages Done in their Territories to Person or Property of 
Foreigners", 20 A. J. I. L., (1926), Sp. Suppl., p. 177, at p. 182 
161 J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, (Cambridge Mass., Harvard University Press, 1971), 
hereinafter cited as TJ 
166TJ, p. 3 
167 ibid., p. 11 
168 Ti, p. 12 
169 Ti, pp. 126-130 
170 Ti, pp. 130-136 
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contractors in agreeing on those principles which would offer the highest 
prospect of desire satisfaction. "' 
Having set the plan, the parties are ready to choose their principles of justice. 
These are two: 
(i) The Principle of Liberty: each person is to have an equal right to the most 
extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty of others; 172 
(ii) The Principle of Equality: social and economic inequalities are to be 
arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged 
and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair 
equality of opportunity. 173 
The first principle is given precedence and applies to "the basic liberties of 
citizens" enumerated as "..... political liberty (the right to vote and to be eligible 
for public office) together with freedom of speech and assembly, liberty of 
conscience and freedom of thought, freedom of the person along with the right 
to hold (personal) property; and freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure as 
defined by the concept of the rule of law. " 174 
VI. 2 The international arena. Concerning international law, Rawls extends the 
principles of justice elaborated in an initial domestic position of ignorance to the 
relations between societies. He admits that those principles are more suitable in 
a closed system and therefore they may not apply entirely to multifarious 
negotiators. He begins with the initial position of the parties who negotiate the 
principles unbiased by the knowledge of their position: 
"One may extend the interpretation of the original position and think of 
the parties as representatives of different nations who must choose 
together the fundamental principles to adjudicate conflicting claims 
among states 
..... 
these representatives are deprived of various kinds of 
information. 
...... 
Once again the contracting parties, in this case 
representatives of states, are allowed only enough knowledge to make a 
171 TJ, pp. 142-150 
72 TJ, p. 60 
"' TJ, p. 83 
174 TJ, p. 61 
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rational choice to protect their interests but not so much that the more 
fortunate among them can take advantage of the special situation. " 175 
The representatives of nations are by analogy in a position of ignorance in order 
to protect them from the biases of their historical fate. In this original position, 
they almost deterministically articulate equality as the most important principle. 
That principle is "analogous to the equal rights of citizens in a constitutional 
regime". '76 As a consequence of that primordial choice other principles follow. 
They are (i) self-determination; (ii) self-defence; (iii) the rule that treaties should 
be honoured; (iv) principles regulating the means that a nation may use to wage 
177 
war. 
Self-determination is "the right of a people to settle its own affairs without the 
interference of foreign powers". 178 This accounts for sovereignty and, therefore, 
non-intervention is a related principle emanating from the original position. 
Nations as moral units having achieved internal equality are not viewed as being 
fired by a desire to pursue on the international plain their self-interest: but a just 
state "will aim above all to maintain and preserve its just institutions and the 
conditions that make them possible. " 179 It thus appears that there is nothing in 
his work that would support a contrary view of intervention. 
VI. 3 Humanitarian intervention. This negative assertion holds truth in his 
hypothetical project but involves a rather elliptical construction were we to 
transmute it in actual situations. Under close examination, we can distinguish an 
analogy between national and international equal liberty. The ascertainment that 
the state should maintain its just institutions is an indication that national equal 
liberty is a mandatory prerequisite for international equal liberty. The parties in 
their national initial position negotiate the principles of justice among which 
equal liberty is prominent. Having done so, the representatives of nations now 
choose in their original position equal liberty as the principle of justice. In other 
1's TJ, p. 378 
176 TJ, p. 378 
"' TJ, pp. 378-379 
178 TJ, p. 378 
1° TJ, p. 379 
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words, only states which achieve national equality are subject to the 
international equal liberty, that is non-intervention. ' 80 
We could attain the same result of humanitarian action even on the assumption 
that the first principle of justice 
- 
equal liberty 
- 
is promulgated and enjoyed by 
both just and unjust participants in the original position. This requires a second 
level of enquiry. The first which corresponds to the above argument, is the ab 
initio acceptance of equal liberty, whereas the second is the a posteriori 
investigation into the maintenance of equal liberty. We explore the traits of 
justice within institutions, that is whether the structures of internal institutions 
satisfy the above principle. If the institutions are defective then non-interference 
is not, per se, justified and war is an option for the amelioration or the 
termination of the violation because "the contractors are concerned 
..... 
with the 
well-being of persons and thus, it is perfectly natural that the contractors may 
approve the destruction of a certain nation, if it severely frustrates the interests 
of its populace. " 181 
Conceding that only parties which have satisfied the rule of equal liberty within 
their systems enjoy the same principle in the law of nations, a fundamental 
question emerges concerning the participants or the quality of the 
representatives who participate in the original position for the formulation of 
principles of international justice. Only parties which have within themselves 
equal liberty should participate. Therefore, the derivative principle of equal 
liberty and non-intervention is not arbitrary or unfair but an expected 
consequence of the participants' status. If it were for just and unjust nations to 
participate in the original position, the hypothetical construction of the initial 
position will be destroyed because the parties do not start from the same footing, 
they do not share the appropriate initial status quo. "Justice as fairness", 1 82 that 
is principles of justice agreed to in an initial situation that is fair, does not apply 
in this case. It is obvious which presumption Rawls made. Equality is not only 
ISO T. M. Franck, S. W. Hawkins, "Justice in the International System", 10 Mich. J LL., (1989), 
127, at p. 144 
D. A. J. Richards, A Theory of Reasons for Action, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1971), p. 138 
182 TJ, p. 12 
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the promulgation of, but also the characterisation of, the original position. ' 83 The 
acceptance of the principle of non-intervention only among just societies is 
derived also from his articulation of permissible conscription: "Conscription is 
permissible only if it is demanded for the defence of liberty itself, including here 
not only the liberties of the citizens of the society in question, but also for those 
of persons in other societies as well. " 184 
Defending people' rights in other societies is an acknowledgement that some 
societies are unjust and they deserve external restoration of rights. Here nests a 
contradiction which could only be resolved by applying the equality principle 
which is the cornerstone of Rawls' theory. Assenting to the international 
function of equality and thus to non-intervention, we condone deprivation of 
equality within some domestic jurisdictions. This contradicts Rawls's banner of 
equality within societies. It can be resolved only when international equality is 
applied to just states. His paradigm of conscription is an admittance, firstly, that 
states could take action to restore a situation of equality in unjust states and, 
secondly, that equality applies only among just states, as unjust ones do not 
participate in the promulgation of the principle of international justice. 
VI. 4 Internal civil disobedience 
- 
external intervention. We reasoned from John 
Rawls's theory of justice that only just states participate in the initial position for 
the extrapolation of principles of justice. An issue that supports the conclusion 
of non-intervention as a peremptory norm between just states is the subject of 
resistance. ' 85 The parties in the original position most probably would agree to a 
right of humanitarian intervention had they known that some of the participants 
were unjust. It corresponds with the right of disobedience for the parties in the 
original domestic position when there is injustice, merely by infringement of the 
first principle of justice, that is equal liberty. 186 
This reminds us of Grotius and his right of resistance. Whereas Grotius is 
concerned with submission unless injustices occur, Rawls' obedience is reserved 
183 A. A. D'Amato, "International Law and Rawls's Theory of Justice", 5 Denver J. I. L. & Pol., 
(1975), p. 525, at p. 531-535 184 Ti. p. 380 
183 W. G. Friedmann, "A Theory of Justice: A Lawyer's Critique", 11 Col. J. Trans. L., (1972), 
369, at p. 376 
186 Ibid., pp. 363,372 
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only for just societies; otherwise revolution is the answer. 187 Rawls' discussion 
of civil disobedience is confined to self-limiting cases of just societies whose 
particular articulations of law may contravene the principles of justice. Our 
purpose is to show whether the circumstances which justify resistance in the 
domestic plain correspond to or could be equated with the circumstances which 
condone humanitarian intervention on the international level. Firstly, they both 
start from an equal footing: the degeneration of either the domestic or 
international principles of justice. The second common trait is that both concern 
just states or those transformed to nearly just. This feature affirms our previous 
observation that only just states participate in the initial position for the 
extrapolation of principles of justice. Hence, for Rawls, the initial position is 
also a device of representation and the qualities of representatives determine the 
outcome of the representation. ' 88 
Permitting both civil disobedience and intervention when justice degenerates 
into injustice within a formerly just state, '89 one could answer the less disturbing 
question of whether the parties in the original position would most probably 
agree to a right of humanitarian intervention had they known that some of the 
participants are unjust in the affirmative. Civil resistance is a corrective action 
addressed to the majority and its purpose is to re-establish the shared underlying 
conception of justice. 190 Civil disobedience as a political act is mainly instigated 
by the infringement of the first principle of justice, which is equal liberty. 191 At 
the second level, the parties choose equality as representatives, "but now they 
are representatives of peoples whose basic institutions satisfy the principles of 
justice selected at the first level. " 192 There is a correspondence here between 
disrespect of the principle of equal liberty and resistance or intervention as 
reactions in the domestic or international planes respectively. 
Rawls is cautious enough not to delineate the instances for revolution as 
whenever equal liberty is violated. Instead, he prefers a more conciliatory 
187 Ibid., p. 363 
88 J. Rawls, "The Law of Peoples", 20 Critical Enquiry, (1993), p. 36, at p. 45, hereinafter cited 
as LP 
189 LP, p. 47 
190 TJ, p. 365 
91 TJ, p. 372 
'92LP, p. 41 
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approach, although it seems that the right to civil disobedience extends also to 
his hierarchical societies which are characterised by a conservative respect for 
basic tenets of liberalism, mainly human rights. 193 Otherwise, they degenerate 
into tyrannies and do not avoid intervention in any case. ' 94 
This correspondence of causes for internal civil disobedience and external 
intervention contravenes Walzer's approach of distinguishing between and 
alienating the two situations from each other. ' 95 
VII. TOWARDS A TENTATIVE CONCLUSION 
Before proceeding to the next chapter which deals with the positivist 
jurisprudence and humanitarian intervention, we will attempt to summarise the 
main aspects of natural law in relation to humanitarian intervention. We have 
presented the historical evolution of this law with its different approaches to the 
idea of right or positive law. It is also significant that one of the conspicuous 
characteristics of human civilisation is a search for an ideal, for a redemptive 
force beyond the posited world. As D'Entreves has observed, it signifies the: 
"unrelenting quest of man to rise above `the letter of the law' to the realm of the 
spirit. "196 The pleas, some impassioned, for higher standards are more obvious 
when the laws and institutions are deficient or unsatisfactory or when cruelty 
reigns. The explanation for humanitarian intervention is simple within this 
matrix. The laws of humanity which justify in principle humanitarian actions are 
universal and above the historic, fortuitous laws. These pervasive ideas of a 
transcended nature are one of the main attractions of natural law which secured 
its regeneration malgre the positivist assault. The latter, as we shall see in the 
next chapter, is not ignorant of abstractions, as Kelsen's theory proves, but in 
19' These safeguard "for all persons at least certain minimum rights to means of subsistence and 
security (the right to life). LP, p. 52 
' 94 LP, P. 47: "Their right to independence is no shield from that condemnation, nor even in 
grave cases from coercive intervention by other peoples". 
°S M. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, (N. Y, 
Basic Books, 1977), p. 89 
190 A. P. D'Entreves, Natural Law. An Introduction to Legal Philosophy. (London, Hutchinson 
University Library, 1970), p. 127 
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general, it is more empiricist. Furthermore, positivism is secular, whereas 
natural law has, since Grotius, rationalised the process for identifying ideas but 
not the ideas themselves. Having said that, natural law succeeds in expanding 
the legal spectrum whereas positivism pretends to secure its distinct character. 
Within the auspices of this chapter, we have tried also to present an articulation 
of naturalist thinking with its perplexities. We have addressed questions such as 
what is law, what happens when law is failing, or what it is that law can achieve. 
These issues should be compared with the concerns of positivism as will be 
demonstrated in the next chapter. One of the principal problems of natural law is 
the distinction between "is" and "ought". The derivation of prescriptions from 
descriptions is an anathema for the positivists, but we have depicted the work of 
Finnis who endeavours to reconcile the distinction. Another issue which 
interrelates with the next chapter is the justification of the authority of law. If 
people are rational and endowed with free will to pursue their ends, they can be 
obliged to do something if there is an accepted formula such as a deity, reason, 
contract or sovereign will. 
In international law, natural law can supersede a statist order because it refers to 
higher principles. One of the most intriguing conclusions after this exposition is 
that the law on humanitarian intervention as it is practised in contemporary 
society, explicitly or implicitly, follows the lines of the Grotian tradition. While 
we should recognise the impact of Grotian thinking on international law, we 
should present a fresh approach to humanitarian actions after we present and 
evaluate the main theories in the field. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
POSITIVISM AND HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
The historical facts which prompted the development of positivist legal theory 
- 
its international law dimensions 
- 
Wolff and Vattel on international law and 
humanitarian intervention 
- 
Austin 's sovereign and the repudiation of 
international law 
- 
modern positivist theorists: Kelsen and Hart on 
international law and humanitarian intervention. 
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
I. 1 The emergence of the state. Positivism as the new legal ideology can be 
traced back to the emergence and assertion of the political entity of the state, 
which occurred after the Reformation. Reliance on transcendental truths 
emanating from God or nature were insufficient explanations for the secular 
world. Thus, positivism appears alongside the new political entities which 
came to power following the break up of the medieval feudalist conception of 
society and the unity of Christendom. Feudalism, by dispersing power to 
different classes in a society, resides at the antipode of the state as it is realised 
with a centralised system. However, some of its features, such as the territorial 
tenure, the loyalty to the prince and that of dominion, assisted in consolidating 
the new entities. Additionally, the Reformation, and, in particular 
Protestantism, solidified the supremacy of the state within its territory. The 
decisive step was the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. ' 
' L. Gross, "The Peace of Westphalia 1648 
- 
1948", 42 A. J. I. L., (1948), p. 20; R. A. Falk, "The 
Interplay of Westphalia and Charter Conceptions of the International Legal Order", in C. 
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Having accepted the existence of separate, self-sufficient entities, the threat of 
disunity and conflict now emerged where previously there was unity. 
However, a broader unity based on the common interests of those separate 
entities could be formulated and that unity took the shape of rules which direct 
and facilitate state behaviour. 
1.2 The concept of sovereignty. The rise of the modern state influenced 
political and legal thought and introduced a new term, sovereignty. Jean 
Bodin 2 initiated a comprehensive concept which appealed to national unity and 
facilitated the state's ability to consolidate its power, from a fragmentation of 
powers, towards a central authority. He attributed to that source of unity the 
facility of legislation. 3 The legislative power was not arbitrary or absolute but 
subdued to the law of God and nature, to the constitutional limitations or the 
fundamental laws and to the Leges Imperii. 4 Sovereignty is, hence, relative and 
legal but also formal and absolute as a political notion of supreme power 
unrestrained by any external authority. This conceptual bifurcation of 
sovereignty retraces the medieval tradition of submitting positive laws to the 
scrutiny of higher laws. Grotius and Vattel are also anchored in the medieval 
tradition of ethically limited sovereignty. 
The legally relative aspect of internal sovereignty vanished in the process of 
consolidating state power, which became predominantly unfettered and 
absolute. The reason for the metamorphosis of a legally circumscribed concept 
to absolute sovereignty was again the political facts which generated new 
philosophical constructions and transformed sovereignty from a partially legal 
to a political notion. The growth in governmental power dissolved all the 
Black, R. A. Falk, The Future of the International Legal Order, (Princeton, Princeton 
University Press, 1969), p. 32 2 A. Gardot, "Jean Bodin. Sa place parmi les fondateurs du droit international", 50 R. C., (1934 
IV), p. 545, at pp. 580-629; F. H. Hinsley, Sovereignty, 2nd ed., (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1986); L. Wildhaber, "Sovereignty and International Law", in R. St. J. 
MacDonald, D. M. Johnston, The Structure and Process of International Law: Essays in Legal 
Philosophy, Doctrine and Theory, (Dordrecht, M. Nijhoff, 1983), p. 425 
"Bodin sees the sovereign embodied in an absolute and perpetual legislative power". A. 
Vincent, Theories of State, (London, B. Blackwell, 1987), p. 53 
J. Bodin, Les six livres de la Republique, (Paris, 1576), livre I, ch. 8, p. 131: "...... car si nous 
disons que celuy a puissance absolue, qui n'est point subiect aux Lois, il n'est se trouvera Prince 
au monde souverain: veu que tous les Princes de la terre sont subiects aux lois de Dieu, et de la 
nature, et a plusieurs loix humaines communes a tous peuples". The incorporation of limitations 
signifies that they were integral to sovereignty, "working for a limited and not absolute 
monarchy". A. Vincent, supra note 3, p. 59 
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limitations imposed by observance of or fear of superior laws. Positive laws as 
man-made and emanating from the will of the sovereign were becoming 
gradually unquestionable. Thomas Hobbes worded the new notion of 
sovereignty: "it appeareth plainly that the sovereign power 
..... 
is as great as 
possibly men can be imagined to make it. "5 He identified sovereignty with 
might. Thus, its alienation from the residue of legal thought transformed 
sovereignty into an absolute political concept. 
As a consequence, the problem of identifying the repository of power in a 
particular society emerged. The location of the source of power has appeared 
illusory in its manifestations. The confusion of legal and political precepts is 
apparent in Austin's exposition of legal theory whereby the law is the 
command of the sovereign. 6 Although the internal identification of power was 
uncertain, the external accumulation was more intelligible. The state as a 
whole was endowed with sovereign quality. This development coincides with 
the rise of nation-states but the establishment of rules for international contact 
remains inexplicable. If the state is sovereign and sovereignty is absolute, 
submission to any rule is problematic. Such a state of affairs is attributed to the 
fact that sovereignty was dealt with in abstracto, not as a requisite for 
international relations. 7 A way out of the imbroglio which this notion of 
sovereignty caused is consent. 8 Nevertheless, it is inadequate to address the 
issue of its morality. 
1.3 Absolute or conditional sovereignty. The dichotomy of political, unbridled 
sovereignty and a legally "tamed" one is persistent in international law. The 
sacred morality of sovereignty is opposed to the interference of human rights 
aspirations or the interdependencies of modern life. 
9 Humanitarian 
S Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, R. Tuck, (ed. ), (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991), 
ch. xx 
6 A. V. Dicey, An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 10th ed., (London, 
Macmillan, 1959), p. 76; W. W. Buckland, Some Reflections on Jurisprudence, (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1945), ch. 9, pp. 82-87 
J. L. Brierly, The Law of Nations, 6th ed., Sir H. Waldock ed., (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 
1963), p. 45; R. P. Anand, "Sovereign Equality of States in International Law", 197 R. C., 
(1986 II), p. 9, at pp. 22-27 
8 F. R. Tes6n, "International Obligation and the Theory of Hypothetical Consent", 15 Yale J. I. L., 
(1990), p. 84, at pp. 94-99 
"...... the increase of civilisation, intercourse, and interdependence as between nations has 
influenced and moderated the exaggerated conception of national sovereignty". North 
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intervention is posited in that dichotomy, and acceptance or opposition thereof 
is closely related to the adopted concept of sovereignty. The legal framework 
of the U. N. Charter contains an affirmation of state authority and aspirational 
pronouncements towards the attainment of human rights. The antinomic 
arguments refer to the exhaustive protection of state sovereignty or its 
constriction by human rights rules. On the one hand, the interpretative 
ambiguity of Article 2(4) on the non-use of force is surpassed by a purposive 
political construction which views it as unambiguously guaranteeing 
sovereignty. 10 On the other hand, sovereignty should be exercised with a view 
to maintaining the droit humain. Human rights have a dialectical relationship 
with sovereignty and, moreover, they have acquired a valuatory standard. " 
Consequently, humanitarian intervention is legitimised as a reaction to the 
malfeasance of sovereignty. These observations conceal a fundamental 
intellectual confusion. Human rights or humanitarian intervention attest to 
naturalist premises of a pre-existing normative order. Positivism has discarded 
this constraining power and replaced it with concepts such as sovereignty, 
equality, independence. ' 2 These concepts are interconnected and also 
contingent upon the absence of a naturalist framework. In effect, the concepts 
of sovereignty, independence and equality mirror naturalist concepts of the 
domestic order in international relations. The "domestic analogy" is persistent 
in international jurisprudence. 13 It holds that individuals are independent and 
equal entities and, therefore, states as super-individuals should be independent 
and equal. In the previous chapter, we explained how Rawls introduces a 
American Dredging Company of Texas (U. S. A) v. United Mexican States, IV Reports of 
International Arbitral Awards (RIAA), p. 26, at p. 28 
10 I. Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 
1963), p. 267 
H. Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights, (London, Stevens & Sons, 1950), 
p. 186: "The circumstances that the legal duty to respect fundamental human rights has 
become part and parcel of the new international system upon which peace depends to that 
immediate connection". 
12 "..... sovereign equality constitutes 
..... 
the fundamental premise on which all international 
relations rest'. A. Cassese, International Law in a Divided World, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 
1990), p. 130; See U. N. Resolutions which ritually repeat their faith in independence, 
equality, sovereignty and non-interference between states, in particular the General Assembly 
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co- 
operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. UNGA 
Res. 2625 (XXV), 24 October 1970 
" A. Carty, The Decay of International Law? A Reappraisal of the Limits of Legal 
Imagination in International Affairs, (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1986), p. 88 
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domestic liberal theory of justice into international relations and, on that 
occasion, we also commented that the problems which his theory of 
international law confronts are seriously affected by this transmutation. This 
chapter will make evident how theorists such as Wolff, Vattel, Austin, and 
Hart have articulated a comprehensive legal theory which includes 
international law, nevertheless, with imports from domestic law. When we 
deal later with Articles 2(4) and 51 of the U. N. Charter and specific cases of 
intervention, the domestic analogy and what it signifies will become more 
apparent. 
We come back to the case of antithesis-synthesis between sovereignty and 
human rights. It highlights the fact that the traditional international legal 
argument has dissipated with the gradual retreat of state positivism. The 
infiltration of instrumentalistic principles or the revival of a natural law 
residuum causes vibrations to the concepts of sovereignty, equality and 
independence. These concepts emerged concurrently with the jettisoning of the 
natural order and also with the intellectual extenuation of domestic natural law 
concepts into international law, as we shall see immediately. 
II. PHILOSOPHICAL TENDENCIES IN THE ERA OF 
SOVEREIGNTY: FROM WOLFF TO VATTEL 
IM State autonomy. Wolff and Vattel are considered as the main intellectual 
pioneers of the new era in the field of international law who succeeded in 
conceptualising these new developments. Wolff s oeuvre is original, whereas 
that of Vattel is an abridgement of the former's work. He modified Wolff s 
work on those areas where his philosophical standing and the actuality of his 
own era diverged. 14 Both writers locate their Law of Nations in natural law. 
" "But I was discriminating in my choice, and I adapted to my design the materials I had 
collected". E. de Vattel, Le Droit Des Gens ou Principes de la Loi Naturelle, appliques ä la 
Conduite et aux Affaires des Nations et des Souverains, trans. Ch. G. Fenwick, (Washington, 
Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1916), in Classics of International Law, vol. III, "Preface", 
para. 8a, hereinafter cited as DdG 
68 
However, natural law could advance either an unconstrained state autonomy, 
which is identical to the free moral standing of individuals, or, on the other 
hand, circumscribing principles of conduct for the regulation of the 
indispensable interrelations between states. The emergent state satisfied the 
first aspect. It solidified its power and assertively propounded its autonomy 
through the concept of sovereignty, which has been misused as an illimitable 
raison d'etat whereby each state, promoting its own interests, was in a 
conflictive attitude towards other states. ' 5 This state of affairs, conductive to 
predatory policies and anarchy, jeopardised the integrity of the new states. The 
feeling of resentment towards such political cruelty, the general outcry for 
limitations, and most importantly the interdependence of states caused by the 
economic, technological and territorial expansion was manifested in a certain 
predilection towards a comprehensive regulation of state conduct in order to 
moderate its excesses. Wolff and Vattel responded to such a need but their 
methodological assumptions differ, being aspirational for Wolff whilst 
realistic for Vattel. 
11.2 Wolff's great society and Mattel 's repudiation. Wolff remained 
cognitively within the natural law tradition whereby legal rules are deduced 
from a unific principle. He acknowledged that civil society, as an aggregation 
of individuals, imposes certain rules on its members and consequently the 
society of states, the civitas maxima, alters the laws which states may observe 
in a natural condition. Those rules which facilitate the civitas maxima, and are 
hence particular, form the voluntary law of nations. Wolff's great society 
derives from a concept of purposive character of nature and it is reminiscent of 
the Aristotelian, Thomistic, and Grotian sociability of human beings. 
Additionally, the civitas maxima should be viewed under another perspective 
which is commonly shared by Wolff, the Stoics or Thomas Aquinas. That is, 
as a device of an intermediary law which facilitates the accommodation of 
"perfect" natural law with the imperfections of human living. 16 
Is A. Sorel, Europe under the Old Regime, F. H. Herrick trans., (N. Y., 1964), p. 17: "Never 
before had the reason of state been opposed more imprudently to the most elementary 
concepts of honor and justice". 
N. G. Onuf, "Civitas Maxima: Wolff, Vattel and the Fate of Republicanism", 88 A. J. I. L., 
(1994), p. 280; L. Strauss, Natural Right and History, (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 
1953), pp. 148-156 
69 
Vattel rejects Wolff s initial assumption of a civitas maxima 17 presumed as 
unnecessary in the international plane. 18 He acknowledges state independence 
and that natural law could facilitate mutual intercourse. 19 This sentiment 
coincides with the disruptive political function of the raison d 'etat in 
European politics. It is peculiar, thus, that the unific, associetal concept of the 
civitas maxima is abandoned in favour of a more individualistic and thus 
menacing concept of the state. The explanation resides more with Vattel's 
realism and his willingness to articulate a system of rules which would reflect 
the realities of his time. Civitas maxima was an anachronism whereas the 
sovereign, independent state was a political entelechy. International society 
ceased to be purposive but contained autonomous units regulated by 
consensual rules. 20 
The corollary of independence is non-intervention. However, the 
corresponding rules which form the legal exposition of this correlation are 
elliptical, admitting a litany of exceptions because Vattel's work is an 
incohesive accumulation of older statements, personal predilection and 
because additionally, his philosophical standing fluctuates between natural and 
positive law. 
The foundation of such consequentialism is a non integral theory of natural 
law which views individuals as autonomous and equal units, free from mutual 
coercion and which collates individual and state relations: "It clearly follows 
from the liberty and independence of Nations that each has the right to govern 
itself as it thinks proper, and that no one of them has the least right to interfere 
in the government of another". 21 The analogy between the individual reserved 
sphere of non-intrusion and non-intervention among states22 as a consequence 
" DdG, "Preface", para. IOa: "...... it is enough that nations conform to the demands made upon 
them by that natural and world-wide society established among all men" 
18"But it is clear that there is by no means the same necessity for a civil society among Nations 
as among individuals. It cannot be said, therefore, that nature recommends it to an equal degree, 
for less that it prescribes it". DdG, para. 9a 
19 DdG, "Preface", para. 1 Oa 
20 S. Pufendorf, On the Duty of Man and Citizen According to Natural Law, J. Tully (ed. ), trans. 
M. Silverthorne, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. xvii 
Z' DdG, bk. II, ch. IV, para. 54 
22 See statement by Clement Atlee, 1 U. N. GAOR, (1946), p. 24: "We see the freedom of he 
individual in the state as an essential complement to the freedom of the state in the world 
community of nations". 
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of natural law's individualistic aspect is a tenet of liberal theory. It also 
characterises the fallacious foundations of international law as a projection of 
domestic legal and philosophical schemata. A comparable attitude informs 
Austin's repudiation of international law and also subsequent argumentation 
which proved corrosive to the legal character of international law. The 
misplaced equation with its inadvertent outcomes has been exposed by the 
realists23 and also the Critical Lawyers, who demonstrate the contradiction 
between the liberal individualistic and altruistic aspect of law, as will be 
explained in Chapter Four. 
11.3 The Necessary and Voluntary Law of Nations. Vattel retains Wolff s 
distinction between Natural and Voluntary Law of Nations but the scientific 
presumption is different. Initially it was derived from the concept of a great 
society, whereas now it can be seen to stem from consideration that "...... we 
may never confuse what is just and good in itself with what is merely tolerated 
through necessity. , 24 Vattel hence categorised Law into the immutable 
Necessary Law of Nations and the mutable Voluntary Law. 25 The former 
refers to the ideological motives of his age, whereas the latter was an attempt 
at realistically systematising state relations. Wolffs system, based on the 
unific principle of the civitas maxima, became redolent, reminiscent of an old 
era of European political unity. The singular source of authoritative rules was 
untenable as an ideational source, whereas Vattel's sources are historical. 
Hence, Vattel articulated a system reflecting the actualities of his 
contemporary era. He embarked initially on explicating the contemporary 
political environment marked by the pre-eminence of sovereign nations 
interrelated with each other and from that framework he deduced the rules of 
comportment. 
23 H. Morgenthau, Scientific Man Vs. Power Politics, (Chicago, The University of Chicago 
Press, 1946), p. 115: "Take the doctrines of non 
- 
intervention and of domestic jurisdiction, 
which are both based upon the idea that, in international field, too, there exists a kind of 
natural sphere to which the activities of the state can be confined by the rule of law, which 
sphere is to be delimited here not with regard to the activities of the individual but with 
regard to the activities of other sates". 
24 DdG, "Preface", para. Ila 
25 DdG, "Preface", para. Ila: "The Necessary Law is derived immediately from nature; while 
this common mother of all men merely recommends the observance of the Voluntary Law of 
Nations in view of the circumstances in which Nations happen to find themselves, and for 
their common good". 
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The state becomes the central tenet in his theory. 26 The freedom and 
independence of the state modifies the Necessary Law of Nations which is the 
ethical postulate for interstate relations. His position implicitly rejects an 
unreserved subordination to the Law of Nations and could be identified, in a 
different context, with Austin's presumption for repudiating international law. 
Austin's legal premise is a relation of authority which requires a superior and a 
subordinate. This relation, by definition, cannot exist among equal units. 
Vattel admits that in civil societies an authority commands and enforces laws 
whereas this "idea is not to be thought of as between Nations. Each 
independent State claims to be, and actually is, independent of all others" 
because "The liberty of a Nation would not remain complete if other Nations 
presumed to inspect or control its contact; a presumption which would be 
contrary to the natural law, which declares every Nation free and independent 
of all other Nations. "27 Vattel has not been as radical in repudiating 
international law as Austin, because he has purported to advance international 
law as a philosophical occupation, and also because he still pays lip service to 
natural law as the enveloping law. 
The distinction between Natural and Voluntary Law of Nations is also 
reminiscent of the realist conception of international law explained by Hans 
Morgenthau. For him, there exists the necessary international law which 
contains rules indispensable for the existence of a multi-state system and also 
consensual international law, created by state agreement. 28 
11.4 The purposive character of state and the principles of natural society of 
states. Starting from the analogy of domestic societies where individuals, 
guided by their sociability, construct their societies for mutual assistance, 
individual duties to humanity are not resolved but performed by the organ 
which is now conferred with that duty, the state. 
The natural society of states is hence conducive to some principles. One is that 
each nation should contribute to the happiness of others only if this does not 
26 "Nation here means a sovereign State, an independent political society", DdG, para. 7a, note k 
27 DdG, "Intro. ", paras. 8a, 9 
28 H. J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace, 6th ed., 
revised by K. W. Thompson, (N. Y., McGraw-Hill Publ. Co., 1985), p. 297 
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endanger its own happiness. 29 The second refers to the liberty and 
independence of states; 30 the third that "...... each nation (is) to decide what its 
conscience demands of it, what it can or can not do, what it thinks well or does 
not think well to do...... ; 31 the fourth is the principle of equality of nations; 32 
and the last principle is that "From this equality it necessarily follows that 
what is lawful or unlawful for one Nation is equally lawful or unlawful for 
every other Nation. , 33 Having set the premises for freedom from compulsion, 
Vattel intended to "...... produce, before the world at least, a perfect equality of 
rights among Nations in the conduct of their affairs and the pursuit of their 
policies. The intrinsic justice of their conduct is not for others to pass upon 
finally,......... 34 
All these constituted societies need to exist " 
..... 
according to the laws of the 
natural society of the human race 
....... 
35 and they form the natural society of 
states. The aim of the aggregation of societies established by nature is "...... that 
of mutual assistance in order to perfect themselves (states) and their 
condition. "36 Having said that, one could easily deduce a principle of 
humanitarian intervention for the amelioration of internal conditions. Such a 
conclusion would not at all appear arbitrary if it is connected with another 
statement made by Vattel that "..... it devolves thenceforth upon that body, the 
State, and upon its rulers to fulfil the duties of humanity towards outsiders in 
all matters in which individuals are no longer at liberty to act, and it peculiarly 
rests with the state to fulfil these duties to other States. , 37 
29 DdG, "Intro. " para. 14 
3o DdG, "Intro. ", para. 15 
" DdG, "Intro. ", para. 16 
32 DdG, "Intro. ", para. 18 
33 DdG, "Intro. ", para. 19 
'° DdG, "Intro. ", para. 21 
'S DdG, "Intro. ", para. I l }6 DdG. "Intro. ", para. 12 
" DdG. "Intro. ", para. ll 
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III. THE LEGAL FICTION OF CIVITAS MAXIMA. STATE 
SOVEREIGNTY, AND HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
111.1 Initial assumptions. At this point we should again emphasise the role of 
presumptions in juridical thinking. From the previous chapter concerning 
natural law and the present concerning positive law, the articulation and 
heralding of a legal rule is based on a logical or fictional presumption which 
provides the legal structure with unity and logical explication. Those initial 
principles are irrefutable and accredited in toto. Hence, we ha\'e explained in 
the previous chapter the role of God as the initial assumption and the 
revolutionary function which the recognition of man's reason played. Later 
natural law located its principles on the reason of man and his sociability. The 
same intellectual process occurs in the positivist camp 
- 
either it is the fiction 
of a sovereign in Austin's system or Kelsen's Grundnorm. Both assumptions 
are conducive to different results concerning the legal character of 
international law, and in particular the legal notion of humanitarian 
intervention, and we are going to deal with them later. 
111.2 The initial assumption of a great society. It is now necessary to explicate 
the initial assumptions made by Wolff and Vattel which not only lead to 
divergent conclusions, but also characterise the advent of positivistic thinking 
in international law. Wolff acknowledges that the function of his assumption 
as "in every kind of science" is "for the purpose of eliciting truths as well as 
providing them 
.,, 
38 He structured his system and deduced its rules from the 
presumption of civitas maxima as "a fixed and immovable foundation for the 
Voluntary Law of Nations, and there are definite principles, by force of which 
that law can be derived from the concept of the supreme state, so that it is not 
necessary to rely by blind impulse on the deeds and customs and decisions of 
the more civilised nations 
...... 
"39 
The ciritas maxima is the logical basis of his system, which also has common 
characteristics with Grotius' system of great society. Both write at a period 
`S Ch. Wolff, Jus Gentium Methodo Scientifica Pertractatum, trans. J. H. Drake, (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, N-114). in Classics of International Lagt', vol. 11, p. 21 hereinafter cited as JG 
39 JG, vol. 11, para. 21 
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characterised by a hypocritical political unity across Europe. Civitas maxima is 
the corollary of human sociability, which functioned in Grotius' natural law 
theory and which in Wolff s system is responsible for forming civil societies. 
Sociability as a state attribute now assists in forming the great society of 
nations. Wolff, in common with Grotius, employs natural law, whereas 
positive law does not transgress those boundaries. Wolff approximates the law 
of nations with civil law and he explains its mode of derivation, which is 
similar 
"Les loix civiles peuvent donc apporter certaines modifications aux loix 
naturelles....... afin de faire passer les hommes de l'etat naturel, oü ils 
jouissent de droits illimites, a 1'etat civil, oü ils se depouillent d'une 
partie de leurs droits pour le bien de la societe. C'est par consequent de 
ce bien qu'on derive les raisons des changement que les lois civiles 
apportent aux loix naturelles, sans neanmoins jamais y deroger 
essentiellement, ni les detruire. "4o 
Nations are comparable to individuals acting autonomously, acceding to the 
law of nature, whose application admits divergence from its principles and 
which forms the positive aspect of the law of nations. 41 The adaptation of 
natural law to the exigencies of international society is again facilitated by a 
fictitious ruler whose function is to define those rules which determine the 
relations between nations. The intercession of the ruler, the rector, is 
necessitated to justify the formation of the voluntary law of nations, which is 
the mutable natural law of nations emerging from the immutable natural law. 42 
The articulation and the role of the civitas maxima is similar to that of 
Kelsen's Grundnorm. They both function as logical presumptions for the 
initiation of a legal system. Their mode of derivation is, similarly, by logical 
deduction from a particular social context. Individuals show certain traits of 
sociability which necessitate the formation of civil societies. The natural rights 
40 M. Formey, Principes du Droit de la Nature et des Gens, Extrait du Grand Ouvrage Latin de 
M. De Wo ff vol. III, livre 8, ch. V, "De la theorie naturelle des loix civiles (XV)", (Amsterdam, 
Marc Michel Rey, 1758), p. 245 
" JG, "Prolegomena", paras. 2,3: For the principles of the law of nature are one thing, but the 
application of them to nations another, and this produces a certain diversity in that which is 
inferred...... ". 
12 JG, "Prolegomena", paras. 21,22 
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of men are altered in these societies. States, as moral persons, are compared to 
individuals in their desire to form a society whose aims delineate the laws 
which prevail therein. Thus, the great society of states becomes the 
foundational presumption which explicates and legitimises the particular law s 
of a society of nations. The interconnection between national law and law of 
nations is the ruler. The ruler is the "superior" in every state with power to 
command and, by analogy, becomes the fictional ruler of the great society with 
power now to adapt natural law. 43 Again, Kelsen's system has striking 
conceptual affinities. Effectiveness, an important principle for domestic 
systems, provides the conceptual link, although it is a rather arbitrary principle 
of international law. 
In the same fashion, Vattel infuses the law of nations with the precepts of civil 
law. A state is regarded as a moral person "..... having an understanding and a 
will peculiar to itself, and susceptible at once of obligations and of rights". 4-` 
Individuals have a general duty to humanity but when they form a society "..... 
it devolves thenceforth upon that body, the State, and upon its rulers, to fulfil 
the duties of humanity towards outsiders in all matters in which individuals are 
no longer at liberty to act, and it peculiarly rests with the State to fulfil these 
duties to other States 
. 
"4S The transfer of the duties to humanity from individual 
to state is completed in the natural society of states, whereunder "..... the end 
of the great society established by nature among all nations is likewise that of 
mutual assistance in order to perfect themselves and their condition. "4 It 
appears that the duties to humanity serve as the link between civil and 
international society. Subsequently, we will try to reformulate Kelsen's link 
between national and international law on similar lines, from a principle of 
effectiveness towards human rights. We should also mention at this juncture 
the similarities with another jurist, Jeremy Bentham. In his "Principles of 
International Law", he aspires to "the most extended welfare of all the nations 
°' JG, "Prolegomena", para.? 1 
" DdG. "Intro. ", para.? 
45 DdG, "Intro. ", para. 1 1 
Dd(;, "Intro. ", para. 12 
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on earth". 47 Under both interpretations, humanitarian interventions for 
restoring the vestiges of humanity are justified 
111.3 Vattel and the sovereign state. Vattel abandons the concept of a great, 
integral society and embeds his legal theory in a natural society of states which 
has specific rules suitable to its subject matter. Vattel's presumption is the 
sovereign, independent state which is responsible for repudiating Wolff s 
civitas maxima and also for the content the Voluntary Law of Nations 
48 
acquires. 
One reason for such repudiation is the requirement of authoritative command, 
a thought that will re-emerge later in Austin's legal negation of international 
law. For Vattel, civil societies require an "authority capable of giving 
commands, prescribing laws, and compelling those who refuse to obey. 
..... 
Such an idea is not to be thought of as between Nations. Each independent 
State claims to be, and actually is, independent of all others. , 49 Wolff's rector 
commands in civil societies but in the civitas maxima he is reduced to 
authoritatively interpreting state interaction within the framework of natural 
law. Moreover, contrary to civil societies, the formation of international 
society is not recommended by nature itself. 50 
Vattel's rejection of civitas maxima springs also from a reasonable and 
realistic conceptual foundation in international law which finds fictitious rulers 
incomprehensible. Thus, the modifications in natural law which form the 
content of voluntary law should acquire a more concrete basis, deduced "....... 
from the natural liberty of nations; from consideration of their common 
welfare; from their reciprocal duties; and from the distinction between internal 
and external, perfect and imperfect rights. , 51 The distinction between the 
Necessary Law of Nations assimilated to Wolffs Natural Law and the 
Voluntary Law of Nations is retained, founded on the sources of state practice 
and not on the civitas maxima. 52 The latter was repudiated as a transcendental 
47 J. Bowring (ed), The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol. 2, (Edinburgh, William Tait. 
1982), p. 538 
48 DdG, para. 7a, note k: "[nation] means a sovereign State, an independent political society". 
40 DdG, para. 8a 
so DdG, "Preface", paras. 9a, I Oa 
S' DdG, "Preface", para. IOa 
32 DdG, "Intro. ", para. Ila 
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principle, whereas rules in fact should emanate from the actual condition of 
states. The rules which moderate their relations are the result of consent: 
"..... nature obliges nations to consent; 
...... 
for even if they had not given their 
consent, the Law of Nature supplies it, and gives it for them. "53 
111.4 Vattel on humanitarian intervention. The distinction between Natural and 
Voluntary Law has practical consequences for humanitarian intervention. The 
difference resides in a moral or a legal duty to perform certain actions. In 
Vattel's system, the individual, and consequently the state, would perform his 
duty of charity: "[ofJ mutual assistance which men owe to one another because 
they are men; that is to say, because they are made to live together in society 
and are of necessity dependent upon one another's and for their preservation 
and happiness..... 
. 
Now, since Nations are not less subject to the laws of 
nature than are individuals, the duties which a man owes to other men, a 
Nation owes, in its way, to other Nations"54 
Simultaneously, Vattel applies his system to specific cases in order to "show 
how by reason of the liberty of nations and the rules of their natural society, 
the external law which they must observe towards one another differs on 
certain points from the principles of the internal law, which however, are 
always binding upon the conscience. , 55 Consequently, on the point of 
humanity, "..... since every Nation is free, independent, and sovereign in its 
acts, it is for each to decide whether it is in a position to ask or to grant 
anything in that respect. , 56 
The Necessary or Natural Law of Nations, concerning a situation where people 
defend their liberties against an oppressor, was "to give help 
...... 
is only the 
part of justice and generosity. Hence, whenever such dissension reaches the 
state of civil war, foreign Nations may assist that one of the two parties which 
seems to have justice on its side. But to assist a detestable tyrant, or to come 
out in favour of an unjust and rebellious people would certainly be a violation 
of duty. "57 According to the Voluntary Law of Nations, in such situations "..... 
s' DdG, Bk III, para. 192; "Preface", para. 5a 
DdG, Bk II, para. 2 
ss DdG, "Intro. ", para. 27 
56DdG, Bk. II, para. 8 
57 DdG, Bk. II, para. 56 
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since both are independent of all foreign authority, no one has the right to 
judge them. Hence, by virtue of the Voluntary Law of Nations, the two parties 
must be allowed to act as if possessed of equal right, and to be treated 
accordingly, until the affair is decided. "58 
Legal discourse has not been liberated from the antinomies of natural and 
positive orthodoxy. In the evolution of the international community towards a 
legally defined body, its rules have attempted to accommodate a declaratory 
approach towards humanitarianism and a conservative actualisation of its 
premises. The U. N. Charter contains both in the Preamble and in Articles 55 
and 56 an approximation of the natural law-like principles concerning 
humanity, though the most vigorously restated principles confirm etatisme by 
protecting the sovereignty and independence of states. 59 That trend of ethical 
commendation and posited prescription explored in Vattel has preoccupied 
international lawyers since then. 
Those writers who resist the doctrine of humanitarian intervention rely on the 
principle of sovereignty and independence of states, which dictates against 
such actions although they may be morally compelling. Pradier-Fodere offers a 
classic statement: 
"..... cette intervention (d'humanite) est illegitime, parce qu'elle 
constitute une atteinte a l'independence des Etats; parce que les 
Puissances qui ne sont pas lesees directement, immediatement, par ces 
actes inhumains, ne sont nullement fondees a intervenir parce que Gelles 
qui sont immediatement, directement lesees, ont des moyens de faire 
valoir leurs droits qui ne sont pas l'intervention, et que le droit 
international reconnait. Si les actes inhumains sont perpetres sur des 
nationaux du pays oü ils se commettent les Puissances etrangeres sont 
completement desinteressees. "60 
38 DdG, Bk. II, para. 56 
s9 Articles 2(3), 2(4), 2(7) of the U. N. Charter 
60 P Pmdier-Fod6re, Traite de droit international Europeen et Americain, tom. I, (Paris, A. 
Durand et Pedone-Lauriel, 1885), p. 663, para. 430 
Those who affirm the morality of such actions, though they disapprove of 
them legally, include Hall, 61 Lawrence, 62 Heffter. 63 In the Bangladesh case, 
India's argumentation both in the Security Council and the General Assembly 
contains humanitarian considerations for the plight of the Bengalis coupled 
with the main argument of self-defence. The Indian representative, rejecting 
the suggestion of an immediate cease fire, explained that a premature cease 
fire may mean a continuation of the oppression of the indigenous population 
and that "So long as we have any light of civilised behaviour left in us, we 
shall protect them". 64 The United States alluded to the atrocities committed but 
deplored the intervention as violation of the U. N. Charter. 65 Sweden was also 
of the same opinion. 66 The most flagrant contradiction in world opinion 
involving a genocidal regime was the case of Kampuchea. The reaction to 
Vietnam's intervention contained condemnation of Pol Pot's morally 
pervasive regime and also of the perceived effect on sovereignty and 
independence. France, for example, declared that "the notion that because a 
regime is detestable foreign intervention is justified and forcible overthrow is 
legitimate is extremely dangerous. , 67 
The above analysis shows the tensions of a philosophical standing which 
attempts to compromise natural and positive tenets but also very much mirrors 
the present disposition towards a law which evidences a dichotomy between its 
theoretical and its practical aspect. This may be characterised, borrowing a 
term from Fonteyne, as the "double level" approach. 68 The theory remains 
61 W. E. Hall, A Treatise on International Law, 8th ed., (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1924), 
62342-344 "An intervention to put a stop to barbarous and abominable cruelty, is `a high act of policy 
above and beyond the domain of law'. It is destitute of technical legality, but it may be morally 
right and even praiseworthy to a high degree". T. J. Lawrence, The Principles of International 
Law, 3d rev. ed., (Boston, D. C. Heaton & Co., 1909), p. 121 
63 to even the most outrageous inequities, that are committed in a State, cannot provide 
another (state) with a legal ground for unilateral intervention against the former; for no state is 
entitled to pass judgment upon another". See J-P. L. Fonteyne, "The Customary International 
Law Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention: Its Current Validity Under the U. N. Charter", 4 
Cal. W. I. L. J., (1975), p. 203, at p. 217 
64 26 U. N. SCOR, 1606 mtg., (4.10.1971), para. 175 
65 Ibid., para. 194 
66 26 U. N. GAOR, Plen. Mtgs, 2003nd mtg, para. 302 
67 34 U. N. SCOR, 2109th mtg, 12/1/1979, para. 36; The ASEAN Foreign Ministers "strongly 
deplored the armed intervention against the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
Kampuchea". U. N. Doc., A/ 13205,12/l/1979, p. 2 
6s Fonteynne, supra note 63, p. 246 
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adamantly prescriptive, whereas the practice is conciliatory, by appealing to 
standards of morality. 69 Such a position, nonetheless, does not redeem legal 
discourse from confusion, it only redeems our moral revulsion towards 
inhumanity. Those writers who adopt that dual approach regard themselves 
positivists but diverge from one of the most important premises of this 
philosophy which is the distinction of "is" and "ought". By blurring the lex 
lata with the lex ferenda, the law which "is" with that which "ought to be , 70, 
they obscure the legal clarity and predictability of which they consider 
themselves guardians. 
IV. AUSTIN'S COMMAND THEORY AND THE REPUDIATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
IV. 1 Law as command. As we have explained above, the consolidation of state 
power has attributed both an internal and an external aspect to sovereignty. 
The two aspects were at their excesses illimitable or, concerning the external 
aspect, limited by consent which emanates from sovereignty and is an aspect 
thereof. The application of notions of internal and external sovereignty was 
quite unfortunate in the field of international law and had contributed to 
confusion and erroneous conclusions. In addition, the concept of sovereignty 
transgressed the legal plain and became a political notion, whose identification 
engaged theorists. In fact, the political circumstances prevailing in Europe 
assisted in assimilating the political and legal notions of sovereignty which 
moved slowly towards absolutism. Austin, reflecting that climate, becomes an 
ardent expositor of a sovereign as the source of law and wrote that 
66 
..... 
every positive law, or every law strictly so called, is a direct or 
circuitous command of a monarch or sovereign number in the character 
69 Q Wright, "The Legality of Intervention under the United Nations Charter", 51 Proc. A. S. I. L., 
(1957), p. 79, at p. 81; L. Henkin, "Remarks", 66 Proc. A. S. I. L., (1972), p. 95, at p. 96. See also 
statements by Franck and Frey in R. B. Lillich, Humanitarian Intervention and the United 
Nations, (Charlottesville, Virginia University Press, 1973), pp. 64,107-8 
70 J. N. Moore, in Lillich, ibid., pp. 121-122 
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of a political superior: that is to say, a direct or circuitous command of a 
monarch or sovereign number to a person or persons in a state of 
subjection to its author. And being a command (and therefore flowing 
from a determinate source), every positive law is a law proper, or a law 
properly so called. "71 
In a nutshell, positive law should contain a sovereign, a command, and a 
sanction. These three facts could be assimilated to the social fact of power. 
Law is power. 72 
Austin's definition of law has contributed to a debate which has preoccupied 
legal theorists and whose outcome is either rejection or reconciliation. As an 
illustration, the concept of command which is pivotal in his theory is 
objectionable. Austin reduces and personifies the command relation by 
identifying a sovereign. However, in modem states the commanding authority 
is diffuse. Furthermore, the interrelation of sovereign and command implies a 
psychological element, whereas the command should be impersonal for legal 
purposes. This latter observation signifies the disparity with Kelsen's theory, 
whereby law is normative and de-psychologised. 73 
Another issue concerns the division of law and morality. Austin defines the 
matter of jurisprudence as "positive law; law simply and strictly so called: or 
law set by political superiors to political inferiors". 74 The legal character of a 
rule is affirmed irrespective of its contradiction with ethical imperatives. 
Austin said that 
"human laws which conflict with the Divine are not binding, that is to 
say, are not laws, is to talk nonsense. The most pernicious laws, and 
therefore those which are most opposed to the will of God, have been 
and are continually enforced as laws by judicial tribunals. Suppose an 
act innocuous, or positively beneficial, be prohibited by the sovereign 
under the penalty of death; if I commit this act, I shall be tried and 
'1 J. Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined and the Uses of the Study of 
Jurisprudence, (London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1955), p. 134, hereinafter cited as The 
Province 
72 "....... the term superiority signifies might". J. Austin, The Province, p. 24 
" GTLS, pp. 33-36. Olivecrona uses the term "independent imperatives". K. Olivecrona, Law 
as Fact, (Ejnar Monksgaard, 1939), pp. 42-43 
74 J. Austin, The Province, p. 9 
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condemned, and if I object to the sentence, that it is contrary to the law 
of God, who has commanded that human lawgivers shall not prohibit 
act which have no evil consequences, the Court of Justice will 
demonstrate the inconclusiveness of my reasoning by hanging me up, in 
pursuance of the law of which I have impugned the validity". 75 
The purely formalistic attitude towards law inscribed in the above passage 
invokes the limitations of and positivism to engulf societal expectations and 
also presents a point for disparaging Kelsen's theory. In international law, such 
a formal approach has contributed to schizophrenic arguments concerning 
humanitarian interventions. As a matter of principle, humanitarian intervention 
is proscribed tout court, because, according to the U. N. Charter: (i) Article 
2(4) includes a general prohibition on the use of force; (ii) Article 51 permits 
self-defence only when an armed attack occurs and (iii) more often than not, 
humanitarian interventions are not a Security Council action under Chapter 
VII. Having said, that and faced with humanitarian disasters of the magnitude 
of Uganda, Kampuchea, Bangladesh or Rwanda, opponents of humanitarian 
interventions resort to sophistries in order to address issues of humanism and 
decency. In such cases, a perceived technical breach of Article 2(4) vies to 
reconcile the morality of the action which might hence be "more or less 
condonable". 76 The dilemma between formal illegality and moral acceptability 
remains unresolved, because an and text has impaired the possibility of 
comprehensive legal reasoning. 
IV. 2 The sovereign authority. Austin's definition of sovereign and 
independent states is Hobbesian in character and rather circular. The positive 
and negative attributes of "sovereign" designate the state as independent, 
whereas the latter does not exist without a sovereign. According to Austin "..... 
the notions of sovereignty and independent political society may be expressed 
concisely thus. 
- 
If a determinate human superior, not in the habit of obedience 
to a like superior, receive habitual obedience from the bulk of a given society, 
's J. Austin, The Province, p. 185 
76 See statement by W. Friedmann, in R. B. Lillich, Humanitarian Intervention and the United 
Nations, (Charlottesville, Virginia University Press, 1973), p. 115. Also, ibid, pp. 64,107- 
108,114 and statements by T. Farer, ibid., p. 151 and I. Brownlie, ibid., pp. 139-148; T. M. 
Franck, N. S. Rodley, "After Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian Intervention by Military 
Force", 67 A. J. I. L., (1973), p. 275, at p. 278 
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that determinate superior is sovereign in that society and the society (including 
the superior) is a society political and independent...... `By an independent 
political society' or `an independent and sovereign nation', we mean a political 
society consisting of a sovereign and subjects, as opposed to a political society 
which is merely subordinate. , 77 
The positive aspect of sovereignty is that of habitual obedience by the bulk of 
a given society whereas the negative is the sovereign's lack of obedience to 
any other superior. Habitual obedience is similar to the "minimum 
effectiveness" commanded by the Basic Norm and introduced by Kelsen. It 
triggers the same objection as to whether the separation of law and morality is 
absolute or whether such definition addresses wider sociological observations. 
It is also obvious from such definition of a legal system 
- 
apart from its 
internal inconsistencies 
- 
that international law has no place. The sovereigns 
within each state are by definition devoid of any legal constraint and outside 
the application of this law. International law lacks a sovereign which could 
give coherence to the system and, concerning its applicability, it is impeded by 
the presence of particular sovereigns. Hence, the preassumption of a 
monolithic sovereign denies legal character to international law, in 
contradistinction to the presumption of the Basic Norm in Kelsen's system 
which does the opposite. The recognition of the initial customary character of 
international law which always played an important justificatory role in 
Kelsen's and Hart's jurisprudence, fails to persuade Austin of the legal 
character of that law. According to Austin, customs are transformed into legal 
rules by judges or legislatures. 78 The dismissal of international law even as 
customary law may be excused in an era where international institutionalised 
judicial bodies were absent, but such a position cannot be adopted today where 
customary rules of international law are recognised and applied by 
international tribunals. 79 
" J. Austin, The Province, pp. 194-195 
78 J. Austin, The Province, pp. 31-32 
79 The Case of the S. S. "Lotus ", P. C. I. J., Ser. A., Part 2, Judgment No. 10, (1927), p. 1, at p. 18; 
Asylum Case, I. C. J. Rep., (1950), p. I at p. 266; North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, I. C. J. Rep., 
(1969), p. 3, at pp. 41-50, paras. 70-92; Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in 
and against Nicaragua, L CJ Rep., (1986), p. 4, at pp. 95-104, paras. 178-195; A. A. D'Amato, 
The Concept of Custom in International Law, (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1971) 
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IV. 3 Bentham 's definition of law and humanitarian intervention. Bentham's 
less dogmatic definition of sovereignty admits the possibility of legal 
limitations. Although the sovereign authority could not have in principle 
"assignable bounds", 80 recognised exceptions refer to the "express convention" 
defined as : "....... the case where one state, has, upon terms, submitted itself to 
the government of another: or where the governing bodies of a number of 
states agree to take directions in certain specified cases, from some body or 
other that is distinct from all of them: consisting of members, for instance, 
appointed out of each". 81 This restriction, contrary to Austin's illimitable habit 
of obedience, springs from the subjects' limited disposition for obedience. 82 
The consequences are tantalising concerning human rights conventions. They 
enshrine limitations on the executive power or a disposition for resistance by 
the subjects when the covenants are implemented incorrectly. This position is 
reinforced by Bentham's discussion of the "droit politique". Concerning "les 
lois qui portent directement sur le pouvoir supreme du souverain", they consist 
of privileges "reserves ou accordes a la masse originaire de la nation: comme 
liberte de conscience, liberte de culte, droit de port d'armes, droit de 
confederation etc. "83 Their enforcement depends on "peines naturelles", 
however, there are instances of "peines plus determinees et pour ainsi dire 
palpables. 1. Lorsque les privileges dont il s'agit ont pour garant un souverain 
etranger. 2. Lorsque le souverain qui les accorde se trouve membre d'un corps 
politique de souverains....... 
. 
Dans ce dernier cas il ya meme lieu pour 
procedure. "84 The penalties being unspecified, the options remain open from 
institutional or conventional actions to unilateral humanitarian actions. The 
undertaking of a foreign sovereign to ensure the protection of those privileges 
has wider implications than the mere protection of nationals by their national 
s0 J. Bentham, A Fragment on Government, (Oxford, B. Blackwell, 1967), ch. 4, para. 26 
81 Ibid., ch. 4, para. 23 
82 H. L. A. Hart, Essays on Bentham, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1982), p. 231: "..... the 
importance of an express convention in limiting the authority of a supreme legislature was 
derivative from what he takes to be the fundamental fact of the subjects' limited habitual 
obedience". H. L. A. Hart, "Bentham on Sovereignty", 2 Irish Jurist, (1967), p. 327, at pp. 330- 
332 
83 J. Bentham, Projet d 'un corps complet de droit, cited by J. H. Burns, "Bentham on 
Sovereignty: An Exploration", in M. H. James (ed. ), Bentham and Legal Theory, (N. I. L. Q., 
1973), p. 133, at p. 144 
84 Ibid., p. 144 
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state. It has natural law implications as a measure of abidance to principles 
which are enforced by a foreign power representing world community. 
IV. 4 Austin 's repudiation of international law. We are not going to deal with 
the other political or legal repercussions of Austin's legal fiction of a 
sovereign but only those which pertain to international law. The sovereign 
could be characterised as a "constructive metaphor"85 similar to that of 
Kelsen's Basic Norm. It provides the legal system with unity and explains the 
basis of legal science. Both systems are based, therefore, on a fiction, an 
hypothesis for the origination of a legal system; that is to say, an "as if,. 86 
Under this legal assumption it was difficult to accommodate international law. 
Austin considered international law to be "positive morality". Austin wrote: 
"they (writers on the Law of Nations) have confounded positive international 
morality, or the rules which actually obtain among civilised nations 
..... 
with 
their own vague conceptions of international morality as it ought to be 
...... 
87 
We should, nevertheless, recognise Austin's theoretical consistency, whereas 
Kelsen, who might have reached a similar conclusion, circumvents the issue 
by introducing debatable sanctions such as war and reprisals. 
Austins's definition of international law has caused disillusionment. 
International lawyers denigrated Austin and resolved to prove the legal 
character of their occupation. Hence, they elevated his theory inadvertently as 
the ultimate legal definition. The realist theory of international law shares a 
common denominator with that of Austin's. International law does not satisfy 
the definition of law as "organised force" emanating from certain authorities, 
coupled with sanctions. 88 It, thus, exists only as a compendium to common 
interests or to the balance of power. The decentralised character of 
international law discredits any legal definition, whereas a political one 
appears more appropriate for the realists. However, a less charitable look at 
Austin's theory of sovereign command reveals its inadequacy, considering the 
fact that command does not account for all the legal rules, even in domestic 
85 J. W. Harris, Law and Legal Science, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1979), pp-31-32 
"Ibid., pp. 31-33,78-79 
87 J. Austin, The Province, pp. 187,127,141-142,200-201 
88 H. J. Morgenthau, "Positivism, Functionalism, and International Law", 34 A 
. 
J. I. L. 
, 
(1940), 
p. 260, at pp. 273-278 and Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace. 6th 
ed., revised by K. W. Thompson, (N. Y., McGraw-Hill Publ. Co., 1985), pp. 295-296 
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systems. Another misconstruction concerns the perspectives involved in the 
promulgation of the theory. Austin measured international law by the model of 
state law, confusing their different premises. Since then, international lawyers 
have tried to prove the existence of international legal order under the familiar 
concepts of municipal law. This was a gross mistake because the domestic 
system is vertical, pyramidical, unlike the international system which is 
horizontal. 89 As was accurately pointed out by Richard Falk: "...... the more 
familiar vertical structure of the domestic legal order is taken as the model for 
the optimum international order. Mere characteristics of the domestic legal 
order are transformed into prerequisites for international order. The acceptance 
of either vertical model as a decisive test of the existence of legal order 
generates irrelevant cynicism as to the stabilising claims of international 
law. 1190 
IV. 5 The role of custom 
- 
humanitarian intervention. In this section, we shall 
raise some points relating to humanitarian intervention, although running the 
risk of plunging into the debate of proving the legal character of international 
law. 91 One important topic concerns Austin's treatment of custom, because 
custom is a primary source of international law and also of humanitarian 
intervention. Austin classifies custom as positive morality until it is recognised 
by a judicial decision, the sovereign or a subordinate legislature. His treatment, 
though, of judicial precedents which are functionally similar to custom, is 
different. They have legal force under a presumption of "tacit" adoption by the 
sovereign. Inferentially, when the legislature or the judicial process prescribes 
the requirements for the legal recognition of custom, the latter should become 
law even if the particular custom has not been recognised explicitly. In 
Austin's terminology, the adoption by the sovereign is presumed when they 
89 "Dominant legal theories all relate to the legal order of vertical systems 
..... 
on which there is a 
vertical or hierarchical relationship between unequal centers of power. This is in contrast to 
systems in which there is a horizontal or non hierarchical order between equal centers of 
power". G. Gotlieb, "The Nature of International Law: Towards a Second Concept of Law", in 
C. Black & R. A. Falk, The Future of the International Order, vol. 1II, (Princeton, Princeton 
University Press, 1972), p. 331, at p. 332 
90 R. A. Falk, "International Jurisdiction: Horizontal and Vertical Conceptions of Legal Order", 
32 Temple L. Q., (1959), p. 295, at p. 297 
91 "I suggest that we lawyers, in uncritically accepting the command theory and applying it to 
international law have ourselves been guilty of woolly thinking". R. Fisher, "Bringing Law to 
Bear on Governments", 74 Harv. L. Rev., (1961), p. 1130, at p. 1132 
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satisfy the institutional criteria and, hence, they become laws. International law 
contains the criteria for identifying custom legally and, additionally, criteria 
for the derivation of this same law. 92 Consequently, humanitarian intervention 
should be law because it satisfies the customary criteria, whereas the same 
argument attributes also legal quality to international law. Had Austin 
generalised this argument, he would have accepted international law, although 
it does not fit into his initial definition of law. Alternatively, he could have 
reached the same result, had he contemplated the acceptance of international 
law by the particular sovereigns who identify the municipal system. The 
incorporation of customary law into municipal law solves the problem of its 
enforceability and sanctioning. Although Austin's requirements refer mainly to 
statute law, by undervaluing custom, he ostracised a large amount of law. 93 
Unfortunately, it seems that international law received a rudimentary and 
rather unintelligent treatment. In contrast, later theorists like Kelsen have 
based the legal character of international law on a pyramidical system with the 
Grundnorm at the apex and on a sanctioning process or, like Hart, on its 
customary acceptance. 
IV. 6 The role of sanction: Austin and Kelsen. A problem related to the 
identification of law with enforcement is the jurisprudential treatment of war. 
In continental jurisprudence, it was Jehring who acknowledged that the 
sanctioning process constitutes the legal character of a proposition. In 
international law it was unregulated, unorganised force, which provided the 
legal character of international law. 94 T. A. Walker, a contemporary of Austin, 
is critical of the latter's repudiation of international law. He introduces war as 
the final sanction, building upon the analogy with municipal law. 95 Moreover, 
Salmond admits a double medium of enforcement: "international opinion and 
force" 96 
. 
92 Article 38 (1) (b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice 
93 L. Stephen, The English Utilitarian, vol. III, (London, Duckworth and Co., 1900), p. 328: 
"Custom is not really the creature of law, but law the product of custom", and p. 331: ....... 
seeks to explain the first state of society by the last, instead of explaining the last by the first". 
94 R. von Jehring, Law as a Means to an End, I. Husic trans, (Boston, Boston Book Comp., 
1913), pp. 242-244 
95 T. A. Walker, The Science of International Law, (London, Stevens & Sons, 1893), pp. 1-56; 
J. B. Scott, "The Legal Nature of International Law", 1 A. JJ. L., (1907), p. 831 
96 J. W. Salmond, Jurisprudence, 6th ed., (London, Sweet & Maxwell Ltd., 1920), p. 62 
88 
We shall pursue in this section an analysis of the jurisprudential function of 
sanction in international law, because we can trace implications for subsequent 
legal theories. It should be observed initially that the sanction orientation is 
methodologically similar to Austin's definition of law97 and shares an 
unwarranted analogy with municipal law. Sanctions are elements of the 
municipal concept of law and international law should provide sanctions in 
order to be called "proper law". However, the sanctioning process in 
international law can be threefold. It could be identified, firstly, as a hybrid 
"dedoublement fonctionnel", secondly, as Hartian and, thirdly, as Austinian- 
Kelsenian. The first aspect of the sanctioning process is explained by the 
function of the municipal courts in administering and enforcing international 
law. As we said above, the incorporation of international law into municipal 
law addresses the problem of its enforceability successfully. The Haitian 
aspect is explained by the fact that principles of international law secure 
obedience through international opinion. Although sanctions may well be 
inadequate, people and states feel bound by international rules. There exists a 
censor morum. The third aspect culminates in war which, as a sanction in 
itself, or, as a threat thereof, secures obedience. 98 At this point, the difference 
between Austin and Kelsen arises. Sanction is an independent and external 
element of the rule but for Austin, actual enforcement is a prerequisite, 
whereas for Kelsen it is an "ought". As we shall explain later, Kelsen's 
position is nuanced by the inclusion of efficacy. 
Returning to the argument which holds war as a sanction, we should submit 
that it is circuitous and contradictory. War and force are presented as agents 
for law enforcement but also simultaneously for law abridgement. In the 
second instance, they are conditions for sanctions, that is, again war. It is also 
97 Bentham, on the other hand, did not initiate that fallacy but distinguished war from 
sanction because the latter is "directed by design". J. Bentham, The Limits of Jurisprudence 
Defined, Ch. W. Everett (ed. ), (1945), p. 152 cited in G. Schwarzenberger, "Bentham's 
Contribution to International Law and Organisation", in G. W. Keeton, G. Schwarzenberger, 
Jeremy Bentham and the Law, (London, Stevens & Sons, 1948), p. 152, at p. 160 
98 See R. Wildman's Institute of International Law, vol.!, pp. 31-32, cited in J. B. Scott, "The 
Legal Nature of International Law", 1 A. JI. L., (1907), p. 831, at p. 865: "The inadequacy of 
its sanctions is an imperfection which attaches to international law in common with all other 
law; 
..... 
Opinion and force are the only sanctions of law, and international and municipal 
law, so far as the former is capable of being administered by judicial tribunals, are in this 
respect not distinguishable". 
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fallacious because the sanctioning process in municipal law is centralised and 
institutionalised, whereas in international law it is defuse. Hesitancy towards 
this argument also proceeds from the indeterminacy and non-elucidation of the 
circumstances which constitute law abridgement. 
Kelsen argues from the same analogy when he concludes that international law 
is real law due to the existence of palpable sanctions. For him, war is either a 
sanction or a delict and although he admits that there may be no concrete 
determination, it does not concern him: "Law is, by its very nature, a coercive 
order. A coercive order is a system of rules prescribing certain patterns of 
behaviour by providing coercive measures, as sanctions, 
....... 
The specific 
sanctions provided by general international law are reprisals and war. "99 This 
line of argument is paradoxical. International law proceeds in a constant and 
persistent manner to eliminate war and at the same time it would appear as 
legalising it as a faculty for performing legal enforcement. It can also be said 
that by rejecting this paradox, we are bound to recognise that international law 
is less enforceable today. As it was observed: "It now frowns on self-help, 
without however, as yet having put anything in its place". 10° In addition, if a 
"minimum of effectiveness" is required for the validity of a legal system, is the 
validity of international law decided inclusively by the sanctioning force? 
Chapter VII of the U. N. Charter contains enforcement action with the purpose 
of maintaining or restoring peace which is different from the role of sanction. 
This conclusion should not impinge on the legal character of international law 
if we are cognisant of the fact that our adopted concept of law is subjective. 
This concept hypostasizes one element of law only, that of sanction, which is 
also treated as the sine qua non attribute of law. 1°' On this account, Kelsen 
99 H. Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations, (London, Stevens & Sons Ltd, 1951), pp. 706-707; 
H. Kelsen, "Theorie du Droit International Public", 84 R. C., (1953 111), p. 1, at pp. 31-50 
goo G. G. Fitzmaurice, "The Foundations of the Authority of International Law", 19 Modern 
L. Rev., (1956), p.!, at p. 8; H. Kelsen & R. W. Tucker, Principles of International Law, 2nd rev. 
ed., (N. Y., Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1968), p. 87: "In the last analysis, however, criticism of 
any attempt to restrict the right of self-help, while failing to provide those institutions which 
would render self-help unnecessary, rests upon a reading of history that can hardly be regarded 
as self evident. The interpretation must be that more often than not the individual use of force by 
States has served the purposes of law and that to restrict States in the measures of self-help they 
may take must seriously jeopardize the prospect of ever achieving a satisfactory and effective 
rule of law in international society". 
101 G. L. Williams, "International Law and the Controversy Concerning the Word "Law", 22 
B. Y. B. I. L., (1945), p. 146, at pp. 156-158 
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failed to provide sufficient justification as to whether sanctioning is the only 
criterion for the validity of laws. 102 It should be submitted that the answer to 
this issue should incorporate other considerations as well. 
V. KELSEN AND THE PURE THEORY OF LAW 
V. 1 A pure theory of law? Kelsen proposes a scientific description of law 
which is pure. It aims to "free legal science of all foreign (non legal) 
elements". 103 Kelsen's methodology endeavoured to inoculate law from 
psychological, ethical, moral, sociological or political elements. Their 
participation in natural law is denounced but such purification also marks a 
departure from the sociologist and realist tradition of social behaviour or 
decision making. 104 Kelsen's scientific legal theory is concerned with the 
sources of legal rules. It contains a chain of validation cells which advance to 
the apex of a legal pyramid. Those concatenated cells explain the existence of 
rules and preclude moral considerations. It is a scientific method constructed 
on fallacious premises, for, the object of his study, law, is not purely scientific. 
The character of the object for study determines the methodology of study. 
Maintaining the purity of legal science equivocates in these circumstances to 
pure ideational exposition. '05 
Kelsen is influenced by the Kantian theory of knowledge which presents the 
iconoclastic world as the projection of human mental constructions and 
transmits it into the legal domain. That is, he elucidated a system which assists 
in recognising valid laws. In order to know valid norms we should first have 
an account of validity. The Grundnorm and the method of imputation 
102 T. A. Cowan, "Law Without Force", 59 Cal. L. Rev., (1971), p. 683 
103 H. Kelsen, Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory. A Translation of the First edition of 
the Reine Rechtslehre or Pure Theory of Law, trans. B. L. Paulson, S. L. Paulson, (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1992), para. 1, p. 7 
104 S. L. Paulson, "The Neo-Kantian Dimension of Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law", 12 Oxford 
J. Legal Stud.. (1992), p. 311 
105 J. Raz, "The Purity of the Pure Theory", Revue Internationale de Philosophie, (1983), p. 442, 
at p. 442 
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underpins this effort. 106 According to Kant, the mind constructs certain 
presuppositions which are essential for our cognition of the actual world, and 
interprets phenomena independently of their influence on man's reason. The 
same construction applies to law. We should start from a hypothesis which 
objectifies and legalises the subjective meaning of an act. The chain of 
validation is not casuistic but imputed, that is, the validity of legal norms 
depends on the validity of other norms until we reach the apex of the pyramid 
which is our initial hypothesis. ' 07 Kelsen also adopts a Humistic approach to 
moral imperatives by rejecting the existence of moral absolutes. There exists, 
thus, an analogy with natural law which concerns the method but not its 
characteristics. Both Kelsenian positivism and natural law share a common 
method of legal understanding through regressive links but with different 
objectives. Kelsen achieves imputation whereas natural law achieves 
causation. 1 08 Law is the creation of mental operations and, thus, it is not 
causative but attributive. To put it differently, it is normative, it prescribes 
right conduct in contradistinction to the causality of natural sciences. The 
validity of any rule is not ascertained by reference to facts but only by means 
of derivation from other rules and those rules derive their validity from the 
Grundnorm which is meta-legal and its validity assumed. The Grundnorm 
validates the system but nothing can account for its validity. The logical 
consistency of this system fails to consider the reasons why it is only this 
system which offers correct reasons for validity. '09 It is submitted that there 
are other aspects referring to purposes or ethics which should also be 
considered. 110 
Furthermore, establishing a principle of higher norm which validates the legal 
system implies a reticent naturalist method. As we explained in the previous 
chapter, the law of nature has abandoned absolute ideas and accepted higher 
X06 H. Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law, Max Knight trans. (Berkeley, Calif., University of 
California Press, 1967), p. 72,202-203, hereinafter cited as PTL (1967), 
107 H. Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, trans. A. Wedberg, (Cambridge Mass., Harvard 
University Press, 1949), p. 113: "The Basic Norm of a legal order is the postulated ultimate rule 
according to which the norms of this order are established and annulled, receive or loose their 
validity. " Hereinafter cited as GTLS 
'08 PTL (1967), pp. 76-77 
109 PTL(1967), p. 72 
10 See S. L. Paulson, "Kelsen's Legal Theory: The Final Round", 12 Oxford J. Legal Stud., 
(1992), p. 265 
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ideas. These ideas can be transformed to positive higher norms during the 
process of societal organisation and, hence, the difference will disappear. 
There are also other similarities with natural law. Kelsen constructs an a priori 
assumption whose codification is contingent to the findings of empirical 
observation and it implies a deduction of "ought" from "is" statements. The 
only solace against the implication of subjectivity in this construction is to 
accept the purity of his model from the Grundnorm onwards. 
According to Kelsen, the Grundnorm should command a "minimum of 
effectiveness", a minimum of support. Otherwise it is replaced by another 
which presumably commands support under reappraised circumstances. 
Effectiveness contains two conditions: (i) that the norm is applied and (ii) that 
it is obeyed. ' 12 Acknowledging the possibility of altering an ineffective 
Grundnorm, we should question not only the purity of the system but also the 
premises which command effectiveness. Is justice or morality a prerequisite 
for maintaining an effective Grundnorm and is there an urge towards altering 
it whenever it is defunct? Admitting that the Grundnorm should partake of 
these values, the whole system built thereupon is consequently based on such 
ethical positions. Moreover, the Kelsenian norm takes the form: "if X. then Y 
ought to happen". Indirectly, sanction Y underlines a value in the prescription 
of X. It shows that the distinction between the "is" and the "ought" is not 
tenable in his theory. The factual statement contained in the first part of the 
hypothesis produces a normative "ought" by the imposition of sanctions. One 
can evidence here a latent natural law tenet. It also introduces a further 
compromise in his jurisprudence. If, for legal promulgation, a sanction ought 
to be delivered when the conditions apply, then effectiveness is an unsuitable 
requirement for legal validity. Effectiveness is concerned with the probability 
of a sanction being imposed and consequently reformulates Kelsen's norm 
I' Kelsen appears to admit that there is no difference: "The reason for the validity of law is 
according to (natural/positive law) a hypothetical basic norm...... The only difference is that 
the validity for which the basic norm of legal positivism furnishes the reason is the validity of 
the positive law, its own validity". H. Kelsen, "What is the Reason for the Validity of Law', 
in D. S. Constantopoulos, C. Th. Eustathiades, C. N. Fragistas, Grundprobleme Des 
Internationalen Rechts. Festschrift für Jean Spiropoulos, (Bon, Schimmelbusch & Co., 
1957), p. 257, at p. 261 
"2 PTL (1967), p. 11 
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into: "if X, then Y is to happen". Be that as it may, the problem concerning the 
content and formation of the Grundnorm still remains. 
V. 2 The status of the Grundnorm. The Grundnorm is presupposed in juristic 
thinking. Kelsen variegates terms in his characterisation of that norm: 
presupposed, hypothetical, fictional. This norm is not posited (gesetzt) but 
meta-legal (vorausgesetzt). It is legal through its function of attributing 
objective validity to subjective acts. ' 13 If we consider the Basic Norm an 
hypothesis, it might mean a supposition that could be verified. That does not 
concern Kelsen. On the contrary, he employs the Grundnorm as a device for 
explaining the logic of legal science 114 and on that account it is similar to the 
Vaihingerian philosophy of "As if'. The Grundnorm is the fictive construct of 
the mind which assists the discursive thought while the existing materials fail 
in that function. ' 15 
According to this reasoning, there are similarities between natural law and the 
meta-legal device of his positive theory. Both resort for validation or initiation 
to extra-legal principles in the form of either the Grundnorm or God, Nature or 
Reason. The resemblance extends also to the mode of delivering this highest 
norm. It is the end of syllogism when the human mind declines further 
syllogism. Consequently, it is an indispensable mental construction for the 
validation of a legal system. The discrepancy refers mainly to the character of 
those sources. The Grundnorm is a human mental construction, a syllogism for 
the explanation of legal phenomena, whereas God is a superhuman ontology 
that conveys with it more than logical constructions. 
V. 3 The formation of the Grundnorm. The formation of the Grundnorm, that is 
the articulation of a certain, specific Grundnorm, is enigmatic. Kelsen made 
the assertion that it is introduced by legal cognition which hence "purifies" the 
system. Nevertheless, the purity of his construction could not be maintained 
because the choice of the Grundnorm is not an act of cognition. It is an act of 
will or intuition, whereas what is presupposable is an act of cognition. Those 
"' H. Kelsen, "Professor Stone and the Pure Theory of Law", 17 Stanford L. Rev., (1965), 
1130, at p. 1141 ý" 
J. W. Harris, Law and Legal Science, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 78-79 
"` I. Stewart, "The Basic Norm as Fiction", Jurid. Rev., (1980), p. 199 
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two different mental operations should be distinguished and cognitive quality 
should not be attributed to the Grundnorm, only to the action for its 
articulation. The Grundnorm as the outcome of cognitive activity is itself an 
act of volition and, therefore, is relative and subjective. 
It is useful in applying Kelsen's theory to start with an appreciation of the 
social order or an observation of those physical facts which constitute the 
meaning of a legal order. It is necessary then to trace and connect the initial 
social condition which amounts to or explains the existing order. The 
Grundnorm furnishes the analysis of a legal system with coherence and unity 
by objectifying the subjective meaning of acts. If the Grundnorm presupposes 
a social context 
- 
though it is itself a mental construction 
- 
and is related to the 
efficacy of the legal order, its formation could not avoid "impurity". The 
description of its formation could be as follows. Because that particular social 
system is legal and efficacious, because there is a particular pattern of legal 
mentality, then the Basic Norm should be x. Hence, the Grundnorm is the 
legal expression of a social conjecture. It is a logical, abstracted deduction 
from a factual situation. 
The description of its formation leaves a mysterious aura in regard to its 
standing, and Kelsen's interpretation is not apt in conveying a definite 
signification. The Grundnorm could be extra-systematic, the apex of the legal 
pyramid and hence not socially conditioned, or intra-systematic' 16 and 
construed from the systematic legal structure. If the latter is the case, the social 
context impinges on the purity of his theory. If the former is the case, then the 
impasse is obvious. The function of the Grundnorm is to concretise an 
aggregation of norms to a system of law but we cannot do that unless we 
identify the Grundnorm and we cannot have the latter unless we demarcate a 
legal system in order to find the Grundnorm. 117 They both exist in a dialectical 
relation. The difficulty arises because the articulation of the Grundnorm entails 
a simultaneous deduction and abstraction, it involves observation and 
16 J. Stone, "Mystery and Mystique in the Basic Norm", 26 Modern L. Rev., (1963), p. 34, at 
44-46 ýý 
J. Stone, Legal System and Lawyers' Reasoning, (Sydney, Maitland Publ. PTY Ltd, 1968), 
p. 130: "..... for it is ex hypothesis impossible to determine whether they are legal norms, until the 
apex norm is determined. " 
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departure from facts. As was observed by H. Lauterpacht: "The tension 
between the factual and the normative must not be too great (if the 
fundamental rule is to retain its usefulness), just as it ought not to be too small 
(if law is to remain a normative as distinguished from the explicative 
sciences). "' 18 
V. 4 Validity of the Basic Norm. The Grundnorm is a peculiar construction of 
factual abstraction or factual pre-assumption. For Kelsen, as soon as the 
Grundnorm is deducted, its abstraction is absolute. The Grundnorm then 
becomes a "depsychologised command" and in common with the initial 
assumption of natural law, its validity is presupposed because there is no other 
validity tracing process against which the validity of the former can be 
examined. "It is not 
..... 
valid because it is created in a certain way by a legal 
act, but it is valid because it is presupposed to be valid; and it is presupposed 
to be valid because without this presupposition no human act could be 
interpreted as legal, especially as a norm 
- 
creating act". 119 The difference 
from natural law lies in the fact that the provided standard of validity is more 
stable. The initial assumption of natural law can create and discard legal 
validity whimsically. The Grundnorm attributes legal signification to acts, it 
determines the participation of a rule in a legal system and it is not 
metaphysical in its creation, although it acquires a position of initial 
assumption. Having said that, much of Kelsen's aversion to natural law leaves 
a lot to be desired. 
The Grundnorm is functioning as a methodological instrument for the creation 
of legal objects, and, thus, absolute principles are absent from its grounding. 
We have also seen that natural law has distanced itself from this tradition. On 
another occasion, we explained above that it is logically and practically 
indispensable for the Grundnorm to concur with the actual experience of a 
system; an aspect identical with the tenet of the "classical" natural law theory 
according to which observation of facts yields the "ought" rules. This 
argument, restricted now only to the Grundnorm, could be characterised as 
18 H. Lauterpacht, "Kelsen's Pure Science of Law", in W. I. Jennings (ed. ), Modern Theories of 
Law, (London, Oxford University Press, 1933), p. 105, at p. 1 I1 
9 GTLS, p. 116 
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ascending because it is directed towards its formation. A second, descending 
argument concerns the application of the Grundnorm to physical occurrences 
which it eventually objectifies. The factual situation does not give rise to legal 
statements; they are only organised into an intelligible system by the 
application of the Grundnorm. Hence, it plays the role of authorising legal 
rules in a process of concretisation. That connection apart, the context of the 
legal system is not a matter of concern, whereas in natural law the content of a 
rule is a matter of evaluation according to the initial assumption. However, 
natural lawyers do not arrive at the same conclusions on this point: some hold 
that unjust laws are not valid laws whereas others like Finnis or Aquinas 
before him do not deny legal validity to unjust laws. But content is not the 
only important connection with morality. Kelsen fails to address the question 
of whether, for an efficacious system, obedience is achieved through morality. 
It seems that there is room to make such connection at least on the reduced 
point of whether obedience as such is morally required, but not the wider 
question of what induces obedience. 
VI. KELSEN ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 
VI. 1 Monism and the link between international and national law: 
effectiveness or human rights? Kelsen elevates the determining principle of 
national legal orders to a higher evaluative system, which is now international 
law. He chooses a monist system because this model corresponds with his 
methodological assumptions and aesthetic views. 120 He acknowledges the 
heuristic character of his universalistic model, but that does not concern him 
from a legal point of view, though "from the point of view of political 
ideology the choice is important". 121 Kelsen purports to achieve the unity of 
legal knowledge avoiding discontinuities which might be incurred had the 
120 'Both systems are equally correct and equally justified. It is impossible to decide between 
them on the basis of the science of law". PTL (1967), pp. 345-346 
12 1 GTLS, p. 398 
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national systems formed their Grundnorm separately and individually. This 
being aspirational, it raises the question of whether the unity should be 
grounded or dictated. Kelsen prefers the latter, which corresponds to his ideal 
of an "enveloping legal community , 122 but confuses the question of the legal 
character of international law with that of its authority between equal states. 
Hence, the primacy of international law is compatible with the equality of 
states by presupposing a higher authority which realises it. If states are equal, 
then a norm pertaining to a higher order should bestow equality by delineating 
their area of valid jurisdiction. That norm can be defined as the intermediate 
norm which links national and international order, and for Kelsen it is the 
principle of effectiveness. Effectiveness determines the validity of national 
orders by endowing them with legality. Being a principle of international law, 
it embraces all valid national legal orders which are contained consequently in 
international law. The system then has a solid appearance. Effectiveness as 
both national and international property is the uniting principle which 
attributes also pre-eminence to international law. 
"The reason for the validity of the individual national legal order can be 
found in positive international law. In that case, a positive norm is the 
reason for the validity of this legal order not merely a presupposed 
norm. 
...... 
a government which, independent of other governments, 
exerts effective control over the population of a certain territory, is the 
legitimate government; and that the population that lives under such a 
government in this territory constitutes a "state" in the meaning of 
international law, 
...... 
Translated into legal language: A norm of general 
international law authorises an individual or a group of individuals, on 
the basis of an effective constitution, to create and apply as a legitimate 
government a normative coercive order. That norm, thus, legitimises 
this coercive order for the territory of its actual effectiveness as a valid 
legal order...... 123 
'22 J. Cohen, "The Political Element in Legal Theory: A Look at Kelsen's Pure Theory", 88 Yale 
L. J., (1978), p. 1, at p. 20; W. L. McBride, "The Essential Role of Models and Analogies in the 
Philosophy of Law", 431 V. Y. U. L. Rev, (1968), p. 53, at pp. 62-72 
'23 PTL (1967), pp. 214-215; H. Kelsen, "The Pure Theory of Law and Analytical 
Jurisprudence", 55 Harvard L. Rev., (1941), p. 44, at pp. 66-70 
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Consequently, the intermediate norm for legitimising the position of states 
anticipates effective coercion. This contention is ambiguous and essentially 
dangerous, while it invests effective coercion with disproportionate value. It 
locates the validity of national orders on their potential for effective coercion. 
Monopolisation of coercion is not a sufficient prerequisite for validation 
because it appears that "might makes right". It is important to demonstrate the 
trail of Kelsen's essential, not procedural, mistakes. Legal unity is achieved by 
a dubious principle. Effectiveness is not identical with validity and a domestic 
system is only partly conditioned on effectiveness for validity. Does 
international law command any minimum of effectiveness? If the sanctions 
offered in international law are reprisals and war, then the intellectual dilemma 
approximates the legal essence of the latter. The object of international law is 
to prevent both of them. How do they appear then as justification for the 
legality of international law? Effectiveness is a thin and insufficient link but 
rather a strong element in Kelsen's philosophical standing. Again, the choisist, 
subjective character of his theory, criticised in natural law, reappears. The 
postulate for unity being effectiveness, it would be intolerable not to include in 
that principle an ethical element and also to recognise domestic orders which 
fail in that respect. By choosing indissoluble unity and the primacy of 
international law, Kelsen has given the juristic hypothesis a political core 
which should also be linked with an ethical environment. The state system 
represents subjectivism and for Verdoss that postulate should have an ethical 
as well as a juristic content and it should find its justification in some 
conception of justice. 124 
At this point, we will attempt to rectify the moral indignation which a 
formalistic application of Kelsen's theory may cause by recognising a right of 
humanitarian intervention implicitly accommodated in his theory. If the 
essence of effective law is coerciveness, then sanctions are conditio sine qua 
non. Kelsen's characterisation of law is that sanctions ought to apply when 
certain conditions are satisfied. Extensive maltreatment of people even to 
124 A. Verdross, "Le fondement du droit international", 16 R. C, (1927 I), p. 245, at p. 286: "le 
droit positif est donc, il est vrai, une valeur relative, qui change avec le developpement de la 
civilisation mais tout de meme, il est fonde sur la valeur absolue de l'idee de la justice; comme 
toute valeur relative nest valeur qu'en relation avec une valeur absolue. " 
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genocidal dimensions is not a delict because sanctions are not provided. In that 
case, the legal formalistic inadequacy impinges on the minimum human 
ethical standing. Humanitarian intervention viewed as a sanction in 
international law, which as a primitive legal order resorts to individual state 
sanctioning methods, can attribute a legal character to genocide. 
On the other hand, dismissing an outmoded criterion of effectiveness based on 
coercion is also necessitated by a different perception of state authority. It 
contains two aspects, a radical and a reconciliatory one. The radical aspect 
envisages a novel link between international and national law. It preserves the 
logical underpinnings of Kelsen's theory but the link is now transformed to 
human rights. Human rights norms, either expansive or restricted to the 
protection of essential rights, prominent among them the right to life, have 
become principles of international law. They could consequently function as 
validation norms for domestic systems. Therefore, domestic jurisdictions 
should be evaluated according to their compliance with those norms. That is an 
aspirational model which identifies strong and persistent trends in international 
mentality, but at a jurisprudential level, its actualisation is not hindered by the 
pure theory model. This reconciliatory model retains effectiveness as the link 
ascribing to an ethical imperative as well. The effectiveness of domestic 
systems consequently would reside on the political fact of authority exercised 
in an ethical manner. Human rights protection within systems becomes a 
prerequisite for the effective exercise of power, whereas their abuse, even if it 
contains effective control, de-legitimises effectiveness. 
VI. 2 The Basic Norm in international law. The primacy of international law 
and hence the construction of a unified coherent system, is an affirmation of 
Kelsen's belief in human mental capabilities and the dignity of man. Natural 
law is for him anathema. It is rejected because it includes absolutes. Positive 
law is a man-made law, it surpasses the religious or metaphysical dualism of 
natural law which betrays lack of confidence in human capabilities and 
projects man as the creator of law. 125 
'25 H. Lauterpacht, "Kelsen's Pure Science of Law", in W. I. Jennings (ed. ), Modern Theories of 
Law, (London, Oxford University Press, 1933), p. 105, at pp. 128-131 
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It is disheartening then to admit that his theory, though sympathising with 
human dignity at the level of intellectual potentialities, is lacking human 
dignity at the level of ethical postulates. His legal science is the product of his 
belief in the authority of man, it is initiated from moral premises, but two 
elements should be distinguished. One is the liberation of the method from 
ethical postulates and the other is its liberation from the facts. He believes in 
the creative potentialities of the human mind which does not attempt to depict 
the ideal law of nature but which autonomously creates legal rules, that is, 
positive law. The Grundnorm in Kelsen's articulation has a teleological 
purpose, it is the ultimate end or the regressive beginning and the difference 
from classical natural law is that, contrary to the latter's absolute ideals 
inaccessible to human cognition, Kelsen's norm is accessible. 
The Basic Norm of international law is "coercion of state against state ought to 
be exercised under the conditions and in the manner that conforms with the 
custom constituted by the actual behaviour of states". 126 
The Pure Theory as an "exercise in logic, not in life", presents its limitations in 
the palpitating conditions of international law where enquiries into other 
spheres, beyond the ambit of the pure theory, are invited. The function of the 
Grundnorm is to proffer an objective premise of initiation for his whole 
theory. Nevertheless, its articulation is not independent of state practice. As in 
national law, the Grundnorm is the distillation of experience in the particular 
international context, the principle which explains the present conjecture. And 
because the legally defined body of international law is more limited than that 
of national law, it involves improvisation within those less pure premises. The 
same Grundnorm as custom supports this conclusion if we consider the fact 
that international law has been developed through custom. Custom is the 
rationalisation of actualisation, in other words international la«w is a 
prescription, an "ought", derived from a description, an "is". Kelsen has 
rejected the view that an "ought" can be derived from an "is" which belongs to 
his stigmatised natural law. There is no doubt that humanitarian intervention 
1 26 PTL (1967), }).? 16 
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residing in the customary field of state practice is completely justified under 
Kelsen's theory. 
The contradiction in his Grundnorm now refers to the fact that it could justify 
simultaneously intervention and non-intervention. Equality of states 
fictionalised in the Grundnorm is a premise for non-intervention, whereas the 
Grundnorm as a customary practice is an invitation for humanitarian 
intervention according to the customary law. Another contradiction in his 
theory is his stated aim to liberate it from the "ideological fright" and his use 
of ideology which even the sheer choice of a value neutral theory betrays. He 
is conscious that ideology may be used by those in power for their own 
purposes. 127 True though this might be, the articulation of an ideologically 
tainted Grundnorm fails to liberate his system from the burden of ideology 
unless someone accepts it injudiciously. Ideological subjectivism is a recurrent 
recrimination by those who oppose humanitarian intervention as ideologically 
biased. 128 The opposite position to non-intervention nonetheless is equally 
ideologised. It promotes the attainment of peace, however precarious, as the 
main objective in international law. ' 29 In Chapter Five we have the occasion to 
present the bifurcation of the international legal argument between order/peace 
and justice/human rights. 
Kelsen develops his theory of law in order to sever the relation of law and 
morals. The Grundnorm would be ethically repugnant and cause problems of 
obedience as a morally sterilised imperative. We could find ethical ideas 
which are recognisable in every civilisation. However, each moral system can 
include but a part of those ethical principles. Kelsen failed to address the 
question of whether there exists common values in every relativist morality 
and whether legal systems enshrine those values as did Hart who found a 
minimum content. Kelsen's contingent thesis of denying the connection 
127 GTLS, p. xvii: "The overwhelming interest that those residing in power, as well as those 
craving for power, have in a theory pleasing to their wishes, that is, in a political ideology. " 128 T. M. Franck 
, 
N. S. Rodley, "After Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian Intervention by 
Military Force", 67 A. J. I. L., (1973), p. 275, at p. 304 129 Article 2(4) of the U. N. Charter; G. A Res. 2734 (XXV), 25 U. N. GAOR, Supp. 28, at 22, 
U. N. Doc. A/8028 (1970); I. Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1963), p. 436: "There is even greater agreement and community of 
interest behind the proposition that, in the era of nuclear and thermonuclear armament, self-help 
involves intolerable risks. " 
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between laws and moral values addresses, then, a different question and it 
appears narrowly constructed. 
We could consider the primordial thesis of life as a value for protection. It is 
both ethical and practical and impinges on the minimum content of his 
Grundnorm. If "law is an order of human behaviour"130 then humans are 
presupposed. People are prerequisites for legal order, yet they make the 
political order as well. In such circumstances they should be protected. The 
protection of life is also an essential ethical verity. Kant said that life is a thing 
in itself, necessarily presupposed. Life then bridges legal and moral ideals and 
serves the point where ethical ideals become identical with the "logical 
ideal". 131 
VI. 3 Collective security as constitutionalism: Kelsen; Franck and Bettati. The 
role of the individual and the state. For Kelsen, collective security is the 
security afforded by a social order, national or international. This social order 
is in both cases also a legal order, thence, collective security is legal security, 
that is, security established by law. International security is guaranteed by 
international law which preordains that a law-abiding state will be redeemed in 
case of a violation. ' 32 Following his repeated pattern of employing parallelisms 
between national and international order, security is the common interest 
which federates citizens and states and shares in both national and 
international level common elements such as policing; sanctions; and 
centralisation. 
Legal orders, including collective security systems, provide for sanctions as 
reactions to delicts. ' 33 Collective security gains subsistence in the 
centralisation of the coercive order constituting the legal community. The use 
of force is imputed to the legal community acting through its organs, 
establishing, hence, "a force monopoly of the legal community". 134 
Consequently, the collective character of the security established by the legal 
130 GTLS, p. 3 
' 31 GTLS, p. 440 
132 H. Kelsen, "Collective Security under International Law", in International Law Studies, 
Naval War College, Navpapers 15031, Vol. XLIX, (Washington, Government Printing Office, 
1957), pp. 1-5, hereinafter referred to as NWC 
'' Ibid., pp. 37-38 
134 Ibid., p. 6 
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order enjoys two features: (i) prohibition of the use of force; (ii) collective 
reaction against an illegal use of force. However, due to discrepancies, a 
residue of self-help is admitted within a collective security system. 135 
Kelsen, interestingly, observes that an international organisation which 
establishes a system of international security can request a state to sacrifice the 
lives of its subjects in order to guarantee international security, 136 and that an 
international security organisation which provides for military sanctions 
imposes such an obligation. 1 37 
Contemplating the main features of a collective security system, it should be 
endowed with (i) a centralised procedure for the ascertainment of a delict and 
for determining the party responsible and (ii) centralisation in applying the 
sanctions. 1 38 The former is achieved by transferring the determining power to 
an institutional organ such as the Security Council in the United Nations' 
system. It is also assisted by the rule of law principle which satisfies the legal 
security which pre-established rules rather than principles provide. 1 39 
The second trait in Kelsen's scheme is the centralisation of the use of force as 
a sanction. 140 It can occur at different levels, from low, such as self-help and 
collective self-defence, to high, such as peaceful settlement through judicial 
decisions or collective sanctions. For Kelsen, the execution of sanctions can be 
effectuated by establishing a centralised organ, or, by individual members 
which are authorised by the security organisation to fulfil this function. 141 The 
U. N. Charter envisages such an international security system in Chapter VII. A 
determination of a breach or threat to the peace provokes, initially, collective 
non-coercive measures, or, at a later stage, coercive ones. These measures may 
be executed by the institutions which are provided for by the organisation or 
by individual states under the authorisation of the central organ of the security 
organisation that is, of the Security Council. Hence, cases such as Haiti, 
Rwanda, or Somalia have been deemed as threatening peace and states, 
'" lbicl., p. 7 
1 36 Ibid., p. 4 
1.17 /bid., p. 5 
138 Ibid., pp. 12-14 
139 p. 16 
l4) Ibid., pp. 2 3- 26 
'4' Ibid.. pp. 104-105 
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according to this interpretation, have been authorised to use a variety of 
measures in order to ameliorate the situation. 142 These cases also share in 
common another denominator. They involve human disasters and degradation, 
however, they have been included in the wider framework of peace and 
order. 143 As maintained above, this statement concurs with the observation that 
the U. N. system of collective security works on a delegated basis lacking its 
own means. Threats or breaches of peace either stricto sensu or lato sensu 
containing human rights concerns have been addressed mainly by individual 
states. 
We should, at this point, consider an issue which pertains to the constitutional 
law of the U. N. Charter, however attractive a collective reaction may appear to 
be. Our non-allayed concerns refer to the extend of discretionary power 
enjoyed by the Security Council to authorise forcible humanitarian actions. 
Human rights violations do not necessary constitute practically a threat to the 
peace as the Somali case reveals. If institutionality implies proceduralism, can 
the Security Council overstep the legal confines of Chapter VII which 
delineate the relevant circumstances requiring forcible action? This issue 
involves quests on the character of discretion which can be characterised as 
weak or strong according to Dworkin. ' 44 According to the strong sense of 
discretion, the body which makes decisions can introduce law afresh, 
unconstrained by specific rules. It is only constrained by the procedural rules 
which empower it to make decisions. Following this interpretation, the 
Security Council, which is empowered by the U. N. Charter rules of 
competence to make determinations concerning forcible actions, can 
incorporate human rights violations therein. Hence, there looms the new law 
according to which human rights violations constitute a breach or threat of 
peace involving collective reaction. Consequently, the aforementioned cases 
can be interpreted analogously. In particular, the Somali case, although 
142 S. C. Res. 940, U. N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3413th mtg., U. N. Doc. S/RES/940 (1994), (Haiti); 
S. C. Res. 794, U. N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3145th mtg., U. N. Doc. S/RES/794 (1992), (Somalia); 
S. C. Res. 929, U. N. SCOR, 3393rd mtg., U. N. Doc. S/RES/929 (1994), (Rwanda) 
"' see bellow Chapters Five and Eight 
144 R. M. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (London, Duckworth, 1977), pp. 31-39 
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factually questionable, it has been deemed by the Security Council to entail a 
threat to the peace triggering a collective reaction. '45 
On the other hand, according to the weak interpretation of discretion, the 
authoritative body is constrained by standards and, although its decision is not 
reviewable, it can be accused of misapplying the law. Concerning the area of 
the use of force, the Security Council may be accused of applying the law 
incorrectly. This refers to the standards contained in Chapter VII and which do 
not mention human rights violations or, additionally, to the general standards 
contained in the purposes which mention human rights. A strict adherence to 
institutionality may confine the decision to the applicable by Chapter VII 
standards and, thus, the cases of Haiti, Rwanda or Somalia will appear to be 
un-institutional because human rights concerns are not contained therein. On 
the other hand, employing the general standards included in the Preamble 
allows for a less narrow construction of Chapter VII, henceforth the above 
cases are institutional. Consequently, it should be maintained that, concerning 
this issue, there exists certain confusion among those who adhere to 
institutionalism or, faute de mieux, it is politely ignored. However, they agree 
on the crux of the matter as it has also been observed in the recent practice of 
the Security Council that human rights violations constitute threats or breaches 
of peace. 
In the same vain, the legitimacy of any action assimilated to resort to force is 
discovered according to Thomas Franck "in the discursive processes of the 
(Security) Council' 
. 
146 His institutional approach crumbles when he considers 
national interests in the area of self-defence. 147 Self-defence is an individual 
measure which, denoting a decentralised action, does not sympathise with 
institutionality at the point of its application. On the other hand, it affirms a 
social order because only within such a socio-legal order an exemption of self- 
defence exists. 148 Franck anticipates an institutional decision as to the reasons 
"s The U. N. action was prompted by the "magnitude of human tragedy" caused by the civil 
war which did not by itself pose a danger to international peace. See Chapter Eight, Section 
11.2 
"a T. M. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 
1995), p. 313, hereinafter referred to as Fairness 
"' Ibid., pp. 292-298 
148 NWC, supra, note 132, pp. 26-28 
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and limits of self-defence but any determination will only be ad hoc and ex 
post facto because it extends to the realm of state auto-interpretation of 
relevant circumstances. The requirement of reporting to the Security Council 
according to Article 51 of the U. N. Charter only follows the exercise of the 
right of self-defence and, moreover, self-defence action is exercised until the 
Security Council takes action. Thus, it appears that institutionality cannot 
hinder a unilateral state action. Where his policy considerations are more 
evident and reveal contradictions is when he attempts to accommodate 
anticipatory self-defence within an institutional system. 149 By itself, 
anticipatory self-defence lies at the opposite pole of an institutional system. He 
accepts a residue of validity in the consideration that in a nuclear era 
anticipatory self-defence is permitted but then again, he subjects the 
determination of an imminent attack to an institutional body. This is brimming 
with contradictions. It either assures the opportunity for mutual destruction 
whereby the members of this institutional body authorise one member with the 
nuclear capabilities to annihilate everyone in a pre-emptive nuclear attack, or, 
by retaining their sobriety and wisdom they contain such a right and, therefore, 
practically, emasculate the right of anticipatory self-defence. It is either that 
the institution subscribes voluntarily to a writ of death or the issue of 
anticipatory self-defence becomes a non-issue. In the opposite case where 
anticipatory self-defence should be retained as a possibility within an 
institutional system, it should be conceded that it can be even severely 
circumscribed by the institution, in particular concerning the mode of its 
application. Au contraire, Franck does not distance himself from the traditional 
"state-conscience" of international lawyers when he expects only an 
institutional 
- 
prospective or retrospective 
- 
decision on the bona fides of the 
claim. It seems that all depends on the rhetoric aptitude of the state. ' 50 
149 Fairness, supra, note 146, pp. 266-271 
150 Ibid., p. 267. An "institutional" determination of the reasons which allow for anticipatory 
self-defence and its authorisation would only, according to this writer, diffuse the 
responsibility or guilt for a nuclear Armageddon. It is also interesting to note on this occasion 
that there is no adjudicatory decision on this matter. The International Court of Justice in the 
Nicaragua Case expressed "no view" on the issue of anticipatory self-defence. Case 
Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, I. C. J. Rep.. 
(1986), p. 14, p. 103, para. 194 
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On the issue of humanitarian intervention, Franck resorts to presumptions. 
Faced with the international reality, he requires that a state should first exhaust 
the remedies envisaged in the Charter before resorting to unilateral action. 151 
This is reminiscent of the exhaustion of local remedies rule included in 
international adjudication and now applied to use of force issues. Here, we 
have the opposite, that is, exhaustion of international remedies before the 
employment of unilateral-state remedies. The U. S. unilateral action in Panama 
has been condemned as deficient on this procedural issue, whereas that in Haiti 
was justified as procedurally legitimate. In Chapter Eight we shall explore the 
different justifications offered for these actions and they will be considered 
under the assumption of human dignity. Suffice here to say that these actions 
do not loose their particular-unilateral character even with the stamp of the 
U. N. approval. On the other hand, he employs a sophistry when he says that 
when the Security Council is paralysed and declines decision, this should be 
interpreted as a decision not to pursue any action. ' 52 In the majority of 
analogous cases, lack of decision is credited to political considerations and it 
would be a mistake to imply, as Franck does, that no decision is equivalent to 
a legitimate process. Thus, legitimacy within the collective security system 
could barely hide the role of the state, unless presumptions are employed. It is 
interesting that Franck does not consider the role of the General Assembly in 
circumstances of Security Council paralysis. On this issue, his ideological and 
political influences are more than apparent and concern the well-documented 
power manipulation within the Security Council, whereas for Kelsen, in such 
circumstances, the General Assembly which is more representative is 
empowered to consider the matter. 153 
What is intriguing, additionally, is that Kelsen envisages a court which will 
execute this function of authoritative determination. He acknowledges that this 
function may be exercised by a centralised organ which is also endowed with 
the power to execute sanctions such as it is the Security Council, however, his 
's' Fairness, supra, note 146, p. 272 
152 Ibid., pp. 273-274 
's' NWC, supra, note 132, p. 126. See the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution of the General 
Assembly concerning Korea, G. A. Res. 377,5 U. N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20), U. N. Doc. 
A/RES/377 (1950), p. 10; N. D. White, Keeping the Peace, (Manchester, Manchester 
University Press, 1993), in particular Chapter Five, p. 127 
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preference lies with a judicial body. He attributes any hostility to this proposal 
to particularised state interests which vie to retain their political influence 
within the security organisation, because, otherwise, an independent court, 
having discretion to decide a case, will also include political considerations. 1 54 
Thus, it seems that his collective security organisation is the antipode of the 
United Nations because in his system the judicial organ dominates the 
decisional one that is, the Security Council. 
Inferentially, humanitarian intervention is permitted within the Kelsenian 
collective security system through a wider construction of the preponderant 
aim of preserving peace and is effectuated institutionally either by the 
collective organisation itself or through authorisation. '55 This observation 
recapitulates the trend of the United Nations system which submits the 
humanitarian element into a comprehensive and primary requirement of peace 
and order following the Grotian tradition as it has been explained in the 
previous chapter. 156 
Likewise, concerning humanitarian intervention, Franck, treats certain cases 
like Somalia or Rwanda as an institutional action by the Security Council, 
thus, a process oozing fairness and legitimacy. 157 These actions will be 
addressed in subsequent chapters where their contradictory character and their 
multifaceted justifications will be revealed. However, adopting a reflective 
view on these cases, their individual components should be addressed and in 
particular their unilaterism. In such cases, according to Franck, the participant 
states still retain what he considers to be legitimacy and fairness because they 
have satisfied the procedural even if hypocritical requirements of 
institutionality. These comprise of reference to the Security Council and 
authorisation by the latter. We submit that the cases reside beyond this 
institutionality and only by a reflective view the requirements of human 
dignity can be addressed. 158 
1 54 NWC, supra, note 132, pp. 120-122 
ss NWC, P. 44: "An international legal organisation for collective security presupposes the 
value of peace to be higher value than the value of justice. " 
156 see Chapter One, section V. 3 and Chapter Five, section VI 
1" Fairness, supra, note 146, pp. 272-274 
I `8 see Chapter Five, section IV. 5 and Chapter Eight, section 11.2 
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A common criticism addressed both at Franck and Kelsen is that their 
institutional 
- 
constitutional system seems to retain the status quo. Franck 
conceals this trait behind an elaborate and appealing institutional procedure 
whereunder the Security Council is eminent however, the distribution of power 
therein or its repercussions is not illustrated. Suffice to say that the "Big Five" 
are predominant and this affects the performance of the Security Council. 
Kelsen, on the other hand, addresses this issue and attributes it to legal 
ideology. Collective security as a legal order should be, for him, conservative 
and aims at preserving peace not justice. 159 Also, ineffectiveness is attributed 
to a "false" interpretation of the legal order established by the collective 
security. It could be maintained, hence, that both Kelsen and Franck employ 
presumptions in order to justify their institutionality. Franck mistakes the real 
with the ideal, whereas Kelsen the ideal with the real. Kelsen proffers an 
idealised collective security system in abstracto, therefore, any criticism which 
will spring from real circumstances may address a different audience. 
However, faced with a real and operative system of collective security as 
established by the U. N. Charter, his points seem to be irrelevant. Why is it 
presumed that the status quo guarantees peace and what if what is considered 
very subjectively by him as "false" interpretation of the collective system is 
sustained and subsequently substitutes his "correct" interpretation? 
The erroneousness of both expositions is that they seem to ignore or to 
downplay the relational framework beyond the institutional one. The latter 
does not absorb or hide the former. Whenever the United Nations have reacted, 
it has always been after political consultations mainly between the "Big Five", 
often late, with contradictions, and sometimes inefficiently. The cases of 
Somalia and Rwanda are instructive. Concerning these cases, the U. N. 
Secretary-General sought a comprehensive settlement which required a 
different, not conventional disposition of U. N. functions. However, the 
Somalia action was an institutional "echec" as it will be described in Chapter 
Eight, whereas the U. N. action in Rwanda followed the unilateral French 
action. According to the U. N. Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali: "The 
delay in reaction by the international community to the genocide in Rwanda 
159 NJ C'.. cupra. note 112, p. 44 
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has demonstrated graphically its extreme inadequacy to respond urgently with 
prompt and decisive action to humanitarian crises entwined with armed 
conflict. "' 
60 
A prominent exposition of the new humanitarianism is found in the work of 
Mario Bettati which has institutional implications similar to those of Kelsen 
and Franck as explained above. Bettati has been involved, together with 
Bernard Kouchner and in close relation with the administration of Francois 
Mitterrand, with developing the concept of "1'ingerence humanitaire". This 
term, translated into English, does not denote the same concept which the 
English term humanitarian intervention does. Bettati makes fine distinctions 
whose transposition into the English language may be confusing. At this stage 
we are not concerned with explaining the semantic approximations. We are 
more concerned with presenting the constitutional element in his work and the 
similarities it exhibits with the work of Franck and Kelsen. However, we 
should describe what is understood by "droit d'ingerence humanitaire" 
because otherwise the confusion and "quiproquos" are assured. 
The pertinent right contains the "intervention humanitaire" and the 
"intervention d'humanite". The former concerns only one type of interference, 
what he names "intervention habilitee". 161 It is effectuated by the United 
Nations which authorises members to provide direct assistance; protect 
threatened populations or establish minimum security by re-establishing 
normal conditions. The second aspect of the "intervention humanitaire" is to 
create secure areas for the victims. These include: "zones preventives", "zones 
protegees par les Nations Unies", "zones de securite", or "zones d'interdiction 
de survol". 162 Such operations were those pursued by the Allies in Iraq, in 
Somalia, Rwanda or Yugoslavia. ' 63 Thus, operation "Provide Comfort" 
160 Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Rwanda, S/1994/640,31 May 1994, 
6Para. 43 1 M. Bettati, Le droit d 'ingerence: mutation de 1 'ordre international, (Paris, O. Jacob, 
1996), p. 186: "Cette delegation de competence ne signifie pas que 1'Etat agissant supplante 
1'ONU, mais plutöt qu'il s'y substitue par subrogation. " Hereinafter referred to as Le droit 
d 'ingerence 
162 M. Bettati, "Ingerence, intervention ou assistance humanitaire", in N. Al-Nauimi and R. 
Meese (eds. ), International Legal Issues Arising under the United Nations Decade of 
International Law, (The Hague / London / Boston, M. Nijhoff Publ., 1995), p. 935, at pp. 957- 
962 
163 Le droit d 'ingerence, supra, note 161, pp. 187-203 
111 
instituted by Resolution 688 '64 in Iraq for the protection of Kurds comprised of 
humanitarian aid, "relais humanitaires" and "centres humanitaires". 165 
"Intervention d'humanite", on the other hand, concerns the "soustraction 
unilaterale des victimes", that is, extraction of victims. ' These operations are 
unilateral, unfolding without institutional authorisation or the consent of the 
recipient state and also have a contested legal basis. He also considers 
operations strictly characterised as protection of nationals as constituting 
"intervention d'humanite". On this issue, the position of the present writer as 
explained in Chapter Six approximates Bettati's view, motivated, though, from 
different concerns. For Bettati, protection of nationals is the modern residue of 
the old concept of "intervention d'humanite", whereas for us, it is the purpose 
of these operations to safeguard lives and the human dignity of threatened 
nationals which credits them with the humanitarian character. 167 Additionally, 
we do not consider only this type of unilateral action as humanitarian 
intervention but also other actions, unilateral, multilateral or institutional 
which share a humanitarian mandate. The legitimacy of the "interventions 
d'humanite" is easily established, not though their legality. Their legitimacy is 
reminiscent of Grotius and accrues to defending the public order. As 
formulated by Georges Scelle, they "assur(ent) le respect d'un certain nombres 
de regles fondamentales, respect de la personne humaine, de sa vie, de ses 
libertes, de sa propriete. " 168 On the other hand, they have a contested legality 
in international law. 
The conceptual and technical perplexity which springs from the proposed 
definitions is manifest. The fine terminological distinctions may produce 
consternation but legally, the usage of more neutral terms, relieves the issue 
from the impregnated connotations which the word intervention carries. 
In more detail, the first case of "intervention humanitaire" may be confused 
with humanitarian assistance. 169 In order to distinguish, it should be submitted 
164 S. C. Res. 688, U. N. Doc. S/RES/688 (1991) in 30 I. L. M., (1991), p. 858 
'65 M. Bettati, in N. Al-Nauimi, R. Meese (eds. ), supra, note 162, pp. 952-957 
1b° Le droit d'ingerence, supra, note 161, p. 204. Also supra, note 162, p. 952 
167 see Chapter Six, title V 
168 G. Scelle, Droit International Public, (Paris, D. Montchrestien, 1944), p. 622 
169 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, I. CJ 
Rep., (1986), p. 14, at p. 114, para. 242: "there can be no doubt that the provision of strictly 
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that, according to Bettati, "intervention humanitaire" is a wider concept and 
includes the panoply of measures which can be adopted internationally when 
there are humanitarian needs of certain gravity and the territorial state does not 
respond and/or hinders any such action. It is, therefore, evident that 
humanitarian assistance is only one aspect thereof, the first one, and confines 
itself to responding to humanitarian needs. The second stage is the 
"intervention humanitaire" stricto sensu when the state does not respond to 
and does not obey the elementary obligations which these humanitarian needs 
give rise to and, therefore, the need to react to these violations arises. 
Consequently, although they should not be confused, the "intervention 
humanitaire" enters into play only when the humanitarian assistance does not 
function. It may as well require security afforded manu militari as the ultima 
ratio in cases where the recipient state is recalcitrant or for the protection of 
the "Good Samaritans". 170 
These operations distinguish themselves from the "intervention d' humanite" 
on three grounds: (i) they are not unilateral but always require the 
authorisation of the Security Council; (ii) they are preceded or followed by 
United Nations forces and (iii) they share in common with the traditional genre 
of "intervention d'humanite" the fact that they try to secure the population of a 
third state. 171 
"Intervention d'humanite" and "intervention humanitaire" have not the same 
juridical basis because they do not share the same technical and political 
nature. Misunderstandings on this issue, generates confusion on its 
permissibility. The legal basis for the "intervention humanitaire" operations is 
the maintenance of peace under Chapter VII of the U. N. Charter. 172 There is an 
humanitarian aid to persons or forces in another country, cannot be regarded as unlawful 
intervention, or as in any other way contrary to international law. " 
170 L. Condorelli, "Intervention humanitaire et/ou assistance humanitaire? Quelques certitudes et 
beaucoup d'interrogations", in N. Al-Nauimi and R. Meese (eds. ), International Legal Issues 
Arising under the United Nations Decade of International Law, (The Hague / London / Boston, 
M. Nijhoff Publ., 1995), p. 999, at pp. 999-1004. See S. C. Res. 1101, U. N. SCOR, 3758th mtg., 
S/RES/1101 (1997) concerning the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Albania. 
"' M. Bettati, "Ing6rence, intervention ou assistance humanitaire", supra, note 170, p. 935, at 
pp. 952-953 
According to Resolution 688, the Security Council: "Gravely concerned by the repression 
of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish 
populated areas which led to the massive flow of refugees towards and across international 
frontiers and to cross border incursions, which threaten international peace and security in the 
113 
evaluation of causes and effects and the Security Council authorises a number 
of states to pursue the requested action. ' 73 Hence, the institutional framework 
comprises of the U. N. Charter with its mechanism of evaluation, authorisation 
and execution. The fact that the relevant mechanism is construed differently 
than initially envisaged happens, "faute de mieux", in the absence of other 
more agile and satisfactory mechanisms. As observed above, also Kelsen and 
Franck accept a delegation of powers from the Security Council to national 
states which execute the humanitarian action. 
However, and this criticism is addressed to the described institutionality of the 
Bettati, Kelsen and Franck, the Security Council is heavily politicised in order 
to react impartially or routinely concerning its humanitarian activities. The 
cases where it reacted have been characterised by the most exceptional 
circumstances on the ground concerning the humanitarian catastrophe and 
within the Security Council, concerning the political balances. ' 74 
What is implied, surreptitiously, in certain actions included by Bettati in his 
genre of "intervention humanitaire" is an amalgam of assistance and sanction. 
In the case of Iraq or Yugoslavia the created "safe havens" or "safe areas" are 
not the same as the "protected zones" sanctioned by international humanitarian 
law. ' 75 In Iraq, the distinction between humanitarian and political aims was 
blurred, whereas in Yugoslavia, Resolution 819176 which created a "safe area" 
for Srebrenica, and Resolution 824 '77 creating a "safe area" for Sarajevo, 
Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde and Bihac was coupled with the enforced demand to the 
parties to cease all armed attacks. As observed: "..... the threat of force to 
region 
..... 
Insists that Iraq allow immediate access by international humanitarian 
organisations to all those in need of assistance..... " supra, note 164 
173 Le droit d'ingerence, supra, note 161, pp. 223-224 
174 "..... such Security Council decisions, as they have been taken until present, remain ad hoc 
and do not afford constitutional principles for further action. " T. Carty, The Failed State and 
the Tradition of International Law 
- 
Towards a Renewal of Legal Humanism, Inaugural 
Lecture, University of Derby, 6 December 1995, p. 14 (unpublished paper) 
"s P. Alston, "The Security Council and Human Rights: Lessons to be Learned from the Iraq- 
Kuwait Crisis and its Aftermath", 13 Australian Y. B. I. L., (1993), p. 107; G. Best, War and 
Law Since 1945, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1994), pp. 318-323; D. Pallister, "When Food 
Relief Comes Out of the Barrel of a Gun", The Guardian, 7 May 1994, p. 16 
176 S. C. Res. 819, U. N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3199th mtg., U. N. Doc. S/RES/819 (1993), in S. 
Trifunovska, Yugoslavia Through Documents: From its Creation to its Dissolution, 
(Dordrecht / London / Boston, M. Nijhoff, 1994), p. 906 
177 S. C. Res. 824, U. N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3208th mtg., U. N. Doc. S/RES/824 (1993), Ibid., 
p. 936 
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assert demands naturally implies, in addition to adequate military means, 
seeking a political solution to the conflict, which thus goes beyond the scope 
of international humanitarian law. " 78 The danger behind this approach is that 
the intermingling of political considerations in the concept of "intervention 
humanitaire" which, among others, includes humanitarian assistance would 
result in the reluctance of states to receive even the minimum of assistance. 
Therefore, conceptual and practical confusion with humanitarian law would 
render disservice to both areas of humanitarianism, whereas humanitarian 
intervention in its classical form is more clear in its objectives, recipients, 
modes and timing. 
Concerning the legitimacy of "intervention humanitaire", it is contained, as 
Franck also explains, within the cadre of the United Nations. It is the 
authorisation which attributes legitimacy. As it was observed above, even the 
manipulation of the institutional authorisation would suffice for Franck, Bettati 
or, inferentially for Kelsen, to attribute institutionality thereto. Although it is 
not denied that the United Nations could instigate collective humanitarian 
actions, the discussed cases cannot be detached from their strong parochialism. 
They are, in effect, unilateral actions without this fact impinging on their 
legality according to our view. The United Nations imprimatur pacifies or 
distracts certain states and saves an Organisation from being seen condemned 
into impotence. The Rwanda case is illustrative. The U. N. mission in place 
was incapable of detaining the aggravating situation. Therefore, it was with the 
initiative of France that an intervening force was secured. Resolution 929 
which authorised the French action was adopted with the insistence of France 
and this unilateral operation was followed by a U. N. force. 179 
The debates in the Security Council which preceded Resolution 929 reveal the 
differing attitudes of states: some requiring a purely U. N. action, whereas 
others accepting authorisation by the United Nations. New Zealand, speaking 
for many states, made obvious the preference for a U. N. action. It said: "Nous 
admirons et respectons hautement la motivation humanitaire dont a fait preuve 
"' Y. Sandoz, "The Establishment of Safety Zones for Persons Displaced within their 
Country of Origin", in N. Al-Nauimi, R. Meese (eds. ), supra, note 170, p. 899, at p. 925 
179 see Chapter Five, section IV. 5 and Chapter Eight, section II. 1 
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la France en saisissant le Conseil de ce projet de resolution. La seule 
divergence concerne les moyens. "18° 
The acknowledgement of the unilateral character comes also from another 
source. Some states are persistent in repeating the exceptional character of 
these actions, requesting the consent of the recipient state18 1 and underlining 
their limited reach. ' 82 If they were indeed institutional reactions, there would 
be no need for such qualifications. One of the most prominent NGOs, the 
Medecins sans frontieres (MSF) took a more realistic line to which we 
subscribe: "Une intervention des Nations Unies aurait sans doute ete preferable 
mais le seul fait qui doit etre pris en consideration, c'est qu'il ya genocide et 
qu'il faut 1'arreter par tous les moyens. "183 
Concerning the ethical basis for such operations, humanity is looming as the 
ideological substratum in the work of Bettati. On this issue, there exists 
agreement with this present work which is concurrent to the idea of human 
dignity and individual humanity. The difference lies in the methodological, 
practical, ideological effectuation of humanism as it will be explained 
subsequently. 
Theoretically, Bettati reminds us of Grotius who advanced the individual as a 
respected unit in international law or Scelle's dedoublement fonctionnel. 1 84 
The prominence of the individual anticipates his entitlement to humanitarian 
assistance which individual states offer in the name of humanity when the 
180 Mr. Keating, S/PV 3392,22 June 1994, p. 7 
181 see the "Memorandum of Understanding" detailing the conditions of the United Nations 
humanitarian presence in Iraq, signed in Badgered 18 April 1991. The United Nations and the 
Iraq-Kuwait Conflict 1990-1996, (United Nations, N. Y., Department of Public Information, 
1996), p. 210-211. Letter from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the Secretary - 
General transmitting the Memorandum of Understanding dated 18 April 1991 between Iraq 
and the United Nations concerning humanitarian assistance, S/22513,22 April 1991 
182 see the opinion of the Argentine representative to the Security Council, Mr. Ricardes, 
concerning Rwanda, S/PV 3392,22 June 1994, p. 10. Resolution 794 on Somalia mentions 
its "unique character", S. C. Res. 794, U. N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3145th mtg., U. N. Doc. 
S/RES/794 (1992) and also that on Haiti refers to the "uniqueness" of the case, S. C. Res. 940, 
U. N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3413th mtg., U. N. Doc. S/RES/940 (1994). The representative of 
Romania Mr. Munteanu, discussing Resolution 688 said : "..... we should not create a 
precedent that could be used 
- 
or rather, misused 
- 
in the future for political purposes. " S/PV 
2982,5 April 1991, pp. 23-24. Also the Representative of Turkey to the Security Council Mr. 
Aksin "..... firmly support[s] the independence, sovereignty and integrity of Iraq. " Ibid., pp-3- 
7 
183 Liberation, 23/6/1994, p. 3 
' 84 Le droit d 'ingerence, supra, note 161, p. 186 
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institutional order malfunctions. 185 Concerning the lego-philosophical issue of 
the role of the individual, one could trace a common property with 
McDougal's jurisprudence. For both, the individual is citizen of the state but 
also a unit of international law and, therefore, s/he should be afforded the 
necessary protection. ' 86 What is impressive is the humanism evidenced in their 
work, the rule of the human being. The difference between Bettati and 
McDougal is methodological and practical. Whereas for the policy-school 
individual states can provide or restore humanism, for Bettati or Franck this 
can only be done institutionally. 
Another issue with major implications is their approach to sovereignty. There 
is ample criticism of the notion of sovereignty-fortification. For Bettati, 
McDougal or, Grotius in the past, the residue of humanity requires a limited 
respect of state sovereignty. Instead of state monopoly, the human rights 
revolution has tampered with sovereignty and the protection of the individual 
which derives from a common human patrimony mobilises states. According 
to Bettati, the word "ingerence" conveys any juridical meaning only when it is 
followed by the world "humanitaire" because only then it has a "finalite" 
which, otherwise, would render it illegal. He does not dispense though at all 
with sovereignty but recognises "une modulation de son (sovereignty's) 
excercise". 187 This statement affirms the observation that we have reached a 
stage in the development of human civilisation where the violation of human 
rights is not tolerated. It requires a moral, psychological and legal 
transformation which is gradually evidenced. However, the psychological 
transformation has not definitely affected as yet the ubiquity of the state but 
only modified its function. In a nutshell, it only requires that the sovereign 
prerogatives "s'exercent de facon plus humaine. "188 
At this point and discussing the role of individual and the state, we should 
present its theoretical antipode which is the work of Phillip Allott as a non- 
state utopia and the conservatism of Koskenniemi who, amid criticisms and 
185 Le droit d'ingerence, supra, note 161, p. 37: "..... promouvoir son statut (1'individu) de 
sujet universel. " And at p. 186: " 
..... 
1'Etat qui intervient agit pour le compte de la societe 
internationale defaillante. " 
196 see Chapter Three, section 11.2, IV. 2 
187 Le droit d 'ingerence, supra, note 161, p. 119 
188 M. Bettati, "Un droit d'ingerence? ", 95 R. G. D. I. P., (1991), p. 639, at p. 653,667-668 
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deconstructions, emerges as defendant of the state. Finally, the distinction with 
our position will be made. 
Koskenniemi, in contradistinction to Bettati, defends the state on its formal not 
substantive character. Whereas the quality a state sovereignty acquires is a 
matter for evaluation and justifies humanitarian actions according to Bettati, 
defending the formal quality of the state is oblivious to such actions and 
represents a form of mental antediluvianism if the substance is not 
distinguished from the form. 1 89 
His defence of the state is peculiar. It resides on an extreme formalism and on 
an extreme suspicion of subjectivism. Thus, he admits that the state's "formal- 
bureaucratic rationality provides a safeguard against the totalitarianism 
inherent in a commitment to substantive values, which forces those values on 
people not sharing them". ' 90 However, he repeats the same mistake which he 
criticises. Sovereignty as a "deified" concept plays this role of obstructing 
other issues such as human rights into developing. ' 91 
From the above statement one can make two conclusions. The first, shared 
theoretically with Franck, is the formal justice of formality. The institutional- 
procedural aspect produces neutrality and obeisance. The similarities though 
stop at this level. We are not going to repeat the criticisms addressed at this P 
procedural aspect192 however, Franck or Bettati adhere to a certain purpose 
which is peace, public order or humanitarianism. Koskenniemi, pathologically 
189 M. Koskenniemi, "The Future of Statehood", 32 Harvard I. L. J., (1991), p. 397. Tony 
Carty deplores the "failure of the (legal) profession to respond in a creative way to the 
developments which have affected the composition of the state...... [T]he approach of the 
international lawyer to the Failed State has a simpler theoretical explanation. The lawyer 
remains a state positivist. " For him, human rights "are regarded as relevant to a judgement as 
to the validity of a state at present. " T. Carty, The Failed State and the Tradition of 
International Law 
- 
Towards a Renewal of Legal Humanism, Inaugural Lecture, University 
of Derby, 6 December 1995, pp. 5-9 (unpublished paper) 
190 M. Koskenniemi, "The Future of Statehood", 32 Harvard I. L. J., (1991), p. 397, at p. 407. 
M. Koskenniemi, "Theory: Implications for the Practitioner", in P. Allott, T. Carty, M. 
Koskenniemi, C. Warbrick, Theory and International Law: An Introduction, (London, The 
British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 1991), p. 1, at p. 42: "..... statehood 
functions as precisely that decision-process which tackles the problems of multiplicity of 
ideas and interpretative controversy regarding their fulfilment. Its very formality intends to 
operate as a safeguard so that these different (theological) ideals are not transformed into a 
globally enforced tyranny. " 
91 R. Ashley, R. B. J. Walker, "Reading Dissidence/Writing the Discipline: Crisis and the 
Question of Sovereignty in International Studies", 34 /nt'! Studies Q., (1990), p. 367 
192 see Chapter Seven, section 1.1 
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suspicious of any overriding aim, implies an uninhibited raison d'etat. 
However, there is a fundamental mistake in his observation. The Rechtssaat as 
institutionalism is the first stage in the organisation of a society which gives 
way to a more contextual Sozialstaat. The other fundamental difference with 
Franck or Bettati in his primitive institutionalism is that for Koskenniemi, the 
state still remains the hegemonic actor. It was explained above that both 
Franck and Bettati prefer an institutional reaction to humanitarian needs. 
Individual state reaction is included into this institutionality, either genuinely 
or by default and, additionally, it alludes to certain standards as public order or 
humanism. Even the dedoublement fonctionnel ensures for Bettati that the 
higher standards, justice, peace or humanism are guaranteed, whereas for 
Koskenniemi, it guarantees that states remain in control. 193 This is different 
than expecting of the omnipresent state to safeguard human rights. In the latter 
case as considered by Bettati, McDougal or Franck, the state adopts a mission, 
a moral mission. Thus, states act as envoys of higher ideas being also subjects 
of the international procedure. ' 94 Au contraire, state agnosticism provides the 
best reason for upholding statehood according to Koskenniemi, in the absence 
of a "universally shared substantive faith". 195 
Koskenniemi's approach to sovereignty can only be viewed as an exercise in 
rhetoric. It reproduces the basic themes of the Critical Lawyers in the analysis 
or defence of statehood. Critical Lawyers criticise the traditional approach of 
defining modernity with sovereignty and history. They criticise the traditional 
scholarship for revering the past, awaiting a reformed future but forgetting the 
present. 196 What is his response, though, to the substantive problems of the 
present? Koskenniemi leaves the answer in limbo. If the past was an 
unremitting statism and the future a human rights utopia, Koskenniemi is 
ambivalent. A staunch defence of the state is followed by the statement that 
"statehood remains a second best" without proffering to what: to human rights, 
193 M. Koskenniemi, "The Future of Statehood", 32 Harvard I. L. J., (1991), p. 405 
194 A-M. Slaughter, "Liberal International relations Theory and International Economic Law", 
10 Am. U. Int '1. L. & Pol 'y, (1995), p. 717, at pp. 729-730 
'93 M. Koskenniemi, in P. Allott, supra, note 190, p. 43 
196 D. Kennedy, "A New Stream of International Law Scholarship", 7 Wis. I. L. J., (1988), p. 1, 
at pp. 2,12 
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order, or peace? 197 If the main grid in his exposition is the interchange of 
"apologetic" and "utopian' arguments, he falls victim to his own binarisms. He 
simultaneously embraces and criticises sovereignty. He only justifies one of 
the CLS tenets that law is rhetoric because the legal structure depends on the 
mutual reliance of the opposing arguments which, in this case, sovereignty 
releases. ' 98 
Whereas Koskenniemi describes the quests of an enlightened but frustrated 
jurist, Phillip Allott journeys through "consciousness" to a new international 
society. 1 99 This international society is above the state society but behind 
everything lies the human being as a member of both state and international 
society. 200 On the other hand, the present state-structured society produces 
anomy because the state dominates our consciousness. 201 The new 
international society of human beings transgresses national borders and 
induces our human feelings of sympathy and responsibility for other human 
beings. Thus, "human societies and human beings everywhere at last begin to 
take moral and social responsibility for the survival and prospering of the 
whole of humanity. , 202 Finally, all depends on the human spirit which is 
formed as "self perfecting, self-ordering 
..... 
[when] humanity [acts] in love 
and hope. , 203 
This seems to be a radical position because it unsettles the consciousness of 
international lawyers, however, it does not say how and with what means it 
will be achieved or, at least, approximated. On the other hand, Allott is 
19' M. Koskenniemi, "The Future of Statehood", 32 Harvard 1. L. J, (1991), p. 406 
198 D. Kennedy, "A New Stream of International Law Scholarship", 7 Wis. I. L. J., (1988), p. 1, 
38 
99 P. Allott, Eunomia: New Order for a New World, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1990), 
para. 16.17, p. 303: "International law is a reality-forming of international society which does not 
recognise the reality of the total social process by which all reality is formed. It chooses to 
recognise only the social process of the interacting of the governments of state-societies, as if 
they constituted a self-contained and self-caused social process, as if they constituted the whole 
of the total social process of international society. " Also, ibid., paras. 15.26,15.36, pp. 270,275 
zoo Ibid., para. 16.36, p. 311. P. Allott, Reconstituting Humanity 
- 
New International Law", 3 
E. J. I. L., (1992), p. 219, at p. 251, para. 40.3 
201 P. Allott, Eunomia: New Order for a New World, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1990), 
paras. 15.41,16.16,17.40,18.18, pp. 277-278,303,354,382 
02 Ibid., p. xxiii 
203 P. Alloff, "Reconstituting Humanity 
- 
New International Law", 3 E. JI. L., (1992), p. 219, 
at p. 252, para. 41.4. "..... societies are systems made by human beings for human survival and 
human prospering, not for human oppression and human indignity. " P. Allott, "International 
Law and International Revolution: Reconceiving the World", The Onoh Memorial Lecture 
1989, (Hull, University of Hull Press, 1989), pp. 2-3 
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ambivalent on a fundamental issue which represents the gist of individual 
human dignity as it is developed in the present work 
. 
204 He does not address 
the issue of whether smaller communities 
- 
ethnic, religious, linguistic 
- 
will 
retain their possibilities within the new international community or whether 
they will be foreclosed. 205 Singleness which encroaches upon individual 
humanity is threatening and destructive. The humanitarian crisis caused in the 
history of mankind witness the repercussions of foreclosure. 
If the present work is stimulated from a concern for human dignity, where 
does it stand between the opposites of statism or humanity? It should be 
submitted that our approach differs in its assumptions and its emphasis. We 
are not concerned with the state itself as an institution or its position in 
international legal structures. The state may exist or not, it may be 
hierarchically superior or subordinate. Our emphasis is on humanitarian 
disasters and our reaction to them. This can be effectuated by states, 
organisations or individuals. Consequently, the state looses its prominence in 
our legal disposition and becomes a second rated interest exercising a residual 
function. We are not concerned with the state, its institutions, and, how they 
create human disasters or, on the other hand, heal them. We are concerned 
with the individual and the preservation of human dignity. The question of 
who, either states or international organisations, will provide humans with 
protection is included as a description of the fact of restoring the human 
dignity of threatened human beings. 
VII. HART'S CONCEPT OF LAW 
VII. 1 Descriptive sociology and the bridging of "is " and "ought ". Hart 
bridges two legal traditions: those who hold like Kelsen or Austin that law is a 
correlation of authority, command and sanction and those who see law as a 
204 see Chapters Seven and Eight 
205 P. Allott, Eunomia: New Order for a New World, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1990), 
para. 13.41-13.56; 20.24-20.26, pp. 221-226,418 
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social fact. The description of legal orders reveals certain common forms and 
human attitudes which are also elements of natural law. Hart asserts that legal 
systems share a minimum common denominator. He articulated an elementary 
overlapping between law and morality by acknowledging the contingent facts 
of human nature, those truisms which offer the reason why "Law and morals 
should include a specific content"206 in order to achieve the aim of survival 
. 
207 
What Hart says is that the observation of human nature and activities which 
aspire towards survival are accredited to some "ought" propositions which law 
should envelop. This argument could be considered as a reversal of the 
purposiveness evidenced in natural law. Whereas in the latter the purpose is 
all-inclusive and determines the facts and subsequently the law, in Hart's 
system, between the "is" propositions, which allude to the observable facts of 
human nature, and the "oughts", which refer to the content of laws, another 
value judgement is interposed, that of survival. In the next chapter, we shall 
witness the same intellectual twisting performed by the policy school. For 
them, the observation of facts reveals the values of human dignity but how do 
we identify them if we do not presuppose the value of human dignity? The 
difference is that survival is explicitly stated as a purpose, whereas human 
dignity nests at the background of the juristic mind. 
True as all this is, Hart adheres to the positivist tradition of denying any 
conceptual connection between law and morality, as advanced by classical 
natural law theory. The links between natural and positive law depend on their 
"functional similarity" and thus, he rejects what he calls the extreme Thomistic 
perception of natural law which maintained that there are principles of 
morality discoverable by human reason and that laws should conform 
therewith. 208 Contrary laws are not invalid and, on this point, we should 
emphasise the similarity with Finnis's restatement of natural law. Rejecting 
206 H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1961), p. 254, hereinafter cited 
as CL 
207 CL, p. 189: "The general form of the argument is simply that without such a content laws 
and morals could not forward the minimum purpose of survival which men have in 
associating with each other. In the absence of this content men, as they are, would have no 
reason for obeying voluntarily any rules; and without a minimum of co-operation given 
voluntarily by those who find that it is in their interest to submit to and maintain the rules, 
coercion of others who would not voluntarily conform would be impossible". 
208 N. MacCormick,, H. L. A. Hart, (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1981), p. 24; CL, p. 152 
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the infusion is, however, itself a moral position which permits the distinction 
between invalidity and immorality. 209 
It appears that, although Hart does not accept the doctrine of lex uniustia non 
est lex, 210 the minimum content indicates the type of rules incorporated into 
the legal system. As a consequence, it excludes some for the benefit of those 
rules which conform therewith and describes a rather similar function of 
natural law not in pervasiveness but in procedure. Additionally, he maintains 
that the minimum content is necessary for the viability of a legal system not 
for its existence. An unresponsive rule may exist but not endure. This alludes 
to a temporally longer process for rule invalidation, whereas natural law can 
offer an instant one. 211 Transmuting this observation into international law, it 
gives ammunition to those revisionists who see in the Charter and in particular 
in the rules on the use of force or self-defence an obsolete system, which is 
unresponsive to the needs of modern society and indifferent to the observed 
traits of international society which include the protection of human beings. As 
a consequence, this system may continue as a legal one but in the absence of 
these traits, its viability is shortened and it may cease to exist. 
VII. 2 Humanity's survival and the minimum content of natural law. As was 
stated, Hart articulates an "empirical version of natural law"212 and traces 
contingent links between law and morality. Human beings are inclined towards 
their optimum end of survival which is reminiscent of the teleological 
character evidenced in traditional natural law theory whereunder things are 
directed towards their optimum state of existence. The proximity and 
sociability of the human cosmos contains certain features which correspond to 
the so-called minimum content of natural law and which are indispensable for 
209 CL, pp. 206-207 
110 CL, pp. 195,205-207. See N. MacCormick "Natural Law and the Separation of Law and 
Morals", in R. P. George (ed. ), Natural Law Theory, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992), p. 107, at 
p. 109, where, comparing Finnis' account of natural law and positivism, he says: "But the 
positivistic theory I have in view yields just the same conclusion 
- 
the law is a valid law, but if 
the duties it imposes are duties in violation of the demands of justice, it will follow that the 
moral issue whether or not to comply is prima facie an open one. " 
21 A. P. D'Entreves, Natural Law, (London, Hutchison University Library, 1970), p. 199: "In the 
end does Hart present natural law as a "central and privileged sphere of morality distinguished 
bye its sacred and inviolable character? ". 
21 CL, p. 254 
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the aim of survival. 213 The observed contingent facts of human nature are: (i) 
human vulnerability; (ii) approximate equality; (iii) limited altruism; (iv) 
limited resources; (v) limited understanding. These traits of human existence 
are universal and ingrained in moral laws as well. To that extent, there is a 
certain correspondence and influence in the content of moral and legal rules. 
The truisms provide the reason, not the causes for the specific content of a rule 
and, hence, they resolve the "hoary perennial known as Natural Law versus 
Legal Positivism". 214 
Hart claims that the projection of survival as the aim of minimum natural law 
is attained by sociological inquiry, probably to avert criticism of discretion in 
his choice of an end. Survival as an aim is indisputable and easily acceptable 
even by the most vociferous critics of natural law. Human survival entails a 
reduction of the optimum content of law and appeals to a "common sense" 
approach. Maintaining the objectivity of choice is not sufficiently convincing. 
Hart appears dubious when he acknowledges that there are also "..... simpler, 
less philosophical, considerations than those which show acceptance of 
survival as an aim to be necessary 
...... 
"215 Those other reasons place the 
choice under subjective scrutiny and positivism would be reluctant to 
countenance the implications. 
First, the nature of the choice reveals a certain contingency with 20th century 
history infested with catastrophic wars and the nuclear threat. It is reminiscent 
of what Albert Camus once wrote: "One might think that a period which, in 
the space of fifty years, uproots, enslaves, or kills seventy million human 
21 CL, pp. 185-188: "Moreover, we can, in referring to survival, discard as too metaphysical for 
modem minds, the notion that this is something antecently fixed which men necessary desire 
because it is their proper goal or end. Instead we may hold it to be a mere contingent fact which 
could be otherwise, that in general men do desire to live, and that we may mean nothing more 
by calling survival a human goal or end than that men do desire it". And at p. 176: "These simple 
facts constitute a core of indisputable truth in the doctrines of natural law. " 
214 H. L. A. Hart, "Kelsen Visited", U. CL. A Law Rev., (1963), p. 709. "The simple truisms we 
have discussed not only disclose the core of good sense in the doctrine of Natural Law. They 
are of vital importance for the understanding of law and morals, and they explain why the 
definition of the basic forms of these in purely formal terms, without reference to any specific 
content or social needs, has proven so inadequate 
...... 
It is in this form that we should reply to 
the positivist thesis the "law may have any content". For it is a truth of some importance that 
for the adequate description not only of law but of many other social institutions, a place 
must be reserved, besides definitions and ordinary statements of fact, for a third category of 
statements: those the truth of which is contingent on human beings and the world they live in 
retaining the salient characteristics which they have". CL, pp. 194-195 
215 CL, p. 188 
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beings should be condemned out of hand". 216 Secondly, survival as a 
purposive end could only raise a multitude of questions. Is it strictly connected 
to individual or to group survival? If the latter, then individual survival might 
be occasionally compromised and the chain of argumentation is too dangerous 
to pursue. The other questions it may involve is what percentage of the 
population should survive and is the survival of some people the goal of 
society? Does it include the cultural or only the physical content of a society? 
Does it include the survival of humanity as a whole? Limited to individuals, it 
appears vague and abstract in many respects. If survival with the signification 
of maintaining life denotes what Aristotle refers to as "good life"21 and 
Hobbes as "commodious living", it involves evaluative considerations that 
would be immediately rejected by positivism. Another objection refers to the 
incipient truisms which count for protean societies but not for modern ones 
which are more sophisticated. Modem societies pursue aims other than 
survival or a qualified notion of optimum survival. Acknowledging this 
evolution, the content of law should change. 218 Hart understates his case by 
adopting mere survival as the basic aim of societies. However, by adhering to 
such minimisation, he avoids the Scylla of natural transcendental theories and 
the Charydbis of absolute distinction. 
VII. 3 Minimum content of natural law and humanitarian intervention. In 
order to recapitulate, Hart distils five features within social organisation which 
correspond to human qualities and are essential for survival. Human 
vulnerability and limited altruism are of particular interest for our case of 
humanitarian intervention. The first corresponds to restrictions on violence: 
"thou shalt not kill"; 219 and the second is a measure of limited mutual 
benevolence. Men are not devils where rules would be impossible, nor angels 
where rules would be unnecessary. They exhibit altruism but they are driven 
also by self-interest. "As things are, human altruism is limited in range and 
2'6 A. Camus, The Rebel, trans. A. Bower, (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1962), p. 11 
21 Aristotle, "Nicomachean Ethics", in J. Barnes (ed), The Complete Works of Aristotle, vol. II, 
(Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1984), 1095a (13) 
- 
1096a (10), 1097a (15), 1096b (10), 
at PP. 1730-1734 
218 M. Kiygier, "Me Concept of Law and Social Theory", 2 Oxford J. Leg. Studies, (1982), 
155, at pp. 178-180 
219 CL, p. 190 
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intermittent, and the tendencies to aggression are frequent enough to be fatal to 
social life if not controlled". 220 The two are thus interconnected and form a 
system of mutual forbearance. 
The above argument of limited altruism and immeasurable self-interest 
transmuted into international law echoes the positivist thesis of scepticism and 
eventually condemnation of humanitarian intervention. In other words, the 
legal evaluation of humanitarian actions contains a hard core of applying the 
non-intervention rule strictly, whilst the intervenors are suspected of 
selfishness. Hence, forbearance means non-intervention and secures the aim of 
survival. On the other hand, positivists also address instances whereby the 
notion of human compassion may "condone" such actions as in Bangladesh or 
Rwanda. In the jargon of international lawyers as it is presented in Chapter 
Five, mutual forbearance among states commends non-intervention in order to 
secure the aim of peace, which secures the aim of survival. The latter, 
however, is attained at the cost of condemning some people to extermination. 
We consider two instances: the case of genocide and of gross human rights 
violations endangering life. Forbearance as non-intervention may secure peace 
and survival "generally speaking", but not the survival of those threatened 
individuals. In that case, it is expected that minimum altruism would revolt. 
The inherent contradiction between these two truisms has been successfully 
grasped by the Critical Legal Studies movement as we shall see in Chapter 
Four. In order to do justice to Hart, we should point out that he is not 
concerned with the content of the rules which arise from the minimum content 
of natural law or the consequences of his observations concerning the 
contingent facts of societal living. Nevertheless, we shall speculate on this 
fundamental question concerning the content of the rules. More specifically, 
we are going to speculate on the content of international rules which emanate 
from the truisms of altruism and forbearance. Our predictions would not differ 
considerably from the contemporary rules of international law. The U. N. 
Charter contains altruistic rules invoking human rights but also individualistic 
ones requiring forbearance. Moreover, because the survival of mankind as a 
220 CL, p. 192 
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whole is preponderant, the individualistic rules of non-intervention are given 
precedence. On the other hand, altruism is introduced by default as a 
component of forbearance. 
The contradiction between altruism and forbearance is exacerbated by the lack 
of exceptions. Restriction on violence instructed by the first truism appears 
inconsistent with the aim of survival when a menacing attack has been 
inflicted upon an individual and the latter is precluded from resorting to force 
in self-defence. In international law, the case is tautological in regards to the 
right of self-defence, individual or collective, when the survival of the state is 
threatened. Minimum altruism, on the other hand, may justify coercion in 
order to vindicate survival. Abhorrent criminal policies or genocidal events 
such as those committed in Uganda, Kampuchea or Rwanda, could legitimise 
intervention in order to secure the survival of the indigenous population. A 
purposive, coercive action in that case derives from a sense of human 
affiliation which is the essence of altruism. 
As it stands befuddled, Hart's minimum natural law content is transmogrified 
from empirical to cynical when he says that "...... though a society to be viable 
must offer some of its members a system of mutual forbearances, it need not, 
unfortunately, offer them to all 
.,, 
221 By reserving forbearance to some members 
of a society, he affirms the viability of such a society but this is inadequate 
without certain criteria for evaluation. For example, South African society 
under apartheid was a society under the Hartian restrictive application, but the 
non-white majority conceived it otherwise. Hart uses interchangeably two 
concepts of society on a qualitative basis without defining their criteria. This 
static and regressive concept, however problematic its application appears in 
domestic societies, would not be inconsistent with attributing societal qualities 
to the international community, for the minimum standards do not cover the 
whole scope of international society. Consequently, mutual forbearance would 
not disclaim interventions by "advantageous" states against the 
"disadvantageous" ones. What Hart does not say is if, when, and how states or 
humans excluded from the umbrella of minimum protection could enter such 
22 1 H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed., (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1994), p. 201 
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status. We can only speculate, but the protection of human rights in a 
particular state appears to be a strong candidate for legitimising a regime and 
protecting it against intervention. This argumentation is reminiscent of John 
Rawls's qualitative selection of states in the original position which 
consequently determines the content of the principles of justice. As was 
maintained in the previous chapter, forbearance and non-intervention prevail 
among just states only. Unjust states do not participate in these principles. 
Another point which needs more clarification is the right to resistance. Hart 
constricts the application of minimum protection without denying societal 
character to those formations. If in a particular society the morality of the 
majority or of the dominant group is imposed and contradicts the morality of 
the minority, do people excluded from protection have the right to resist in 
order either to enforce the expansion of the minimum protection upon 
themselves, or to realise their ultimate end of survival when it is threatened? If 
the offered minimum protection degenerates into oppression, do the laws 
which clash with the minimum content still hold the quality of laws or are they 
repelled? If they are valid, however iniquitous, does the population have the 
right to resist? 
VII. 4 Hart on international law as custom and humanitarian intervention. 
Concerning international law, Hart proceeds with a double denial. First, he 
denies Austin's description that international law is "positive morality" and 
also he denies the existence of a Grundnorm. 222 As we said above, Kelsen's 
approach is influenced by his striving to achieve legal unity and by a 
philosophical predisposition towards universal aspiration. His system therefore 
is vertical with international law at the apex. Hart's international structure is 
horizontal, centripetal, developed through state interaction. States find in their 
activities common grounds which elevate into legal propositions223 and 
therefore Hart's system is more flexible than Kelsen's because it enables a 
222 CL, pp. 230-231: "Again once we emancipate ourselves from the assumption that 
international law must contain a basic rule, the question to be faced is one of fact. What is the 
actual character of the rules as they function in the relations between states? 
...... 
but it is 
submitted that there is no basic rule providing general criteria of validity for the rules of 
international law, and that the rules which are in fact operative constitute not a system but a set 
of rules, among which are the rules providing for the binding force of treaties". 
223 J. Cohen, "The Political Element in Legal Theory: A Look at Kelsen's Pure Theory", 88 Yale 
L. J., (1978), p. 1, at pp. 30-31 
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multitude of rules to be established by state practice at different levels, 
whereas Kelsen's model is singular 
International law, as a primitive system, contains only the primary rules and 
does not enjoy the promotional function a rule of recognition ascribes to. 224 
Being an embryonic system, one should look at the binding force of the rules, 
that is, whether those rules are accepted and observed. Lacking a validating 
rule of recognition, the binding force of international rules is similar to the 
rules of the game. A state, playing according to the rules of the game, 
implicitly accepts those rules and also the rules which are formulated as legal 
propositions from the relevant practice. The rules are legal distillations of 
crystallised practices and consequently are binding: "International law in the 
usual terminology of international lawyers is a set of customary rules of which 
the rule giving binding force to treaties is one". 225 The only aspirational 
reference in this rudimentary exposition concerns treaties as a putative rule of 
recognition. 226 
Three points should be further elaborated concerning his concept of 
international law and their relation to humanitarian intervention. One concerns 
the role of custom in his system and its relation to humanitarian intervention. 
The second is the bridging of "is" and "ought" propositions, which elevates the 
practice of humanitarian intervention into a normative rule. The third concerns 
his concept of international law and the institutional comparison with 
municipal law. 
Hart considers the international legal system as a pre-legal system where, 
similar to primitive communities, "...... the only means of social control is that 
general attitude of the group towards its own standard modes of behaviour in 
terms of which we have characterised rules of obligation. A social structure of 
this kind is often referred to as one of "custom"...... ". 227 Employing 
224 CL, p. 209: "The absence of these institutions means that the rules for states resemble that 
simple form of social structure, consisting only of primary rules of obligation 
...... 
" 
225 CL, p. 228 
226 CL, p. 231: "Perhaps international law is at present in a state of transition towards acceptance 
of this and other forms which would bring it nearer in structure to a municipal system. " 
227 CL, p. 89 and p. 106: "The statement that a rule exists may no longer be what it was in the 
simple case of customary rules 
- 
an external statement of the fact that a certain mode of behavior 
was generally accepted as a standard in practice" 
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anthropological inquiries, he argues that custom or "the standard modes of 
behaviour" is the central point for legal reference in legally primitive societies. 
The similarities with Kelsen's position that "States should behave as they have 
customarily behaved" are rather obvious. Notwithstanding, he criticises this 
proposition as a "reduplication of the fact that a set of rules are accepted by 
states as binding rules". 228 
His negative attitude stems probably from a distaste for abstractions and his 
inclination towards a pragmatic "medium" line. A second reason, apart from 
this general attitude, is that he regards international law as a primitive system 
through an inappropriate and unnecessary institutional comparison with 
municipal systems, following a common theoretical trend. According to his 
legal exposition, it could only have primary rules, not secondary ones which 
are appropriate for more advanced systems. Admitting the existence of 
secondary rules would deny verity to his system. Nevertheless, primitive 
societies also contain some elements which Hart attributes to developed ones 
and have a legal content. 229 For this instance, we are going to show the 
association of the "standard modes of behaviour" and treaties. Hart suggests 
multilateral treaties should become a rule of recognition which "would 
represent an actual feature of the system and would be more than an empty 
restatement of the fact that a set of rules are in fact observed by states". 230 
Under such transformation, the formal similarities between international and 
municipal law would become strong enough for the former to be recognised as 
law. 
This position shows a dubious foundation in philosophical reasoning and 
additionally an inappropriate and unnecessary comparison of two different 
fields. It has other implications as well. Treaties are legislative acts of states. 
They may represent state practice hardened into legal words and they also may 
extend to non-parties by attributing customary character to that treaty or to 
23 some of its provisions 
.1 If treaties become the rule of recognition for Hart, it 
228 CL, p. 230 
229 S. Roberts, Order and Dispute: An Introduction to Legal Anthropology, (Harmondsworth, 
Penguin, 1979) 
230 CL, p. 231 231 I. Brownlie speaking of "law-creating" treaties says that such treaties may produce a law- 
creating effect as strong as that of "general practice considered sufficient to support customary 
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is because of his longing for a legislative system similar to the municipal one. 
Explication of his treaty proposition directs us to simpler, more familiar 
notions, such as custom, or the "standard modes of behaviour" and of course 
back to Kelsen's Grundnorm. Hart derives "ought" propositions from "is" 
statements. He observes the practice of states and finds the mooring points 
which become the "ought" propositions of international law. It is ironic to say 
that Hart "reduplicated" Kelsen's Grundnorm, rendering a disservice at the 
same time to international law on three accounts. He denies the existence of a 
Grundnorm, which, even for him is custom; secondly, he attributes a legal 
character to international law only at the cost of reducing it to primitiveness; 
and finally he blurs the distinction between international and municipal law 
with conceptual consequences. In order to recapitulate, the Hartian 
jurisprudence allows two antithetical constructions concerning international 
law: a primitive order or a developed system with treaties as the rule of 
recognition. Behind both constructions resides the element of custom. Kelsen 
acknowledged this in the articulation of the Grundnorm, whereas Hart dithers. 
On both grounds, Kelsenian or Hartian, humanitarian intervention as 
customary rule is justified. 
VII. 5 International law as law containing secondary rules232 and 
humanitarian intervention. The final observation concerns the presumption 
that international law is a primitive system. The secondary rules in Hart's 
system remedy the defects of the primary rules with regard to their 
ascertainment, alteration and enforcement. They are the "rule(s) of 
recognition"; "the rules of change" and "rules of adjudication" whereas the 
union of primary and secondary rules is essential for legal quality. 233 Hart's 
view of international law 
- 
more progressive than Austin's whose legal 
exposition he refines 
- 
is still fragmentary and leans towards the superficial. In 
international law, the secondary rules refer to the sources of international law 
rule. By their contact non 
- 
parties may accept the provisions of a multilateral convention as 
representing general international law". Principles of Public International Law, 4th ed., (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 12. North Sea Continental She #* Cases, I. C. J. Rep. (1969), 
3, at pp. 32-41, paras. 47-69 ý'2 
K. C. Wellens, "Diversity in Secondary Rules and the Unity of International Law: Some 
Reflections on Current Trends", 25 Neth. Y. B. I. L., (1994), p. 3 
233 CL, pp. 78-79,90-96 
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which integrate the procedures for change, and to dispute settlement. The 
sources or rule of recognition are contained in Article 38 of the I. C. J. 's Statute. 
For treaties, identification and legal inclusion is contained in the 1969 Vienna 
Convention of the Law of Treaties. The global order is regulated by the U. N. 
Charter which contains primary rules, in particular those related to the use of 
force and self-defence, rules for law production, administration and change, 
and enforcement. 
It is important to mention the particularised character of those rules, and whilst 
doing so we may consider that this special character was the reason they were 
overlooked by Hart. Contrary to domestic law, where the rules of recognition 
and change apply uniformly to all situations, international law is 
compartmentalised and the rules are defined by the area of application. 234 The 
subject-matter and the interests attached to a particular area determine the use 
of treaties or custom separately or concurrently as rules for recognition or 
change. The primary rule for the protection of human rights evidences an 
interplay of custom and codification. Its special subject-matter attached to state 
interest has procured a division of issues within the rule and exclusion of 
change concerning particular rights which are inalienable. The primary rule on 
the non-use of force is also influenced by customary and conventional law. 
The procedure for change is more flexible than in domestic systems, 
depending on the circumstances, the inadequacy of the legal framework and 
the character of the participants. The enforcement of primary rules in 
international law is effectuated at two levels: structural and decentralised. The 
structural level contains the mechanisms provided in the U. N. Charter which 
involve the Security Council. The intervention of the latter traditionally 
concerns the primary rule on the use of force, but also recently the primary 
234 A similar view of diversity is expressed by Myres McDougal: "..... the contemporary 
world arena exhibits no such international law or public order, effectively applied on a global 
scale. What we have instead is rather a variety of "international" laws and an anarchy of 
diverse, contending orders 
- 
orders proclaiming and embodying the values of human dignity 
in different degree, and aspiring to application and completion on many different scales of 
international, regional, and global compass". M. S. McDougal, "Perspectives for an 
International Law of Human Dignity", 53 Proc. A. S. I. L., (1959), p. 107, at pp. 107-108. The 
difference in that approach of non uniformity concerns its foundation on political and cultural 
traits which are dissipated by the proffered methodology whereas in Hart's system is within 
the legal system. 
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rules on human rights. 235 The special character of international law permits 
also discretionary and decentralised modes of enforcement. The use of force in 
self-defence is an acknowledgement of this feature as well as the provision of 
sanctions. Those measures are regulated by convention and custom. 236 
Concerning the primary rules on human rights, the subject-matter determines 
their conventional or customary enforcement. Humanitarian intervention could 
be practised as a customary sanction when there are gross violations of human 
rights. 
We should now address a fundamental problem which affects the quality of 
international law as law in Hart's system. The secondary rules in international 
law are contingent to the subject-matter, the participants and the importance of 
primary rules. Consequently, they are inclusive and flexible. The crucial 
question is whether this particular feature negates international law. It is not a 
threat when the diversity of secondary rules is perceived cumulatively as 
guaranteeing the effectiveness of primary rules and of international law in 
237 general. 
A final observation with implications for the legality of humanitarian 
intervention concerns the primary rules on human rights and their practical and 
jurisprudential differentiation. There exists a "variable geometry" of 
fundamentality concerning human rights coupled with a reluctance to change 
them, as well as differentiation in the means of protection according to their 
seriousness. Certain rights, prominent among them the right to life, form the 
"core" of human rights and are considered absolute and non-derogative. 238 The 
235 See S. C. Res. 688, U. N. SCOR, 2982nd mtg., (1991), concerning the Kurds in Iraq; G. A. 
Res. 182, U. N. GAOR, 46th Sess., U. N. Doc. A/Res/46/182 (1992) concerning humanitarian 
assistance; S. C. Res. 770, U. N. SCOR, 3106th mtg., U. N. Doc. S/RES/770 (1992), 
concerning humanitarian assistance to Bosnia; S. C. Res. 794, U. N. SCOR, 3145th mtg. U. N. 
Doc. S/RES/794 (1992), concerning Somalia 
236 Article 51 of the U. N. Charter; Article 60, para. 5 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties. 
237 B. Simma, "Self-Contained Regimes", 16 Neth. Y. B. J. L., (1985), p. 111, at p. 135 
238 Article 4 of the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; T. Meron, Human 
Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989), 
pp. 193-194: "Most observers would also agree that the small, irreducible core of rights that 
are deemed non-derogable under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and 
the European and American Conventions on Human Rights constitute fundamental, and 
perhaps even peremptory norms of international law. "; Case Concerning the Barcelona 
Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, L CJ Rep. (1970), p. 3, at p. 32: "..... the 
principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person" are considered erga 
omnes obligations. 
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legal ascertainment and integration of those rights, that is, the rule of 
recognition, is custom and convention. Their enforcement mechanisms should 
include consequently traditional and conventional modes. Humanitarian 
intervention is the primitive enforcement mechanism of a primary rule, which, 
at the second level, satisfies the differentiation element in those primary rules 
relating to content and degree. Humanitarian intervention only concerns the 
"hard core" of primary rules on human rights and situations when there are 
gross violations. 
VIII. TOWARDS A TENTATIVE CONCLUSION 
Positivist thinking, under its different approaches, is still dominant in the 
theory of international law. In this chapter we presented the main 
representatives of this jurisprudence: the analytical school; Kelsen's pure 
theory and the modern reinterpretation of analytical and normative 
jurisprudence by Hart. We also presented the historical context 
- 
legal and 
political 
- 
which gave rise to positivism and in particular the works of Wolff 
and Vattel, who are considered to be the forefathers of this jurisprudential 
stance in international law. They first arrogated certain concepts of natural law 
such as equality, individualism, freedom, or the concept of an organised 
community in new interpretations which have become, since then, the bastion 
concepts of positivism in their restatement as state sovereignty and non- 
intervention. 
Consequently, the observation that the concept of humanitarian intervention 
has not been dealt with systematically in the preceding exposition of positivist 
theory in international law will not come as a surprise. Later, in Chapters Five 
and Six dealing with the U. N. Charter and in particular with Articles 2(4) on 
the use of force and Article 51 on self-defence, we shall have the opportunity 
to unfold the performance of the positivist doctrine in the field of humanitarian 
intervention by dealing with certain cases. 
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At a more theoretical level, positivism is not concerned with humanitarian 
intervention or sometimes even with international law. Its definition of law as 
sanction-oriented could only deny legality to this area of law, as Austin has 
consciously done. Hart, on the other hand, revisiting the latter, has recognised 
international law as primitive, customary law. The most developed and 
comprehensive exposition is that of Kelsen's. He stands at the other end of the 
line above Austin's negation and Hart's lukewarm acceptance. For him, 
international law is a mature legal system; a hierarchical, enveloping system. 
However, he achieves this conclusion only by some dubious reasoning 
concerning the function of sanctions. As we observed above, war and reprisals 
are the pertinent sanctions in international law but this sounds aberrant. One 
would expect that humanitarian intervention would gain certain ground within 
such a detailed occupation with international law. It has not done so because 
Kelsen is not concerned with the detailed rules of the system as such, but with 
describing a legal system. He wants to know what law is and how it is 
produced, not whether there is a certain law and how it functions. Therefore, 
our references to humanitarian intervention in Kelsen's theory or in that of 
Austin and Hart are only by inference. These inferences try to argue from 
within their legal theories and their structure in relation to humanitarian 
intervention. Our purpose was to show that these systems are not as closed as 
believed and that they offer room to argue for humanitarian actions. 
In the next chapter we are going to deal with the policy school, which stands at 
the opposite pillar of Kelsen's decantated theory, by being invested with all 
these elements which Kelsen attempted to rescue legal theory therefrom and 
also is more explicit in its sociological and behavioural attitudes than Hart's 
tepid jurisprudence. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE POLICY-ORIENTED SCHOOL IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
The development of the policy-oriented school as a reaction to legal 
formalism 
- 
the main jurisprudential characteristics of this school 
-a critique 
of its tenets 
-a critique of its ideological principles 
- 
an articulation of 
humanitarian intervention within the jurisprudential and ideological tenets of 
this school. 
I. THE ORIGINS OF THE POLICY-ORIENTED SCHOOL AND ITS 
PREMISES CONCERNING INTERNATIONAL LAW 
1.1 The Realist Movement. The realist school of law has emerged as a reaction 
to traditional jurisprudence, and in particular positivist formalism. ' The latter 
which had preoccupied legal thinking since the 19th century, had 
consummated its ability to address the new problems facing the world. In this 
environment, the realist school developed its tools for a functional 
interpretation of legal phenomena within their social context. As a reaction to 
the positivist theories, the realists displayed scepticism towards legal rules, 
and also, according to another aspect of that movement, scepticism towards 
the facts. 2 That scepticism could be enveloped in the conviction of the 
indeterminacy and inadequacy of legal rules to provide viable answers to 
N. Duxbury, Patterns ofAmerican Jurisprudence, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995), chs. 1,2 
J. Frank, Law and the Modern Mind, (Gloucester, Mass., Peter Smith, 1970; orig. publ. 
1930); W. E. Rumble, American Legal Realism: Scepticism, Reform, and the Judicial Process, 
(Ithaca, N. Y., Cornell University Press, 1968) 
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social phenomena. The belief in the inadequacy of rules is also a main tenet of 
the Critical Legal Studies movement. However, the policy-school, as an 
evolution from realism, succeeds in projecting a scheme for legal explication 
and does not confine itself only to a demonstration and critique of the latter. In 
this regard, the policy-school also differs from mainstream realism which put 
emphasis on the social effects of law, whilst it proved prudish about projecting 
a larger vision. 3 
1.2 The emergence of the policy-school and its international law tenets The 
policy-oriented school emerged from a sense of dissatisfaction concerning the 
perceived lapses of the other jurisprudential schools, realism included. 4 This 
disenchantment induced McDougal to formulate a liberal purposive theory by 
"unremitting efforts to apply the best existing scientific knowledge to solve 
the policy problems of all our communities. "5 International law is perceived as 
a process of authoritative decisions for achieving a minimum order of 
restricting coercion and an optimum order of achieving human dignity, that is, 
the wider allocation of the separate values which comprise the ultimate value 
of human dignity. G 
The factor which propagated a theory of international law arrogating indices 
from other disciplines, and which would present a theory for legal 
development instead of legal description, 7 was the exploration of certain 
3 K. N. Llewellyn, "Some Realism about Realism-Responding to Dean Pound", 44 Harvard 
L. Rev., (1930-31), p. 1222. One of the most persistent critics of Realism is Roscoe Pound for 
whom, realism "eliminate[s] from its science of law all question of what ought to be, all 
disputes as to canons of value, 
.... 
". R. Pound, "The Future of Law", 47 Yale L. J., (1937), p. 1, 
at p. 6. Also, realism "is essentially an art that cultivates the ugly 
..... 
in jurisprudence it is the 
cult of what we always supposed abnormal". R. Pound, "Modem Administrative Law", 51 
Reports of the Virginia State Bar Association, (1939), p. 372, at p. 385 
4 "McDougal had a doubly negative orientation: he was dissatisfied with traditional 
jurisprudence; he was disenchanted with American legal realists. He at once received the 
possibilities of a comprehensive, affirmative and empirical method". H. D. Lasswell, "In 
Collaboration with McDougal", 1 Denver J. I. L &Pol., (1971), p. 17, at p. 17 S M. S. McDougal, "The Law School of the Future: From Legal Realism to Policy Science in 
the World Community", 56 Yale L. J., (1946-47), p. 1345, at p. 1349 
Lung-Chu Chen, An Introduction to Contemporary International Law: A Policy Oriented 
Perspective, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1989), p. 4 
R. Pound, "Philosophical Theory and International Law", I Bibliotheca Visseriana, 
(Leyden, 1923), p. 71, at p. 89: "But we may demand of him (jurist of the immediate future) a 
legal philosophy that shall take account of the social psychology, the economics, the 
sociology as well as the law and politics of today, that shall enable international law to take in 
what it requires from without, that hall give us a functional critique of international law in 
terms of social ends, not an analytical critique in terms of itself, and above all that shall 
conceive of the legal order as a process and not as a condition". 
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trends in humanity. Those trends were the rising demand of people for greater 
sharing of values and security, the interdependence of human beings, the 
inclination towards the realisation of an affluent free society and finally the 
inadequacies of contemporary theories to respond sufficiently. 8 The social 
factors which generate law and their study underlines the sociological trend in 
policy-school's jurisprudence and also reminds us of the Haitian descriptive 
sociology. The parallels are, though, limited. Hart identifies the truisms but 
not the content of the law, whereas the policy-school expands the spectrum of 
law towards its teleology. 
Positivism is inadequate to apprehend and engulf the inexorable non-legal 
features of a rule, by insisting on understanding law as a system of rules, and 
also in the distinction between the lex lata and lex ferenda. This is 
characterised as the "normative ambiguity" of rules, because under an 
innocent insistence of univocalism lies a commingled statement of preferences 
and facts. 9 The policy-school transcends the illusory distinction between lex 
lata and lex ferenda by advocating an intermingling of the two. Law as 
process is simultaneously concerned with rules, values, aspirations and 
suitable choices. Hence the dichotomy evaporates in a non rule-oriented 
jurisprudence. 
The other pillar of the policy-school's criticism is realism, or the "pure theory 
of power". By emphasising naked power realists misconceive the function of 
law. For the policy-school law is instead a process of authority and control. 
Absence of those ingredients transforms law either into an illusion or naked 
power. 
The major premises of the school's conceptual thinking concerning 
international law could be adumbrated in the following propositions. 
International law exhibits a high degree of decentralisation, with the national 
states as the main components of the system. The nation-states, through their 
8 M. S. McDougal, "International Law, Power and Policy: A Contemporary Conception", 82 
R. C. (1953 I), p. 133, at pp. 137-191, hereinafter cited as Power and Policy 
H. D. Lasswell, M. S. McDougal, "Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training 
in the Public Interest", 52 Yale L. J., (1943), p. 203, at pp. 266-272, in part. p. 267: "..... a 
speaker may conceal his own preference or volition on contentious matters and increase the 
attention paid to what he says by enunciating norms whose sponsor appears to transcend the 
speaker. ". 
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officials, dispense a double function in international law similar to Georges 
Scelle's dedoublement fonctionnel. The state actors, in the absence of a 
centralised valuator authority, are simultaneously claimants in the 
international process and authoritative interpreters of their actions and the 
actions of other claimants. 10 Because law, for the policy-school, consists of 
authoritative decisions, it seems that the "authority elites" are performing the 
function of international legislation, adjudication and enforcement which 
happens indistinguishably in the domestic or international plain. Also, 
whereas states are perceived as the exclusive participants in the decentralised 
field of international law, the world exhibits an inexorable interdependence 
which is evidenced even within the smaller components of the community. 
1.3 The policy-school's critique of positivist thinking. Having described the 
plan for interaction, the policy-school proceeds in demonstrating the 
inadequacies of established theories when attempting to manage the problems 
of the social process of international law. The positivist school is lamented for 
its unjustified credence in the omnipotence of rules, its dogmatism and 
formalism. The rules-oriented school of international law exhibits a delusory 
self-sufficiency and inner logic which becomes precarious when mechanical 
application is abandoned. In addition to the legal rigidity a strict rule 
application exhibits, it is also devoid of a conscious deliberation of other 
aspects related to the rules. Rules show indeterminacy in meaning and appear 
in complementary sets. The application of a rule is hence not mechanical but 
involves consideration of wider perspectives, the included values and those 
aspired to. The application of a certain rule therefore requires an intellectual 
employment which positivism renders unnecessary. It requires an exploration 
of the values inherited in the rules, and those a purposive legal system would 
serve. This intellectual task could not be neutral, as positivism claims by an 
illusory submission of choices and values to the unemotive power of past 
decisions. Positivism offers a thin disguise to the policy choices involved in 
the application of rules, maintaining a procedural rigidity that denies any legal 
10 Lung-Chu Chen, An Introduction to Contemporary International Law: A Policy Oriented 
Perspective, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1989), p. 9. For the concept of 
dedoublement fonctionnel, see G. Scelle, "Regles generales du droit de la paix", 46 R. C.. 
(1933 IV), p. 331 
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system including international law the dynamism necessary for its application. 
The choices, however, should be made explicit by exploration of the 
consistent trends in community values, and the decision-maker should be 
informed by the ultimate considerations of the legal system of which he is a 
component. The sanctification of past decisions becomes incongruous in an 
ever-changing world, and condemns creativity. In addition, positivism, by 
insisting on an automatic application of rules for dispute resolution, overlooks 
the fact that rules are complementary and that a situation does not invoke 
automatically the application of a certain rule without evaluation of the facts. 
A factual instance of aggression does not place it automatically within the 
framework of Article 2(4) of the U. N. Charter, irrespective of the evaluation 
of events as either aggression, self-defence, reprisals or justified intervention. 
A rule-obsession obfuscates the normative ambiguity of rules, which contain 
in their framework a stabilised component of past decision, an aspirational 
component of future decisions and also an evaluative one of preferred 
decisions. Non-intervention may be a descriptive statement of operative facts, 
or a statement of evaluative or wishful importance. The policy-school attempts 
to find an answer to these problems by constructing a theory about law and 
not of law. These theorists start from the insights of the realist movement in 
the U. S. A but surpass its limits by delineating a purposive theory, which 
recognises law as an instrument for the achievement of wider values 
aggregated in the ultimate value of human dignity. Law becomes a process of 
authoritative decisions and control, thus breaking with the tradition of rigid, 
automatic rules and attributing a degree of flexibility and creativity to legal 
systems. It is easy in this framework to trace the reasons for criticism. The 
stabilising and impartial function of rules is replaced by choiceness and 
partiality. Law is intermingled with power, policy or social aspirations. The 
criticism, however, resides either in misinterpretation or misunderstanding of 
the policy-school. The latter could be better described as a reconciliation of 
power and authority, of "is" and "ought". The dichotomy perpetuated by 
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positivism is overcome by ingeniously performing the policy methodology 
and clarifying the values. " 
In a nutshell, "the policy-oriented approach is contextual, problem-solving, 
and multimethod in nature". 12 It is multimethod because it is enriched with the 
insights of other disciplines in the social sciences. It is problem-solving 
because it provides the framework for a purposive usage of law as an 
instrument for value optimisation, and also it is contextual, through taking 
cognisance of the relevant social context. 
II. THE POLICY FRAMEWORK 
11.1 The framework. As said previously, the policy-oriented school, contrary 
to realism's philosophical disorganisation, offers a framework for application. 
We are going to present their proposals and then demonstrate the merits and 
limitations of that framework. In the end, we will try to adapt humanitarian 
intervention in that expositional framework and also evaluate its place within 
the broader ideological commands of the policy-oriented school. The policy- 
oriented approach should include: '3 
11.2 The establishment of an observational standpoint. The observer should 
acquire a standpoint which is detached from the events he is scrutinising. The 
observer should be freed from the subjectiveness of his position in the social 
process, of which he is both participant and scrutiniser. The distinctiveness of 
the observer's standpoint liberates him from the parochial interests which 
could heavily affect his evaluation. The suggested observational point is that 
of the citizen of humankind, which assists in diagnosing the interests and 
values of the world community. 
R. Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It. (Oxford. 
Clarendon Press, 1994), ch. 1, pp. 1-16 
12 Lung-Chu Chen, An Introduction to Contemporary International Law: A Policy Oriented 
Perspective, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1989), p. 15 
1' M. S. McDougal, W. M. Reisman, "International Law in Policy-Oriented Perspective", in 
R. St. J. MacDonald, D. M. Johnston, The Structure and Process of International Law: Essays 
in Legal Philosophy, Doctrine and Theory, (Dordrecht, M. Nijhoff, 1983), p. 103 
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11.3 The formulation of problems. The policy-school offers a comprehensive 
categorisation of problems which overshadow the parochial biases of 
individual cultures. The identification of problems is achieved by locating the 
disparities between human values and their actualisation. This categorisation 
assists in performing the intellectual tasks for policy decisions by delimiting 
the field of particular inquiries into the approximation of policies to values. 
The values identified are: respect; power; enlightenment; well-being; wealth; 
skill; affection; rectitude. In order to make the inquiry sufficient, these values 
are supplemented with institutional devices such as participation; 
perspectives; situations; base values; outcomes. 
11.4 The delimitation of the focus of inquiry. The focus of inquiry is the 
authoritative decisions which, according to the policy-school, count as the 
law. The decisions should be both authoritative, that is, correspond to peoples' 
expectations of authority, and also controlling, that is, effectively applied. 
Lack of those two factors casts law into disrepute or transforms it into naked 
power. The definition of authority as securing the common interests of people, 
transmuted into the international arena, implies a comprehensive 
understanding of mankind's interdependent interests. 
The authoritative decision, on the other hand, consists of constitutive and 
public order decisions. The former establish the authoritative decisions by 
performing seven functions: intelligence; promotion; prescription; invocation; 
application; termination and appraisal. The public order decisions emanate 
from the constitutive process and are directed towards achieving the 
community values. For international law, a wider perception of the relevant 
intellectual tasks is essential and also a study of the interplay between the 
national and international arenas. 
11.5 The explicit postulation of public order goals. The policy-school 
postulates the goal of human dignity. That goal is not arbitrary but the 
distillation of the contingent values of all cultures and civilisations. The 
difference from existing theories, though, is that the goal is now postulated 
and not derived by mental exercises into practices and ideologies. 
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Another difference is the abrasive and open manner in which human dignity is 
postulated, contrary to the value timidity and implicitness of existing theories. 
The postulated value of human dignity in international law assists in 
reconciling the dichotomy which has plagued international law 
- 
that between 
justice and order. The hierarchical opposition between those two postulates 
has obscured the real question of appraising policies. Human dignity is the 
indication for testing whether the formulations of public or just order are 
responding to that ultimate criterion. Human dignity includes polymerous 
justificatory modes; metaphysical, religious or intellectual. This goal also 
demonstrates diversification in its realisation. 
11.6 The performance of intellectual tasks. The legal task in a policy context 
extends beyond the traditional legal investigation into logical derivation and 
application towards the clarification of goals, description of past decisional 
trends, analysis of the factors which affect decisions, projection of future 
trends and also invention and evaluation of policy alternatives. 
Adherence to that framework of inquiry offers the best device for value 
optimisation and in particular the achievement of the value of human dignity, 
by scrupulous investigation into the dynamics of international interaction. 
This conceptual project, however, is deficient in many respects and we shall 
proceed now with the exposition of the intellectual frailties of such a project 
before we discuss the place of humanitarian intervention therein. 
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III. A CRITIQUE OF THE FRAMEWORK 
III. 1 The conception of law. As already pointed out, McDougal was 
influenced by realism's criticism of legal formalism. It has been commented 
that legal realism emerged as a "revolt against formalism". 14 For McDougal, 
the most fundamental obscurity in contemporary theory about international 
law is the "...... over-emphasis, by most writers and many decision-makers, 
upon the potentialities of technical "legal" rules, unrelated to policies, as 
factors and instruments in the guiding and shaping of decisions...... ". '5 Thus, 
McDougal shares in common with the realist movement a distrust towards the 
normativity of rules. However, he adopts a dynamic and functional approach 
to law as a medium for social projection and realisation of values and policies, 
achieved through a thorough examination and appreciation of the social 
16 
process. 
Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law is a prime target because it engages the jurist 
only in a "syntactic clarification" of the rule by retaining the distinctiveness of 
the legal profession. '7 Counterposed to this is an intermingling of law with 
policy, whereby rules are constantly redefined and reformulated in the context 
of reappraised situations. ' 8 In a realist system, the function of rules, instead of 
being one of automation, is "to serve as summary indices to relevant 
crystallised community expectations, and, hence to permit creative and 
adaptive, instead of arbitrary and irrational, decisions. "19 Any hint of 
14 W. Twining, "The Significance of Realism", in Lloyd's Introduction to Jurisprudence, 
M. D. A. Freeman (ed. ), 6th ed., (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1994), p. 723 Is Power and Policy, p. 143 
10 "The life of law has not been logic but experience". O. W. Holmes, The Common Law. 
(Boston, Little, Brown, 1881), p. 1; K. N. Llewellyn, "Some Realism about Realism", in 
Jurisprudence: Realism in Theory and Practice, (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 
1962), p. 42, at pp. 55-57: "....... [a] conception of law in flux, of moving law 
....... 
An 
Insistence on evaluation of any part of law in terms of its effects, and an insistence on the 
worthwhileness of trying to find these effects". 
" M. S. McDougal, H. D. Lasswell, M. W. Reisman, "Theories about International Law: 
Prologue to a Configurative Jurisprudence", 8 Va. J. I. L., (1968), p. 188, at p. 243 
18 Power and Policy, supra, note 8, p. 156 
19 M. S. McDougal, F. P. Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order: The Legal 
Regulation of International Coercion, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1961), p. 57 
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subjectivity is dispersed by a systematic use of the methodology and by the 
fact that choice is inevitable even within "neutral" rules. 20 
Associated with this is the belief in the indeterminacy of legal rules 
. 
21 This 
contains two interrelated aspects. A rule derives its existence and validity 
from its attachment to the expectations of a particular community. The test of 
validity is similar to that of customary law. An aggregate of shared 
perspectives and a material conformity should be ingrained in that rule. 22 The 
ever-changing social context induces a continual process of evaluation and 
identification of perspectives and actualisation. 23 Law, as a mergence of 
community shared expectations and operations, is homocentric because it pre- 
empts explicit value identifications and choices. This human derivability is 
contrary to the transcendental identifications of natural law or the logical 
theoretical abstractions of positivism. Whereas for Kelsen intrusion of values 
would interfere with the purity of the project, Hart, on the other hand, starting 
from a sketchy sociological position and concerned with linguistics, proceeds 
in a lukewarm acknowledgement of shared perspectives or "assumed common 
24 human objectives" approximating to McDougal. 
Secondly, the intrinsic indeterminacy as the outcome of the contextual 
formation of rules is exhibited in form by the imprecise terminology and the 
complementary itinerary of rules. 25 The indeterminacy and normative 
ambiguity of rules is indeed accentuated in a decentralised and polymorphic 
system, and thus it could be detrimental to the essence of international law if it 
is viewed as an open-ended process. Contrary to realism, the policy-school 
20 H. Lauterpacht, The Development of International Law by the International Court, 
(London, Stevens & Sons, 1958), p. 399; R. Higgins, "Integrations of Authority and Control: 
Trends in the Literature of International Law and International Relations", in W. M. Reisman 
and B. H. Weston, (eds. ), Towards World Order and Human Dignity, (N. Y., Free Press, 
1976), p. 79, at p. 85 
21 R. A. Falk, Legal Order in a Violent World, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1968), 
V501: "..... indeterminacy to be an all 
- 
pervasive attribute of legal process". ol: 
Paust, "The Concept of Norm: A Consideration of the Jurisprudential Views of Hart, 
Kelsen and McDougal 
- 
Lasswell", 52 Temple L. Q., (1979), p. 9, at p. 15: "Without shared 
perspectives behind them, an opinio juris at their base, formal rules will not reflect law but 
something else". 
23 R. A. Falk, Legal Order in a Violent World, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1968), 
p. 89: "...... McDougal sacrifices too many of the stabilising benefits of a rule-oriented 
approach to international law by stressing policy flexibility". 
2 H. L. A. Hart, "Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals", 71 Harvard L. Rev.. 
(1958), p. 593, at p. 628 
25 
"travel in pairs of opposites", Power and Policy, supra, note 8, p. 156 
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defies the uncertainty of such an approach by providing an intellectual 
framework for the "neutral" scientific identification of the change. For them, 
a scientific and methodological enquiry into the social context could assist in 
the identification of values. 26 The distillation of those subjectivities requires a 
coherent mapping of context beyond Hart's partial exploration of the assumed 
common human objectives. The policy-school proceeds, though, from an 
empirical identification of values to an abstraction 
- 
human dignity 
- 
similar 
to that of Kelsen's abstraction of the Basic Norm from an empirical 
observation. 27 
The point of divergence with Kelsen is that the policy-school does not through 
reliance on pure norms escape from but instead recognises the function of 
values in guiding our perception of law. 28 Kelsen, as highlighted above, 
observes the social context in order to designate his Basic Norm but he 
conceals the extent of the exercise by insisting in measuring only the degree of 
experience. This is not a comprehensive exploration because it attempts to 
ignore the subjectivity inherent in the experience. Past practice incorporates 
values and one should extricate those values in order to evaluate their 
conformity with present practice. An illusive insistence on existence has the 
defect of exploring only partially the experience and also lacks the indices for 
comparing values for present purposes. Another defect is the potentiality of 
characterising as law a consistent distorted practice, which lacks community 
perspectives, or of denying the attribute of law to a pattern of expectations. 
For instance, interventions are historically repetitive and occur under multiple 
perspectives, communal or parochial. Therefore, a myopic measurement may 
provide them with a legal attribute due to the distorted or elliptical 
apprehension of the community expectations. On the other hand, one may 
deny or ignore a consistent pattern of conduct with consistent perspectives as 
26 
"..... to focus attention on the necessity of goal definition and to make final choices explicit 
for appraisal by others........ ". J. N. Moore, "Prolegomenon to the Jurisprudence of Myres 
McDougal and Harold Lasswell", 54 Va. L. Rev., (1968), p. 662, at pp. 676-677 
27 Ibid., p. 676: "The policy plugged into the system is largely independent of the system". 
28 J. Dewey, The Public and its Problems, (N. Y., Holt & Co., 1927), pp. 175-176: "The 
glorification of "pure science" is a rationalisation of an escape...... ". 
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with humanitarian intervention because of a general negation of the conduct. 29 
Hence an exploration is suggested of past practice and perspectives 
concerning humanitarian intervention and their evaluation with the extant 
perspectives of present context. The method of enquiry, then, assists in the 
exploration of humanity's demands30 by delimiting personal preferences and 
avoiding the mixture of personal and communal perspectives that occurs in 
natural law. 
Any criticism concerns the claimed scientific character of the method. It is the 
impossibility of practical, not conceptual, disassociation of empirical 
observation from the values sought. The theoretical or empirical justification 
of certain values presupposes the embedment of those values in the suggested 
schedule for observation. Failure to vindicate these values as the outcome of 
enquiry implies that the framework cannot be maintained. On the contrary, 
continual affirmation of the same value outcomes evidences the surreptitious 
inclusion of those values into the structure. 3' The framework of enquiry and 
the observer are not thus neutral, contrary to the affirmations of the policy- 
school. The values cannot be perceived as external to the enquiry unless we 
proceed, as Kelsen did, in an illusory abstraction. The consistency of 
McDougal's framework in reproducing the value of human dignity indicates 
that this value is inherent in the mode of enquiry. 
It is ironic that Kelsen's cognitive approach to the legal system, advertised as 
procuring "exactness and objectivity" for scholarly inquiry 32, is embedded 
with human values and choices. Kelsen escapes the exploration of the latter by 
resorting to conclusive statements which make redundant the need for a 
methodological framework. But when Kelsen requires the external observer to 
29 Hart nearly admits that when he says that otherwise "In so doing, one will miss out a whole 
dimension of the social life of those whom he is watching....... ". H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of 
Law, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1961), p. 87, hereinafter cited as CL 
'o M. S. McDougal, "International Law and Social Science: A Mild Plea in Avoidance", 66 
A. J. I. L., (1972), p. 77, at p. 79: "The realist question is whether these choices are to be made 
by the criteria of mysticism or obscurantism or by theory and procedures designed best to 
promote long-term aggregate common interest. It is a layman's fantasy to hope that some set 
of words can be found to make choice easy or automatic". 
" C. Taylor, Philosophy and the Human Sciences, vol. Il, (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1985), pp. 75,77-81 
12 H. Kelsen, "The Pure Theory of Law and Analytical Jurisprudence", 55 Harvard L. Rev., 
(1941), p. 44, at p. 47 
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identify the social and legal context in order to extract the Basic Norm, that 
excursus, although cognitive, is charged with subjectivities and additionally it 
lacks the methodology for a systematic articulation. 
A point where Kelsen, Hart and McDougal meet in different degrees is the 
issue of shared legal expectations. Although for Kelsen normativity is derived 
from the law creators, the objective meaning of a norm involves the 
subjectivities of the law creator, the specific actor and that of "a third 
individual not involved in the relation between the two". 33 This is a peculiar 
sociological observation, particularly when the validity of the act is still 
affirmed although the perspectives of those persons have changed. In this 
instance, Kelsen includes patterns of authority in his consideration of patterns 
of control. For Hart, there must be a general acceptance of the rule and also an 
internal aspect34 evidenced in criticisms towards deviatory behaviour: "Rules 
are conceived and spoken of as imposing obligations when the general 
demand for conformity is insistent and the social pressure brought to bear 
upon those who deviate or threaten to deviate is great". 35 These features 
- 
"acceptance", "pressure"- may persuasively denote "volition", that is, 
preferences towards certain ends. 36 By linking norms to societal commands, 
Hart admits the formative role of societal expectations. However, he does not 
acknowledge the fact that the subj ectivities may change and his system does 
not provide the tools for handling these inquiries as McDougal's does. On the 
other hand, Hart's mature legal system is equally hierarchically oriented as 
Kelsen's, by constricting the internal aspect solely to the officials. 
We have already spoken about the validity of a rule according to the policy- 
school and its differences or affinities with the Kelsenian or Haitian approach. 
Another issue which should be contemplated is that of its binding character. 
McDougal is explicit in his preference for "effective control" instead of 
" H. Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law, Max Knight trans. (Berkeley, Calif., University of 
California Press, 1967), p. 7 
" CL, p. 55; N. MacCormick, H. L. A. Hart, (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1981), p. 25, 
and chs. 3,4 
's CL, p. 84 
36 N. MacCormick, H. L. A. Hart, (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1981), pp. 33-34; J. 
Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1980), Chapters 
3-4 
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"formal authority" which is refuted as "mystical". 37 The antithesis to Kelsen is 
not so absolute as it prima facie appears, because they both make or imply 
concessions towards the other aspect of the distinction. We have already 
explained how Kelsen inserts the criterion of effectiveness, which in a formal- 
normative system implies actualisation. In this regard, McDougal 
approximates to Kelsen, because effective control may well imply sanction, 
which is a conditio sine qua non for legality according to Kelsen. The 
difference is that McDougal includes a multitude of parameters in his 
articulation of effective control, of which actual sanction is only one 
element. 38 On this issue, Kelsen's exposition is confusing and permits 
different interpretations. Effectiveness can mean actual sanction or normative 
sanction, an "ought'. On the other hand, McDougal says that community 
expectations may produce effectiveness and detaches international law from 
actual sanction, thus assimilating it with Hart's acceptance of rules by the 
community. 39 One can reverse the argument and ask whether sanction is a 
prerequisite for the formation of community expectations. This brief 
exposition shows, however, that a caricature of these jurisprudential schools 
emphasises their disparateness, whereas a more sagacious approach can 
eventually expose their links. 
111.2 The process of decision-making: Participants. As stated above, 
McDougal, in order to describe the decisional process, offers an economical 
indication of the features of such decisions. Participants are "...... an individual 
or an entity which has at least minimum access to the process of authority in 
the sense that it can make claims or be subjected to claims". 40 McDougal 
rectifies the persistent injustice in international law of considering the states 
as exclusive participants in the world constitutive process, and projects the 
37 Power and Policy, pp. 185,194-198 
'e M. S. McDougal, W. M. Reisman, "International Law in Policy-Oriented Perspective", in 
R. St. J. MacDonald, D. M. Johnston, The Structure and Process of International Law: Essays 
in Legal Philosophy, Doctrine and Theory, (Dordrecht, M. Nijhoff, 1983), p. 103, at pp. 104- 
106 
39 J. L. Brierly, The Law of Nations, 6th ed. rev. by C. H. M. Waldock, (Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1963), p. 52: "..... is observed, not because it has been consented to, but because it is 
believed to be binding, 
..... 
". 
40 M. S. McDougal, H. D. Lasswell, W. M. Reisman, "The World Constitutive Process of 
Authoritative Decision", in R. A. Falk, C. E. Black, The Future of the International Legal 
Order, vol.!, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1969), p. 73, at p. 81 
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individual into the equation. The recognition of the individual as a participant 
in the process of authoritative decision-making transcends the traditional 
controversy concerning the subjects of international law. 41 It is presented as a 
consequence of the values shared by the author and also a component of his 
scientific framework. The international movement of human rights is crucial 
for that conceptual change and has proved subversive to the dominance of 
states. 
McDougal humanised and democratised the decisional process not only by 
admitting values but also by defusing the participants therein. Kelsen has 
equated authority with sanctions and the law creators. 42 This shows a 
predisposition towards authority, but again it does not escape the emotive 
element. Hence, a large deal of subjectivities are incorporated in the pure 
theory; namely, those predominant within the elites, as opposed to those 
shared by the community. 
The criticisms levelled at McDougal, that he is transmitting his conceptual 
standing, his values into the empirical field, that is, the framework of enquiry, 
would now appear less fervent. The dominance of the state in practice and in 
legal thinking made any proposals for elevating individuals appear either 
subversive or wishful thinking. Now, individuals are not extraneous to the 
world process. The criticism would be valid if it referred to a certain 
abstraction in the framework, or to the failure to elucidate which values the 
decision-makers hold. McDougal states the participants in a descriptive mode, 
without articulating further their interdependencies and their implications in 
the system. On the other hand, there is the presumption that participants, and 
in particular decision-makers, share the postulated values. Otherwise, they 
may opt for other values. Before assuming that they hold values, we should 
answer a more cardinal question of whether they see law as a system of rule or 
as a process. 
41 M. S. McDougal, "Review of Hersch Lauterpacht's International Law and Human Rights". 
60 Yale L. J., (1951), p. 1051, at p. 1055: "..... the whole controversy about the "subjects" of 
international law might be more explicitly recognised as a verbalistic quagmire. ". 
42 H. Kelsen, Principles of International Law, 2nd ed., R. W. Tucker (ed. ), (N. Y., Holt, 
Rinehart & Winson, 1966), pp. 410-411: ....... the contents of the norms must be determined 
by acts of authorised individuals 
....... 
They are valid if they are created in this way, ...... 
whatever their contents may be". 
150 
111.3 Base-values 
- 
strategies. McDougal is concerned with the operational or 
interpersonal definition of base values. This includes, firstly, the establishment 
of a constitutive relationship between the participants in the world arena and, 
secondly, the proportionality of exclusive and inclusive jurisdiction. In 
relation to the first aspect, he establishes a consensual and procedural system. 
The enumeration of the values of human dignity as power, respect, 
enlightenment, wealth, well-being, skill, affection and rectitude rephrases the 
content of existing human rights instruments and, hence, enables these values 
to be "identi[fied] with the whole of humankind". 43 What is implicit in 
McDougal's theory is that reasonable people would agree on these values and, 
hence, a connection with Rawls could be founded. Rawls derives the primary 
goods, which establish the principles of justice, from reason. Dworkin's 
observation concerning Rawls's theory that it entails "choice conditions 
..... 
constructed so as to reflect 
..... 
principles of reasonableness suited to the 
political culture of Western liberal democracies" is an accurate analysis 
addressed also to McDougal. 44 
Concerning the second dimension of the operational definition of bases and 
under the guiding principles of interdependence and world-wide humanity, 
McDougal believes that only an inclusive operation achieves a better 
apportionment of base values. He admits that certain matters are effectively 
enjoyed at the domestic level but again they are submitted to review by the 
inclusive authority. Also he observes that the "chief trend is towards the 
attention of exclusive competence (domestic jurisdiction) and the broadening 
of inclusive authority". 45 McDougal proceeds towards the internationalisation 
of matters which are considered within the domestic jurisdiction of states, and 
43 M. S. McDougal, W. M. Reisman, "International Law in Policy-Oriented Perspective", in 
R. St. J. MacDonald, D. M. Johnston, The Structure and Process of International Law: Essays 
in Legal Philosophy, Doctrine and Theory, (Dordrecht, M. Nijhoff, 1983), p. 103, at pp. 117- 
119,121-123; B. Rosenthal, Etude de 1'oeuvre de Myres Smith McDougal en matiere de droit 
international public, (Paris, Librairie generale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1970), pp-54-57 
`a R. Dworkin, "What is Equality? Part 3: The Place of Liberty", 73 Iowa L. Rev., (1987), p. 1, 
at p. 14; B. Rosenthal, Etude de l oeuvre de Myres Smith McDougal en mauere de droit 
international public, (Paris, Librairie generale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1970), pp. 123- 
127; W. A. Galston, Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues, and Diversity in the Liberal State, 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991); P. Alloff, "Language, Method and the 
Nature of International Law", XLV B. Y. B. I. L., (1971), p. 79, at pp. 122-125 
45 M. S. McDougal, H. D. Lasswell, W. M. Reisman, "The World Constitutive Process of 
Authoritative Decision", in R. A. Falk, C. E. Black, The Future of the International Legal 
Order, vol.!, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1969), p. 73, at p. 110 
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thus the treatment of human beings within the exclusive sphere is predicated 
upon its legality according to international standards. McDougal regards 
domestic jurisdiction as a concession to national states by the general 
community46 and in that respect he distances his theory from the confines of 
absolute sovereignty, which pervades international law. Humanitarian 
intervention is extricated as the natural outcome of theorising and practising 
international concern and indeed it could be linked with strategies for 
achieving human dignity. 
"Strategies are the modalities by which base values are manipulated in the 
decision-making process". 47 Humanitarian intervention as humanity's reaction 
to the inadequacy of domestic arenas in safeguarding human rights is an 
aspect of the authoritative decisional process: 
...... 
the concept of "international concern" which underlies so much of 
international law, and all its supporting doctrines have historically performed 
the function of permitting an elite external to any particular nation-state to 
intervention in the affairs of that nation-state in the name of a wider 
community of a wider body politic. The whole function of international law is 
to permit such intervention in affairs which would otherwise be regarded as 
internal". 48 
By opposing the exclusive domestic jurisdiction in the field of human rights 
and also by raising the prospects of international concern and action, he pre- 
empts a structural change in the international substratum as it was formatted in 
the post-World War years with the pre-eminence of states combined with a 
timidity towards concerns for human rights. McDougal resides, in this respect, 
within the natural law tradition, which advocated international action in the 
interests of humanity when gross and abhorrent violations of human rights 
occur. 
'° M. S. McDougal, H. D. Lasswell, Lung-Chu Chen, Human Rights and World Public Order: 
The Basic Policies of an International Law of Human Dignity, (New Haven, Yale University 
Press, 1980), p. 214 
" M. S. McDougal, H. D. Lasswell, W. M. Reisman, "The World Constitutive Process of 
Authoritative Decision", in R. A. Falk, C. E. Black, The Future of the International Legal 
Order, vol. 1, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1969), p. 73, at p. 119 
48 M. S. McDougal, "Remarks on International Concern versus Domestic Jurisdiction", 48 
Proc. A. S. I. L., (1954), p. 120 
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III. 4 The explicit postulation of the basic public order goal of human dignity. 
The postulation of human dignity provokes criticism related to the perceived 
neutrality of the scientific research when arriving at its findings. It was 
queried above whether human dignity as the outcome of research does not 
implicitly direct the latter. It could be maintained, though, that the explicit and 
specific exposition of values "objectifies" the pursued research by making the 
participants conscious of those values which permeate the latter. 49 Personal 
predilections would otherwise interfere surreptitiously with research. 5° 
For McDougal, the goal of human dignity is attained both from an 
observational and empirical point. The observational point is that of citizen of 
the world, as was explained above. The postulation of that goal is not derived 
but explored and established in the empirical plain. 51 
Still, the question remains whether that goal is subjective and whether 
McDougal objectifies it by empirical research. First, the observer could not be 
neutral. He lives in a community and he is affected by the values and 
schemata of that community. Any inquiry, therefore, could not escape the 
intricacies of the received experience. This concerns theories of law, and of 
course theories about law are affected by human fallibility as well. Secondly, 
the system is purposive. Contrary to the reification of past decisions, the 
observer in the policy-school should promote through clarification, 
explication, and commitment the goal he is engaged with. It could be referred 
to as democratic "evangelism" because it activates the dialogue concerning the 
content of that principle and does not commit the participants to a uniform 
application of that principle, but recognises flexibility and institutional 
diversity. 
49 G. Myrdal, "A Methodological Note on Facts and Valuations in Social Science", in An 
American Dilemma, (N. Y., Harper & Bros Publ., 1944), p. 1035, at p. 1043: "The attempt to 
eradicate biases by trying to keep out the valuations themselves is a hopeless and misdirects 
venture........ There is no other devise for excluding biases in social sciences than to face the 
valuations and to introduce them as explicitly stated, specific and sufficiently concretised 
value premises". 
so H. L. A. Hart, Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1983), 
132 
' H. D. Lasswell, M. S. McDougal, "Criteria for a Theory About Law", 44 S. Cal. L. Rev.. 
(1971), p. 362, at p. 393 
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However liberal the effectuation of human dignity, it does not counter the 
suspicion of subjectivity and arbitrariness in the adoption of the postulate. It 
could be encountered through empirical inquiry. McDougal contends that the 
values comprised in the ultimate value of human dignity are not an 
"idiosyncratic or arbitrary choice"52 but attributes them to a "common 
inheritance", not articulated by him. It seems that he eschews empirical 
inquiry in order to avoid employing the observational techniques which he 
criticises. Those techniques refer to the methods of natural law with the 
metaphysical or transempirical derivation of principles and to legal formalism 
with logical abstractions. Although he avoids explicating the sources of those 
values for the reasons just stated, he refers to some trends in the world arena 
which induce the observer to adopt that particular goal. Hence his method, 
instead of being empirical, is purely descriptive, and defective due to 
limitations of time and place. It is also unconvincing as a scientific method if 
it does not explicate derivation and formation of the phenomenologically 
objectified reality. The merit of such disposition is that it overcomes the 
disagreement concerning value derivation. Observation of the aggregate finite 
trends in the world arena facilitates the extrication of an "objective" value by 
minimising the value references. The postulation of human dignity is global in 
perspective from the observational point. That process is thus deductive and 
not derivative. It could be described as the reception of polymorphic stimuli, 
their articulation and the projection of such distillation. McDougal is not 
concerned with the derivation of values and thus the critique concerning the 
non 
- 
derivation of his postulate is not entirely justified. However, by side- 
stepping that matter, the necessity of indicating the indices in his global 
vision of the world process from which he distils the value of human dignity 
remains unfulfilled. Proffering no such hint, his postulate could be 
53 characterised as transempirical. 
52 M. S. McDougal, H. D. Lasswell, Lung-Chu Chen, Human Rights and World Public Order: 
The Basic Policies of an International Law of Human Dignity, (New Haven, Yale University 
Press, 1980), p. 90 
s' J. Stone, "A Sociological Perspective on International Law", in R. St. J. MacDonald, D. M. 
Johnston, The Structure and Process of International Law: Essays in Legal Philosophy. 
Doctrine and Theory, (Dordrecht, M. Nijhoff, 1983), p. 263, at p. 274 
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McDougal does not validate his postulate of human dignity because he 
recognises the diversity of epistemological methods in acquiring knowledge of 
its content. Although this counts against the perceived epistemological 
security, it mirrors the diversity of the observational point, which is the 
individual. In the end, his framework is like Janus, incorporating 
simultaneously precepts of weakness and strength. 
One other weakness is that McDougal does not suggest how the conflicts that 
may arise between the different values which constitute human dignity may be 
accommodated. By stating them in a general form, the decision-makers 
unfortunately exercise their discretion concerning the mode and degree of 
their actualisation. The potential for derogation is thus acknowledged. 54 
IV. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION UNDER THE CRITERIA OF 
THE POLICY-ORIENTED SCHOOL55 
IV. 1 The context. The policy-oriented school views law as an authoritative 
process, contrary to the traditional perception of law as a body of rules. Under 
the remit of such a definition, one should look beyond the rules which 
formally prohibit humanitarian intervention, to the endless process of claims, 
counter-claims and decisions, the underlining policies of past trends and the 
expectations of the wider community, in order to formulate a viable 
perception of the legal merits of humanitarian intervention itself. A flat 
rejection of the latter is injudicious, because it disregards the process of 
authoritative decision-making and the lack of sufficient control which an 
observation of the factual situations produces. 
" J. Stone, "Approaches to the Notion of International Justice", in R. A. Falk, The Future Of 
the International Legal Order, vol. 1, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1969), p. 372, at 
p. 424: "As with the list of values 
..... 
the real difficulties begin after the values have been 
listed and named, either in general or for the particular conflict. It is after that, usually, that 
the crucial choices have to be made about which of them is to be sacrificed and how far. For, 
except in the simplest cases, not all of them can be equally secured". 
`s See for a version of this section, N. Tsagourias, "The Lost Innocence of Humanity: The 
Tragedy of Rwanda and the Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention", 2 International Law and 
Armed Conflict Commentary, (1995), p. 19 
155 
The aggregate legal context under which humanitarian intervention is to be 
posited is that of the post-war order, delineated in the U. N. Charter. This 
framework contains an appraisal norm on non-aggression, namely Article 2(4) 
within an aspired effective system of collective security. Thus, Article 2(4) is 
not "an independent imperative of pacifism"56 but a contextual one. The other 
feature of the established legal order is the "aspirational" norms, that is, those 
related to the promotion of human rights. 
The function of this order unfortunately betrayed the concept. The collective 
security system as a corollary to the non-use of force has lapsed into 
desuetude, and Article 2(4) has fallen into disrespect. A system of claims, 
counter-claims, reactions and approvals has developed and this system, 
complex as it is, needs to be explicated in order to evaluate humanitarian 
actions. Demonstration of the latter's compatibility with Article 2(4) is not 
adequate. One should incorporate diverse factors into its appraisal. The most 
important issue to consider is the perspectives of the wider community for the 
promotion of the values of human dignity which are the distillation of 
humanity's optimum order and, on the other hand, to reject reliance on 
parochial interests. 
The criteria for appraisal should not be value-neutral, concentrating 
exclusively on the methods and procedures for such intervention. They would 
otherwise overlook the necessity for providing a substantive calculus of 
evaluation. Additionally, they invite and legitimise parochial actions if the 
procedural criteria are followed. Nor could such actions be tied to value 
conservation which has been promulgated as the maintenance of peace. This 
could not be the case, because humanitarian actions are by definition value 
expansive. On the other hand, value conservation is static and parochial if it 
does not take into consideration humanity's general aspirations. The value of 
preserving peace should be considered equally with the value of promoting 
human dignity. 
The criteria for a doctrine of humanitarian intervention in a policy context 
could be presented in the uniformity of trends concerning the situations, the 
S° M. W. Reisman, "Article 2(4): The Use of Force in Contemporary International Law", 78 
Proc. A. S. I. L., (1984), p. 74, at p. 76 
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participants, the perspectives, the strategies, the outcomes and the effects of 
such actions. 
IV. 2 Observational point. For McDougal, as was said above, the 
observational point is that of the world citizen. That position is reconciled 
with the adoption of humanitarian intervention as a method for protecting 
human rights. Such a predisposition is palpable, because humanitarian 
interventions do not emanate from state sovereignty; on the contrary, the two 
are antinomic. Human rights have emerged from a sense of affiliation among 
human beings, which is the essence of natural law philosophy, and also as a 
medium for protecting and maintaining the attributes of humanity within a 
state order. The sanctity of life has become a moral imperative and is 
contained in what is characterised as the droits humains, 57 that is, the 
exceptions to a vigorous exercise of sovereignty. The U. N. Charter has 
strengthened that process by reaffirming and emphasising the faith in human 
rights, as well as the interrelation of the latter with the maintenance of peace. 58 
The anthropocentric character of international law has not been immediately 
consented to, and in this field the contribution of the policy-school is 
immense. Having adopted a homocentric perception of international law, 
humanitarian actions for the restoration of the vestiges of humanity are hence 
condoned. 
IV. 3 Situations. The situations which command such intervention should be 
characterised by gross, extensive, and heinous affronts to human rights. 59 
Concerning the constitutive power of the state, humanitarian intervention is an 
affront to sovereignty. Therefore, it could take place in situations of internal 
S' A. Rougier, "La theorie de l'intervention d'humanite", 17 R. G. D. I. P., (1910), p. 468, at 
p. 472 
e See U. N. Charter: Preamble; Article 55 according to which the United Nations should 
promote: "universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms"; 
Article 56: "All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation 
with the Organisation for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55"; Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights; H. Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights, 
(London, Stevens & Sons, 1950), p. 186: "The correlation between peace and observance of 
fundamental rights is now a generally recognised fact". 59 
"An immediate threat of genocide or other widespread arbitrary deprivation of human life 
in violation of international law. ", T. J. Farer, "On Professor Moore's Synthesis", in J. N. 
Moore, (ed. ), Law and Civil War in the Modern World, (Baltimore, J. Hopkins University 
Press, 1974), p. 549 at pp. 553-554 
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anarchy, when the government is not authoritative and controlling. The public 
order in these situations is seen as having failed and degenerated into anarchy: 
"[W]hen the administration of a State has completely collapsed because of 
internal unrest and the authorities have lost control of the situation. In such 
circumstances the State as a subject of international law has been temporarily 
paralysed; it is unable to protect its citizens, not to speak of aliens sojourning 
in its territory, or to carry out its other responsibilities. , 60 
Such situations include the Dominican Republic (1965) where the State 
Department issued a statement justifying the intervention in view of the fact 
that "[t]he factual circumstances of the breakdown of order in the Dominican 
Republic were such that the landing could not have been delayed beyond the 
time it actually took place without needless sacrifice of lives 
........ 
61 On 
October 25,1983, United States. and Caribbean forces intervened in 
Grenada 62 because "[t]he disintegration of political authority in Grenada had 
created a dynamic that made further violence likely and that spread 
uncertainty and fear". 63 Other instances of internal disorder are Biafra in 
Nigeria, Bangladesh, Somalia, and more recently Rwanda. In the latter case, 
the collapse of the internal order followed the crash of the presidential plane 
and involved genocidal events. Somalia's internal order was the victim of cold 
war thaw. Local clans were involved in bitter fighting for control which 
victimised sectors of the population and hindered relief agencies' efforts to 
distribute food. 64 
60 Comments by V. Saario on the "Report of the International Committee on Human Rights". 
52 International Law Association, (1972), p. 616 
61 U. S. State Dept. Memorandum, "Legal Basis for U. S. Actions in the Dominican Republic", 
111 C. R. 10734, (20.5.1965) 
62 S. Davidson, Grenada: A Study in Politics and the Limits of International Law, (Avebury, 
1987); W. C. Gilmore, The Grenada Intervention: Analysis and Documentation, (London, 
Mansell Publishing, 1984) 
63 Statement by Deputy Secretary of State, K. W. Dam before the House C/tee on Foreign 
Affairs, on November 2,1983, in M. N. Leich, "Contemporary Practice of the United States 
Relating to International Law", 78 A. J. I. L., (1984), p. 200, at p. 201; President Reagan's letter 
to Congress on October 25, refers to "..... the anarchic conditions and the serious violations of 
human rights and bloodshed that had occurred, and the consequent unprecedented threat to 
the peace and security of the region created by the vacuum of authority in Grenada. ". 83 
Dept. St. Bull., No. 2081, Dec. 1983, at pp. 68-69 
°` House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1991, 
102nd Cong., 2nd Sess. 344 
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Another aspect of constitutive defects which prompt intervention is when the 
state abuses its sovereignty by resorting to abuses of human rights. This aspect 
coincides with the historical trend of treating humanitarian intervention as a 
remedy whenever the state maltreats its nationals. In a nutshell, it was phrased 
by Stowell as "...... treatment which is arbitrary and persistently abusive as to 
exceed the limits of that authority within which the sovereign is presumed to 
act with reason and justice. "65 Revulsion against internal abuses of human 
rights perpetuated by the authoritative elite in a particular state was the most 
common indication for humanitarian action in the 19th century and as was 
presented in Chapter One, 66 this is still the case. In Rwanda, it was not only 
the constitutive disorder which generated the massacres; the remnants of the 
previous Hutu regime have also manipulated the situation in order to impose 
their final solution. 
IV. 4 Participants. Concerning this criterion, opinions are divided between a 
unilateral or a multilateral initiation of intervention. Even writers sceptical of 
such actions admit that multinational participation would render the objectives 
of the pursued action less parochial, and increase the legitimacy of the 
action. 67 We regard such an opinion as a recipe for inaction or, if pursued, as 
being infused with the participants' interests. The realities of the post-World 
War era have shown that ideological division has predetermined or annulled 
any decision in that direction. It could be argued, though, that in a post-Cold 
War period the multilateral pursuance of humanitarian actions would be 
facilitated by the lack of divisions. However, that leads us to the second 
concern of those who advocate multilateral interventions in order to avoid 
abuses. The world is now unipolar, and although bipolarity has curtailed any 
action, unipolarity may increase the prospect of particular ideologically 
tainted interventions. Therefore, our concern should not be constricted to the 
participants but to the perspectives of those involved. If unilateral intervention 
serves the wider community interest towards safeguarding human rights, the 
singular participant should not be condemned, as in the reverse situation, 
es E. C. Stowell, Intervention in International Law, (Washington, Byrne, 1921), p. 53 
See Chapter One; C. G. Fenwick, International Law, (N. Y., Century Co., 1924), pp. 287- 
288: "If a sovereign abuses his sovereignty, if he perpetrates crimes against humanity, other 
states can lawfully use military force in protection of fundamental rights". 
67 L. Henkin, "Remarks", 66 Proc. A. S. I. L., (1972), p. 95, at p. 96 
159 
multi-participants should not be exonerated when they pursue parochial 
interests. 68 The interventions in Grenada and in Czechoslovakia were 
negotiated within the relevant political organisations, OECS and the Warsaw 
Pact respectively, and accomplished with the even nominal participation of 
allied contingents. Those interventions had nevertheless haphazard legal 
justifications. Consequently, the transparency of the argument which 
substantiates the restraining function of multilateral interventions is 
undeniable. On the other hand, in Rwanda, the intervention was pursued by 
one state, France, under widespread suspicion concerning the motives of such 
action. However, this intervention was induced by the sense of revulsion at the 
inaction of the world community and was temporally and strategically 
69 limited. 
A related argument adduces to the "impartiality" and hence desirability of a 
United Nations-instigated humanitarian action. It is maintained that the 
parochial character of such action is mitigated due to the representativeness of 
interests which a collectivity involves. This position suffers from political 
naivete and practical inadequacies. The United Nations involvement in 
Somalia would suggest a cautionary remark. An initial U. N. action70 was 
obsessively manipulated by its main enforcer, the U. S. A, into a national 
policy exercise and a foreign debacle. 7' 
IV. 5 Perspectives. Concerning perspectives, humanitarian interventions have 
always been fraught with the suspicion of serving motives other rather than 
the expressed humanitarian concerns. The possibility of abuse, the prospect of 
fabricating a humanitarian excuse and the lack of objective determination have 
led many writers and decision-makers towards an absolute prohibition of such 
68 E. C. Stowell, Intervention in International Law, (Washington, Byrne, 1921), pp. 63-64: 
"Desirable as it is that humanitarian intervention should be, whenever possible, both 
disinterested and collective, this cannot be made a condition for the justification of the action 
taken". 
09 S. C. Res. 929, U. N. SCOR, 3393rd mtg., U. N. Doc. S/RES/929 (1994): "The Security 
Council, Deeply concerned by the continuation of systematic and widespread killings of the 
civilian population in Rwanda, Recognising that the current situation in Rwanda constitutes a 
unique case which demands an urgent response by the international community, Determining 
that the magnitude of the humanitarian crisis in Rwanda constitutes a threat to peace and 
security in the region, Acting under Chapter VII 
..... 
authorises the Member States 
..... 
to 
achieve the humanitarian objectives set out 
..... 
". 
70 S. C. Res. 794, U. N. SCOR, 3145th mtg. U. N. Doc. S/RES/794 (1992) 
71 J. R. Bolton, "Wrong Turn in Somalia", 73 For. Aft', (1994), p. 56 
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actions. The concerns are legitimate but the answer to the problem is narrow 
and insufficient. The possibility of abuse should not lead to a flat rejection of a 
rule but to the invention of modes in order to defy its manipulation. 72 
When there is a mixture of motives, evaluation of the spurious from the 
genuine humanitarian concerns is necessary73. This could be achieved by 
evaluating the goals of any intervention, whether they promote parochial 
interests or the inclusive interests of the world community. Humanitarian 
interventions should serve those inclusive interests: "....... the use of armed 
force in defence of human rights is as emphatically in the common interest as 
is the maintenance of international peace and security. , 74 
Some examples would suffice to show that the world community takes 
cognisance and evaluates the arguments for state actions. The Indian action in 
Bangladesh was not free from ulterior motives. 75 The world community, 
however, accepted India's action. 76 
The Dominican Republic case offers an example of an initial humanitarian 
action being transformed into one pursuing the political interests of the USA 
in containing communism. 77 It was opined: 
"That United States action which had been predicated on protection of human 
life was not subject to extreme criticism, but vehement protest was registered 
at what was called an arrogant assumption by the United States of power to 
72 M. S. McDougal, F. P. Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order: The Legal 
Regulation of International Coercion, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1961), p. 416: "A 
policy of permitting individual initiative is, 
..... 
susceptible to perverting abuse; but this 
susceptibility is an attribute common to all legal policy, doctrine or rule". 
" M. S. McDougal, H. D. Lasswell, Lung-Chu Chen, "Human Rights and World Public Order: 
A Framework for Policy-Oriented Inquiry", 63 A. J. I. L., (1969), p. 237, at p. 242: "It is of 
particular importance that latent (or disguised) objectives be distinguished from manifest 
ýrroclaimed) objectives". 
W. M. Reisman, M. S. McDougal, "A Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the Ibos", in 
R. B. Lillich, Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations, (Charlottesville, University 
Press of Virginia, 1973), p. 167, at p. 177, hereinafter cited as HIUN 
'S The Representative of Pakistan Agha Shahi quoting Mr. S. Swamy, an Indian political 
publicist, said: "The break-up of Pakistan is not only in our external security interests but also 
in our internal security interests. India should emerge as a super-Power internationally 
and we have to nationally integrate our citizens for this role. For this the 
dismemberment of Pakistan is an essential precondition". 9 United Nations Monthly 
Chronicle, (1972), p. 7 
76 V. Nanda, in HIUN, p. 66: "..... it appears that this Indian intervention 
..... 
has been 
accepted by the world community without the taint of illegality". 
" See Statement of Secretary of State Dean Rusk of May 8,1965, on communist subversion. 
"The Dominican Crisis", Dept. State Pub. 7971, Inter-American Series, (1965), p. 92 
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intervene unilaterally in an internal revolutionary situation in a nation of the 
Western Hemisphere when the United States unilaterally determined that a 
dangerous degree of communist participation was involved 
. 
"'g 
The condemnation of the U. S. intervention in Grenada was poignant and 
almost unanimous also including states friendly to the U. S. A Security 
Council Resolution79 deploring the action was vetoed by the U. S. but the 
General Assembly adopted a similar Resolution with an overwhelming 
majority. 80 Nevertheless, the initial stated justification of overriding 
importance was the protection of innocent lives. 8' In Rwanda, apart from the 
French affiliation with the previous regime, the intervention provided relief 
and sanctuary to distraught Rwandese, irrespective of tribe, and the troops 
were withdrawn within the time limits set. This action served wider interests 
than those of France, and the purely humanitarian aims could be evidenced in 
the sentiments of relief and consonance accompanying that action. 82 
In order to recapitulate, the perspective of the intervenor is always scrutinised 
and should be evaluated according to the interests of humanity. 
Concerning the perspectives of the intervenee, it is forcefully argued that the 
state should consent or give its permission for any such action. Of course, if 
consent is given, the potentiality of abuse could be reduced and the action is 
removed from the category of interventions. However, this requirement has 
the potentiality of emasculating the whole concept, considering the fact that 
humanitarian interventions are mainly reactions to malfeasance of 
sovereignty. In such cases, it is highly doubtful that the sovereign would 
condemn itself to extinction. Additionally, consent was claimed or fabricated 
in order to legitimise humanitarian actions but it appears as ancillary and not 
the conditio sine qua non. 83 
78 A. J. Thomas & A. V. W. Thomas, The Dominican Republic Crisis 1965, The Hammarskjod 
Forum, (N. Y., Oceana, 1967), p. 7 
79 U. N. Doc. S/16077/Rev. 1. 
eo G. A. Res. 38/7,2/11/1983 (108 votes for, 9 votes against, 27 abstentions) 
91 President Reagan, Collective Action by the Caribbean Peace Force, Dept. St. Bull., 
Dec. 1983, p. 67 82 Declaration of the President of the Security Council, 14/07/1994, S/PRST/1994/34. 
83 R. B. Lillich, "Forcible Self-Help by States to Protect Human Rights", 53 Iowa L. Rev., 
(1967), p. 325, at p. 340 
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Furthermore, the possibility of abuse is not annulled, because consent could be 
fabricated, extricated or manipulated. The Dominican Republic instance again 
offers an example of a non authentic consent to the U. S. intervention. ' The 
intervention in Grenada was effectuated after the Governor-General, Sir Paul 
Scoon requested assistance. It was maintained that the request was kept secret 
for reasons relating to his safety. According to a letter addressed to the Prime 
Minister of Barbados, John Adams, the Governor-General requests "..... your 
(PM's) help to assist me in stabilising this grave and dangerous situation. It is 
my desire that a peace-keeping force should be established in Grenada to 
facilitate a rapid return to peace and tranquillity and also a return to 
democratic rule. In this connection I am also seeking assistance from the 
United States, 
...... 
"85 The wording of the letter is inadequate to support with 
certainty any explicit invitation for military intervention. The most crucial 
issue is the legality of such an invitation, in particular, which constituent 
authority may issue a request for intervention. A related issue is whether the 
request should proceed or follow the intervention. In Grenada all these 
elements are seriously disputed, factually and legally. 86 A similar case is the 
invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 by Warsaw Pact troops, in order to 
reverse the process of political enfranchising in that country. Immediately 
after the invasion, an "appeal" for assistance was published which "..... 
requested the Soviet Union and other allied States to give the fraternal 
Czechoslovak people immediate assistance, including assistance with armed 
forces". 87 
IV. 6 Strategies. Concerning the strategies for human rights protection, almost 
all the commentators agree that there should be a gradual increase in the 
14 See statements by Senators Fulbright, Clark and Morse, 111 Cong. Rec. 23001 (15.9.1965), 
23366 (17.9.1965), 26185 (15.10.1965); V. P. Nanda, "The United States' Action in the 1965 
Dominican Crisis: Impact on World Order 
- 
Part I", 43 Denver L. J., (1966), p. 439, at pp. 466- 
467 
8S J. N. Moore, "Grenada and the International Double Standard", 78 A. J. I. L.. (1984), p. 145, at 
148 
...... the Scoon request was almost certainly a fabrication concocted between the OECS and 
Washington to calm the post 
- 
invasion diplomatic storm. As concoctions go, it was flimsy". 
The Economist, Mar. 10,1984, p. 31, at p. 34; V. P. Nanda, "The United states Armed 
Intervention in Grenada 
- 
Impact on World Order", 14 Cal. W. 1. L. J., (1984), p. 395, at pp. 411- 
414; C. C. Joyner, "The United States Action in Grenada: Reflections on the Lawfulness of 
Invasion", 78 A. J. I. L., (1984), p. 131, at pp. 138-139 87 71. L. M., (1968), p. 1283; R. M. Goodman, "The Invasion of Czechoslovakia: 1968", 4 Intl 
Law., (1969), p. 42, at pp. 61-63 
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intensity of the methods adopted, from less coercive to highly coercive, that is, 
military. The latter is recognised only as a last resort and it should satisfy the 
requirements of necessity and proportionality. 
IV. 7 Outcomes. The outcome of any humanitarian action should be the 
termination of human rights violations. This is, the wider, inclusive goal of 
promoting human dignity. However, humanitarian actions may also generate 
other outcomes. These include authority-oriented results in the sense of either 
influencing or altering the authority structure in a particular state. Prohibition 
of humanitarian intervention on those grounds is misleading and too narrow 
because humanitarian actions take place when there is abuse of authority and 
additionally the past trends show that humanitarian actions are authority- 
oriented. The intervention in Greece (1827-1830) had the result of creating a 
new state by assisting the emancipation of the suppressed nation. The creation 
of Bangladesh (1971) is a contemporary example. The authority-oriented 
interventions have not always had the character of authority abridgement. 
They may additionally mean legal delimitation of the governmental power, or 
submission to international standards of human rights. 88 
Again, the evaluation of humanitarian actions should not be exclusively 
determined by the magnitude of its impact on the authoritative elite in the 
particular state, but according to the promotion of the wider interests of human 
dignity. In the Dominican case, while the safeguarding of lives was appraised 
as consonant to the promotion of human dignity, the other outcome of 
replacing authority was condemned as promoting the particular interests of the 
United States. The intervention in Grenada was swiftly condemned as 
prompted by the U. S. policy objective of "sanitising" the hemisphere from 
communism or Soviet influence. According to the report prepared by the 
American Bar Association, the humanitarian aim of safeguarding nationals 
was "collateral to the primary purpose of favourably resolving an internal 
political struggle". 89 The U. S. intervention in Panama was couched in 
88 J. N. Moore, "Towards an Applied Theory for the Regulation of Intervention", in J. N. 
Moore, (ed. ), Law and Civil War in the Modern World, (Baltimore, J. Hopkins University 
Press, 1974), p. 3, at pp. 24-26 B° C/tee on Grenada, Section of International Law and Practice, American Bar Association. 
International Law and the United States Action in Grenada: A Report, 18 Int'l Law., (1984), 
p. 331, at p. 379; President Reagan stated that Grenada was transformed into a "Soviet - Cuban 
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humanitarian terms but the political considerations were overwhelmingly 
imperative and thus condemned. 90 In Rwanda, the constitutive government 
had collapsed, but the French action, contrary to initial suspicions, was not 
intermingled with the power struggle. 91 It was confined to giving sanctuary to 
refugees, assisting international agencies with their work and relieving 
neighbouring countries from the bulk of refugees. In Uganda (1979), the 
alteration of a genocidal regime through foreign intervention has been 
92 
welcomed. 
IV. 8 Effects. The main goal of humanitarian actions is to protect human rights 
and promote the goal of human dignity. They also serve as a future deterrent 
by increasing the awareness of authoritative elites that violations of human 
rights will not go unpunished and that their actions are scrutinised by world 
opinion. Any abuse of humanitarian intervention is characteristic of all 
institutions which are vulnerable to contraventions. However, what causes 
indignation is the perpetuation of abuses within internal jurisdictions, if 
humanitarian intervention is to be prohibited. In Rwanda, the humanitarian 
character of the pursued action outweighs any ulterior motive. The function 
and value of the French intervention could only be measured by a relative 
comparison of the situation and a deliberation of the potential human disaster 
had the intervention not occurred. 
colony". L. Doswald-Beck, "The Legality of the United States Intervention in Grenada", 31 
Neth. I. L. Rev., (1984), p. 355, at p. 374 90 See articles by V. Nanda, T. Farer and A. D'Amato in "Agora: U. S. Forces in Panama: 
Defenders, Aggressors or Human Rights Activists", 84 A. J. I. L., (1990), pp. 494-524 91 With the victory of the F. P. R., France declared in the Security Council that "les autorites 
rwandaises sont par definition soveraines sur l'ensemble du territoire rwandais". Letter by the 
French Permanent Mission to the United Nations, (08/09/1994), S/1994/944 
92 
"[T]he Tanzaninan invasion came as some kind of blessing. Though it was charged as a 
violation of certain peremptory norms of international law, it was never seriously censored". 
I. J. Wani, "Humanitarian Intervention and the Tanzania-Uganda War", 3 Horn of Africa. 
(1980), p. 18, at p. 24 
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V. TOWARDS A TENTATIVE CONCLUSION 
An evaluation of the policy science school could not ignore the criticisms 
concerning its form or substance. Epithets such as idiosyncratic, elitist, 
utopian, or apologetic are abundant. Some are unsubstantiated, based on a 
caricature of its jurisprudence or on a misunderstanding of its inveterate 
verbiage. McDougal and his associates are responsible because they did not 
rectify the caginess of verbosity. 
Concerning the substance, we have seen that the policy-school provides a 
blend of realist and naturalist indices. It gave the jurisprudence of 
international law a vision and a method. It is hardly necessary to say that, as 
observed, international law, for a long period, has been "discredited and on the 
defensive". What was needed was the "renovation of international law or the 
creation of an entirely new system of law adequate to the demands of a new 
social order". This system would have as its object "the protection of the 
individual in his eternal struggle for freedom of personality 
..... 
wherever he 
may be and whatever his national or racial allegiance. "93 
The policy-school was to pick up the gauntlet. The realists inaugurated a 
contextual legal analysis but were only scantily concerned with international 
law. Thus, policy science could be viewed as transmuting the realist mood 
into international law. Emending the scepticism towards legal rules, they see 
law as a process of authoritative decisions and an instrument for the 
promotion of values. Consequently, diverse scientific methods are introduced 
into the corpus of international law which now also acquires a mission. Its 
mission is to promote human dignity, "the greatest production and the widest 
possible sharing 
..... 
of all values among all human beings". 94 The values of 
human dignity are merely those of the western liberal democracies which are 
promoted as universal. The universal singularity of this ideal has provoked 
fierce reaction. The whole system has been derided as ideological aggression 
or propaganda. The Cold War helped in instilling the belief that it mirrored 
93 P. M. Brown, "International Lawlessness", 32 A. J. I. L., (1938), p. 775, at pp. 776-7 
94 M. S. McDougal, "Perspectives for an International Law of Human Dignity", 53 Proc. 
A. S. I. L., (1959), p. 107, at p. 107 
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American chauvinism. The writings of McDougal or of his affiliates on 
matters of policy have reinforced this opinion. We would like to circumvent 
this issue because our purpose is the lego-philosophical analysis of the policy 
teachings. 
We said above that human dignity represents the ultimate and unifying value. 
Its common denominator is natural law values. Both are presented as elevated 
ultimate values. We can also sense the feeling of aggression, because human 
dignity is promoted relentlessly. In a world of ideological, political, and 
cultural differences, the threat is obvious. However, does the collapse of 
communism and the poaching of the new democracies into (still awkward) 
liberalism mean that the value of human dignity has won? Or, assuming just 
for the sake of hypothesis that human dignity prevails throughout the world, 
does this mean the end of history? It is suggested by Francis Fukuyama that 
there is a common pattern of the world evolution of mankind towards the 
direction of liberal democracies and that "..... the idea of a universal and 
directional history leading up to liberal democracy may become more 
plausible to people, and that the relativist impasse of modern thought will in a 
sense solve itself. , 95 
Leaving this question to be answered by futurologists or more capable 
intellectuals, we should submit at this stage that the policy-school has opened 
the horizon by providing broad ends and also a framework for discussion. 
Even if one disagrees with the particularities of this framework, it contains the 
seeds of a potentially fruitful dialogue. A uniform insistence on matters of 
strict legality in international law is unrewarding. It obscures other important 
elements. Charges of illegality concerning "violations" of Article 2(4) may 
erode and rigidify our thinking. A humanitarian intervention should not 
provoke an automatic response of illegality because this is what the 
formalistic signals indicate. It should initiate discussion about what happened; 
what was involved; what we should do; what values are engaged; what are our 
policies and what will be the result when they are applied. This involves more 
intellectual reasoning than an automatic reaction does. The policy-school 
95 F. Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, (London, Hamish Hamilton, 1992), 
p. 338 
167 
provided vision but not the methods of realising human dignity beyond the 
belief in educating and training decision-makers in the spirit of human dignity. 
The dichotomy between a visionary and a pragmatic view of the legal system, 
and the employment of synthetic perspectives for the explication of legal 
phenomena is taken up more profoundly by the Critical Legal Studies 
movement, as we shall see in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT: INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
The development of the Critical Legal Studies as a reaction to formalism and as 
a systematised outgrowth of realism 
- 
the deconstruction of legal argument 
- 
the 
indeterminacy and non-objectivity of legal argument 
- 
the fundamental 
contradiction: individualism and altruism applied in international law and 
humanitarian intervention. 
I. THE EMERGENCE OF CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 
1.1 Introduction. The traditional legal doctrine of liberal legalism either 
naturalist or positivist contains the concepts of legal determinism and objectivity 
in order to sustain a comprehensive and unobjectionable legal system. The 
assumption of determinacy, objectivity and apoliticism marks the dividing line 
where the subjectivity of individual interests are eventually dissipated. ' 
Consequently, legal language reproduces, within its particular linguistic 
conventions, the reification of social discourse. 2 
As was argued in the previous chapter, legal realism as a reaction to formalism 
emphasised the indeterminacy and ambiguity of rules and, hence, anticipated 
M. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1982), pp. 116-118,154-161; R. M. Unger, "The Critical Legal Studies Movement", 96 Harvard. 
L. Rev., (1983), p. 561, at pp. 564-573 2 Claude Levi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology, (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1979), p. 217: "..... 
language continues to mold discourse beyond the consciousness of the individual, imposing on 
his thought conceptual schemes which are taken as objective categories". Jaques Prevert, "Dans 
la maison", in Paroles, (Gallimard, 1949), p. 99: 
"Est 
- 
ce qu'on sait ce qu'est une prison? " 
"D'ailleurs il ne s'appelle pas reellement comme ca" 
"C'est l'homme qui a appele cet oiseau comme ca" 
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Critical Legal Studies (CLS). The project of the CLS is to decompose the 
rigidity of legal-linguistic reasoning and profess edification. In other words 
"help 
..... 
readers, or society as a whole, break free from outworn vocabularies 
and attitudes, rather than to provide "grounding" for the intuitions and customs 
of the present". 3 
In common with realism, the Critical Legal Scholars challenge the established 
legal doctrine, nevertheless they have not succeeded in embracing each other. 
CLS reacted against the predominant individualistic liberal doctrine whereby 
individual rights and welfare should be promoted. The unassumingly 
individualistic project of the policy-school counters the communitarian 
extolment of CLS. 4 There exists an institutional difference as well. Legal realism 
was never a systematised legal school: it merely represented a certain mood of 
dissatisfaction with existing legal doctrines which prompted a reconsideration of 
rules, policies and values. On the other hand, CLS are more institutionalised. 
The major difference which actually did not permit a more cordial relationship 
lies in the differing perspectives. Both realists and Critical Lawyers are 
debunkers. However, we have observed in the previous chapter that, the policy- 
school as a branch of legal realism in international law, proceeded towards a 
reconstruction by projecting a certain vision for societal transformation, whereas 
Critical Lawyers, with the exception probably of Unger, remained in the field of 
deconstruction. 5 
1.2 Assessment of Critical Legal Studies. The displacement of congealed legal 
forms demonstrates their indeterminacy and non-objectivity. This displacement 
is a familiar realist occupation, but the latter did not consider why legal 
reasoning perpetuates its inconsistency. Moreover, having mitigated the 
recipient legal absolutism, CLS purport a transformation which transgresses the 
traditional modes of accessing it. Alternatives could be achieved only by a 
liberating argumentation, not by suggested strategies. 
' R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, (Oxford, B. Blackwell, 1979), p. 12 
M. Tushnet, "Critical Legal Studies: A Political History", 100 Yale L. J., (1991), p. 1515 
N. Duxbury, Patterns of American Jurisprudence, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 194- 
195, in particular footnote 189 
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The impact of Critical Lawyers on society is difficult to assess. The explanation 
for this resides on the exaggeration of the techniques they hire in order to 
achieve their project. They resort to social or linguistic sciences in order to 
explicate legal systems. Social transformation would spring from an extensive 
understanding of societal reality. The employment of social sciences by realism 
is criticised as timid, not allowing legal reasoning to emancipate itself from legal 
constraints. Critical Lawyers delve into the labyrinth of social, political, 
philosophical, and linguistic sciences and do not recover but oscillate between 
utopianism, far removed from socio-legal reality, or ephemerality, by describing 
a transient social reality which hinders ambitious projects. In the end, they 
appear divorced from their subject-matter, which is law. 
They deride the liberal doctrinal falsification of the neutrality and apolitical 
nature of rules. Rules are subjective and they imply choices. They oppose the 
choisist character of realism 
- 
grounded on shared expectations and fundamental 
values. Values are co-determined with societies and legal rules reflect that. 
Koskenniemi in his attempt to expose contextual justice endorses legal 
formalistic "orthodoxy". He denies choice because it requires non-legal 
considerations and the dominance of certain values. 6 Reconstruction is thus 
denied because legal rules cannot escape contingency. Legal argument can only 
experience the sense of pessimism. 
Demonstration of legal incommensurability assists in demystifying law and in 
querying legal complacency. It could be an effective means for projecting 
transformation if it was accompanied by a vision but unfortunately, criticism 
and deconstruction is self-perpetuating, cynical, and eventually disregarded. ' 
Our intention in this chapter is to present the main arguments of CLS concerning 
international law and apply them to humanitarian intervention. Thus, we build 
upon their methodology. However, we overcome the deconstructive barrier and 
by reassessing and re-evaluating legal reasoning we suggest an alternative based 
on a conversational model. 
M. Koskenniemi, "The Politics of International Law", 1 E. J. I. L., (1990), p. 4, at p. 32 
M. Tushnet, "Critical Legal Studies: An Introduction to its Origins and Underpinnings", 36 
I. Leg. Ed., (1986), p. 505; D. Livingston, "Note: Round and Round the Bramble Bush: From 
Legal Realism to Critical Legal Studies", 95 Harvard L. Rev., (1982), p. 1669 
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II. INDETERMINACY 
11.1 Legal determinacy. Indeterminacy is not a novel concept. Legal realists 
have introduced this argument and redirected the study of law towards its 
effects. 8 But realists opted eventually for certainty through the notion of 
prediction. The predictivist function implies the need of achieving certainty. 
Although it blends the study of legal rules with other factors, these factors will 
eventually secure a more certain prediction. 9 Realism's difference with 
formalism is modest on this matter, but it emphasises the radicalism of the CLS. 
The assumption of determinacy in liberal legal theory is formulated mainly in 
opposition to the arbitrariness of unhampered, unrestricted governmental or 
judicial power. Legal theorists such as Kelsen, Hart, Rawls and Dworkin have 
articulated a framework of principles which, if accepted and applied 
consistently, would eventually assist in determining the rules of conduct. That 
framework's role is rather eclectic, in other words, the matrix of principles 
constrains the choices by projecting the boundaries for decisional process. ' 0 
Legal discourse exhibits less determinacy than the penumbra of traditional legal 
theory has adumbrated for it. In fact it contains both determinacy and 
indeterminacy. Legal rules proffer automatic response to "plain, or paradigm, 
clear cases". But as Hart asserts "in every legal system a large and important 
field is left open for the exercise of discretion by courts and other officials in 
rendering initially vague standards determinate, in resolving the uncertainties of 
statutes, or in developing and qualifying rules only broadly communicated by 
the authoritative standards". I I The crux of the matter is the calibre and 
"I 
..... 
legal criticism is empty without objective description of the causes and consequences of 
legal decisions". F. S. Cohen, "Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach", 35 
Col. L. Rev., (1935), p. 809, at p. 849 
° K. L. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals, (Boston, Little, Brown & 
Co., 1960), pp. 302-303; M. Radin, "The Theory of Judicial Decision: Or How Judges Think", 
11 Am. Bar Assoc. J., (1925), p. 357, at pp. 358-362 10 H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1961), pp. 132-137; hereinafter 
cited as CL; J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, (Cambridge Mass., Harvard University Press, 1971), 
p. 4, hereinafter cited as TJ; R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (London, Duckworth, 1977), 
? p. 
81-137, hereinafter cited as TRS 
CL, pp. 123,125,132; TRS, pp. 83,127 
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repercussions which the indeterminacy argument produces. Although it is not 
dismissed by "soft" positivists such as Hart, the consequences attributed thereto 
are minor and insignificant because the whole argument of indeterminacy is 
viewed as "peripheral". Eventually, he opts for certainty. ' 2 
Determinacy is viewed as a constraint to arbitrariness but its mechanical, non- 
contextual application might again result in arbitrariness. ' 3 Inferentially, the 
legal system is bifurcated. It includes both determinacy and indeterminacy, 
forging a compromise between the social needs for certainty and change. ' 4 In 
international law, rules may denote certainty but custom alludes to change. 
Additionally, the inclusion of elements such as "justice", "equity", "fairness" 
de-objectifies the application of "stabilised" rules. However, legal doctrine 
emphasises the determinacy of legal rules as a prerequisite for the rule of law. 
According to Dworkin: "...... a judicial decision is fairer if it represents the 
application of established standards rather than the imposition of new ones". 's 
Dworkin contests the minimum degree of indeterminacy accepted by Hart 
because, according to him, the "best" interpretation of legal materials would 
procure determinate results. ' 6 
International law doctrine emphasises also determinacy as a means of clothing 
its science with legitimisation. The contention that it represents legalisation of 
politics is deeply ingrained and, thus, requires intellectual and argumentative 
bravura to discard it. Avoiding the quandary demands that international rules 
should be distinguished from politics and provide definite, detached answers to 
12 A. Altman, "Legal Realism, Critical Legal Studies and Dworkin", 15 Phil. & Pub. Af 
, (1986), p. 205, at p. 207 
" D. Kennedy, "Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication", 89 Harvard. L. Rev., (1976), 
p. 1685, at p. 1689: "..... rigid rules require the sacrifice of precision in the achievement of the 
objectives lying behind the rules". CL, pp. 126-127: "We shall be forced by this technique to 
include in the scope of a rule cases which we would wish to exclude in order to give effect to 
reasonable social aims and which the open textured terms of our language would have allowed 
us to exclude had we left them less rigidly defined". 
4 CL, p. 127 
'S TRS, p. 5; CL., pp. 132-137; TJ, p. 235: "A legal system is a coercive order of public rules 
addressed to rational persons for the purpose of regulating their conduct and providing the 
framework for social cooperation. When these rules are just they establish a basis for legitimate 
expectations. They constitute grounds upon which persons can rely on one another and rightly 
object when their expectations are not fulfilled. If the bases of these claims are unsure, so are the 
boundaries of men's liberties". 
16 TRS, pp. 14,81-84 
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problems. '7 It is essential for the legal existence of international law to sustain 
this "mystified" belief. Therefore, the CLS by presenting international law as 
immersed into the broader ideological struggles of life contain a perennial 
danger, although they emancipate legal thinking towards more comprehensive 
modes. 
II. 2 The missing elements of determinacy in international law. A legal rule 
should satisfy certain criteria in order to be determinate, such as 
comprehensiveness, consistency, directiveness and self-revision. A 
comprehensive legal system should cover all the factual situations. That being 
impossible, legal theory systematises instead principles intended to be generally 
applicable. International legal theory does not satisfy these two requirements for 
comprehensiveness. It is significantly less comprehensive than the domestic 
systems and has not invented, contrary to the theories of justice such as those of 
Rawls and Dworkin, a consistent standard of application. 
Relating to the above is the lacunae in the law. How could legal reasoning,. 
confronted with gaps, be determinate when it should eventually dismiss the 
case? How could such reasoning stand up admitting either the material 
incomprehensiveness of the legal system or the absence of a substantive 
evaluating principle or when it is finally compelled to resort to discretionary 
adjudication? 18 
Process cannot achieve determinacy because it is not neutral. Before the 
procedure, administrative or legislative, decides on the determinacy of certain 
value, political judgments are made concerning the function or character of this 
procedure. Thus, according to Critical Lawyers, rules or procedures fail on this 
matter. 
II. 3 The application of standards. Determinate legal rules would require an 
automatic deduction. The recognition of the internal substantive inconsistency 
of the rules has led to their attribution with exceptions. Thus, the rule on the 
non-use of force is accompanied by the exception of self-defence. Because the 
17 J. Boyle, "Ideals and Things: International Legal Scholarship and the Prison-house of 
Language", 26 Harvard I. L. J. (1985), p. 327, at pp. 346-349 
18 L. Siorat, Le probleme des lacunes en droit international, (Paris, R. Pichon & R. Durand- 
Anzias, 1958); J. Stone, "Non Liquet and the Function of Law in International Community", 35 
B. Y. B. 1. L., (1959), p. 124 
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line between the rule and the exception is abstruse and could be moved, we 
require a transcendental standard or a metatheory which would diminish the 
discretion. That metatheory would be at a high level of generalisation, 
abstraction and vagueness. 19 Hence, we use concepts such as sovereignty, self- 
determination, democracy, and freedom, which either reinforce, nullify or limit 
the attitudinal peregrination of certain rules. Those metatheories postulate 
contradiction and indeterminacy. Their mechanical application results in a 
logical antithesis because they cannot be simultaneously true. The principles of 
self-determination and sovereignty can be antagonistic, the application of either 
is contextual and corresponds to a plausible choice for achieving a justified 
solution. Additionally, rules and underlying principles are non-directive mainly 
because they are ambiguous20 and their concrete exercitation requires 
interpretative evaluation. Consequently, they do not determine their scope of 
application adding thus to their non-direction. 21 
Finally, international law is deficient in the area of procedural revision. Self- 
revising techniques are fundamental in legal systems. 22 In international law 
reified concepts eviscerate the need for appropriate revision invoking the danger 
of opening Pandora's box. Consequently, the participants in a procedural 
rigidified system have more discretion to whimsically alter a rule under revised 
circumstances, affecting in this way rule determinacy. Humanitarian 
intervention is a prime example. Assuming that it is prohibited under the rule on 
the non-use of force (Article 2(4) of the U. N. Charter), we create a legal 
impasse. Article 2(4) has been disrespected and state practice has affirmed the 
right to humanitarian intervention. The need for procedural adaptation is refuted 
by the lack of structures. The impasse is resolved by consistent practice which 
19 TRS, pp. 24-31; D. Kennedy, "Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication", 89 Harvard. 
L. Rev., (1976), p. 1685, at pp. 1687-1689; 0. Schachter, "International Law in Theory and 
Practice", 178 R. C, (1982 V), p. 9, pp. 43,74-82 
20 Sir H. Lauterpacht, International Law, Vol. 1, "The General Works", E. Lauterpacht (ed. ), 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University. Press, 1970), pp. 25-28; J. J. A. Salmon, "Le fait dann 
l'application du droit international", 175 R. C., (1982 II), p. 257, pp. 277-285; Ch. de Visscher. 
Problemes d'interpretation judiciaire en droit international public, (Paris, 1963), p. 14 21 H. G. Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, (Berkeley Calif., University of California Press, 
1976), p. 64: "We are always biased in our thinking and knowing by our linguistic interpretation 
of the world". P. Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy. (London. 
Routledge, 1958), p. 15: "Our idea of what belongs to the realm of reality is given for us in the 
language we use". CL, pp. 126-127 
22 J. W. Singer, "Catcher in the Rye Jurisprudence", 35 Rutgers L. Rev., (1983), p. 275, at p. 278 
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formulates criteria for accepted interventions, always running the risk of 
spurious interventions. 
111. OBJECTIVITY 
111.1 The need for foundation. Objectivity in legal theory implies the quest for a 
substantive, rational foundation of legal rules and institutions. 23 The substantive 
foundation is not a matter of conviction but of knowledge. 24 It refers to the 
discovery of first principles, of legal foundations, which would legitimise the 
legal system through their inherent validity. As such, they transgress the 
subjectivity of human disquisition and become interpersonal, intersubjective and 
even universal. In formalised terms it is what Kelsen calls the Grundnorm, Hart 
the Rule of Recognition and Rawls the "original position". 
The criticism of that pre-established matrix is focused on the external aspects of 
that substantive foundation, in particular, on what is its rational ground and 
whether the latter is unquestionable. This external critique has in itself an 
internal and an external aspect. 
The external manifestation is dependent on propositions which are themselves 
based on an external source. 25 Positivism and natural law theory correspond to 
that external source of justificatory theory. They adhere to an aprioristic 
assumption which involves cognition rather than judgement. 26 The positivist 
command theory relied on the sovereign for its legitimisation, whereas Kelsen 
relied on a deductive, logical procedure. Natural law requires rational reflection 
on human nature, that is, it relies on mental constructions or on divine 
providence. 
Accordingly, law is a matter of perception. This anticipates certainty, a tenet of 
the liberal doctrine, as opposed to discretion. The unreflective acceptance of the 
23 TJ, pp. 516-517 24 "Virtue is Knowledge", Plato, Protagoras, W. Guthrie tans., (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1956), 
99 F; 
M. Moore, "Moral Reality", Wis. L. Rev., (1982), p. 1061, at pp. 1072-1075,1106-1116 26 TRS, p. 81: "It remains the judge's duty even in hard cases, to discover what the rights of the 
parties are, not to invent new rights retrospectively". CL, pp. 92-93 
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position that law or morality is a matter of discovered truth and not of individual 
preference or conviction transforms discretionary judgements arbitrarily into 
non-discretionary descriptions. The search for foundations in legal theories, 
positivist or naturalist, could be regressed ad infinitum. Consequently, it is 
accepted that there should be a certain basis; however, its selection is 
unavoidably subjective. Therefore, the external super-imposed source of legal 
argument lacks the necessary degree of neutrality. 27 
The second, internal, scheme for the pursuit of objectivity concerns the 
procedural theories. This method is deductive in its working. We assume the 
objectivity of a certain procedural process and we accept the outcomes. This 
scheme is more concerned with the method of achieving outcomes (legal 
reasoning), and not with the nature of those outcomes (legal rules). 28 It is 
admitted that disagreement on the results could originate even if we employ the 
same legal procedure. However, as Rawls explains, if everyone applied the 
method correctly then everyone would agree. 29 This is an implied 
acknowledgement of the possibility for predetermined, subjective results 
achieved through a "correct" employment of the method. 
111.2 The use of procedure. Legal reasoning tries to overcome the dichotomy of 
objectivity-subjectivity by liberating legal discourse from human intuitions. 
Legal rules should be grounded on a procedural decision disestablished from our 
intuitions. Legal reasoning is vying to create a perspective of impartiality for the 
consideration of all the relevant claims, which should be inter-subjective, as 
27 R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, (Oxford, B. Blackwell, 1979), pp. 334-335; 
R. M. Unger, Social Theory: Its Situation and its Task. A Critical Introduction to Politics, a Work 
in Constructive Social Theory, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp-80-81 
28 R. W. Newell, Objectivity, Empiricism and Truth, (London, 1986), pp. 16-38: "On the other 
hand, it (objectivity), may also refer to the character of methods (absence of bias) in the process 
of knowledge production. A dispute about what one would have reason to believe tends to turn 
on this latter question. Here there is no question of the acceptance of "knowledge", only 
something that is "external". Objectivity now concerns the character of the common practices of 
p9roduction". 
TJ, p. 21 
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with Rawls' "veil of ignorance"30, Ackerman's "neutral dialogue"31, or 
Dworkin's "equal concern and respect". 32 
The problem with the procedural theories is that they claim comparative 
supremacy over other relevant and competing procedures. 33 Bereft of any 
standard of adjudication, the solicitation of any procedure for objectivity is 
arbitrary and biased towards a particular procedure. Rival claims depart from a 
different procedural basis which they consider as appropriate and valid. In the 
end, accepting certain standards as points of reference or sources of purported 
results tends to integrate those standards in our interpretation of events, 
reproducing causative discourse. Human dignity as the major premise of the 
policy school is both ingrained into and a consequence of the procedure. 
Disagreement on the procedural theories culminates in disagreement upon the 
yielded principles and rules. The objectivity of the procedural techniques is 
reduced while rival procedures, by invoking comparative or absolute 
supremacy, reveal alternative concepts of moral reasonableness, impartial 
consideration of events and of the objectivity of particular results. 
A congeneric problem with the procedural theories is their incompleteness, in 
the sense that they cannot be finite. They should produce a descriptive 
framework or an enumeration of elements for their employment in future events. 
New factors being unanticipated require either exception or new prescription. 
Therefore, enumeration is humanly impossible and the descriptive framework is 
incomplete and inadequate to deal with the complexities of human activity. 34 
30 Ti, pp. 516-517 31 B. Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1980), 
11 
2 TRS, pp. 234-238,275-278; H. L. A. Hart, "Between Utility and Rights", in A. Ryan (ed. ), The 
Idea of Freedom, (Oxford, Oxford University. Press, 1979), pp. 77-98 
" J. Fiskin, "Liberal Theory and the Problem of Justification", NOMOS XXVIII, p. 207, at p. 216 
34 L. Husson. Les transformations de la responsabilite. Etude sur la pensee juridique, (Paris, 
PUF, 1947), p. 515: "Les categories juridiques, comme toutes les categories logiques, ne sont 
jamais que des cadres imparfaits, susceptibles de s'ouvrir ä des actes ou ä des situations pour 
lesquels ils n'ont point ete faits, ou au contraire d'exlure des actes et des situations auxquelles ils 
devraient convenir, selon que la definition logique s'en sera tenue aux caracteres communs ou, au 
contraire, pour introduire plus de precision, en aura fait intervenir d'autres, qu'elle aura dü 
envisager dans leur determination specifique". 
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III. 3 Rational consensus. Finally, rational consensus is presented as a 
"procedural framework in order to achieve objectivity, 
. 
15 It underlines rational 
agreement on certain values among intelligent people. 
Rational agreement could be described as the location of certain values which 
permeate human experience irrespective of derivation. Those non-inferential 
values are presented as objective. We could include in those objective precepts 
Hart's minimum content of natural law; Finnis' "basic values of human 
experience"; McDougal's human dignity or Rawls' principles of justice. 
The consensus is the source of those values. Although it appears objective 
because it represents the views of a wider segment of a community and not of 
particular individuals, it is subjective because it reflects the view of a particular 
and unstable majority. As a decision process it is eventually subjective because 
it represents the combined and negotiated wishes and interests of the 
community. 
Rational consensus is folded in internal contradictions. It embraces 
communitarian, consensual criteria for justification as well as individualistic and 
rational ones. The fundamental contradiction between consensus and reason is 
engulfed in the rational agreement. Consensus is the descriptive representation 
of a certain community. Reason is the rational decision on certain premises 
based on an imaginary consensus. Therefore, it hides subjectivity as to the facts 
and contradiction as to the choices. 
IV. THE FUNDAMENTAL CONTRADICTION IN LEGAL 
REASONING AND HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: 
INDIVIDUALISM VERSUS ALTRUISM 
IV. 1 The inherent contradiction in liberal legal theory. One of the most 
prominent Critical Lawyers, Duncan Kennedy, pursued a project of exposing 
the indeterminacy and inherent tensions of the liberal legal argument in private 
law, which applies to international law as well. Legal reasoning is infused with 
33 TRS, pp. 125-130; TJ, pp. 516-518 
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contradictory perspectives which "cancel and refute each other" because it 
endeavours to accommodate contradictory visions. Those visions, within a 
liberal society, mirror the tension between freedom and restraint: "....... an 
opposition between freedom, conceived as arbitrary and irrational, yet creative 
and dynamic, and restraint, conceived in similar stark terms, as rigid, principled 
in an absolutist way, yet necessary as the antidote to freedom". 36 That tension 
was later defined as the tension between altruism and individualism. 37 
Kennedy exposes the thrust of the internal liberal contradiction which is that of 
"a commitment to mechanically applicable rules as the appropriate form for 
resolving disputes 
..... 
and a commitment to a situation 
- 
sensitive, ad hoc 
standards". 38 For Kennedy, legal argument is described then as a contradiction 
between rules and standards which advances to express itself in the conflict 
between individualism and altruism, this latter contradiction being transformed 
at a higher stage to the contradiction between liberalism and communitarism. 39 
The infested individualism of the rules produces more individualism, while 
altruism cannot reverse that inclination. "Individualism seems to harmonise with 
an insistence on rigid rules rigidly applied 
...... 
altruist views on substantive 
private law issues lead to willingness to resort to standards in administration". 40 
Those standards are the underlining values of a certain community and they 
involve "value judgements". 41 Standards are not determinate themselves 
because their application requires arbitrary choice in apprehending the values 
and purposes of a particular community. 42 The resulting indeterminacy in 
adjudication or decision-making is the core of the liberal argument which then is 
36 Duncan Kennedy, "The Rise and Fall of Classical Legal Thought, 1850-1940", p. 8, 
unpublished paper cited in N. Duxbury, Patterns of American Jurisprudence, (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 458 
" Duncan Kennedy, "Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication", 89 Harvard L. Rev., 
(1976), p. 1685, hereinafter cited as Form and Substance 38 M. Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies, (Cambridge Mass., Harvard University. 
Press, 1987), ch. l 39 Form and Substance, p. 1685, The dichotomies represent an absolutist view of liberalism. 
See N. MacCormick, "Reconstruction after Deconstruction: Closing In On Critique", in A. 
Norrie (ed. ), Closure or Critique: New Directions in Legal Theory, (Edinburgh, Edinburgh 
University. Press, 1993), p. 142, at p. 145: "It takes a rule to make a standard legal; it may take 
a standard to make a rule satisfactorily workable". 10 Form and Substance, p. 1685 
" Form and Substance, p. 1752 42 Form and Substance, p. 1771: "the direct application of moral norms through judicial 
standards 
...... 
leaves us far from anything worthy of the name of altruistic order". 
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paralysed between an individualistic and an altruistic vision. Indeterminacy is 
endemic in the absence of a metaprinciple which would assist objectively our 
preference for either a standard or a rule. 43 Again, the existence of the 
metaprinciple could not be proved capable of attributing determinacy due to its 
own ambiguity and conflict with confluent metaprinciples. 
IV. 2 Altruism versus individualism The explication of the altruistic and 
individualistic premises44 countenances the international law dichotomy of 
national egoism and communitarian morality. Individualism, identified with 
liberalism, insists on the regulatory function of rules which define autonomy and 
moderate activities located outside the spheres of individual liberty. Values are 
subjective and their postulation is an arbitrary exercise. Therefore, the role of the 
state is "facilitative" and there is a strong presumption against state intervention 
viewed as a constraint on individual self-interest and as a means of imposing 
communitarian values. In international law, it is evident that the individualistic 
premise is the prevalent presumption. Non-intervention affirms state autonomy, 
asserts that the interests of a particular state take precedence against the general 
interests of a community, and also avoids moral paternalism by extending 
certain values to non-consensual members. 
The altruistic premises include a belief in shared values which are not arbitrary 
but the distillation of societal functions. These values are understood as being in 
a state of evolution towards the attainment of ideals of human affiliation. They 
attack individualism as a negative mentality. The rule obsession is identified 
with the regulation of the contact of the "bad" man. 45 The latter needs 
limitations on his antisocial inclinations. Also individualism is linked with a 
lack of concern for fellow human beings. In international law, the rule on non- 
intervention purports to accomplish the function of restraining unscrupulous 
states. Moreover, those rules which affirm state sovereignty and enhance state 
autonomy create a situation whereunder states function within autonomous 
clusters, alienated from other states and linked only horizontally for matters at 
" Form and Substance, p. 1724; W. W. Bratton Jr., "Manners, Metaprinciples, Metapolitics 
and Kennedy's Form and Substance", 6 Cardozo L. Rev., (1985), p. 87 1, at pp. 884-886 
"Form and Substance, pp. 1766-1777 
`s O. W. Holmes, "The Path of Law", 10 Harvard L. Rev., (1897), p. 457; T. Twining, "The Bad 
Man Revisited", 58 Cornell L. Rev., (1973), p. 275 
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their discretion. In such a state of affairs, they become oblivious to grievous 
conditions existing in neighbouring states. Hence individualism as expressed in 
Articles 2(4) and 2(7) on non-intervention does not define a value but interprets 
the value of autonomy and indifference. 
On the other hand, altruism is identified with the "good" man who promotes 
community values. It disputes the main argument of individualism that rules 
achieve certainty. Only when the "good" man knows that the law would not 
criticise him when he acts in accordance with community expectations, is legal 
certainty secured. The use of force against individuals is not excluded but the 
aim is to transform that force into a moral one. In international law, Article 2(4) 
does not secure certainty because benevolent states which resort to force in order 
to restore humanity are victimised by that rule. In an altruistic environment, 
physical coercion is justified as promoting morality. 
Altruism and individualism are the two poles of the fundamental contradiction. 
They concretise conflicting views concerning the organisation of society and 
they are the fountain of the contradictory arguments in the interpretation of 
events. Those attitudes are contained in all legal systems and the U. N. Charter is 
not an exception. 
The fundamental contradiction is hence between individual and community. 
"The goal of individual freedom is at the same time dependent on and 
incompatible with the communal coercive action that is necessary to achieve it. 
..... 
But at the same time that it forms and protects us, the universe of others 
..... 
threatens us with annihilation and urges upon us forms of fusion that are quite 
plainly bad rather than good". 46 Liberal theory is reproached for keeping a 
suspicious silence on the matter of contradiction or denying its existence. 
47 
Kennedy wants to liberate legal argument from its confinements and expose the 
encapsulated compromise between individual independence and communitarian 
restraint. 48 
46 Duncan Kennedy, "The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries", 28 Buffalo L. Rev., 
41979), p. 205, at pp. 211-212 
M. Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies, (Cambridge Mass., Harvard University. 
Press, 1987), p. 3: "..... a system of thought (liberalism) that is simultaneously beset by internal 
contradiction 
...... 
and by systematic repression of the presence of these contradictions". 
48 Ibid., p. 217 
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Kennedy failed or simply was indifferent to suggesting a remedy or in 
articulating his vision of transcending that fundamental contradiction. However, 
his arguments concerning the irresolvable indeterminacy of private law apply in 
the field of international law and in particular humanitarian intervention 
expressed in the tensions between individualism and independence, altruism and 
communitarism, or rules and standards. 
IV. 3 The fundamental contradiction in international law: 
individualism/altruism; state/community. In international law the fundamental 
contradiction is also evidenced in the tension between exclusivity and 
community. 49 States' socialisation, their participation in a community of states, 
amounts to affirmation of their individuality, but on the other hand also to a 
threat. 50 Collectivities impose upon their members constraints which restrict 
individual autonomy and it is only collective action which could transgress 
those constraints. The United Nations as a collective international legal order 
has imposed upon its members certain legal restraints, i. e. on the non-use of 
force, which serve multiple and rather irreconcilable purposes: confirm state 
identity, restrain state individuality and reaffirm state association. Only the 
collectivity can change that rule; for instance, when the United Nations 
Organisation initiates the use of force. 
The contradiction appears in many forms which either reinforce or transform it. 
Hence, we experience in international legal discourse the tension between 
individualism/communitarism; individual will/communal will; independence/ 
equality. 51 The contradiction exists within and between layers, with the 
exception of the last pair which reaffirm each other. The independence of states 
presupposes their equality but reversing that argument it might appear 
inconsistent. Independence could not be illimitable because it is a threat to 
equality. The unrestrained authority to use force is an affirmation of individual 
state authority but precludes equality. Therefore, communitarian will supported 
by individual will has imposed structures towards that end. Those structures 
49 David Kennedy, "Theses about International Legal Discourse", 23 German Y. B. I. L., (1980), 
353, at pp. 361-367, hereinafter cited as Theses 
Theses, p. 361: "...... individual nations find in socialisation both the source of their identity 
and a threat to their existence". 
31 Theses, pp. 364-366 
183 
reverse the argument. Whereas before the two first pairs were opposite and the 
last complimentary, now the latter is opposite and the other two are 
complimentary. 
The interlocking arguments of Critical Lawyers prove the relevance of 
Voltaire's observations concerning international relations. 52 In common with 
writers of his era such as Wolff, Vattel and Grotius, state affairs are considered 
as a reflection of human relations. He maintains the antithetical instinctual 
influence of "amour-propre" and "bienveillance", of egoism and benevolence 
which translates into the fundamental contradiction between individualism and 
altruism. The destructive force of egoism is prevaricated by the instinct of 
compassion. Egoism directs human and state actions but the rule of forbearance 
which emanates from benevolence is stated in a negative form as equality and 
independence. The optimistic element is that altruism always fosters itself in the 
end and that nations which have attained a balance of egoistic and altruistic 
instincts should disperse benevolence. 
IV. 4 Humanitarian intervention. In a nutshell, the fundamental contradiction 
can be described as that between individualism and communitarism. A factual 
situation of humanitarian intervention triggers arguments within that 
contradiction which support or negate the specific opposing pairs of arguments. 
Humanitarian intervention asserts communal values and supports the authority 
of the intervening state. It may also affirm the authority of the intervened state 
when it is accompanied by consent. On the other hand, humanitarian 
intervention may defeat the authority of the intervened state, overlook equality 
and mutual respect and endanger other communal values i. e. peace, which are 
also supported by communal will. In the opposition of individualism and 
altruism, humanitarian intervention reaffirms the latter but also the autonomy of 
the individual state which resorts to action. The dilemma appeals now to the 
method of choosing between individual particularism or communitarian altruism 
in a specific situation. 
52 M. L. Perkins, "Voltaire's Concept of International Order", Studies on Voltaire and the 
Eighteenth Century, T. Besterman (ed. ), vol. XXVI, (Geneve, Institut et Musee Voltaire, Les 
Delices, 1963), p. 1291. All references were made therefrom. 
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Humanitarian intervention exposes the failure of the traditional theories of either 
naturalism or positivism to predict and persuade because their arguments are 
circular. Separation of law and state action suffers from "the problem of 
normative source" that is, the inability to determine the content and the instances 
for the rule's application. On the other hand, fusion of law and practice suffers 
from "the problem of normative legitimacy". Deviant behaviour cannot be 
distinguished as either "contranormative" or "protonormative". 53 Article 2(4) on 
the non-use of force and in principle interdictory of humanitarian interventions, 
fused with state practice, does not allow us to distinguish whether humanitarian 
activities are mere violations of that rule or demonstration of a shifting state 
attitude. On the other hand, the same article being critical of abundant contrary 
state practice is reduced to irrelevance. Those arguments describe the main 
failures of positivism in international law. 
On the naturalist side, general principles which express values and purposes in 
international law such as non-intervention and human rights try to control the 
decisions and exclude other solutions but they fail, because the choice between 
them is irresolvable and also because there are no secondary norms which would 
articulate their exercise in detail. Thus they are stated as mutually exclusive 
principles which apply, if need be, without determining the inferred results. 
These are, in a nutshell, the deficiencies of natural law. 
As is evident from this exposition, the arguments could not solve the 
contradiction. We need the assistance of a metaprinciple which will neutralise 
the opposition to any particular argument by increasing the point of reference. In 
the particular case of humanitarian intervention, the metaprinciples that may 
apply are those of humanism or sovereignty. Choosing between them reveals the 
"right" argument but again the choice is arbitrary because there are no meta- 
metaprinciples which would assist us in that choice. The matter then is one of 
intuition. 
" David Kennedy, "Theses about International Legal Discourse", 23 German Y. B. LL.. (1980), 
p. 353, p. 383 
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V. TOWARDS A TENTATIVE CONCLUSION 
The insistence by the Critical Legal Studies on deconstruction has infused legal 
thinking with a considerable degree of self-exploration and anticipation. On the 
other hand, it has procured intellectual or practical cynicism. Establishing the 
indeterminacy of the legal rules and arguments has released jurisprudence from 
the confines of formalism but also left it in the wilderness. A method which 
promotes indeterminacy could only be, for the sake of intellectual consistency, 
indeterminate itself and, thus, fall on its own sword. 
Having said that, the CLS have exposed the multiplicity and conflicting 
character of the rules or principles which compete to prevail in the field of 
humanitarian intervention. It has also provoked us to contemplate the foundation 
or the substantial basis of these rules and principles. Altruism or egoism are 
human feelings which can describe different relations. Applied to the 
international argument concerning humanitarian intervention, they procure 
intervention or its opposite, non-intervention. The two principles and their 
pertinent outcomes are conflicting. One has to go beyond this in order to 
uncover indices, signals for further action. The CLS are quite unable to offer it. 
They are more concerned about the argument and not for the argument. 
In the present work concerning humanitarian intervention, the method of 
presenting, explaining, and arguing within the major jurisprudential schools is 
followed closely. Eventually, a reconstruction shall be attempted: a new 
suggestion for legal explication of humanitarian actions. Before immersing in 
this ambitious project, it is first necessary to present and explicate those rules of 
international law which are relevant in the field of humanitarian intervention. 
This could be named as a Lego jurisprudential exercus. The author is of the 
opinion that, by placing the rules into the jurisprudential framework which has 
been presented above, a better understanding of the implied assumptions can be 
achieved. Following this, the author will proceed to develop a reconstruction. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN A LEGAL CONTEXT: THE 
PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF FORCE 
In this chapter as well as in the following, we shall apply the theory of 
international law developed heretofore to specific rules 
- 
the interpretations of 
Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter shall be explored and also their 
significance according to the observations made in the previous four chapters 
- 
a sample of cases concerning humanitarian intervention and their legal 
interpretation shall be presented 
-finally, the fundamental contradictions which 
rules, and in particular Article 2(4) hide will be explored 
- 
these contradictions 
between sovereignty/human rights; peace/justice provoke conflictual legal 
argumentative outcomes 
- 
our purpose is, as stated at the beginning of this 
work, to present the sources of argumentative conflict and then to proceed with 
a reconstruction 
I. THE LINK WITH THE PRECEDING CHAPTERS 
I. 1 The link. In the previous chapters the philosophical foundations of 
humanitarian intervention were contemplated by demonstrating the relevance of 
legal philosophies to the articulation of this doctrine. In the following chapters 
we will deal with the legal arguments and demonstrate that their underpinnings 
are influenced by and adhere to the main philosophical tenets presented above. 
A diachronic aspect of world community is its endeavour to regulate the use of 
force which always proved disruptive to its flourishing. Thus, at the aftermath of 
every war since the end of the eighteenth century - 1815; 1918; and again in 
1945 
-a conscious and concerted effort was made by States, each more radical 
than the previous one, to reform the international system in ways which were 
calculated as necessary for enabling them to avoid another conflict. 
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The United Nations is an undertaking, the most progressive and significant in 
this process, kindled by the horrific human devastation of World War II and the 
advent of the nuclear era. It incarnates the expectations for regulated state 
conduct and a reversal of the previous political and legal disarray. Those internal 
motivations, reasonable expectations and policy considerations evidenced in 
states' behavioural patterns and inherent in the foundation of the United Nations 
system as well as the pragmatics of their realisation could ingeniously be 
described in the dialogue between Gaston and the General in Jean Anouilh's 
Waltz of the Toreadors: 
"General: La vie est une longe dejeuner de famille 
- 
ennuyeux, comme 
tous les dejeuners de famille, mais necessaire. D'abord, parce qu'il faut 
bien se nourir; ensuite, parce qu'il faut le faire, pour ne pas tomber au 
niveau des betes, suivant un ceremonial longuement eprouve, avec des 
ronds de serviette a son chiffre, des dessous de plats a musique 
...... 
Mais 
attention! ce sont les apparences. C'est un jeu qu'on a decide de jouer 
parce qu'une longue experience a appris a des tas de gens qui n'etaient 
pas plus betes que vous et moi, que c'etait le seule facon de s'en tirer. Il 
faut donc j ouer le j eu, selon les regles, repondre aux questions des enfants, 
partager la tarte en parts egales, gronder le plus petit qui have, plier 
convenablement sa serviette et la remettre dans son rond 
- 
jusqu'au cafe. 
Mais le cafe bu 
- 
ni vu ni connu je t'embrouille 
- 
c'est la loi de la jungle 
qui reprend ses droits. "I 
1.2 The dialectical method. Having said that, the purpose of this Chapter is to 
examine humanitarian intervention within the legal regime of the United 
Nations Charter, in particular, under the prohibition of the use of force in Article 
2(4) and the establishment of a collective security system. Our aim is also to 
make explicit the philosophical foundations of the different legal reasoning 
which the interpretation of the aforementioned article permits. The discussion 
will follow a dialectic method by contrasting the apparently antagonistic pairs of 
sovereignty and human rights, peace and justice. The conceptual and practical 
I J. Anouilh, Pieces Grincantes, "La Valse des Toreadors", Act III, (Paris, Editions de la Table 
Ronde, 1958), p. 85, at pp. 153-154 
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dilemma was highlighted by the former Secretary-General of the United 
Nations, Javier Perez de Cuellar: 
"The right to intervene has been given renewed relevance by recent 
political events. 
...... 
We are clearly witnessing what is probably an 
irresistible shift in public attitudes towards the belief that the defence of 
the oppressed in the name of morality should prevail over frontiers and 
legal documents....... Does it not call into question one of the cardinal 
principles of international law, one diametrically opposed to it, namely the 
obligation of non interference in the internal affairs of States? " Finally, he 
proposed "a new concept, one which marries law and morality". 2 
The adopted method of dialogic approach towards humanitarian intervention 
corresponds to the need of accentuating our reasoning in order to apprehend 
those argumentative premises which are significant. That is, we try to explain 
that the legal argument is not a sterile exercise within a legal procedure which 
produces answers semi-automatically. Behind an apparently neutral, stabilised 
and even "clear" argument nest assumptions, beliefs, fears, hopes. By presenting 
the antithetical ideals which strive to delimit the argumentation which arises 
from Articles 2(4) and 51, we will be able to distinguish what is involved, what 
is the essence of the matter beyond a capricious legalistic logomachy. 
Eventually, we will able to present another ideal which may achieve results 
longed for. 
2 
"Secretary-General's Address at the University of Bordeaux", UNDPI Press Release, 
SG/SM14560, (Apr. 24,1991) 
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II. THE LEGAL PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF FORCE: ITS 
INTERPRETATION AND HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
II. 1 The prohibition of force. Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter reads: 
"All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or 
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United 
Nations. " 
The prohibition on the use of force as a legal imperative would ideally contain a 
clear and simple proposition. However, confluent as it is with moral and 
political considerations, it reveals perplexity. This is not peculiar or exceptional 
but humanly indispensable. 3 To argue that the United Nations Charter escapes 
the destiny of limited human intellectual resources is inane whilst it attributes an 
unwarranted quality of perfectionism to the "founding fathers" of the United 
Nations. 4 The relativity, on the other hand, of legal porisms should not be 
disregarded. What man sees depends both upon what he looks at and also upon 
5 
what his visual 
- 
conceptual experience has taught him to sees 
Accordingly, the rendition of the prohibition contained in Article 2(4) has 
procured considerable dissension in legal literature and also scepticism 
associated with its normative integrity. The different constructions reveal the 
background theories which support them. There are mainly three lines of legal 
reasoning. According to the first, Article 2(4) envisages an absolute prohibition 
on the use of force, choosing thus normative purity, whereas the second divests 
Article 2(4) of legal absolutism by diluting its wording and also by 
contemplating wider moral interests. The third argumentative line borrows 
elements from the two others and presents a reconciliatory framework for legal 
evaluation. 
3 Sir F. Pollock, A First Book of Jurisprudence, 2nd. ed., (London, Macmillan, 1904), p. 3: "We 
find in all human sciences that those ideas which seem to be most simple are really the most 
difficult to grasp with certainty and express with accuracy". 
4 Cordell Hull characterised the United Nations Charter as "a human rather than a perfect 
instrument". Charter of the United Nations. Hearings, p. 323 
5 T. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed., (Chicago, University Press of 
Chicago, 1970), pp. 113 
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Irrespective of the legal diversity those approaches attain, their point of 
departure is common. It is the lexical structure of Article 2(4) and the 
preponderant aim is to absolve force in international relations attained through 
different avenues. Be this as it may, the main arguments of the above schools 
will be presented concerning the exegesis of Article 2(4). 
11.2 Absolute prohibition. The advocates of an all-inclusive prohibition of the 
use of force maintain that the words "territorial integrity and political 
independence", strengthen the absolute prohibition because they epitomise the 
"total of legal rights" a state has. 6 The travaux preparatoires, it is argued, dispel 
any uncertainty concerning the exact function of those phrases because they 
were inserted upon the "insistent behest of small states" aiming at strengthening 
the guarantee against intervention rather than restricting its scope. ' Additionally, 
the phrase "or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United 
Nations", considered under the same prism, purports to emphasise the absolute 
prohibition on the use of force "by insuring that there should be no loophole". 8 It 
has been described by Judge M. Lachs as a "residual `catch 
- 
all' provision"9 in 
the sense that it frustrates lesser uses of force. 10 
6 I. Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 
1963), p. 268; P. De Visscher, "Cours general de droit international public", 136 R. C, (1972 II), 
p. 7, at pp. 19-20; M. S. McDougal, F. Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order, (New 
Heaven, Yale University Press, 1961), p. 177: "`Territorial integrity' and `political independence' 
..... 
are classical, technical terms embracing in summary reference the most important bases of 
state power, the values or interests whose impairment and destruction are sought to be prohibited 
and, correlatively, whose necessary protection by coercion is permitted". 
6 U. N. C. I. O. D., pp. 557,720; M. S. McDougal, F. Feliciano, "The Legal Regulation of Resort to 
International Coercion: Aggression and Self-defence in Policy Perspective", 68 Yale L. J., (1958- 
1959), p. 1057, at pp. 1100-1101; E. Giraud, "L'interdiction du recours ä la force. La theorie et la 
pratique des Nations Unies", 67 R. G. D. I. P., (1963), p. 501 at pp. 512-513; L. M. Goodrich, E. 
Hambro, A. P. Simons, Charter of the United Nations, 3rd ed., (N. Y., Columbia University Press, 
1969), pp. 44-45: ".... was added merely to satisfy the small Powers who wished to see the 
guarantee of Article 10 of the Pact of the League of Nations restated in the Charter, and not to 
restrict the scope of the prohibition of recourse to force". 96U. N. C. I. O. D., p. 335; H. Wehberg, "L'interdiction du recours ä la force. Le principe et les 
problemes qui se posent", 78 R. C., (19511), p. 1, at p. 70; R. Russell, J. Muther, A History of the 
United Nations Charter, (Washington, D. C., The Brookings Institution, 1958), p. 456: "This was 
considered a strong pledge than the more conventional promise not to resort to violent means for 
the settlement of disputes". 9 M. Lachs, "General Course in Public International Law", 169 R. C., (1980 IV), p. 9, at p. 162; L. 
Henkin, "General Course In Public International Law", 216 R. C., (1989 IV), p. 10, at p. 148: "..... 
it would seem to suggest that the only use of force between states whatsoever, if not prohibited 
b1 the first clause of Art. 2 (4), is prohibited by the last phrase". 
Y. Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-defence, (Cambridge, Grotius Publications, 1988), p. 85; 
0. Schachter, "The Enforcement of International Judicial and Arbitral Decisions", 54 A. J. I. L.. 
(1960), p. 1, at pp. 14-17 
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Article 2(3) which imposes an obligation upon the United Nations members to 
settle their disputes by peaceful means is viewed as another foundation for the 
absolute alignment of force. " The two articles appear interdependent imposing 
"une obligation de comportement" and "un resultat" thus amounting to "un 
corollaire logique de cette interdiction". 12 These stipulations highlight the 
contextualization of the enshrined principles with the instituted methods for the 
maintenance of peace. The frustration of this objective and its repercussions will 
be dealt with later but at this point the interrelated character of the United 
Nations provisions should be emphasised. 
Concerning the initial assumptions, the advocates of a restrictive prohibition 
advocate a hierarchical realisation of the United Nations' purposes. They focus 
their attention on the maintenance of peace and security as envisaged in the 
Preamble and Article 1, proceeding hence in a rather ideologically selective 
enumeration of the United Nations' purposes. 
In a nutshell, according to this line of reasoning, the abstention from the use of 
force is absolute, save in the circumstances pronounced in the United Nations 
Charter. 13 Consequently, humanitarian intervention is illegal, located outside the 
legal context of the Charter. 
11.3 Preparatory work and the intention of the parties. Advocates of an all 
inclusive prohibition assemble their arguments by elaborating the travaux 
" K. Skubiszewski, "Use of Force by States. Collective Security. Law of War and Neutrality", in 
M. Sorensen (ed. ), Manual of Public International Law, (London, Macmillan, 1968), p. 739, at 
pp. 745-746; J. Zourek, L'Interdiction de 1'Emploi de la Force en Droit International, (Geneva, 
Institut H. Dunant, 1974), p. 44 
2 J. Charpentier, "Article 2 paragraphe 3", in J. P. Cot, A. Pellet, La Charte des Nations Unies, 
(Paris, Economica, 1985), p. 103, at pp. 104,106; M. Virally, "Article 2 paragraphe 4" ibid., p. 113, 
at p. 114; Goodrich and Hambro, supra note 7, p. 41; Y. Dinstein, supra note 10, p. 85 
1' See declaration of the U. S. Delegate at Committee 111,6 U. N. C. I. O. D., p. 335; "..... the 
intention of the authors of the original text was to state in the broadest terms an absolute all - 
inclusive prohibition"; M. Akehurst, A Modern Introduction to International Law, 6th ed., 
(London, Allen & Unwin, 1971), p. 261; J. L. Brierly, The Law of Nations. An Introduction to the 
International Law of Peace, 6th ed., Sir H. Waldock (ed. ), (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1963), 
p. 415; Y. Dinstein, supra note 10, p. 86; E. Giraud, supra note 7, pp. 512-513; H. Kelsen, 
Principles of International Law, 2nd rev. ed. R. W. Tucker (ed. ), (N. Y., Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston, 1966), p. 45; L. Oppenheim, International Law, vol. II, "Disputes, War and Neutrality". 
7th ed., H. Lauterpacht (ed. ), (London, Longmans, 1952), p. 154; A. von Verdross, "Ideen 
directrices de l' Organisation des Nations Unies", 83 R. C., (1953 II), p. 1, at p. 14; P. De Visscher, 
supra, note 6, p. 19-20; C. H. M. Waldock, "The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual 
States in International Law", 81 R. C., (1952 II), p. 455, at p. 493; H. Wehberg, supra, note 8, p. 70; 
Q. Wright, "The Legality of Intervention Under the United Nations Charter", 51 Proc. A. S. I. L.. 
(1957), p. 79, at p. 88 
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preparatoires 
. 
14 It is submitted that resort to the preparatory work should not be 
unreserved and conclusive. 
The initial Dumbarton Oaks proposal was: "[alll members of the Organisation 
shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any 
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the Organisation". 15 Proposals by 
Norway, Costa Rica and New Zealand which omitted the last part of the draft 
article "in order that the principle of abstention from the use of force may be 
absolute" 16 were rejected. Later, an Australian amendment inserted the phrase 
"territorial integrity and political independence" which was finally accepted. 
The preparatory work is completely devoid of references to the doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention. 17 This is reasonable, since the drafters were 
concerned with setting forth the general framework. This omission induced the 
unverifiable contention that the aforementioned doctrine was a non-issue. 18 
However, it could be maintained that the Charter may accommodate other uses 
of force such as humanitarian intervention because the prohibited type of force 
was not elucidated and its provisions are contextual. This was acknowledged by 
the Rapporteur of Subcommittee U1/A: "[g]iven international conditions on the 
one hand, and the fluctuating nature of the evolving substance we have in 
Preamble, Purposes, and Principles, we cannot in our present situation seek to 
attain a complete amplification, clarification, and precision which may lead to 
undue rigidity. General terms do sometimes mean more than other terms, which 
though tending to be more ample and precise, lead in fact by further 
enumeration of things to leave unmentioned elements of the substance that, on 
account of their omission, seem to be waived away at the very time when they 
. 
Consequently, the indeterminacy of the travaux ought to be included" 19 
14 H. Lauterpacht, 43 Annuaire I D. 1., (1950), p. 397: "interpreter la Charte sans se referer aux 
vastes ressources qu'offrent les travaux precedant sa conclusion, equivaut ä adopter la methode 
de la "Begriffsjurisprudenz" dans son acceptation la plus discutable". 
's 6 U. N. C. I. O. D., p. 556 
16 Ibid., p. 560 
17 R. B. Lillich, "Humanitarian Intervention: A Reply to Ian Brownlie and a Plea for Constructive 
Alternatives", in J. N. Moore (ed. ), Law and Civil War in the Modern World, (Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, 1974), p. 229, at p. 236. Also "Intervention to Protect Human Rights", 
15 McGill L. J., (1969), p. 205, at p. 210 
IB I. Brownlie, "Humanitarian Intervention", in J. N. Moore (ed. ), Law and Civil War in the 
Modern World, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1974), p. 217, at p. 222 
19 6 U. N. C. I. O. D., p. 700; J. A. Delanis, "`Force' under Article 2(4) of the United Nations 
Charter: The Question of Economic and Political Coercion", 12 Vand. J. I. L., (1979), p. 114 
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preparatoires eludes definite answers. 20 It is also maintained that the initial 
intention of the drafters corresponds to an absolute prohibition. The obvious 
predilections substantiated in this systematic and normative order incline more 
towards the maintenance of peace and the protection of the value of 
21 
sovereignty. 
Our hesitation to place unreserved reliance to the preparatory work and the 
original intentions emanates from the understanding that the United Nations 
Charter should be interpreted organically, in accordance with the needs of the 
present international community. It should be submitted that a teleological 
approach concurs with the rules for treaty interpretation found in the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties. The United Nations engulfs the whole of 
international community and, therefore, our observation that it should be 
interpreted according to the perspectives of the present international community 
is not novel or radical. However, a more cautionary attitude springs from the 
vast area of participants or objectives which are included therein and, thus, 
should be anticipated. Whereas other treaties have a more limited objective, this 
should not impel us towards modest ways of interpretation. 22 A strictly legalistic 
dependence on the preparatory work is insufficient because it attempts to 
explain current phenomena in the light of the 1945 dispositions. No doubt, the 
changes are inexorable. Additionally, any intention cannot be ascertained or 
20 E. Lauterpacht, "The Development of the Law of International Organizations by the Decisions 
of International Tribunals", 152 R. C., (1976 IV), p. 380 at p. 440: "..... the preparatory work is 
frequently incomplete, inaccurate, ambivalent and even intentionally vague. " Professor Verdross 
expressed the view that in a case of a very large international conference, where the texts debated 
in commissions are merely voted by the conference itself, the travaux preparatoires are either 
non existent or of a little use. 42 Ann. I. D. I., (1952), p. 377; Also see the Individual Opinion by 
Judge Alvarez, in Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the Unites Nations, I. C. J. 
Rep., (1947-1948), p. 56, at p. 68: "the preparatory work on the constitution of the United Nations 
Organization is of but little value". 
21 T. J. Farer, "An Inquiry into the Legitimacy of Humanitarian Intervention", in L. F. 
Damrosch, D. J. Scheffer (eds. ), Law and Force in the New International Order, (Boulder, 
Westview, 1992), p. 185, at p. 190: "..... the promotion of human rights ranked far bellow the 
protection of national sovereignty and the maintenance of peace as organisational goals. " Also 
at p. 191: "The nub of the matter, then, is that if one deems the original intention of the 
founding states to be controlling with respect to the legitimate occasions for the use of force, 
then humanitarian intervention is illegal. " I. Brownlie, in J. N. Moore supra, note 18, p. 219: "..... 
suspicion of unilateral action by states, coupled with certain faith in collective action". 
22 See Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969,8 I. L. M.. 
(1969), p. 679; M. S. McDougal, H. D. Lasswell, J. Miller, Interpretation of Agreements und 
World Public Order, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1967), pp-3-77 
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identified accurately and ignores subsequent membership changes. 23 The 
realities of international life frustrate any mechanical adherence to the 
preparatory work and the intention of the parties. It was acknowledged with 
hindsight by Judge Alvarez that "an institution, once established, acquires a life 
of its own, independent of the elements which have given birth to it, and it must 
develop, not in accordance with the views of those who created it, but in 
accordance with the requirements of international life". 24 The challenge facing 
our wisdom is the comprehension of the political, economic and social forces 
which strive to shape our time and their legal evaluation. 25 The travaux 
preparatoires and the intention of the parties are thus valuable as a starting 
point of reference but lack decisiveness. They represent the danger of restraining 
legal evolution. The subsequent practice and attitudes of states is important and 
this is more relevant in the area of the use of force. 
On the other hand, General Assembly Resolutions, and in particular those on 
Friendly Relations26 and Aggression, 27 could not arrogate decisively the 
arguments which aspire towards an absolute prohibition. The main reservation 
refers to their uncertain legal status and power to confer legal obligations 28 
_ 
other than those concerning the internal administration of the Organisation. 
23 Professor Chaumont recognises it when he says that "..... dans un cas comme celui des Nation 
Unies, on ne peut se contenter d'une interpretation de la volonte des Etats createurs pour une 
organisation dont la composition s'est considerablement modifiee depuis sa fondation". 42 Ann. 
I. D. I., (1952), p. 59 24 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South 
West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), (Advisory Opinion of 21 
June 1971), I. C. J. Rep., (1971), p. 14, at p. 31, para. 53: "..... changes which have occurred in the 
supervening half-century, and its interpretation cannot remain unaffected by the subsequent 
development of law, through the Charter of the United Nations and by way of customary law. "; 
Professor P. de la Pradelle said: "Pour interpreter convenablement des tels traites ( traites 
institutionels tels que la Charte des Nations Urries ), on ne peut se limiter ä la recherche de 
l'intention des parties teile quelle resort des travaux preparatoires 
." 
44 Ann. I. D. 1., (1952), 
366 ýs 
C. W. Jenks, "Some Constitutional Problems of International Organizations", 22 B. Y. B. I. L., 
(1945), p. 11, at p. 15 
26 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co- 
operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. G. A. Res. 2625 
(XXV), (October 24,1970) 
27 Resolution on the Definition of Aggression 1974, G. A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), U. N. GAOR., 29th 
Sess., Supp. 31, p. 142 28 O. Asomoah, The Legal Significance of the Declarations of the General Assembly of the 
United Nations, (Den Haag, Martinus Nijhoff, 1966); J. Castaneda, The Legal Effects of the 
United Nations Resolutions, (New York, Columbia University Press, 1969); R. A. Falk. "On the 
Quasi-Legislative Competence of the General Assembly", 60 A. J. I. L., (1966), p. 782; D. H. N. 
Johnson, "The Effect of Resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations", 32 
B. Y. B. I. L., (1955-56), p. 97 
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During their long and laborious discussions, the doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention and protection of nationals was only marginally discussed. The 
opposition was not on the principle but on the political considerations of its 
instantiation. There was considerable support on the other hand for the 
proposition that the domestic jurisdiction limitation does not apply to human 
rights violations. 29 
II. 4 Relative prohibition. The opposite view embarks again on a literal 
interpretation of Article 2(4) and purporting to convey the full meaning of the 
words used, infers that the prohibition is qualified. The abstention from force 
concerns only three instances: (i) territorial integrity; (ii) political independence; 
(iii) inconsistency with the purposes of the United Nations. 30 Therefore, Article 
2(4) does not forbid the threat or use of force "simpliciter" but these words, if 
they were not to be made redundant, must qualify the supposedly all inclusive 
prohibition. 31 Once these words were included, their meaning should be 
considered32 but their historical evolution does not justify an extensive 
interpretative construction. 33 The plain meaning of the words "territorial 
integrity or political independence" does not mean territorial inviolability. A 
violation of Article 2(4) occurs only when a portion of state territory is annexed 
and political independence should be interpreted negatively as the absence of 
political subjugation and not of political coercion. 34 In subsequent years, an 
29 The mood is best expressed by the Algerian statement: "If it was true that such jurisdiction 
[domestic] left States free to choose their own political, economic and social systems, it could 
not, even if exclusive, be regarded as arbitrary and absolute....... whenever it was a question 
of ensuring respect for and the integrity of the human person". 20 U. N. GAOR, 6th C/tee, 878 
mtg., (1965), p. 222, at para. 6; Ibid., 882d mtg., p. 249, para. 34; Ibid., 888th mtg., p. 294, 
para. 92; Ibid., 889th mtg., p. 298, para. 20. See also Statement by Mr. Jacovides, (Cyprus), 18 
U. N GAOR, 6th C/tee, 834 mtg., (1963), pp. 247-48, para. 32; J-P. L. Fonteyne, "Forcible Self- 
Help by States to Protect Human Rights: Recent Views from the United Nations", in R. B. 
Lillich (ed), Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations, (Charlottesville, University 
Press of Virginia, 1973), p. 197 
'° F. R. Tesön, Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry Into Law And Morality, (Dobbs Ferry, 
N. Y, Transnational Pub., 1988), p. 131 (the second edition is due in 1996). 
" O. Schachter, "The Right of States to Use Armed Force", 82 Mich. L. Rev., (1984), p. 1620, at 
p. 1633; O. Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice, (Dordrecht/Boston/London, 
Martinus Nijhoff Pub., 1991), p. 112 32 D. W. Bowett, Self-defence in International Law, (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 
1958), p. 152 I. Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 2nd ed., (Manchester, 
Manchester University Press, 1984); M. K. Yassen, "L'interpretation des traites d'apres la 
Convention de Vienne sur le Droit des Traites, 151 R. C., (1976 111), p. 20 
" A. A. D'Amato, International Law: Process and Prospect, (New York, Transnational Pub. Inc., 
1987), pp. 57-73 
" Ibid, pp. 57-83; D. W. Bowett, supra note 32, p. 152; J. Stone, Legal Controls of International 
Conflict, (London, Stevens & Sons, 1954), p. 234 
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extensive construction of Article 2(4) identifies or complements territorial 
integrity with territorial inviolability. " No territory is, however, immune from 
intrusion on a small or a larger scale. 
An argument based on the limited effects of the pursued action was submitted 
by Sir Eric Beckett in the Corfu Channel Case: "[b]ut our action on the 
12th/13th November threatened neither the territorial integrity nor the political 
independence of Albania. Albania suffered thereby neither territorial loss nor 
any part of its political independence". 36 The findings of the Court are rather 
inconclusive on this subject because it neither pronounced specifically on this 
argument, nor on Article 2(4). 37 The I. C. J. in a different context said: "[b]etween 
independent States respect for territorial sovereignty is an essential foundation of 
international relations. , 38 This statement addressed the British plea for 
intervention in order to put an end to a breach of general international law (the 
laying of mines) which interferes with third states' rights. The Court's allusion 
to sovereignty illustrates a consistent jurisprudential enterprise to reinforce the 
idioms of Article 2(4). 39 This attempt is erroneous because it entails normative 
obscurity and it is essentially superfluous. 40 If the protected value in Article 2(4) 
is sovereignty, there exists a fundamental contradiction. The same article 
champions sovereignty, whereas on the other hand modifies it by limiting the 
unbridled right to wage war, inherent in sovereignty. 
The gist of the conditional reasoning is its attempt to overcome a procedural 
evaluation of events defined by the legal pillar of state sovereignty. Not all 
potential breaches of Article 2(4) are real breaches. Consequently, territorial or 
political impairment necessitated for the protection of higher values such as 
human rights in cases of egregious violations should not amount to a breach of 
this article. The premises of this reasoning are traced to a reluctance to condemn 
mechanically an act as abridgement of Article 2(4), failing to appraise its 
's G. Fischer, "Quelques problemes juridiques decoulant de 1'affaire Tchecoslovaque", 14 
A. F. D. 1., (1968), p. 15, at p. 18: "1'expression integrite territoriale signifie inviolabilite du 
territoire". 
36 The Corfu Channel Case, L CJ Rep., (1950), `Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents", 
vol. llI, p. 296 37 D. W. Bowett, supra, note 32, p. 151 38 The Corfu Channel Case, 1. C. J. Rep., (1949), p. 4, at p. 35, hereinafter cited as Corfu Channel 
Case 
39 See Article 1 of the 1974 Definition of Aggression 
40 B. Broms, "The Definition of Aggression", 154 R. C., (1977 I), p. 299, at pp. 342-343 
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motives or its effects. It fulfils the prospect of eschewing legal rigidity but it 
encounters the thrust of the prevailing positivist doctrine which concerns itself 
with the argument from within the legal framework. 41 Nevertheless, it is not 
redundant but intrinsic in current theories advancing human rights. The policy 
school, according to our preceding exposition, adopts a methodologically 
similar argument of instrumentality. The promotion of human dignity becomes 
the overlapping aim and criterion for state actions which eventually attaches 
legality thereto. According to Professor Reisman, the modernjus ad bellum is 
not value neutral: "[h]ence, appraisals of state resort to coercion can no longer 
simply condemn them by invoking Article 2(4), but must test permissibility or 
lawfulness by reference to a number of factors, including the objective and the 
contingency for which coercion is being applied". 42 
Article 2(4) encapsulates within its language the tension between minimisation 
and extension of values when it refers to the purposes of the Organisation. This 
article, by prohibiting the use of force, becomes the locomotive for ensuring 
peace which is one of the stated purposes. Human rights concerns are another 
stated purpose which may prompt forcible actions. How are they 
accommodated? The view from the Charter is that human rights are 
interconnected with the maintenance of peace contributing to the overlapping 
purpose of peace and security. 43 Thus, the dialectical posture between force and 
human rights has been solved by tipping the balance towards peace. 
In the following sections we shall have the opportunity to elaborate more on this 
issue. At this point, we should submit that according to this line of argument, a 
literal approach to Article 2(4) supported by the inconclusiveness of the 
preparatory work and the intention of the parties, supports the view that the 
prohibition is not against the use of force per se. Since the use of force for 
41 "La menace et l'emploi de la force sont proscrits, en eux memes et quels que puissent etre leurs 
motifs". H. Wehberg, supra note 8, p. 64 42 W. M. Reisman, "Criteria for the Lawful Use of Force in International Law", 10 Yale J. I. L., 
(1984-85), p. 279, at p. 281 
H. Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights, (London, Stevens & Sons, 1950), 
p. 186: "The correlation between peace and observance of fundamental human rights is now a 
generally recognised fact". Clement Atlee: "In the Charter we reaffirm faith in fundamental 
human rights. We see the freedom of the individual in the State as an essential complement to 
the freedom of the State in the world community of nations. We stress, too, that social justice 
and the best possible standards of life for all are essential factors in promoting and 
maintaining the peace of the world". 1 U. N. GAOR (1946), p. 24 
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humanitarian purposes may not impair the constitutive elements of the state and 
may also affirm the United Nations purposes, it escapes the prohibition of the 
first clause of Article 2(4). " 
11.5 The reconciliation. The reconciliatory reasoning interconnects the 
apposite poles of the above arguments by recognising a limited right of 
humanitarian intervention only when certain criteria are satisfied. 
Both permissive and restrictive arguments have the potential of being 
misemployed or become absurd. Absolute prohibition reaches absurdity when 
it remains formalistic, rigid and indifferent to the plight of endangered 
humans. The permissive, on the other hand, may be exploited for ulterior, 
fraudulent purposes. Therefore, the articulated criteria purport to enhance the 
ability of the international community to evaluate the humanitarian character 
of interventions and could be categorised as substantive, procedural and 
preferential. 45 The first refers to the "quality and quantity" of the human rights 
violations. The deprivation should comprise of fundamental human rights and 
be substantial. The reaction should also satisfy the requirement of necessity 
and proportionality concerning the domestic structures of the receiving state. 
Nevertheless, it is admitted that humanitarian intervention is condoned in 
cases of genocidal regimes such as those in Uganda, Kampuchea or 
Bangladesh46 where the incursion may have substantial effects on the 
authority structures of the state. 
The procedural requirements contain criteria referring to the exhaustion of 
other available remedies, the reporting of the action to the Security Council 
44 P. Jessup, A Modern Law of Nations: An Introduction, (New York, Macmillan, 1949), p. 169; 
D. W. Bowett, "The Use of Force for the Protection of Nationals Abroad", in A. Cassese (ed. ), 
The Current Legal Regulation of the Use of Force, (Dordrecht, M. Nitjhoff, 1986), p. 39, at p. 40; 
W. M. Reisman, M. S. McDougal, "Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the Ibos", in R. B Lillich 
(ed. ), Humanitarian Intervention, supra, note 29, p. 167, at p. 177 
,s J-P. L. Fonteyne, "The Customary International Law Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention: 
Its Current Validity under the U. N. Charter", 4 Cal. WI. L. J., (1974), p. 203, at pp. 258-268; 
T. E. Behuniak, "The Law of Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention by Armed Force: A Legal 
Survey", 79 Military L. Rev., (1978), p. 157, at pp. 186-188; R. B. Lillich, "Forcible Self -Help 
to Protect Human Rights", 53 Iowa L. Rev., (1967), p. 325, pp. 347-351; J. N. Moore, "The 
Control of Foreign Intervention in Internal Conflict", 9 Va. J. 1. L., (1969), p. 205, at p. 264; T. J. 
Farer, "The Regulation of Foreign Intervention in Civil Armed Conflict", 142 RC. (1974 1I), 
p. 291, at p. 394; R. B. Lillich, "Humanitarian Intervention through the United Nations: 
Towards the Development of Criteria", Za6RV, (1993), p. 557 
46 N. D. White, "Humanitarian Intervention", 1 International Law and Armed Conflict 
Commentary, (1994), p. 13, at p. 21 
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and, lastly, arithmetical and functional conditions are also included. Collective 
action is preferable under the presumption of relative disinterest, state 
authorisation is desirable as well as the disinterestedness of the intervenor. 
These requirements could be described as a practical rule of thumb and, if 
followed, they may liberate states willing to activate humanitarian 
intervention from the burden of legal acrobatics when justifying their action. 
They also procure consistency. However, their status as legal rules or mere 
recommendations has not been clarified and both may create further problems. 
Although they may consist of an attempt to overcome the ad hoc evaluation of 
forceful actions implied in the permissive interpretation and the policy school, 
it is irrefutable that in the international arena each case has its own dynamic 
and special features. 47 Consequently, attempts to confine those dynamics into 
lofty rules may be counter-productive as the absolute interpretation indicates. 
III. THE COLLECTIVE SECURITY SYSTEM AND ITS 
CORRELATION WITH ARTICLE 2(4): THE REVIVAL OF THE 
CUSTOMARY LAW OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
111.1 Article 2(4) is conditioned on a collective security system. The legal 
regime established by the United Nations Charter has its own logic and dynamic 
and therefore, instead of being compartmentalised by selecting particular rules, 
its overall intrinsic dynamic should be considered. The simple prohibition to 
intervene is not a panacea and is unable alone to cope with the problem of 
intervention. 48 
However, the existence of an organic connection between the unilateral 
abstention from the use of force and a collective security system has been 
47 O. Schachter, "Remarks", 86 Proc. A. S. I. L., (1992), p. 320 
48 M. Bos, "Intervention and International Law II", 25 International Spectator (1971), p. 69, at 
p. 73; R. A. Falk, Legal Order in a Violent World, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1968). 
p. 339; R. Y. Jennings, "General Course on Principles of International Law", 121 R. C., (1967 II), 
p. 325, at p. 584: "...... the problem is not one of drafting legal precepts controlling the use of force 
but one of devising international institutions through which the use of force in international 
relationships can be legally ordered and controlled on an international instead sovereign basis". 
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denied. 49 It is at least simplistic to contend that the states have assumed solemn 
obligations, absolving their individual right to use force without providing a 
substitute. Historically, the use of force has been a means of vindicating rights 
and therefore any law "which prohibits resort to force without providing a 
legitimate claimant with adequate alternative means of obtaining redress, 
so contains the seeds of trouble". 
The collective security system was the substitute for the non-use of unilateral 
force and hence the contingency of Article 2(4) therein is logically and 
politically defensible. Nevertheless, it has also been maintained that the 
obligation to restrain from the use of force was not intended to be conditioned 
on an effective collective mechanism. 5' If the intention was not to create an 
effective, that is, operational system, there would be no utilitarian justification 
for the existence of the system envisaged in Chapter VII. Consequently, states 
would not have agreed so easily to abstain from resorting to force. 
The system in Chapter VII mirrors the precedent of the co-operation between 
the now permanent members during World War II. The voting procedure, 
namely the veto power of the permanent members, supports the view that the 
original scheme was to establish an effective system. It is an acknowledgement 
of the privileged status attributed to the permanent members in view of their 
participation in the effective dispensation of the United Nations purposes. In 
effect, it is a balance of interests. The interest in a functional system activated 
though the Security Council and the interest of the permanent members to have 
a say in the system: "ou bien les "Cinq Grands" sont d'accord et les Nations 
Unies disposent des pouvoirs tres etendus, ou bien ils ne le sont pas et tout 
52 action devient impossible". 
49 N. Ronzitti, Rescuing Nationals Abroad Through Military Coercion and Intervention on 
Grounds of Humanity ", (Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster, M. Nijjoff, 1985), p. 9; Case Concerning 
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, L CJ Rep., (1986), p. 14, at 
p. 100, para. 188: "The principle of non-use of force 
..... 
may be regarded as a principle of 
customary international law, not as such conditioned by provisions relating to collective security, 
". Hereinafter cited as Nicaragua Case 
...... C. H. M. Waldock, supra note 13, p. 490; P. Jessup, A Modern Law of Nations, supra note 44. 
pp. 170-1 
0. Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice, (Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster, 
Martinus Nijhoff Pub., 1991), p. 129 52 P. Reuter, Droit International Public, (Paris, PUF, 1983), p. 524 
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Moreover, the euphoria surrounding the negotiations and adoption of the 
Charter after a destructive war could only add weight to the argument that they 
were oriented towards an effective system and that Article 2(4) was part of a 
comprehensive agreement. 
111.2 The Corfu and Nicaragua Cases imply a contextual character. Thus, 
Article 2(4), instead of being an "independent imperative of pacifism", 53 was 
associated with a collective security system forming therewith a sliding scale. 
Output in one pole of the scale corresponds to input in the other. Due to chronic 
malfunction and distortion, 54 the effectiveness of the collective security system 
has been eroded and states have resorted to a process of partially returning to the 
so called Westphalia System, 55 that is, "the revival of a type of unilateral jus ad 
bellum". 56 It is maintained that the contingency of Article 2(4) with an effective 
collective security system was answered negatively in the Corfu Channel Case. 
The Court said that it "can only regard the alleged right of intervention as the 
manifestation of a policy of force 
..... 
whatever be the present defects in 
international organisation 
..... 
it 57 This was said in order to rebut the British 
argument that their interventionist action was justified in order to secure the 
corpora delicti and submit them to an international tribunal. The decision is thus 
restricted only to the inefficiency of the international judicial system and the 
claim to exercise judicial action in the territory of another state whose 
53 W. M. Reisman, "Coercion and Self Determination: Construing Charter Article 2(4)", 78 
A. J. I. L., (1984), p. 642. "Reciproquement, cette regle (Article 2(4)), ne sera respectee et ne 
constituera une guarantie de la paix que si ses mechanismes fonctionnent de facon efficace 
...... 
" 
M. Virally, "Article 2 paragraphe 4", in J. P. Cot, A. Pellet, La Charte des Nations Unies, (Paris, 
Economica, 1985), p. 113, at p. 115 
54 Premier Rapport sur 1'activite de l'Organisation par M. Perez de Cuellar, 7/9/1982: "c'est 
l'absence d'un systeme efficace de securite collective Bans le cadre de la Societe des Nations qui, 
entre autres facteurs, a amene la Seconde Guerre mondiale. La situation actuelle est certes 
entierement differente, mais les gouvernements n'en ont pas moires besoin, et memes plus que jamais d'un systeme de securite collective dans lequel ils puissent avoir pleinement confience". 
A/37/1,7 Sep. 1982 
ss L. Gros, "The Peace of Westphalia", 42 A. J. I. L., (1948), p. 20; A. Cassese, "Return to 
Westphalia? Considerations on the Gradual Erosion of the Charter System", in A. Cassese (ed. ), 
The Current Legal Regulation of the Use of Force, (Dordrecht, M. Nitjhoff, 1986), p. 505; A. 
Cassese, International Law in a Divided World, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1986), pp. 223; I. 
Claude Jr., Swords into Plowshares, 4th ed., (New York, Random Hause, 1971), chs. I, II; R. A. 
Falk, "The Interplay of Westphalia and Charter Conceptions of International Legal Order", in 
R. A. Falk, C. E. Black (eds), The Future of the International Legal Order, vol.!, "Trends and 
Patterns", (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1969), p. 32 
56 W 
. 
M. Reisman, "Criteria for the Lawful Use of Force in International Law", 10 Yale J. I. L., 
1984-85), p. 279, at p. 281 
The Corfu Channel Case, I. C. J. Rep., (1949), p. 4, at p. 35 
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authorities are incapable or unwilling to co-operate. In his dissenting opinion, Dr 
Eger said that it was an intervention, not in the political but in the police or legal 
58 
sense. 
According to one interpretation, the I. C. J. denied any interrelation in the 
Nicaragua Case where it said that "the principle of non-use of force 
...... 
may be 
regarded as a principle of customary international law, not as such conditioned 
by provisions relating to collective security, or to the facilities or armed 
contingents to be provided under Article 43 of the Charter. , 59 The Court's 
reasoning, by maximising the value of the rule against force and denying at the 
same time its adherence to a collective security system, rigidifies the United 
Nations' system and makes it intolerable to states. The domestic systems 
regulate and overcome the discrepancies between actual and normative 
behaviour through their established institutions: legislative and judicial. In the 
case of the international system, remedy is presented by the status quo ante, that 
is, the customary law. The Court alluded to this construction because, by freeing 
the customary rules on the use of force from the collective security system, it 
acknowledged inadvertently their independence from Charter constraints. The 
I. C. J. also seems to accept the more liberal character of customary law. It said in 
the Nicaragua Case that "on a number of points, the areas governed by the two 
sources of law (customary and treaty law) do not exactly overlap, and the 
substantive rules in which they are framed are not identical in content", that "the 
United Nations Charter 
..... 
by no means covers the whole area of the regulation 
of the use of force in international relations" and that "customary international 
law continues to exist and apply, separately from international treaty law even 
where the two categories of law have an identical content". 60 Customary 
international law on the use of force is less restrictive than treaty 1aw61 and, 
although the I. C. J. did not determine the deviations, it allowed for multiple 
interpretations. Consequently, the line of argument which makes Article 2(4) 
dependent on the function of a collective security system and contemplates the 
breakdown of that system, recognises also a residue of the customary law of 
58 Ibid, p. 130 
59 Nicaragua Case, p. 188 
0 Ibid., pp. 94,96, paras. 175,176,179 
61 See on the relation of treaty and customary law the Dissenting Opinions of Judges Ago, Oda, 
Schwebel and Jennings. Ibid, pp. 183-184,215-217,302-306,530-534 respectively 
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self-help. 62 Therefore, a "second order" inquiry is needed in appraising the 
resort by states to the more permissive notions contained in customary 
international law. The essence of such an inquiry would be that Article 2(4) 
suppresses self-help insofar as the organisation can assume the role of enforcer. 
When it cannot, self-help prerogatives revive. 63 Humanitarian intervention has 
been assimilated into customary law. It is a self-help measure when human 
rights violations occur as it has been presented in the preceding chapters. There 
is thus ample room to retain the above doctrine when the old system revives. 
111.3 A recapitulation. It is essential to point out that all these interpretations: 
restrictive; permissive or reconciliatory vow, in different degrees, their respect 
to non-intervention. The restrictive upholds the rule against force irrespective of 
the subsequent developments which seem to have amplified it. The permissive 
and reconciliatory account on the other hand, acknowledge certain deficiencies 
and permit interventions under specified circumstances. The policy-school 
evades this construction by considering interventions ad hoc under certain 
criteria for appraisal which pursue the policy of promoting human dignity. We 
could characterise with a certain degree of simplification the restrictive position 
as hard, whereas the permissive and reconciliatory as soft positivism. The policy 
approach resembles more to a naturalist stance. 
The discourse on article interpretation and the contextualization of the United 
Nations provisions is finally amplified by the actual course of events and, hence, 
the crucial point is to observe the evolution and modus operandi of the entire 
62 That has provoked a learned author, Professor McDougal, who at earlier times resided within 
the absolutist camp, to suggest later that in the absence of collective machinery, an interpretation 
of Article 2(4) should honour self-help: "I am ashamed to confess that at one time I lent support 
to the suggestion that Article 2(4) and the related articles did preclude the use of self-help less 
than self-defence. On reflection, I think, this was a very grave mistake, that Article 2(4) and 
Article 51 must be interpreted differently. In the absence of collective machinery to protect 
against attack and deprivation, I would suggest that the principle of major purposes requires an 
interpretation which would honor self-help against prior unlawfulness. The principle of 
subsequent conduct certainly confirms this. Many states of the world have used force in 
situations short of the requirements of self-defence to protect their national interests. " M. S. 
McDougal, "Authority to Use Force on the High Seas", 20 N. W. CRev., (1967), p. 19, at pp-28-29 
63 W 
. 
M. Reisman, Nullity and Revision, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1971), p. 850; B. 
Asrat, Prohibition of Force under the UN. Charter: A Study of Art. 2(4), (Uppsala, Justus 
F6rlag, 1991), p. 46; J. Combacau, "The Exception of Self-defence in the United Nations 
Practice", in Cassese (ed. ), The Current Legal Regulation of the Use of Force, (Dordrecht, M. 
Nitjhoff, 1986), p. 9, at pp. 30; W. M. Reisman, "Article 2(4): The Use of Force in Contemporary 
International Law", 78 Proc. A. S. I. L., (1984), p. 74, at p. 78; G. Schwarzenberger, "The 
Fundamental Principles of International Law", 87 R. C., (1955 I), p. 190, at p. 338 
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law of the United Nations system, its actual formation by ensuing events, and 
the survival in this environment of humanitarian intervention. 
IV. STATE PRACTICE CONCERNING HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION AND ITS JUSTIFICATION ACCORDING TO THE 
ABOVE REASONING 
IV. 1 Bangladesh, 1971.64 East Pakistan consisted the eastern province of 
Pakistan which emerged after the British withdrawal from the subcontinent. It 
was politically and economically dominated by West Pakistan although it was 
more populous and had a distinct ethnic, linguistic and cultural identity. In 
November 1970, the Awami League which supported a degree of autonomy for 
East Pakistan won a majority in the National Assembly. 65 In order to avoid any 
vociferous claim to autonomy, the central government annulled the convention 
of the new Parliament. This action was confronted with demonstrations and the 
leader of the League issued a "Declaration of Emancipation". 66 The central 
government sent the army on March 25,1971 to quell the situation. Public order 
was imposed with mass killings, atrocities and terror. 67 The situation amounted 
to genocide and an estimated one million people died, while millions of 
terrorised Bengalis sought refuge in India. 68 On December 5,1971, India 
intervened after seven months of persistent brutality. The next day Bangladesh 
64 T. M. Franck, N. S. Rodley, "After Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian Intervention by 
Military Force", 67 A. J. I. L., (1973), p. 275 
65 "Documents: Civil War in East Pakistan", 4 N. Y. U. J. Intl L& Pol., (1971), p. 524, at p. 550 
0b The Events in East Pakistan, 1971, A Legal Study by the Secretariat of the International 
Commission of Jurists, (Geneva, 1972), pp. 20-21 
67 "The principal features of this ruthless oppression were the indiscriminate killing of 
civilians, including women and children and the poorest and weakest members of the 
community; the attempt to exterminate or drive out of the country a large part of the Hindu 
population; 
...... 
All this was done in a scale which is difficult to comprehend". Ibid., pp. 
26- 
27; V. P. Nanda, "Self-Determination in International Law: The Tragic Tale of Two Cities - 
Islamabad (West Pakistan) and Dacca (East Pakistan)", 66 A. J. I. L., (1972), p. 321, at p. 332 
68 The Events in East Pakistan, 1971, A Legal Study by the Secretariat of the International 
Commission of Jurists, (Geneva, 1972), pp. 41-42; V. S. Mani, "The 1971 War on the Indian 
Subcontinent and International Law", 12 Indian J. 1.1., (1972), p. 83, at p. 85. The exact number 
of refugees is disputed between Pakistan's claim of 2,000,000 and India's 10,0000,000. 
See 
Keesing's, (1971), 24990; I. Ghandi, "India and the World", 51 For. Af , (1972), pp. 70-71 
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was recognised as an independent state. 69 India offered a humanitarian 
justification for her action. During the debate of the situation in the Security 
Council, the Indian delegate said: "we are glad that we have in this particular 
occasion nothing but the purest of motives and the purest of intentions: to rescue 
the people of East Bengal from what they are suffering". 70 The Indian 
representative also urged the Security Council members to acknowledge some 
"realities": "[r]efugees were a reality. Genocide and oppression were a reality. 
The extinction of all civil rights was a reality 
..... . 
"'1 It is surprising that the main 
line of argument was based on the right of self-defence72 amid frequent 
references to humanitarian concerns. The representative of the Soviet Union, 
responding to China's claim of non-interference, charged the latter with trying 
"to divert attention from the main cause of the conflict in the Hindustan 
Peninsula, which was the monstrous and bloody repression of East Pakistan". 73 
In a nutshell, the reaction in the United Nations was muted and India was 
criticised mainly on political grounds irrelevant to the particular case. 74 The lack 
of any conspicuous condemnation of India's action as a violation of Article 2(4) 
shows the degree of acceptability the normative attenuation of its content has 
received. The rarity of criticism is coupled also by the passivity and inability of 
the United Nations to respond sufficiently. The systematic tension between 
ambitious pronouncements concerning humanitarianism and meagre activity 
69 The Events in East Pakistan, 1971, A Legal Study by the Secretariat of the International 
Commission of Jurists, (Geneva, 1972), pp. 43-44 
70 26 U. N. SCOR, 1606th mtg, U. N. Doc. S/PV. 1606 (1971), p. 18. "The reaction of the 
people of India to the massive killing of unarmed people by military force has been intense 
and sustained. The common bonds of race, religion, culture, history and geography of the 
people of East Pakistan with the neighbouring Indian state of West Bengal contribute 
powerfully to the feelings of the Indian people". U. N. GAOR, 2002nd mtg, U. N. Doc. A/PV. 
2002 (1971), p. 14 
"9 United Nations Monthly Chronicle, (1972), p. 25 
72 It is maintained by Akehurst that the initial humanitarian arguments was later deleted from the 
official records and self-defence was inserted later. M. Akehurst, "Humanitarian Intervention", 
in H. Bull (ed. ), Intervention in World Politics, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 95, at 
pp. 96-7 
9 United Nations. Monthly Chronicle, (1972), p. 15 
"Only China and Albania criticised India as aggressor. 26 U. N. GAOR, Plen. meetings, 
2003nd mtg., (7 December 1971), para. 311 (China); ibid., para. 112 (Albania). Other states 
emphasised the need for a political solution referring to the principle of sovereignty and also 
acknowledging the human dimension of the conflict. Thus, the U. S. Representative spoke of 
the "untold suffering" but also about "building a peaceful world". 26 U. N. SCOR, 1606th 
mtg., (4 December 1971), paras. 187,194 
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towards this aim was encapsulated by the Indian delegate in the Security 
Council: 
"[I]n the face of a direct violation of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and the provisions of Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter by Pakistan, 
the Security Council and the United Nations should have found 
themselves in a position to intervene and persuade Pakistan to return to 
reason. That did not happen. While developments proceeded on their 
inexorable course towards the present tragedy, the United Nations 
continued to be inhibited by considerations of domestic jurisdiction". 75 
IV. 2 Kampuchea, 1978-79.76 The Khmer Rouge regime installed in 1975 was 
perverse and in its four years of terror one sixth of the entire population of six 
million was murdered. After a frontier incident, Vietnam invaded on Christmas 
Day, 1978 and by early January 1979, it had captured the capital. Vietnam 
maintained that it was acting in self-defence and that the overthrow of the Pol 
Pot government was the result of the civil war. 77 
The issue of humanitarian intervention was raised by Senator McGovern who 
wondered "..... under those circumstances if any thought is being given either 
by our Government or at the United Nations or anywhere in the international 
community of sending in a force to knock this Government out of power, just on 
humanitarian grounds. , 78 
In the Security Council, the Vietnamese action was condemned and 
humanitarian intervention was not mentioned as a possible justification. 
Although any formal condemnation was avoided by the Soviet veto, 
79 a 
resolution by China in which Vietnam was to be condemned as an "aggressor' 
did not acquire support. In the General Assembly, Vietnam's condemnation for 
encroaching the sovereignty of Kampuchea was more explicit. Thus, according 
80 
to Greece, the human rights violations do not justify Vietnam's intervention. 
'S 9 United Nations Monthly Chronicle, (1972), p. 29 
76 M. J. Bazyler, "Re-examining the Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention in light of the 
Atrocities in Kampuchea and Ethiopia", 23 Stanford J. I. L., (1987), p. 547 
" U. N. SCOR, 2108th mtg, (Jan. 11,1979), p. 34 
78 Indochina: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on East-Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Senate 
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1978), p. 24 
19 U. N. SCOR, 2112th mtg., (Jan. 15,1979), p. 34 
8° 17 United Nations Chronicle, (1980), pp. 39,41,44 
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The subsequent General Assembly Resolutions follow the pattern of 
condemning "foreign intervention" and requesting the withdrawal of "foreign 
troops'. 81 
Appraising this action according to the above-mentioned triple interpretation of 
the rule on the non-use of force, it seems that the world reaction conforms with 
the restrictionist interpretation of non-intervention. Moreover, the criteria for the 
reconciliatory approach are not met. Although the atrocities were considerable, 
the humanitarian purposes were not overriding in Vietnam's motive for 
intervention, 82 and also Vietnam remained in the country after the overthrow of 
the Pol Pot regime. According to the permissive interpretation, the initial action 
did not violate the territorial integrity, nor the political independence understood 
as deposing a barbaric regime. In addition, it supported the human rights 
purposes of the United Nations Charter because it had the effect of terminating 
the large scale affronts to human dignity. However, the Vietnamese remained in 
the country and this constitutes an infringement of political independence 
which, coupled with the bleak situation of human rights after the invasion, raises 
questions concerning the character of the action. Having said that, this case will 
again be dealt with in Chapter Nine where an alternative, reconstructive 
approach is offered. At this stage, the pursued appraisal of these instances aims 
at showing the incommensurability of the argument on the use of force when it 
is applied to specific cases. 
IV. 3 Uganda, 1979. The relations between Tanzania and Uganda have always 
been strenuous and frontier incursions were frequent. Following the invasion of 
Ugandan troops into Tanzania in October 197883 and their retreat a month later, 
Tanzania decided to attack Uganda in January 1979. It declared that it had "no 
claim to an inch of Ugandan territory". 84 Three month later, on April 11,1979 
Ugandan exiles forming the Ugandan National Liberation Front (UNLF) with 
the help of Tanzanian military force entered the Ugandan capital Kampala and 
81 G. A. Res. 34/22 (November 14,1979); G. A. Res. 35/6 (October 22,1980) 
82 According to the Lawyer's Committee for Human Rights: "The primary purpose of the 
[Vietnamese] invasion has been to bring about the replacement of Pol Pot's regime, which had 
been unremittingly violent in its hostility towards the Socialist republic of Vietnam (SRV) 
since 1977, by one that could be relied upon to be friendly to it". Kampuchea: After the Worst, 
1985), p. 17 
' Keesing's, (1979), p. 29669 
84 Ibid., p. 29670 
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toppled Idi Amin's regime. This regime was characterised by gruesome 
violations of human rights, perverseness and arbitrariness. 85 It is estimated that 
up to 300,000 citizens perished in those eight years. 86 The justifications offered 
by the Tanzanian government were mixed, containing the traditional arguments 
of self-defence with some reference to humanitarian considerations. The Foreign 
Minister declared that Amin's overthrow has been " 
...... 
a singular triumph for 
freedom, justice and human dignity". 87 When the matter was considered at the 
OAU meeting in Monrovia, on July 17,1979, the official justification for that 
action was "...... the Ugandan army's aggression against Tanzania and Idi 
Amin's claim to have annexed part of Tanzanian territory. There [had been] no 
other cause for it". 88 However during the initial stages of the conflict when the 
OAU attempted to mediate, Nyerere, the President of Tanzania, criticised the 
organisation for protecting tyrants and said: "[t]here is a strange habit in Africa: 
an African leader, as long as he is African, can kill Africans just as he 
pleases". 89 
The reaction to this action was rather muted and it was not censured in the 
United Nations or the OAU although it had violated cardinal principles of their 
respective Charters. 90 Responding to some criticism at the OAU meeting, 
Professor Yusuk Lule, the new leader of Uganda, challenged them "..... not to 
hide behind the formula of non-intervention when human rights are blatantly 
violated". 91 An interesting point was the acknowledgement of the revival of self- 
help in cases of inaction. Nyerere responded to criticisms at the OAU meeting 
that: "[w]hat we did was exemplary at a time when the Organisation of African 
85 
"Since the present regime came to power in 1971 there has been a complete breakdown in 
the rule of law. Today, every Ugandan citizen is in daily fear of his or her own safety. 
Government security forces virtually control the country and have assumed practically 
unlimited powers to kill, torture, and harass innocent civilians. In fact, all of these practices 
have become routine occurrences". Statement of Michael H. Posner, Uganda: The Human 
Rights Situation: Hearings Before the Subc/tee on Foreign Economic Policy of the Senate 
C/tee on Foreign Relations, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 11, (1978) 
86 Amnesty International, Annual Report, (1980), p. 38 
87 16 Africa Research Bull. 
- 
Political, Social and Cultural Series, (1979), p. 5223 
B8 Ibid, p. 5224 89 11 Africa Contemporary Records, (1978-79), p. 394 
90 16 Africa Research Bull. 
- 
Political, Social and Cultural Series, (1979), pp. 5154-5155; 
Keesing's, (1979), pp. 29670-29761; I. J. Wani, "Humanitarian Intervention and the Tanzania- 
Uganda War", 3 Horn of Africa, (1980), p. 18, at p. 24: "The Tanzanian invasion came as some 
kind of blessing. Though it was charged as a violation of certain peremptory norms of 
international law, it was never seriously censored". 
91 Keesing's, (1979), pp. 29840-29841 
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Unity found itself unable to condemn Amin. I think we have set a good 
precedent in as much as when African nations find themselves collectively 
incapable of punishing a single country, then each country has to look after 
itself '92 
. 
Concerning the legality of this action, the restrictive view of Article 2(4) would 
condemn it as a violation of sovereignty. This principle amounts to an 
incantation within the legal context of the United Nations but the lack of serious 
condemnation reveals the dilemma of positivists who should condemn in 
principle but accept in practice humanitarian intervention. Under the permissive 
view, this action was not an impairment of territorial integrity or political 
independence and additionally it affirmed the United Nations purpose of 
safeguarding human rights. The criteria for the reconciliatory approach are 
mainly satisfied because there were serious deprivations of human rights, and 
the prospect for international action was minimal. The requirement of 
proportionality was not met but it would be unimportant if we consider the 
effect of the action which was the restoration of a regime which vowed to 
respect human dignity. When the Tanzanian troops advanced and Ugandans 
welcomed them, Amin threatened to punish those supporting the enemy. Thus, 
93 
withdrawal with Amin in power would have meant massive killings. 
IV. 4 Central Africa, 1979. "Emperor" Bokassa had imposed his loathsome 
regime in the Central African Republic which included killings and terror. 
Reports of killing some hundreds of demonstrators circulated in January 1979. 
The French Government refused to interfere reiterating respect for sovereignty. 94 
The persistent pattern of human rights violations culminated with the killing of 
almost two hundred children, under the personal order of Bokassa, who refused 
to buy the government-mandated school uniforms. 95 Faced with this situation, 
France prompted the formation of a "commission d'enquete" composed of 
African jurists which would prepare a report on the massacre. The official line 
92 Ibid., p. 29673 
°; I. J. Wani, : Humanitarian Intervention and the Tanzania-Uganda War", 3 Horn of Africa, 
1980), p. 18, at p. 25 
4 "[La France] estime, en cons6quence, que tout intervntion officielle de sa part aupres de cc 
Gouvernement au sujet de tels 6venements ne pourrait que constituer une immixtion dans le 
domaine de sa politique interieure. " Response of the Foreign Affairs Minister, no. 12545, 
JO. 
- 
AN, 15 mars 1979 95 Keesing's, (1979), p. 29933 
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was that "avec efficacite et discretion, respectueuse de la souverainete de tous 
les Etats, [France] usera de 1' influence dont eile dispose pour faire respecter les 
droits de l'homme" although this massacre "souleve l'indignation". 96 When the 
report directly implicated Bokassa, France responded with suspension of aid and 
finally his regime was toppled with French participation on September 21, 
1979.97 According to a communique published on the same day, France reacted 
"..... pour repondre aux menaces sur la securite des populations, compte tenu des 
graves atteintes aux droits de 1' homme" and the French contingent "sera rappele 
aussitöt que les autorites centrafricaines jugeront assuree la securite de la 
population". 98 During the debates in the National Assembly, the Foreign 
Minister, confronting the accusations by Francois Mitterrand of neo- 
colonialism, tried to reconcile non-intervention with respect of human rights: 
"[i]ntervenons- nous en Centrafrique? Alors nous sommes les gendarmes de 
cette Afrique, les neocolonislistes....... 
. 
Nous abstenons-nous d'intervenir? 
Alors nous soutenons des regimes tyranniques, nous laissons bafouer les droits 
de 1' homme 
..... 
" 
. 
99 
Appraising the French action according to the three aspects identified above, it 
satisfies the requirements for humanitarian intervention because it was a reaction 
to human rights violations, it was limited temporally and in its objectives, and it 
did not compromise the territorial integrity or political independence of the 
Central African Republic. The reaction to this action was scant and the 
humanitarian motives are evident in the speech of the Central African 
Ambassador to the United Nations: 
"I cannot conceal the bitter disappointment of my country over the 
culpable silence of the United Nations and of the Organisation of African 
Unity regarding the suffering of the people of the Central African 
Republic in face of massive and flagrant violations of human rights in the 
name of the sacred principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of 
states. These institutions, whose basic principles depend on the protection 
% J. O. 
- 
A. N., 17 mai 1979, p. 3852, ibid, 24 mai 1979, p. 4129 97 83 R. G. D. I. P., (1979), p. 1058; 25 A. F. D. I., (1979), p. 908 
98 Le Monde, 22 septembre 1979; Repeated by the Foreign Minister, J. O. - AN, 4 octobre 
1979, p. 7721; Le Monde, 14-15 octobre 1979 09 J. O. 
- 
AN., 6 october 1979, p. 7885 
211 
of human rights and freedoms 
....., 
will never be able to do anything useful 
until they stop being a syndicate of dictatorial oppressive 
governments". 1 00 
However, the interpretation which sees in Article 2(4) an absolute prohibition 
would condemn this action to illegality because it encounters the constituent 
pillars of the article. 
IV. 5 Rwanda, 1994. The ethnic violence101 erupted on April 6th, 1994, with 
the crash of the presidential plane which was carrying Rwanda's President 
Habyarimana and the President of Burundi Ntaryamira. The aircraft was 
attacked by a rocket launched by the mainly Tutsi Rwanda Patriotic Front 
(F. P. R). Rwanda and the neighbouring Burundi are divided along ethnic lines 
and ethnic violence is entwined in their history. Rwanda's population is 90% 
Hutus and 10% Tutsis whereas in Burundi it is 83% Hutus and 16% Tutsis 
respectively. 
The warring factions in Rwanda had concluded the year before the Arusha 
Peace Agreement (August 4,1993), which established a transitional 
government and provided for democratic elections. Consequent to that 
agreement, a United Nations Force (UNAMIR I) was dispatched in the area to 
supervise its implementation. 1 02 
With the eruption of ethnic strife that force proved inadequate to handle the 
situation. The policy of France was neutral, "le role de la France n'est pas de 
retablir fordre par ses soldats sur l'ensemble du continent africain"103 but with 
Belgian troops they evacuated 600 French nationals. 104 As the atrocities 
intensified, the Belgian and other national contingents were withdrawn from 
100 4 U. N. GAOR, U. N. Doc. A/34/PV 32, (1979), p. 32 
101 Rapport sur la situation des droits de 1 'homme au Rwanda, soumis par M. R. Degni-Segui, 
Rapporteur special de la Commission des droits de 1 'komme, en application du paragraphe 
20 de la resolution 1994 S-3/1 de la Commisssion, en date du 25 mai 1994, E/CN. 4/ 1995/7, 
28 juin 1994 
102 S. C. Res. 872, U. N. SCOR, 3288th mtg., U. N. Doc. S/RES/872 (1993), Rapport du 
Secretaire general sur le Rwanda, S/26488, (24 septembre 1993), p. 14, para. 66: "...... aurait 
pour mandat de contribuer ä l'instauration et au maintien d'un climat propre a assurer 
la mise 
en place et le fonctionnement du Gouvernement de tansition". 
103 Interview of the French Foreign Minister, (11/4/1994), PEF (La Politique etrangere de la 
France), mars 
- 
avril, p. 150 
10' lbid, p. 153; The Economist, 9-15.4.1994, p. 63; ibid., 16-22.4.1994, p. 77 
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UNAMIR I which was reduced to 1,705 men. 105 The Security Council decided 
to modify its mandate. 1 06 
Faced with the gravity of the situation, the U. N. agreed to send a force of 
5,500 men in a humanitarian mission (UNAMIR 1, ). 107 That mission was 
faced with logistical delays; as the Secretary-General said: "[i)t is genocide 
which has been committed 
..... 
and the international community is still 
discussing what ought to be done". 108 
Under those circumstances, disgruntled by the international torpor, the French 
decided to dispatch some 2,000 men in Rwanda on the 23rd of June in the 
"Operation Turquoise" and also to create a humanitarian safe area in the 
south-west. According to the official announcement: 
"La France souhaite que soit mise sur pied au Rwanda une operation 
internationale a but humanitaire destinee ä sauver des vies humaines et ä 
mettre fin aux massacres qui sont perpetres dans ce pays. 
..... 
Cette 
operation, dont le but est strictement humanitaire, sera menee sur la base 
d'un mandat qui sera demande aux Nations Unies et en liaison avec 
toutes les organisations internationales et toutes les parties 
interessees". 109 
The debates in the National Assembly reveal the purpose and the conditions 
attached to the "Operation Turquoise". According to the French Prime- 
Minister, the operation is "humanitaire destinee a sauver des populations 
menacees". 110 The operation was governed by some principles. The first was: 
pos Letter of the Permanent Representative of Belgium to the President of the Security 
Council, S/1994/430, (13/04/1994) 
106 S. C. Res. 912, U. N. SCOR, 3368th mtg., U. N. Doc. S/RES/912 (1994). Its mandate was 
restricted: "(a) To act as an intermediary between the parties in an attempt to secure their 
agreement to a cease-fire; (b) To assist in the resumption of humanitarian relief operations to 
the extent feasible; and (c) To monitor and report on developments in Rwanda 
...... 
" For the 
role of the United Nations see F. Ouguergouz, " La tragedie Rwandaise du printemps 1994: 
quelques considerations sur les premieres reactions de l'organisation des Nations Unies", 100 
R. G. D. 1. P., (1996), p. 149 
107 S. C. Res. 918, U. N. SCOR, 3377th mtg., U. N. Doc. S/RES/918 (1994); President Clinton 
said concerning those operations that they should go ahead when "..... humanitarian 
consequences of inaction by the international community have been weighed and are 
considered unacceptable". The Economist, (21-27.5.1994), p. 16 
108 The Economist, (28.5-3.6.1994), p. 66 
109 Communique conjoint du palais de 1'Elysee et de 1'h6tel Matignon, 18/06/1994, PEP. mai 
VJM 1994, p. 296 
JO. AN. CR., (Journal officiel. Debats parlementaires - Assemblee Nationale - Compte 
rendus), 23/06/1994, p. 3339 
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"la France n'agira qu'avec un mandat du Conseil de Securite des Nations 
Unies. Le Gouvernement a considere qu'une action de ce type, qui repond ä 
un devoir humanitaire, devrait etre, malgre l'urgence, autorisee par la 
communaute internationale". 1 11 One other principle was the purely 
humanitarian and disinterested character of the operation: "il s'agit d'une 
operation oü il peut etre fait usage de la force, mais avec un objectif 
uniquement humanitaire, a savoir sauver des vies humaines et mettre ä l'abri 
des enfants, des malades, des populations terrorisees. Cette force, je le redis 
tres clairement, nest pas une force d'interposition, mais une force qui doit 
proteger les populations civiles". 112 Finally, the operation should be limited 
temporally. The French troops remained in the area until August 22,1994 
after their mandate was prolonged by the Security Council. 
"Operation Turquoise" was condoned by the Security Council. ' 13 In the 
preamble of Resolution 929, the Security Council defined the strictly 
humanitarian character of the operation prompted by the delays in the 
deployment of UNAMIR II, reiterated the urgency of the situation and, also, 
conferred part of UNAMIR I mandate thereto. The creation of a safety zone, 
though, was met with suspicion. According to the Belgian Defence Minister, 
"...... l'affaire devient trop politique et delicate", beyond the initial 
humanitarian character. ' 14 There was suspicion that the zone would serve as a 
sanctuary to the Hutu perpetrators of massacres. However, it was made clear 
by the French that "il n'est pas souhaitable que des responsables politiques 
rwandais s'introduisent dans cette zone, au risque de changer la nature de la 
11 
zone qui a une vocation strictement humanitaire". 5 The F. P. R. condemned 
the safety zone as "un projet de neo 
- 
colonisation....., une forme de 
balkanisation du Rwanda sur un modele ethniquement calcule...... une 
consolidation des bases armees de 1'armee gouvernementale et des milices". 
116 
Examining the situation, the Security Council, through its President, 
"' Ibid. 
12 Press conference of the French Foreign Minister, (5/07/1994), PEF, juillet - aout, p. 30 
"' S. C. Res. 929, U. N. SCOR, 3393rd mtg., U. N. Doc. S/RES/929 (1994). China, Brazil, 
New-Zealand, Pakistan and Nigeria abstained 
"' Le Monde, 8.7.1994, p. 3 
"s 98 R. G. D. I. P., (1994), p. 991 
116 Le Monde, 06/07/1994, declaration of the F. P. R representative in Europe 
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reaffirmed: "...... le caractere humanitaire de la zone sure au sud 
- 
ouest du 
Rwanda et exige que tous ceux que cela conceme respectent ce caractere". 117 
With the victory of the F. P. R., France declared in the Security Council that 
"les autorites rwandaises sont par definition souveraines sur l'ensemble du 
territoire rwandais". 118 A factual evaluation of the French operation could be 
described as "L'operation Turquoise a ete dictee par les evenements. A 
vocation strictement humanitaire, eile a rempli ses objectifs: sauver des 
dizaines de milliers de vies; faire cesser les massacres; securiser les 
populations; mobiliser la communaute internationale pour qu'elle apporte son 
aide". 119 
IV. 6 Preliminary legal evaluation. This section includes a prefatory 
evaluation of the preceding cases which appeals to the traditional methods of 
legal appraisal. Consequently, the discussed actions will be considered under 
the argumentation identified above as restrictive, permissive, and 
reconciliatory. It should also be stressed that in the final chapter of this work, 
these actions will be elaborated under a new standard, that of human dignity. 
Proceeding now with this preliminary evaluation, the French action in Rwanda 
and all the above instances could be legal or illegal according to the preferred 
reasoning. An absolute interdiction on the use of force and an absolute 
affirmation of sovereignty would render such actions illegal whilst they 
involve military force in a foreign state without the consent of the latter. Thus, 
they could be presented as a violation of Article 2(4). On the other hand, the 
limited nature and purpose of certain actions such as the Indian in Bangladesh 
and the French in Rwanda would legitimise them, considering the fact that 
there was no territorial impairment and the action was not against the purposes 
of the United Nations. Au contraire, they upheld central tenets of U. N. policy 
which is the protection of human rights. Consequently, under permissive 
reasoning, these actions are legitimate. 
These actions are legal under the reconciliatory argument as well. The 
intervention in Rwanda or Bangladesh, though unilateral, was effectuated only 
'" Declaration of the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/1994/34, (14/07/1994) 
118 Letter by the French Permanent Mission to the United Nations, 08/09/1994, S/ 1994/944 
119 Interview by the French Foreign Minister, 14/09/1994, PEF, septembre - octobre, p. 91 
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when the international community showed restricted resolve in tackling the 
situation, and it was triggered by serious deprivations of human rights. 
Additionally, it satisfied the requirements of necessity and proportionality and 
had the blessing, even nominal, of the United Nations. In order to recapitulate, 
the Indian and French actions are legal under two lines of argumentation and 
appears illegal only by a strict adherence to legal formalism which sacrifices 
morality to and texts. 
Having said that, the Rwandan incident needs further scrutiny because the 
development of the case and the values or policies it sustained are helpful in 
understanding and bridging this section, which comprises of a rather traditional 
exposition, with the rest of this chapter, which presents and underlines the 
fundamental contradictions within the legal framework of the Charter. We 
elaborate later on the antithetical relation between order and peace/justice and 
also emphasise the contemporary trend of subsuming justice or human right 
observance to the purpose of preserving peace. Such an analysis is consistent 
with the approach of this study, that is, of unfolding the conflictual character of 
legal argument and then transgress it by presenting a new assumption. 
The Rwanda case is quite paradigmatic in this field. As we have seen above, the 
French government invoked the authorisation of the Security Council as a 
prerequisite for its "Operation Turquoise". Initially, it would seem admissible to 
maintain that this operation is within the cadre of Chapter VII. However, the 
development of events which led to this action would disown any such 
conclusion. Military intervention on humanitarian grounds was mentioned by 
the French Government before Resolution 929 was adopted, on June 18.120 Even 
before that date, according to a press release on June 15th: "..... je dis 
aujourd'hui 
- 
le gouvernement en a delibere, nous en avons egalement pane ce 
matin en Conseil restreint avec le President de la Republique - que la France 
serait prete a monter, avec ses principaux partenaires europeens et africains, une 
intervention sur le terrain visant a proteger les groupes menaces 
d'extermination". 121 When the U. N. Secretary-General showed his willingness 
120 A. F. D. 1., (1994), p. 1030 
121 Point de presse precite du M. A. E. le 15 juin 1994, PEF, p. 271; Interview du M. A. E. le 27 
juin 1994, PEF, mai-juin, p. 342: " 
..... 
j'ai propose au Premier ministre, de prendre une 
initiative et d' intervenir". 
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to support such action, ' 22 France proposed a draft resolution before the Security 
Council. 123 The French proposal was adopted by the Security Council in 
Resolution 929 the next day. This Resolution is explicit in recognising the active 
role which the delegated state(s) will have in accomplishing its objectives. 
Accordingly, Resolution 929: "Taking into account the time needed to gather 
the necessary resources for the effective deployment of UNAMIR, Noting the 
offer by Member States, 
..... 
Determining that the magnitude of the humanitarian 
crisis in Rwanda constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region, 
.... 
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, authorises the 
Member States 
..... 
to conduct the operation 
..... 
using all necessary means to 
achieve the humanitarian objectives 
...... 
"124 
This wording reveals the true character of the operation which is conceived and 
executed nationally with the discreet imprimatur of the Security Council. ' 25 It 
would be hypocritical to consider the Security Council's a posteriori and 
supplementary authorisation as a fact of such legal significance that would place 
the action within the boundaries of Chapter VII. The realities of the situation 
were acknowledged by the Secretary-General who said: "[d]es l'instant qu'ils 
utilisent des forces qui ne sont pas des forces onusiennes a proprement parler, je 
suis partisan de sous-traiter a des Etats membres les operations de maintien de la 
paix impliquant 1'emploi de la force". 126 
Another observation motivated by this action and Resolution 929 is the 
character of humanitarian considerations within the United Nations' system. In 
particular, whether human rights concerns constitute independent indices which 
prompt action under Chapter VII or are they considered to be complimentary 
indices in the evaluation of a situation as "a threat to or breach of peace". 
Resolution 929 characterises the situation in Rwanda as "threat to peace and 
122 Letter Dated 19 June From the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the 
Security Council, U. N. Doc. S/1994/728, (20 June 1994) 
123 S/1994/737, (June 21,1994) 
124 S. C. Res. 929, U. N. SCOR, 3393rd mtg., U. N. Doc. S/RES/929 (1994) 
125 J-D. Mouton, "La crise Rwandaise de 1994 et les Nations Unies", A. F. D. 1., (1994), p. 214, 
at p. 222: "Car il est Claire que l'operation turquoise a ete nationale de bout en bout et que de 
ce point de vue, le contröle onusien a ete reduit au strict minimum" 
126 Le Monde, 26/07/1994; "Croniques des faits internationaux", 98 R. G. D. I. P., (1994), p. 991, 
at p. 992 
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security in the region" and it also states Chapter VII of the United Nations 
Charter as its legal basis. 
This modus operandi is not novel although it has been more frequent the recent 
years. What has been more evident recently is a certain tendency that the 
"polymophe" conception of peace; that is, its "dimension structurelle" and 
"dimension securitaire" to be interlaced. 127 However, the results are modest 
because the humanitarian interests are merely included in a different 
interpretation of what constitutes a risk against peace. Whereas the traits of such 
procedural evolution go back to the reaction against the situation in Rhodesia 
and South African, it was more vigorously stated with Resolution 688 
concerning the Kurds in Irag128 and Resolution 794 concerning Somalia. 
In title V, we shall elaborate more on this issue but at this stage we should point 
out that the operation in Rwanda could not be considered as an institutional 
reaction to the events taking place in this country. It could be characterised as a 
unilateral action with an international flavour. This flavour is the Security 
Council's benison which confined the action normatively within its practice of 
subsuming humanitarian concerns to the overlapping aim of preserving peace. 
V. THE POSITIVIST FRAMEWORK: THE LEGAL VALIDITY OF 
ARTICLE 2(4) IN VIEW OF CONTRARY STATE PRACTICE 
V. 1 Law and force in the United Nations system. In the previous chapters we 
have contemplated the different jurisprudential definitions of law. According to 
Oppenheim's definition, inspired by positivist jurisprudence, law is a body of 
rules for human conduct within a community which, by common consent of this 
community, shall be enforced by external power. ' 29 Professor McDougal refers 
127 P-M. Dupuy, "Securite collective et organisation de la paix", 97 R. G. D. I. P., (1993), p. 617, 
at pp. 622-627. "..... le Conseil de securite introduit cette dimension ample jusqu'au coeur du 
chapitre VII". Ibid, p. 626 
128 S. C. Res. 688, U. N. SCOR, 2982nd mtg. (1991), reprinted in 301. L. M., (1991), p. 858; B. 
Simma (ed. ), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 1994), "Article 39", pp. 605-616; H. McCoubrey, N. D. White, International Law and 
Armed Conflict, (Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1992), p. 129 
129 L. Oppenheim, International Law, 9th ed., Sir R. Y. Jennings, Sir A. Watts (eds), vol. I, 
"Peace", (London, Longmans, 1992), Part 1, p. 9, para. 3 
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to law as "a process of decision characterised both by expectations of authority 
and by effective control"' 30 
The "founding fathers" of the United Nations, by transferring imports from 
domestic systems, drafted an organic framework where authority and control are 
invested in one organ, the Security Council. They intended to redeem the 
deficiencies of the old system by acceding to an institutionalised order whose 
main feature was the conditioning of power as a means for institutional or 
relational enforcement. 13 1 The whole structure contains the basic elements of a 
legal order reminiscent of domestic systems, in particular, authoritative decision, 
deference and limited discretion for individual actors. The function of 
authoritative decision and enforcement has been, however, performed by the 
Security Council selectively and deficiently. ' 32 It has been thus observed that the 
system is not only transposed but is deformed as well. ' 33 
The divergent state practice described above introduces the issue of 
effectiveness. The precise degree of effectiveness or control required for "law" 
- 
national or international 
- 
varies according to its institutional context. In the 
United Nations system, effectiveness is evidenced only at the fringes, in the 
procedures for reconciliation, condemnation and exhortation. It should be 
observed that the sanctioning process in international law differs considerably 
from national law. The element of systematisation which characterises the latter 
would impinge upon the legal quality of international law. Accordingly, 
theorists from legal positivism or realism have denied this quality to 
international law and also to Article 2(4). On the other hand, according to 
Kelsen, the international system is decentralised and, therefore, sanctions are 
130 M. S. McDougal, H. D. Lasswell and W. M. Reisman, "The World Constitutive Process of 
Authoritative Decision", in M. S. McDougal, W. M. Reisman (eds. ), International Law Essays, 
(New Haven, Yale University Press, 1981), pp. 192-193 
"1 R. J. Dupuy, "Communaute internationale et les disparites de developpment", 165 R. C. (1979 
IV), p. 10, at p. 55. "La mise en place dune organisation aux finis de maintenir la paix entre Etats, 
suppose qu'une certaine force lui soit attribuee. Toutes les societes justifient ce que, Max Weber 
deffinissant comme le monopole de la violance legitime". Ibid, p. 64 
132 A. Cassese, "Return to Westphalia? Considerations on the Gradual Erosion of the Charter 
System", in A. Cassese (ed. ), supra note 55, p. 505, at p. 519: "The drafters were fairly sure that 
(the provisions of the Charter) would be fleshed out by a case law developed by the Security 
Council; this body was in effect designed as the agency responsible for implementing, clarifying 
and elaborating the legal dictates of the Charter". 
"' R. J. Dupuy, "The International Community, War and Peace", in A. Cassese (ed. ), supra note 
55, p. 271, at p. 277 
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indeterminate. Enforceability is effectuated "horizontally", involving measures 
of self-help. 134 
This approach reveals a wider issue concerning the role of force within legal 
systems. Force has been traditionally viewed as an instrument for law 
enforcement or as a source of law when it introduces a new relation or when it is 
the source of an institutional policy. The modem law has partially retained and 
recombined the two positions. Thus, force is the institutional origin of law in the 
case of Chapter VII as well as an enforcer of law when action is taken under the 
collective security system. ' 35 Humanitarian intervention may be an enforcer of 
institutional policy as a regulated measure under the United Nations; a unilateral 
- 
multilateral primitive enforcer of community policies or, in the case of being 
outlawed, it is a source of law. Force can mediate between sovereignty and 
international order and thus be reintegrated as instrument and authority. In 
particular, humanitarian intervention is not against sovereign authority in the 
sense that it re-establishes authority. It is only against states which have misused 
their authority that humanitarian intervention is used and consequently, it 
satisfies a certain purpose. As Stowell put it: "[w]hy 
..... 
should the 
independence of a state be more sacred than the law which gives it that 
independence 
..... 
the very principles which are declared to be the most worthy 
of respect of all? " 136 The re-inclusion of force as humanitarian intervention 
within a legal system of exclusion has been also recognised in the Dominican 
Republic case by the Legal Advisor to the U. S. State Department, Leonard 
Meeker. ' 37 He rejected a "reliance on absolutes for judging and evaluating the 
events of our time" because it is "artificial". Intervention is then recognised 
according to a substantive vision of international law defined by him as 
"practical idealism". In a nutshell, force has been excluded in the legal 
134 See above, Chapters One, Two and Three. J. Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence 
Determined, (London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1954), pp. 127,141-142,200-201; J. L. Brierly, 
"Sanctions", 17 Trans. Grotius S. I. L., (1931), p. 67, at p. 68; H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 
(Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1961), pp. 208-231; G. Kennan, American Diplomacy 1900-1950, 
(Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1951), pp. 95-96; H. Morgenthau, Politics Among 
Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 6th ed., rev. by K. W. Thomson, (New York, A. A. 
Knoph, 1978), ch. 18, p. 293 
"s I. Brownlie, Use of Force, supra note 6, pp. 342-46 
136 E. C. Stowell, Intervention in International Law, (Washington, Byrne, 1921), p. 53 
137 L. Meeker, "The Dominican Situation in the Perspective of International Law", 53 Dep 't 
St. Bull., (1965), pp. 60-65 
220 
framework of the Charter but this is porous. Thus, force is reintroduced as 
enforcer or as a source of law. 
V. 2 Observance. The congruence between state practice and accepted law or the 
rectification of deviations are vital for attributing legal quality according to 
positivist jurisprudence. Thus, these theoretical underpinnings of positivism 
would rather deny legal quality to Article 2(4). 138 The renowned discrepancies 
evidenced in state action and the frustration caused by these exculpatory 
violations have contributed to the belief that Article 2(4) is null and void. The 
arguments which were presented to support this view reside themselves within 
positivist legalism and reaffirm the major premises of this theory. They are the 
principles of reciprocal observance; rebus sic stantibus; and the notion that 
violations are evidence of the changing norms regarding the use of force. 1 39 
The first principle is contained in Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties and involves suspension or refusal to perform obligations 
violated by the other party. '40 This argument is tenuous in the field of the use of 
force. It fails to determine the other party which may be either ad hoc or the 
society of states. It is also totally incapable of detecting the specific temporal 
point of breach. A similar argument was advanced by the U. S. A in the 
Nicaragua Case, but the I. C. J. was quick in rejecting it: "[i]n a legal dispute 
affecting two States, one of them may argue that the applicability of a treaty rule 
to its own conduct depends on the other State's conduct in the application of 
other rules, on other subjects, also included in the same treaty...... But if the two 
rules in question also exist as rules of customary international law, the failure of 
the one State to apply the one rule does not justify the other State in declining to 
apply the other rule". 141 
138 K. S. Carlston, Law and Organisation in World Society, (Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 
1962), pp. 64-123; O. Schachter, "Towards a Theory of International Obligation", 8 Va. J. I. L., 
(1968), p. 300 
19 O. Schachter, "In Defence of International Rules on the Use of Force", 53 U Chicago L. Rev., 
(1986), p. 113, at pp. 128-131 
10 See J. Kirkpatrick, "Law and Reciprocity", 72 Proc. A. S. I. L., (1984), p. 59, at p. 67: "The fast 
principle of the law is the equal application of the law. Unilateral compliance with the Charter's 
principles of non-intervention and non-use of force may make sense in some instances, 
but is 
hardly in itself a sound basis for either U. S policy or for international peace and stability. 
We 
cannot permit ourselves to feel bound to unilateral compliance with obligations which 
do in fact 
exist in the Charter, but are renounced by others". 
14 ' Nicaragua Case, p. 95, para. 178 
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The second contention refers to the principle of changing circumstances. 142 
Although it is difficult to establish the degree of foreseeability, 143 it contains a 
certain veracity concerning the United Nations system. These circumstances 
refer mainly to the operation of an effective security system upon which Article 
2(4) was conditioned and the ensuing revival of the customary law. The United 
Nations has not fulfilled its task of remedying human rights violations and this 
consists of altered circumstances which necessitate the recuperation of 
humanitarian 144 The dictum of the Court in the Nicaragua Case 
previously cited has wider implications for allowing the customary law of 
humanitarian intervention. The I. C. J. located the law concerning the use of force 
in the field of customary law and thus it was able to reject the argument that it is 
conditioned on an effective collective security system. In customary law, there is 
no such juxtaposition. However, its scope relating to force is more lax than 
Article 2(4). The customary law which consequently binds states allows for 
humanitarian intervention. Moreover, the Court treated customary and Charter 
law as having identical content, ' 45 notwithstanding pleas to the contrary. The 
absurdity and circularity of this position is revealed when someone argues from 
within the liberal customary law. It could hence be maintained that humanitarian 
intervention as customary/conventional rule may be practised even if Chapter 
VII works effectively. If this would not be unapt, the solution would require 
determining and differentiating the content of customary and Charter law and 
recognising the function of the collective security system in relation to the latter. 
142 Article 62,1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties; A. Vamvoukos, Termination of 
Treaties in International Law; the doctrines of rebus sic stantibus and desuetude, (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1985), 
143 N. Ronzitti maintains that the failure of the collective security system was already evident 
towards the end of the war and it was easily foreseeable that it would be intensified when the 
hostilities had ended. Supra note 49, pp. 9-10: T. J. Farer, "Foreign Intervention in Civil Armed 
Conflict", 142 R. C., (1974 II), p. 290, at p. 390 
104 W 
. 
M. Reisman, "Coercion and Self-Determination: Construing Article 2(4)", 78 A. J. I. L., 
(1984), p. 642; F. R. Tesön, Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry Into Law And Morality. 
(Dobbs Ferry, N. Y, Transnational Pub., 1988), p. 138 
"s Nicaragua Case, pp. 106-107, para. 202-204; B. Simma (ed. ), The Charter of the United 
Nations, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 127: "..... but the Judgement does not 
indicate in any way that the Court might determine the scope of the customary prohibition of 
force and that of Art. 2(4) differently. Rather, in interpreting the customary rule, the Court 
adheres to the terms used in Art. 2(4) and refers explicitly to the wording of that provision. It 
follows that the Court 
, ..... 
tends to view the prohibition of force under general international 
law and the prohibition laid down in Art. 2(4) as being identical in content Both prior to and 
following the Nicaragua Judgement, it is right to say, therefore, that the prohibition of the use 
of force under customary international law has a much smaller scope than that laid down 
in 
the U. N. Charter". 
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This anticipates the third proposition which admits that the subsequent state 
conduct eroded or modified Article 2(4). Thus, the recognition and acceptance 
of the incurred modifications and qualifications should determine the scope of 
the customary or conventional use of force. 146 
The decision of the I. C. J. in the Nicaragua Case leans towards the opposite 
direction. The legal normativity of Article 2(4) was sustained although its 
permeability was also verbally conceded. It was stated therein: 
"The Court does not consider that, for a rule to be established as 
customary, the corresponding practice must be in absolute rigorous 
conformity with the rule. 
..... 
If a State acts in a way prima facie 
incompatible with the recognised rule, but defends its conduct by 
appealing to exceptions or justifications contained within the rile itself, 
then whether or not the states conduct is in fact justifiable on that basis, 
the significance of that attitude is to confirm rather than to weaken the 
rule". 147 
The decision of the Court incorporates the dilemmas of positivists in their 
endeavour to uphold the restrictive force of Article 2(4). For them, it is the 
crucial distinction between "ought" and "is". In its determination of customary 
law, the I. C. J. was mainly concerned with the opinio juris suppressing state 
practice, the second crucial element for the formation of custom. This position 
concedes an unnecessary over-legitimisation to governmental declarations and 
fails to apprehend the deeds. The I. C. J. also systematically avoided indicating 
the actual content of the rule on the use of force, albeit it pronounced the 
existence of the rule. 148 This decision may also be unfortunate for the formation 
of custom. The latter emerges initially as a counter-activity which may appear as 
violation of an established rule. If that incompatible behaviour is characterised 
146 See Article 31(3)(b) of 1969 Vienna Convention; E. V. Rostow, "The Legality of the 
International Use of Force by and From States", 10 Yale J. I. L., (1985), p. 286: "A proposition in 
the form of a rule of law can be considered a legal norm even if it is not universally respected 
and enforced; but it cannot be characterised as a norm if respect and enforcement are the 
exceptions rather than the rule. By this standard, the status of Article 2(4) as law is now in 
doubt". 
47 Nicaragua Case, p. 98, para. 186 
149 A. A. D'Amato, "Trashing Customary International Law", 81 A. J. I. L., (1987), p. 101; F. L. 
Kirgis Jr, "Custom on a Sliding Scale", ibid, p. 146; M. H. Mendelson, "The Nicaragua Case and 
Customary International Law", in W. E. Butler (ed. ), The Non-use of Force in International Law, 
(Dordrecht/Boston/London, Martins Nijhoff, 1989), p. 85, at p. 91 
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as a confirmation of a rule, then it seems that there is no room for the 
development of new customary rules and that the rules have been crystallised 
and petrified in the Charter. The gist of the decision is that it showed its 
preference towards the normative validity of the rule following Kelsen's 
distinction of the core meaning of a rule which remains unaffected by the 
practice. Concerning humanitarian intervention, the argument again becomes 
circular. By refusing to appreciate the content of the rule, the argument reverts 
back to the inseparability or not of the rule from the collective system' 49 and the 
existence or not of a more liberal customary rule which revives. 
V. 3 Sovereignty and justice within the argument of observance. In order to pre- 
empt the discussion which follows, we should consider what the interpretative 
constructions of Article 2(4) represent beyond a purely legalistic description. 
Thus, it should be submitted that they contain an inner core of antagonism and 
reconciliation which itself is located within the wider genre of tension between 
sovereignty and justice. 15° The latter two concepts produce in legal reasoning 
consensual (positivist) or extra-consensual (naturalist) arguments but the 
demarcation is not definite because the rhetoric can switch freely between the 
two poles. In particular, Article 2(4) invokes the consensual aspect of 
sovereignty, whereas the arguments which introduce modifications invoke 
extra-consensual aspects referring to changed circumstances or higher notions of 
justice and human rights. However, each argumentative line could easily be 
substituted with the other. Hence, those who adhere to Article 2(4) may invoke 
the justice of keeping promises or of world order which is procured by 
observing this article. On the other hand, the extra-consensualists resort to 
consensual arguments such as the liberty of each state to alleviate itself from 
obligations when the circumstance ceases to correspond. The rhetoric then 
discloses that the different genre of arguments are not mutually exclusive but 
149 The Court noted the contextual character, although it did not observe it. Nicaragua 
Case. 
pp. 95-96, para. 178: "A State may accept a rule contained in a treaty not simply 
because it 
favours the application of the rule itself, but also because the treaty establishes what that 
State 
regards as desirable institutions or mechanisms to ensure implementation of the rule. 
Thus, if 
that rule parallels a rule of customary international law, two rules of the same content are 
subject to separate treatment as regards the organs competent to verify their implementation, 
depending on whether they are customary rules or treaty rules". There 
is hence a strong 
as gument to condition Article 2(4) on an effective security system. 
David Kennedy, International Legal Structures, (Baden-Baden, Nomos 
Verlagsgesellschaft, 1987), ch. 1 
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recombine in order to accommodate the deficiencies of the other line of 
argument. 
However, this does not conceal the fissure between a purely positivist and a 
naturalist position. As was said above, each position may reverse to the opposite 
one but this concerns only those aspects of the opposite argument which would 
eventually justify the initial position. Thus, the consensualist-positivist argument 
would state that Article 2(4) is binding as positive law above the justice of other 
considerations. Now this position may switch to the opposite extra-consensual- 
naturalist position referring to justice but as the justice of being bound by Article 
2(4). The naturalist position contemplates the legal authority of Article 2(4) 
which is oppugned considering the numerous deviations. However, it reverts to 
consensualist arguments when it relies on state practice in order to verify this 
article's lack of authority or the emergence of a new practice. 
Considering now more specifically the previous claim that the non- 
materialisation of a security system has relieved states from their obligation to 
abstain from force and also has reinvented the customary law on the matter, this 
involves a consensualist-positivist argument because it recognises the 
competence of each state to release itself from obligations. To put it differently, 
it is synonymous to sovereignty. It is admitted, hence, that the state has 
consented to certain matters and only itself, as the sole judge, could repeal its 
consent, had the circumstances arisen. On the other hand, there may be 
extraordinary circumstances which may cause hardship to a state and, therefore, 
elementary considerations of justice may require its release. Whereas both 
positions are for the benefit of the state, the emphasis is different. The first 
argument attributes absolute priority to the state and includes also an element of 
justice within this unambivalent statism. The second distances itself form the 
"romance of the state" and puts more emphasis on systematic consideration 
which exceptionally and for the justice of the system may admit revocation. 
Concerning the abstention from the use of force, the altered circumstances - 
deficiency of the collective security system - may prejudice victims of 
aggression or perpetuate violations of substantial rights if they remain 
unacknowledged. As presented above, some states and writers have claimed 
suspension and revival of a more generous customary right, whereas the 
Court 
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and other states have taken a negative view resorting either to the legal 
normativity of the rule or to systematic justice. The contradiction and 
reversibility of theoretical positions is that, when modification is refused, a 
consensual argument is advanced together with an extra-consensual. The 
consensual refers to the binding nature of the obligation, whereas the other to 
systematic considerations of order, peace, justice. This position, however, denies 
to members of the international system the consensual-sovereign competence of 
repealing any rule and also the restoration of the notion of justice which this 
would represent for the particular member. The solution then lies in making 
combinations among the two opposite positions excluding each time some 
elements. Otherwise the argument would be indeterminate. 
VI. THE FUNDAMENTAL CONTRADICTION AND 
INTERRELATION: SOVEREIGNTY / INTERVENTION; PEACE / 
JUSTICE 
VI. 1 Sovereignty and Intervention. The above observations concern the 
interpretation of Article 2(4) and they share a common denominator. They are 
both confined within positivist legalism which is materialised either by 
construing Article 2(4) as an instant phenomenon of legal formation or as an 
amplified construction which preserves, nonetheless, its normative content. The 
different interpretations reveal also the constrictions of legal positivism when 
attempting to encompass the complex phenomena of international life. The more 
it is distanced from pertinent considerations of justice and human rights, the 
more rigidified and unrealistic it becomes. The prohibition on the use of force 
may be absolute on a theoretical level but that is not a satisfactory answer. On 
the other hand, when issues of justice and human rights are contemplated, a 
lukewarm rejection of purely normative positivism is witnessed. The 
interpretations of Article 2(4), restrictive, permissive or reconciliatory, 
demonstrate this multifaceted character of positivist thinking in international 
law. Thus, it is deemed necessary at this point, instead of presenting the merits 
of each argument, to demonstrate the substructure of those interpretations and 
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also to explore the possibility of a restatement. In particular, the contradictions 
inscribed in legal argument will be presented in pairs: peace/order 
- 
justice/ 
human rights; sovereignty/intervention. 
Our discussion begins with the last pair. The notion of sovereignty is the 
acknowledgement in international law of the exclusive domestic order imposed 
by the state and non-intervention is its legal and factual substantiation. 
Sovereignty is idiosyncratic of natural law which deduced this principle from a 
human analogy of freedom and equality. The rights of individuals to autonomy, 
equality and respect have induced lawyers in the naturalist tradition, Grotius, 
Wolff, Pufendorf and partially Vattel, to deduce independence, sovereignty and 
non-intervention as principles for state relations. Positivism bequeathed the 
institutional and legal framework drawing inferences from the individualistic 
conception of autonomy. Henceforth, non-intervention is viewed functionally in 
the conceptual autonomy of sovereignty. 
It was observed in the previous chapters that natural law engulfed contending 
and diverse illations concerning the quality and extent of sovereignty and non- 
intervention. The latter is ingrained in the notion of sovereignty. It is 
indispensable for the formation of sovereign societies and also it embodies a 
rule stemming from sovereignty. However, an absolute notion of sovereignty in 
a Hobbesian state of nature negates the existence of state society. Sovereignty 
could also be subordinated to the higher principles of natural law and become 
relative. For Grotius, the superseded precepts of natural law apply directly to 
individuals as subjects of international law, as well as to states. 15' Therefore, 
humanitarian intervention is permitted. The distinguishing trait with Vattel is 
that Grotius elicits the principles of sovereignty and (non)intervention from a 
theoretical-conceptual approach intersected with naturalist-humanist ideology 
which impels him to admit certain exceptions for humanitarian reasons. On the 
other hand, Vattel articulated the positivist notion of sovereignty and non- 
intervention based on state practice. This was tenuous because, as was shown 
above, when Vattel pronounced the principle of non-intervention, there was no 
15' H. Bull, "The Grotian Conception of International Society" in H. Butterfield, M. Wight 
(eds. ), Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics, (London, Allen 
& Unwin, 1966), p. 68; R. J. Vincent, Nonintervention and International Order, (Princeton. 
Princeton University Press, 1974), pp. 23-24 
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correlation in state practice which would fortify this rule. On the contrary, 
practice was at considerable variance. Thus, Vattel pronounced a principle in the 
form of a verisimilitude, prognosticating the effect which the concepts of 
sovereignty and independence may procure on state relations. On this account, 
the difference with the Grotian conceptualisation of factual circumstances is 
diminished. 152 
Positivists respond to the question of identifying non-intervention as a rule by 
resorting to a mixture of formal sources, customary or promissory. The sources 
contain operational signs but also equivocal principles or assumptions such as 
equity, sovereignty, peace or order. Positivists recognise the functional value of 
these assumptions or principles in elucidating the content of rules and hence, 
they are applied per se. A confirmation of this approach is the decision of the 
I. C. J. in the Corfu Channel Case whereby non-intervention was interconnected 
to sovereignty and peace/order. ' 53 Moreover, the principle of non-intervention 
has been reiterated ceremonially within the United Nations framework. The 
relevant Resolutions evoke the impression of containing a consistent 
reaffirmation and reconfirmation of other concurrent norms such as equality and 
sovereignty. Although their normative coherence is indisputable, they are 
detached from the operational environment and thus fail to explain the content 
of the putative rule on non-intervention. ' 54 The other method employed is to 
subject competing rules to a process of verification through state reception. As a 
consequence, some may be rejected as moral incantations whereas others are 
admitted. An ample humanitarian constituent is usually rejected, whereas a 
particularised one which is also privileged with state consent, as it is in the 
outlawry of genocide, is accepted. 
These two processes are not separate but converge in the following construction. 
If non-intervention is the principle which has been accepted formally by states, 
the alleged exemptions 
- 
humanitarian intervention included 
- 
should be 
132 P. H. Winfield, "The History of Intervention in International Law", 3 B. Y. B. I. L., (1922-23), 
p. 130, at pp. 133-4; A. Carty, The Decay of International Law, (Manchester, Manchester 
University Press, 1986), pp. 89-90 
'" Corfu Channel Case, p. 35 
'54 V. Lowe, "The Principle of Non-Intervention: Use of Force", in V. Lowe, C. Warbrick 
(eds), The United Nations and the Principles of International Law, (London, Routledge, 1994), 
p. 66, at p. 73 
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subjected to rigorous tests in order to pass the threshold of legality. It is 
maintained that interventions are multi-faceted. Therefore, humanitarian 
intervention is illegal because it cannot be extracted as a crystallised segment of 
state practice. The practice of states, tacit or explicit, does not incorporate the 
sense of legal conviction per se. This becomes ascertainable inferentially, 
through a presupposed rule. If this presupposition aggregates into non- 
intervention, it could be claimed that a certain practice is not coupled with the 
legal conviction. The Nicaragua Case provides an illustration of this reasoning. 
The distinct state practice remained unaccountable because the presupposed 
legal conviction contained the rule of non-intervention. Humanitarian 
intervention is subjected to the same treatment. Brownlie anticipates that state 
practice should demonstrate a sheer humanitarian purpose and a sense of legal 
consciousness in order for humanitarian intervention to become law. Failing on 
these accounts, the action is condemned to illegality. ' 55 This claim is insufficient 
because it declines to apprehend the intrinsic values contained in the action and 
also pre-empts the value of non-intervention. If we cannot exclude intervention 
from interstate relations, we need at least to pontificate. Apprehension of the 
contending values, altruistic or individualistic, and explication of the action 
from a humanitarian viewpoint may justify any such action. This latter position, 
however, entails a conceptual contradiction. It admits universal and 
cosmopolitan values which transcend sovereignty and which are effectuated 
through intervention, whereas, on the other hand, the use of force is cursed as a 
source of suffering. The essence of the contradiction is thus that intervention 
promotes higher values but may simultaneously cause considerable destruction 
in other values. At this point, we reach the dilemma of choosing between the 
morality of non-intervention and that of intervention. The morality of non- 
intervention was exposed by John Stuart Mill who attached it to the right of self- 
determination but also admitted a residue of humanitarian intervention in cases 
of civil war. 1 56 The other ethical point for non-intervention is that it upsets 
'S` I. Brownlie, "Humanitarian Intervention", in J. N. Moore (ed. ), Laiv and Civil War in the 
Modern World, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1974), p. 217, at pp. 227-228 
156 J 
. 
S. Mill, "A Few Words on Non-Intervention", in J. S. Mill, Dissertations: Political. 
Philosophical, and Historical, vol. III, (London, Longmans, 1875), pp. 153-178; R. J. Vincent. 
supra note 149, pp. 54-56; M. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with 
Historical Illustrations, 2nd ed., (N. Y., HarperCollins, 1991), ch. 6 
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international stability. A moment's reflection would suggest that there is a line 
to be drawn between the competing values. 
In order to answer the question concerning the morality of intervention, we 
should retreat to the origins of intervention and invoke the domestic analogy. 
According to Locke, the protection of peoples' natural rights endows the state 
with the political right to sovereignty. ' 57 Therefore, the morality invested into 
sovereignty reflects 'the morality of the individual rights. Intervention partakes 
of a residue of morality if it is immersed into the legitimisation standards which 
include human rights as a compendium to sovereignty. The disjunction between 
human rights and legitimacy springs from an inadvertent interpretation of 
sovereignty as signifying absolute power. This opinion is based on a misreading 
of Bodin who spoke of the "potestas legibus soluta" not as the sign of evaluative 
authority but as the premise for the concentration of authority. For Bodin, this 
authority was circumvented by natural law but, eventually, such definition 
arrogated the misconception because it indicated power. In particular, if 
sovereignty contains the notion of "will", the conceptual confusion centres on 
locating the source of will, as we have seen above with Austin's theory. 
Additionally, it may also mean the indivisibility of will and consequently of 
sovereignty. The other confusion concerns the word "ultimate". This has two 
inter-related aspects. The first evolves from the casual meaning of the word 
which alludes to a regressive process whereby we reach the apex of the pyramid 
and may result into evocation of a priori norms. It is similar to Kelsen's 
presupposition of the Basic Norm. Accordingly, sovereignty becomes the 
controlling assumption and non-intervention its consummation. The other aspect 
is the conformity with certain procedural and institutional requirements which 
validate the rule. It is then similar to Hart's concept of law or to McDougal's 
definition of authoritative decision, with the naturalist addition that it should 
embody the value of human dignity. 
'" J. Locke, Two Treatises of Government, M. Goldie (ed. ), (London, Everyman, 1993), "The 
Second Treatise of Government", chs. 2,7 and 8; F. H. Hinsley, Sovereignty, 2nd ed., 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 146-149; I. M. Wilson, "The Influence of 
Hobbes and Locke in the Shaping of the Concept of Sovereignty in Eighteenth Century 
France", in T. Besterman (ed. ), Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century, vol. Cl, 
(Banbury, The Voltaire Foundation, 1973), in particular Chapter II, p. 29 
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This train of thought may lead us back to the contractual discussion of 
humanitarian intervention, in particular, the extent of internal legitimacy which 
affords protection against intervention. Theoretical traces of the internal 
consequentiality with external intervention could be found in Vattel who 
acknowledges a right of intervention when the prince derogates from his duties 
towards his subjects. ' 58 The United Nations Charter would seem to legitimise 
itself and its principles by invoking the popular stamp in the words "[W]e the 
peoples of the United Nations". However, the absolute priority given to peace 
and security has neglected the issue of legitimacy and has congealed our 
perception of interventions. The legitimacy is founded on a "fit" between the 
people and the government but this should be also an expression of basic human 
rights. Otherwise, we may encounter the awkward situation of unscrupulous 
majorities in the Nazi mode which may claim "fit" with the population. If state 
legitimacy is viewed in contractual terminology as protecting the basic human 
rights to liberty and life of its citizens, then any aberration from this course may 
invite intervention because sovereignty is overridden through de- 
legitimisation. 159 Within the legalistic perspectives, the reconciliatory argument 
alludes to this notion when it refers to the criterion of substantive violations of 
human rights. Consequently, misfeasance or nonfeasance of sovereignty would 
legitimise intervention. As an illustration of this position we could take the cases 
of Bangladesh, Uganda and Kampuchea. Their governments were enjoying 
international legitimacy, in particular through the repetitious affirmation of their 
sovereignty in the United Nations. However, in reality, their violation of human 
rights has removed their legitimacy and consequently humanitarian intervention 
did not impinge on sovereignty. The Indian Foreign Minister endorsed this 
argument in the United Nations in relation to the situation in Bangladesh: 
"[i]nternational law recognises that where a mother state has irrevocably lost the 
iss E. de Vattel, Le Droit Des Gens ou Principes de la Loi Naturelle, appliques 6 la Conduite et 
aux Affaires des Nations et des Souverains, trans. Ch. G. Fenwick, in Classics of international 
Law, (Washington, Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1916), Liv. I, chs. I-IV; Liv. II, ch. IV, 
S Para. 
56 
9 G. Doppelt, "Walter's Theory of Morality in Internaitonal Relations", 8 Phil. & Pub. 
Affairs, (1978-79), p. 3; D. Luban, "Just War and Human Rights", 9 Phil. & Pub. Affairs, 
(1980), p. 160; P. Montague, "Two Concepts of Rights", ibid, p. 372; C. R. Beiz, 
"Nonintervention and Communal Integrity", ibid, p. 385; G. Doppelt, "Statism without 
Foundations", ibid, p. 398; M. Walzer, "The Moral Standing of States: A Response to Four 
Critics", ibid. p. 209; M. Walzer, "The Theory of Aggression", in S. Luper-Foy, Problems of 
International Justice, (Boulder, Westview Press, 1988), p. 151 
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allegiance of such a large section of its people 
..... 
and cannot bring them under 
its sway, conditions for the separate existence of such a state comes into 
being" ' 60 
. 
Unfortunately, international law has diminished the operation of this pattern and 
concerned itself mainly with de facto sovereignty which stabilised the 
international system of order and peace. The I. C. J., addressing the U. S. 
contention of human rights violations by Nicaragua, opted for sovereignty and 
respect for domestic jurisdiction and said "[e]very State possesses a fundamental 
right to choose and implement its own political, economic and social 
systems". 16' Without passing judgement on the facts of the particular case, it 
appears that the Court's position is that sovereignty and non-intervention 
provide the ingredients for legitimisation irrespective of human rights 
considerations. ' 62 Although this could be attributed to an operational necessity, 
it does not reflect the initial presumptions of the United Nations Charter and in 
subsequent years there was an attempt to accommodate timidly the issue of 
legitimacy within the precept of peace. 
VI. 2 The United Nations expectations for Peace and Justice. The United 
Nations Charter contains the two-fold purposes of peace and justice articulated 
in the Preamble and Article 1. The promotion of human rights was included as 
an aspect for realising international justice. The United Nations performance in 
subsequent years witnesses, however, the primordial role attributed to peace' 63 
which monopolised conceptual, political and legal reasoning. As a consequence, 
human rights violations may occur irredeemably, subordinated to the overriding 
purpose of maintaining peace. ' 64Within this legal and political rationale, the 
160 U. N. Doc. S/PV. 1611, (Dec. 12,1971), p. 62 
1b1 Nicaragua Case, p. 131, para. 258. See also pp. 133-135, paras. 263,266-268 162 F. R. Tesön, "Le peuple, c'est moi! The World Court and Human Rights", 81 A. J. I. L., 
(1987), p. 173 
163 
"The primary place ascribed to international peace and security is natural, since the fulfillment 
of the other purposes will be dependent upon the attainment of that basic condition. " Certain 
Expenses of the United Nations, (Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962), I. C. J. Rep., (1962), p. 150, 
at p. 168; "La maintien de la paix est le but le plus primordial" D. Ceausu, "Quelques 
considerations relatives ä l'interdiction de 1'emploi de la force dans les relations internationales et 
le droit de la legitime defense", 15 Rev. Romaine d'etudes internationales, (1981), p. 125; F. H. 
Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations 
Between States, (1963), p. 338: "The Charter was less interested in legal and just settlement; the 
great danger was war and any settlement was better than war. " 
O. Schachter, "In Defence of International Rules on the Use of Force", 53 U. Chicago L. Rev.. 
(1986), p. 113, at p. 126-128; W. V. O'Brien, The Conduct of Just and Limited War. (N. Y., Praeger 
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inevitable dilemma between peace or justice arises. Although political 
expediency has neglected the utility of the conditions for justice, the last decades 
evidence a re-emphasis and resurgence of human rights. In particular, the 
functional description of the United Nations system reveals the dialectical 
operation between order/peace and justice/human rights. The association has 
been flexible and encountered divergent stages of disengagement and promotion 
of a singular pillar or symmetry and also appreciation of the other pillar as well. 
Actually, the United Nations recognises the instrumental relation' 65 between 
order and justice as upholding each other, thus refuting the assumption that 
justice and order are mutually nugatory. Any action for the protection of people 
in immediate danger of extermination is not inconsistent with the overriding 
purposes of peace and justice because the minimum requirement of a public 
order is not only the elimination of the use of force, it encompasses also justice 
and respect for the human person. 166 
The intriguing aspect of this reasoning is that it precludes the autonomous 
realisation of justice/human rights which is eventually immersed in the other 
composite of order/peace. It is an approach whereby each pillar in the dialectical 
relation legitimises the other but order is prevalent. The recount is eventually 
tautological. Order as one aspect of the pillar legitimises order included in the 
other pillar which now contains an element of justice. Consequently, the United 
Nations operation in the field of maintaining order through its executive organ, 
the Security Council, has legitimised this order by appealing to the values of 
preserving peace and justice. This exposition concedes the internal relation of 
order and justice as ideological premises but also marks their identification in 
practice. Another aspect in this interrelation is their conceptual amalgamation in 
the comprehensive norm of order. The normative content of order evolves, then, 
into the concepts of state, sovereignty, peace, non-intervention. A consequence 
of the pre-eminence attributed to order as a normative premise and value is that 
it may singularize our perception and evaluation of events monolithically under 
Publ., 1981), p. 23: "Modern international law has sacrificed justice in its attempt virtually to 
eliminate the competence of the state to engage in war unilaterally". 
165 M. Koskenniemi, "The Police in the Temple, Order, Justice and the U. N.: A Dialectical 
View", 6 E. J. J. L., (1995), p. 325 
"" J-P. L. Fonteyne, "The Customary International Law Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention: 
Its Current Validity under the U. N. Charter", 4 Cal. W I. L. J., (1974) p. 203, at p. 269 
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the umbrella of peace. Additionally, in the instrumental relation of justice and 
order, the former may be reinterpreted wantonly in order to satisfy the latter. 
The Security Council's main task is to maintain or restore international peace. 
This is a political imperative and Article 39 does not mention justice or 
international law. 167 It would be a confusion of notions to equate the delivery of 
justice with the Security Council's function of maintaining or restoring peace, 
although it might be contained therein as will be presented subsequently. '68 
Consequently, it should be submitted that the prohibition on the use of force as a 
result of the prevalent aim to preserve peace has no absolute value in itself. It 
should be weighed against other values169 which may eventually reverse the 
balance. Being preoccupied with maintaining peace, with "value conservation", 
against "value extension", 170 the peace we extricate is rather precarious. The 
situation in Kampuchea reveals the absurdity which the pursuit only of peace 
may cause. The Pol Pot regime was notorious; however, the Vietnamese action 
was condemned in the General Assembly as an affront to sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and the independence of Kampuchea. '7' Later, the General Assembly 
ritually asserted that non-intervention would facilitate: "just and lasting 
resolution of the Kampuchean problem". 172 It appears that peace, that is, non- 
intervention, may procure justice and respect for human rights. Commendable 
as it is, it did not facilitate human rights under the perverse Pol Pot regime. The 
lego-political schizophrenia reappears again in the issue of representation. The 
notorious Pol Pot regime was considered as the legitimate representative for 
United Nations purposes 173, although it lacked effective control of the country. 
The dilemma was between a "puppet" or a genocidal government and the 
prevalent wisdom accepted the latter. Thus, they reaffirmed the overlapping 
purpose of preserving peace which had been fractured by Vietnam's action. 
Concerning the question of representation, General Assembly Resolution 396 
167 H. Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations, (N. Y., Praeger, 1964), p. 15-16 
168 G. G. Fitzmaurice, "The Foundations of the Authority of International Law and the Problem of 
Enforcement", 19 Modern L. Rev., (1966), p. 1, at p. 5 
169 R. B. Lillich, "Forcible Self-help under International Law", 22 N. W. C. Rev., (1970), p. 61, at 
65 170 
M. S. McDougal, supra note 6, pp. 18-19 
' 71 G. A. Res. 34/22, (Nov. 14,1979), in particular para. 9 
12 G. A. Res. 41/6, (Oct. 21,1986) 
'" G. A. Res. 34/2 (22 September 1979); G. A. Res. 35/3 (13 October 1980); 25 A. F. D. L. 
(1979), p. 461; 26 A. F. D. 1., (1980), p. 408; 27 A. F. D. 1. 
, 
(1981), pp. 400-401 
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provides for contending cases that "..... the question should be considered in the 
light of the Purposes and Principles of the Charter and the circumstances of each 
"174 case 
. 
It could be maintained that the introduction of a subjective element in 
the determination of representation would allude to the legitimisation standards 
and in particular the human rights considerations contained in the Charter. 
However, the answer to this problem conformed with the static international 
mode of peace and order. It is best captured by France's statement before the 
Security Council: "[t]he notion that because a regime is detestable, foreign 
intervention is justified and forcible overthrow is legitimate is extremely 
dangerous. That could ultimately jeopardise the very maintenance of 
international law and order and make the continued existence of various regimes 
dependent on the judgement of their neighbours". 175 
This case reveals also that the interconnection between order, sovereignty and 
non-intervention is almost inextricable. Sovereignty stimulates non-intervention 
and order which, themselves, realise sovereignty. Within the United Nations 
Charter, the concept of sovereignty implements two functions which also reveal 
the conceptual foundations of the system. Non-intervention as a corollary of 
sovereignty signifies the absence of any superior authority imposed on states but 
also that in inter-state relations there should be a definite allocation of 
competence in order to preserve a rudimentary order. Thus, the purpose of the 
non-intervention principle is teleological. It correlates with the Haitian societal 
telos of survival which is the cardinal human aim. Survival is attained by rules 
which emanate from certain truisms, altruistic or individualistic, pertinent to 
human condition. Two of these essential truisms are forbearance and restriction 
of violence. In the international arena, survival could be interpreted as survival 
of the state system which, supposedly, procures order and peace, or it could be 
described as plain order. The truism which supports this aim is non-intervention. 
This finding is based on the presumption that order is the highest value and also 
"' G. A. Res. 396(V), U. N. GAOR (1950), p. 675. For a contrary view dismissing extraneous 
considerations see Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations, 
1. C. J. Rep., (1947-48), p. 57, at p. 62 
"S 34 U. N. SCOR, 2109th mtg., (12 January 1979), para. 36. See the official position of 
France, 26 A. F. D. 1., (1980), pp. 888-889. The position of New Zealand was: "the misdeeds of 
one State do not 
..... 
justify the invasion of its territory by another". U. N. Doc. S/PV. 2110. 
(13 January 1979), pp. 23-25 
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on the classification of the international system as sovereign-oriented. Although 
it embodies current international property, it is inadequate because it disregards 
the emergence of new participants 
- 
individuals, NGOs etc. 
- 
who are 
antagonistic to sovereign states even if not on an equal footing. The 
maintenance of order through the negation of intervention is also oblivious to 
the quality which sovereignty should enjoy as the previous discussion of 
legitimacy revealed. Finally, it does not answer the crucial question of what 
happens to the system when the order within a state collapses. Sovereignty is 
instrumental in installing internal order within a state by institutionalising the 
basic Hartian truisms. The recognition in international law of sovereignty's 
stabilising function has facilitated in making this concept absolute. When the 
domestic order fails, what is the effect on sovereignty and what is the response 
of international law? The answer to this question is of particular interest to 
humanitarian intervention. The classical answer is that, in circumstances of 
internal disorder and mass killings as in Bangladesh, Uganda, Kampuchea, 
Rwanda, the attributes of sovereignty cease to function and this does not 
forestall intervention which is not in this case a technical breach of the rule of 
non-intervention. 176 The Operation "Restore Hope" in Somalia is more 
indicative. The internal situation characterised by human disaster warranted the 
humanitarian action but this was not caused by the politics of the government. 
176 Concerning the changing attitudes regarding sovereignty and human rights, see Javier 
Perez de Cuellar: "It is now increasingly felt that the principle of non-interference with the 
essential domestic jurisdiction of states cannot be regarded as a protective barrier behind which 
human rights could be massively or systematically violated with impunity........ The case for not 
impinging on the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of States is by itself 
indubitably strong. But it could only be weakened if it were to carry the implication that 
sovereignty, even in this day and age, includes the right of mass slaughter or of launching 
systematic campaings of decimation or forced exodus of civilian populations in the name of 
controlling civil strife or insurrection. With the heightened international interest in universalising 
a regime of human rights, there is a marked and most welcome shift in public attitudes. To try to 
resist it would be politically as unwise as it is morally indefensible. " supra note 2, p. 12; 
Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, 
291. L. M., (1990), p. 1312: "....... where violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms are 
alleged to have occurred, the effective remedies available include 
..... 
the right of the individual 
to seek and receive assistance from others in defending human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
and to assist others in defending human rights and fundamental freedoms; 
..... 
". Charter of Paris 
for a New Europe, 30 I. L. M., (1991), p. 190: "Human rights and fundamental freedoms are the 
birthright of all human beings, are inalienable and are guaranteed by law....... Their observance 
and full exercise are the foundation of freedom, justice and peace. ". The United Nations 
Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali: "State sovereignty takes a new meaning in this 
context. Added to its dimension of rights is the dimension of responsibility, both internal and 
external. Violation of state sovereignty is and will remain an offence against the global order, but 
236 
On the contrary, it was the absence of government and the intertribal fight to 
control the government. Before Resolution 794 was adopted, the Secretary- 
General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in a letter addressed to the President of the 
Security Council urged the Council "..... to make a determination under Article 
39 of the Charter that a threat to the peace exists, as a result of the repercussions 
of the Somali conflict on the entire region" because "[alt present no government 
exists in Somalia". ' 77 Thus, we conclude that the argument of sovereignty and 
order is not a viable hindrance to humanitarian intervention. 
VI. 3 The prominence of order may contain peace 
- 
the analogy with property 
rights. Peace and order (and sovereignty and non-intervention as its practical 
substantiation) function in international society as ordering devises. The best 
understanding of their interrelations could be achieved by analogising with 
property rights. 178 If order is defined as the existence of harmonious inter-social 
relations by abidance to certain rules of conduct, this definition does not 
encapsulate the essence of regularity and conformity observed in certain 
behaviour. It does not unveil the merits of such conformity beyond the formal 
acknowledgement of its factual existence. The valuation is achieved by 
reflecting on the Hartian truisms for social life, the indispensable and essential 
elements for the formation of societies. Abridgement of violence and protection 
of life, protection of property and deference to agreements are the elementary 
constituents for a society. The state as the institutionalisation of these societies 
should protect them in order to procure order. Other elements, ideological or 
social, may also be recognised in the evolution of the state but these elements 
its misuse also may undermine human rights and jeopardise a peaceful global life 
..... 
". United 
Nations Security Council Summit Opening Address by Members, VP 
-5-2,3,4 
"' Letter dated 29 November 1992 From the Secretary-General to the President of the 
Security Council, U. N. SCOR, 47th Sess., U. N. Doc. S/24868 (1992); N. S. Rodley, 
"Collective Intervention to Protect Human Rights and Civilian Populations: The Legal 
Framework", in N. S. Rodley, To Loose the Bands of Wickedness, (London, Brassey's 1992), 
26 
78 F. Kratochwil, "Sovereignty as Dominium: Is There a Right of Humanitarian 
Intervention? ", in G. M. Lyons, M. Mastanduno, Beyond Westphalia? State Sovereignty and 
International Intervention, (Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 1995), pp. 21-42; H. 
Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law, (London, Longmans, 
1927), pp. 95-96: "The reaction against patrimonial ideas cannot obliterate the fact that the two 
notions are essentially analogies on account of the exclusiveness of enjoyment and disposition 
which is in law the main formal characteristic of both private property and territorial 
sovereignty. ". 
transgress the fundamental requirements of a society, that is, the satisfaction of 
the indispensable truisms, and may in addition pose a threat to its integrity. 
The society of states, consisting of autonomous units, does not reflect this 
pattern. Internal order within states is interpreted as external disorder in the 
relations among states. Attempts towards international order should therefore 
imitate the domestic paradigm and characterise the positivist conceptualisation 
of peace and order. The functions of protection of life, sanctity of contracts and 
protection of property are attributed to the states which are the personification of 
the internal order. For these reasons, states comply with certain rules of 
rudimentary conduct. The fundamental rule is the recognition of state 
sovereignty as the exclusive sphere of order within and among societies. Non- 
intervention becomes then the factual acknowledgement of separateness. The 
state as legal, political and judicial power stabilises domestic and international 
society. 
Secondly, order requires the stability of possession which is the integrity 
- 
political or territorial 
- 
of states. Therefore, non-intervention is crucial. These 
observations are prevalent in the United Nations Charter which allocates the 
spheres of domestic and international order to states which are sovereign and are 
protected from intervention. The Charter acknowledges also that state autonomy 
varies in degree, in particular when the United Nations Organisation aspires 
towards a more centralised system and also when some considerations beyond 
the elementary ones, such as human rights, should be counted for order. Thus, 
the contradiction is between international order emanating from isolated state 
sovereignties, and interdependence 
- 
interrelation 
- 
institutionalisation, whereby 
non-intervention is diminished. As it was noted, the United Nations Charter 
contains a compromise by recognising sovereignty to such an extent that it does 
not threaten the order it implies. Chapter VII delimits sovereignty and non- 
intervention by admitting legalising intervention for the maintenance of peace 
and security. 
The problem of the accommodation and function of the evaluative truisms 
which procure inter-societal order, in particular the protection of life or human 
rights, still remain irresolute. These aspects consist of values which transcend 
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the static concept of the state and are threatening the minimum order stabilised 
by the notion of non-intervention. The answer offered to this problem has two 
dimensions. The United Nations system sanctified statism through non- 
intervention and sovereignty but also recognised human rights concerns by 
introducing them to the delimitation of non-intervention and sovereignty 
contained in Chapter VII. This was effectuated by an expanded interpretation of 
what consists of a threat to the peace contained in Article 39.179 Consequently, it 
accordingly characterised the human rights violations in South Rhodesia and 
South Africa. ' 80 Resolution 688181 concerning the plight of Kurds in Iraq is a 
prime example. It characterised the persecution of Kurds as a threat to peace and 
security, that is, the two elements which sketch the limits of sovereignty and 
non-intervention. As such, it allowed for the collective intervention. Had they 
not amounted to a threat to the peace, had they not impinged upon the limits of 
sovereignty and non-intervention, then the static concept of international order 
would have prevailed. Another example is Resolution 794182 concerning 
Somalia, whereby the internal situation again prompted external intervention in 
order to maintain peace. In this case, the clash between the prominent 
considerations within the United Nations is evident in the Memorandum of 
Understanding which eventually recognised "respect for the territorial integrity, 
the political independence and the principle of non-intervention". ' 83 The ritual 
repetition of these verbalistic idioms alludes to a tenuous hypocrisy. 
In conclusion, concerning the dialectical relation of order and justice, we 
observed a modest transformation which, however, retains justice within the 
boundaries of order. The modification relates to the changing jurisdiction of the 
Security Council. The original instrument for order' 84 is becoming the timid 
19 Societe Francaise pour le Droit International, Le Chapitre VII de la Charte des Nations 
Unies, Colloque de Rennes, (Paris, Pedone, 1995) 
180 S. C. Res. 253,23 U. N. SCOR, 1428th mtg, U. N. Doc. S/RES/253 (1968), p. 5 and S. C. 
Res. 418,32 U. N. SCOR, 2046th mtg, U. N. Doc. S/RES/428 (1977), p. 5 respectively 
S. C. Res. 688, U. N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2982d mtg., U. N. Doc. S/RES/688 (1991), p. 2 
18 82 S. C. Res. 794, U. N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3145th mtg., U. N. Doc. SIRES/794 (1992), p. 7 
183 Memorandum of Understanding signed on 18 April 1991.301. L. M., (1991), p. 860 
184 
"It was to keep the peace, not to change the world order, that the Security Council was set 
up". Sir G. Fitzmaurice, Dissenting Opinion, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued 
Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council 
Resolution 276 (1970), (Advisory Opinion of 21 June 1971), 1. C. J. Rep., (1971), p. 14, at p. 294, 
Para. 115; Certain Expenses of the United Nations, (Advisory Opinion of 20 Jul), / 962). 1. C. J. 
Rep., (1962), p. 150, at p. 168 
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instrumentality of minimal justice as the above resolutions witness. The trend is 
irreversible as noted in the Summit Meeting: "[t]he absence of war and military 
conflicts amongst States does not in itself ensure international peace and 
security. The non-military sources of instability in the economic, social, 
humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to international peace 
and security". 185 This formula acknowledges the incorporation of evaluative 
truisms within the expanded jurisdiction of the Security Council but it does not 
emancipate justice from the constraints of order. 
Returning now to the analogy between sovereignty and property rights, ' 86 the 
exclusivity which the arrangement of dominium has provided, similar to 
sovereignty, is not absolute but has been compromised in certain areas. Thus the 
right to property is restricted for the protection of the environment, or civil 
rights, or it becomes divisible as in corporations. If contemporary international 
law is supposed to be based on a concept of sovereign states, we need to observe 
intelligibly the contemporary law beyond the ritual pronouncements on 
sovereignty and non-intervention. We should therefore see what is sovereignty 
and non-intervention today with the development of international institutions 
and agencies, interdependence, and the resurgence of the individual as a 
measure in international law. The doctrine of sovereignty will be proved porous, 
victim in the first place of the effort to accommodate international law. The 
developments relating to the regulation of international violence constricted 
sovereignty. It was initially advanced as a state privilege where only the conduct 
of war was regulated, but in the process it admitted limitations on the decision to 
wage war. Then, matters considered as part of the domestic jurisdiction evoke 
international concern as human rights law evinces. ' 87 The United Nations 
Charter recognises fundamental rights as beholding to individuals which are 
185 U. N. Doc. S/23500, (31/1/1992) 
186 H. Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law, (London, 
Longmans, 1927), pp. 95-96: "..... the two notions are essentially analogous on account of the 
exclusiveness of enjoyment and disposition which is in law the main formal characteristic of 
both private property and territorial sovereignty". 187 Nationality Decrees issued in Tunis and Morocco, P. CI. J. Rep.. Series B, No. 4, (1923), 
p. 27: "The question whether a certain matter is or is not solely within the jurisdiction of a 
State is an essentially relative question; it depends on the development of international 
relations 
..... 
". See also the cases of Rhodesia, South Africa, Iraq, Somalia. B. G. Ramcharan. 
"The Security Council: Maturing of International Protection of Human Rights", 48 Rev. 
I. C. J.., (1992), p. 24 
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beyond the jurisdictional competence of the states and rather resembles the 
Grotian recognition that individuals derive rights directly from international law. 
The other aspect is the consensual acceptance by states of the instruments which 
contain human rights. This development has shifted the demarcation between 
the exclusivity of state jurisdiction and the meagre competence of international 
law concerning human rights protection. It eventually reconciles the positivist, 
naturalist and policy school arguments. The humanitarian precepts derive from a 
naturalist perception of inalienable rights which, however, become enforceable 
through the consensual practice of states. Positivists are thus relieved from the 
awkward position of recognising humanitarian intervention in state practice 
while in theory they hold its illegality. This is the "double level approach" 
referred to in chapter one. It consists of recognising humanitarian intervention as 
a measure of last resort which, although it is a formal breach of Article 2(4) and 
endangers the primary goal of maintaining peace, it is condoned in practice. 
This acceptance combines a positivist and naturalist element. It implies 
transcending moral requirements which prompt humanitarian actions in certain 
circumstances coupled with state consent through the lack of adverse reaction or 
passivity. 188 The misleading advantage of this position is that it fuses also two 
aspects of positivism; the one relating to norms and the other which is 
concerned with state practice. Thus, the normative purity of the envisaged 
United Nations system is maintained and also the practice is not frowned upon. 
However, this practice does not amount to law because it does not share the 
Hartian "internal point", being mere acceptance. In conclusion, beyond the 
deceitful allusion to practice, the argument retreats to the normative validity of 
the rule on the non-use of force. ' 89 
VI. 4 Towards a contemporary elucidation of Article 2(4) as promoting human 
rights. The United Nations Charter is not a static, and construction. Its vitality 
188 E. C. Stowell, Intervention in International Law, (Washington, Byrne, 1921), p. 59, n. 13: 
"..... deny the legality of humanitarian intervention in law, but who condone it to a greater or 
less degree in practice". See also statements by I. Brownlie, R. B. Lillich, in J. N. Moore, supra 
note 18, pp. 223,225,249-250 and T. M. Franck, Frey-Wouters, W. Friedmann, J. N. 
Moore, in 
R. B. Lillich, supra note 29, pp. 64,107-8,114,120-121 
189 I. Brownlie, "Thoughts on Kind-Hearted Gunmen", R. B. Lillich (ed), Humanitarian 
Intervention and the United Nations, (Charlottesville, University Press of Virginia, 1973). 
p. 139, at p. 146: "Moderation in application does not necessarily display a legislative 
intent to 
cancel the principle so applied". 
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springs from the interaction between members, organs and the influences of the 
ideological environment. Evolution is a common phenomenon in every system 
of law. In domestic legal systems, the normative perimeter of law expands 
gradually in order to encompass new developments and adapt to changing 
circumstances. This process contributes to the authority of the legal system, 
because it is not viewed as obsolete, irrelevant and a deterrent to development. If 
this observation has verity in domestic legal systems where the comprising 
elements of the structure demonstrate a degree of cohesion, integration and 
homogeneity, it would be self-evident in a multi-ethical system, as the United 
Nations, where the cultural, political and economical compartmentalisation is 
unavoidable. The United Nations Charter is not a self-sufficient, insular and 
closed text. It is evolving because the Charter is "a means and not an end". 190 
The generality of the language used in this instrument entails a certain 
dynamism. It endows the United Nations Organisation with elasticity and 
flexibility. The evolution of the United Nations is necessary for its durability 
and perhaps its existence as a reliable instrument at the centre of international 
politics. On the other hand, clinging to a legalistic approach and ignoring or 
denying the inexorably altered circumstances (or indeed reading the United 
Nations Charter in isolation of the actual world) is unrealistic. As it was 
observed: "[t]reaties 
- 
especially multipartite treaties of a constitutional or 
legislative character 
- 
cannot have an absolute immutable character". 191 The 
United Nations Charter has constantly reacted to the changing relations among 
its constituents. This process has not always been propitious. It experienced 
drawbacks because the United Nations offers the legal framework whereunder 
state or other actors interact. It would be illusory to maintain that this interplay 
has left the United Nations immune and innocuous. Legal propositions are 
overlaid with new insights when they are interpreted and applied which may 
alter considerably their initial content. The United Nations Charter, in the words 
190 Competence of the G. A. for the Admission of a State to the United Nations, LCJ., Rep., 
(1950), p. 4, at p. 23 
191 Judge Jessup, in South West Africa Cases, L CJ Rep., (1966), p. 5, at p. 439; Judge Sir P. 
Spender, in Certain Expenses of the United Nations, (Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962), I. C. J. 
Rep., (1962), p. 150, at p. 186: "..... does not mean that the words in the Charter can only 
comprehend such situations and contingencies and manifestations of subject - matters as were 
within the minds of the framers of the Charter 
..... 
No comparable human instrument in 1945 or 
today provide against all the contingencies that the future should hold". 
242 
of Judge Alvarez, once established, must develop in accordance with the 
requirements of international life. ' 92 
Even a strict adherence to a normative analysis fails to uphold its position when 
wars of national liberation, self-determination or apartheid are concerned. The 
incontrovertible fact is that these concepts were accepted because the norms 
have experienced a considerable elasticity in their limits, bringing the new 
phenomena within the law of the United Nations. Probably the process was 
unavoidable, but at least it did not estrange a considerable number of states. 
Similarly, Article 2(4) does not exist in a vacuum but there exists a reciprocal 
fertilisation between Article 2(4) and the operative environment. If we deny the 
received modifications and adjustments, we inhibit the potential of every legal 
rule for evolution. 193 What is needed is a reorientation of the research guided by 
the new paradigms. Lacking the talents of Hercules Poirot, it would be 
unnecessary to indulge ourselves in the pursuit of the villain(s) who killed 
Article 2(4)194 but we should try to ferret out the contemporary meaning of 
Article 2(4), avoiding manichaeist tendencies of vilifying or sanctifying it. The 
distinction made between the normative and the interpretative operation of 
Article 2(4) involves subtle conceptual acrobatics and, eventually, it cannot 
assure the maintenance of the purported impermeability of this article. It has 
been maintained that the core meaning of Article 2(4) is uninhibited by 
deliberate attempts to manipulate its application to specific events. ' 95 How do 
we determine the core meaning without sacrificing flexibility and relevance? 
The frequency and legal-political reception of supposedly contrary actions in the 
field of non-intervention, prominent among them humanitarian intervention, 
192 Individual Opinion by Judge Alvarez in Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in 
the Unites Nations, I. C. J. Rep., (1947-1948), p. 56, at p. 68; Legal Consequences for States of the 
Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security 
Council Resolution 276 (1970), (Advisory Opinion of 21 June 1971), 1. C. J. Rep., (1971), p. 14, at 
p. 31, para. 53: "..... an international instrument has to be interpreted and applied within the 
framework of the entire legal system prevailing at the time of the interpretation". J. L. Brierly, 
"The Covenant and the Charter", 22 B. Y. B. I. L., (1946), p. 83, at p. 83 
193 W. Friedman, The Changing Structure of International Law, (London, Stevens & Sons, 
1964), p. 70: "The changes in the dimensions of international law require a corresponding 
reorientation of its study 
..... 
". 
194 T. M. Franck, "Who Killed Article 2(4)? or Changing Norms Governing the Use of Force by 
States", 64 A. J. I. L., (1970), p. 809; L. Henkin, "The Reports of the Death of Article 2(4) are 
Greatly Exaggerated", 65 A. J. 1. L., (1971), p. 544 
195 E. Gordon, "Article 2(4) in Historical Context", 10 Yale J. I. L., (1984-85), p. 271, at p. 273 
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cannot but impinge upon the normative level. ' 96 In essence, the various possible 
interpretations of the relevant Charter provisions and state practice tend to 
crystallise in the normative level. ' 97 We should therefore acknowledge those 
crystallised practices not just for enumerative purposes, but for a better 
understanding of the law. 
This dynamic approach should not stop at that level, but also lead to the 
regeneration of the Organisation, through the recognition of phenomena which 
attach to human dignity. Today the soil is fertile to accept those phenomena 
because the over-politicizing caused by the ideological rivalries has been 
soothed, leaving a sense of bitterness for the cynical crushing of human 
expectations by an unnecessary confrontation. An invigorating approach to the 
United Nations Charter is justified not only by the social, moral and political 
evolution in the subsequent years. It vindicates as well the hopes and 
expectations of the founders and of people at large. The process is beneficial 
while it brings within the boundaries of the system current phenomena by 
attempting to regulate them. The remark made by the French Delegate at the San 
Francisco Conference M. G. Bidault is an unfading warning: "nothing could be 
more deadly than to built in uncertainty a castle of texts which did not 
correspond to reality". 198 
196 U. N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali stated: "It is now increasingly felt that the 
principle of non-interference with the essential domestic jurisdiction of States cannot be 
regarded as a protective barrier behind which human rights could be massively or 
systematically violated with impunity...... The case for not impinging on the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity and political independence of States is by itself indubitably strong. 
But it 
could only be weakened if it were to carry the implication that sovereignty, even 
in this day 
and age, includes the right of mass slaughter or of launching systematic campaigns of 
decimation or forced exodus of civilian populations in the name of controlling civil strife or 
insurrection". Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organisation, U. 
N. GAOR, 
46th Sess., Supp. No. 1, p. 5, U. N. Doc. A/RES/46/1/ (1991) 
197 A. Cassese, "Return to Westphalia? ", supra note 55, p. 514 
198 Doc. 46, P/11, (May 1,1945), 1 U. N. C. I. O., p. 437 
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VII. TOWARDS A TENTATIVE CONCLUSION 
This Chapter served a double purpose. Firstly, we presented the legal argument 
concerning humanitarian intervention as it exists and is realised under a triple 
heading. In order to accomplish this, the rule on intervention, that is, Article 2(4) 
of the U. N. Charter was analysed and, additionally, cases of intervention have 
been elaborated within this framework. Secondly, the theoretical foundations 
which underpin the different interpretative lines have been scrutinised. The 
inquiry into the jurisprudence of international law which has been pursued in the 
previous Chapters has shown that legal theory influences legal reasoning and is 
responsible for the latter's oscillation. Legal argument is a distillation but not an 
hermetic one of these jurisprudential bases. The interpretative articulations of 
Article 2(4) affirm the intermingling of theoretical and legal positions. By 
presenting the background deliberations, the uneasy truce between these 
arguments is revealed. What is more striking is that any action could be justified 
or condemned according to the adopted initial position. Consequently, the 
subjectivity of legal argument emanating from personal predilections becomes 
apparent, although it is presented in an objectified manner by extricating non- 
legal elements. Concerning legal discourse, a hermetic adherence to one 
argumentative line may have the result of obstructing any chance for 
reconciliation, whereas, on the other hand, reversibility of arguments is also an 
option. Thus, the rule on non-intervention can be supported by positivist 
arguments referring to sovereignty, order and consent or naturalist referring to 
equality, peace or justice. Legal arguments fail, though, to demonstrate their 
internal tensions and their theoretical foundations. 
Consequently, the reasoning concerning humanitarian intervention has been 
explored not only legally but also theoretically. The theoretical underpinnings of 
each legal position have been presented and also the produced compromises. 
Accordingly, the dialectical relation between the ideals of peace and justice has 
evolved from one which signalled exclusion and prominence of peace towards 
acknowledgement and inclusion of justice. 
The same argumentation will be followed in the next Chapter dealing with the 
protection of nationals abroad. This issue is considered less controversial than 
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humanitarian intervention as such. It has been justified and explained under the 
doctrine of self-defence. Therefore, it is not controversial because it is included 
in the traditional and accepted mode of statism. If it is an act of self-defence, it is 
a state decision and action therefore it seems to be justified in a state-oriented 
law. However, it does not escape contradictions and we will proceed with them 
immediately. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE PROTECTION OF NATIONALS AS A CUSTOMARY SELF- 
DEFENCE MEASURE OR AS HUMANITARIAN ACTION 
Analysis of the concept of protecting nationals abroad under the heading of self- 
defence 
- 
the customary law of self-defence- the UN. Charter law; Article 51 
- 
the underpinnings of the self-defence approach: state sovereignty 
- 
the proposed 
human rights approach 
- 
protection of nationals as a form of humanitarian 
intervention 
- 
the fundamental contradiction between sovereignty/human rights 
I. THE LINK WITH THE PREVIOUS CHAPTERS 
I. 1 The link. In this Chapter, the issue of protecting nationals abroad will be 
dealt with under the heading of humanitarian intervention lato sensu and the 
grounds for such an approach will also be elucidated. In order to summarise the 
reasons which induce a humanitarian approach, one should refer primarily to the 
fundamental contradiction identified previously between sovereignty and human 
rights. The protection of nationals has traditionally been treated as a measure of 
self-defence. It appears, therefore, that the legal thesis' label is stabilised and 
definite. Concerning the ingredients of the label, one can trace issues of 
disagreement which affect the hard core of the self-defence label. These refer to 
disagreement on what constitutes an armed attack and what Article 51 of the 
U. N. Charter really means. As has already been explained in the previous 
Chapter concerning Article 2(4), legal argument endeavours to address the issue 
of discord from within a legalistic framework. It, thus, succeeded in 
accommodating the protection of nationals within the matrix of Article 51 by 
using interpretative disguises. Consequently, if Article 51 does not refer to the 
customary right of self-defence, the latter may have been revived as a 
consequence of the system's malfunction. If both argumentative lines are 
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rejected by strict and rigorous formalists, then, the act of protecting nationals is 
self-defence because an attack on a national is an attack on the state. One can 
also trace a subconscious fear of de-legitimisation or destabilisation if the 
protection of nationals is to be included in an all-inclusive concept of 
humanitarian intervention. The latter invokes wider issues than a state-attached 
concept such as the protection of nationals as self-defence does. ' 
Thus, discontentment arises from the understanding that the legal argument on 
this issue is equally unsettled and indeterminate. Self-defence has transgressed 
the dichotomy of legal and political signification. The tension between hortatory 
norms, international reality and the value judgment s of inter-actors, observers 
and legislators is highlighted in its interpretative perplexities. Secondly, we 
consider as inappropriate the conceptual treatment reserved to individuals which 
are viewed as objects of an omnipotent and omnipresent state. If the injury to a 
national is by legal fiction attributed to his national state, then individuals are 
presented as depsychologised, unemotional and impotent creatures who submit 
their existence to the will of their own state. Under this reasoning, the opposite 
view of non-interference within domestic jurisdiction is also justified because 
the state as the omnipotent organisation can treat its nationals at its discretion. 
On the other hand, the protection afforded to nationals is not presented as a 
measure which is motivated from a feeling of revulsion towards the 
maltreatment. It springs from a sense of statist pride which, hence, justifies the 
self-defence argument. Otherwise it could be treated as humanitarian 
intervention because, since Grotius, a permanent characteristic of such actions is 
the sense of revulsion. 
As a final remark, it should be emphasised that both protection of nationals and 
humanitarian intervention stricto sensu have an important common 
denominator: they describe attempts to save the lives or personal dignity of 
people. What is condemnable is the discrimination which the concept of 
protecting nationals invokes and there will be an attempt in the course of this 
exposition to revoke it. In this Chapter, we present cases where the danger for 
' D. W. Bowett, "The Use of Force for the Protection of Nationals Abroad", in A. Cassese, 
The 
Current Legal Regulation of the Use of Force, (Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster, M. Nijhoff, 1986), 
p. 39, at pp. 49-51 
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nationals and non nationals was equally imminent. The surgical extrication of 
nationals neglects the rest of the endangered population condemning it to 
threatening circumstances. 
1.2 The discretionary nature of protection of nationals. Having said that, one 
may invoke a reticent utilitarian argument that in circumstances of chaos or 
great and imminent danger it is better to save some people than none. This does 
not address the issue. Discrimination resides in the sheer foundation of the 
notion; it is conceptual not circumstantial. Protection in this case concerns ab 
initio the safety only of nationals and not that of people in general. Therefore, 
we believe that a utilitarian argument is discarded on its foundations. 
However, self-defence reasoning is not redundant. The previous section has 
dealt with the issue from the perspective of the intervening state. Here, the 
perspectives of the perpetrators of the attack should be considered. One should, 
consequently, distinguish those acts which endanger people indistinguishably, 
and those acts which are directed towards certain people for certain reasons. We 
may refer thus to acts of terrorism or hostage-taking. In such cases, individual 
nationals of a particular state are treated as instruments by the attackers in order 
to promote specific aims which refer to/affect not these people but their state. In 
such cases, for example the Entebbe case, the argument of self-defence revives. 
It should thus be submitted that the argument of human rights protection and 
that of self-defence are interlaced on the issue of protecting nationals because of 
a certain statist conception and a certain disregard of human personality by both 
poles of the pursued action: the national state or the perpetrators. Individual 
nationals are caught in the middle, mute observants of actions which relate to 
them but which they do not control. 
In this Chapter, both aspects of the argument will be addressed. The self-defence 
argument could not be ignored because it provides the most compelling 
argument in state practice and legal theory for rescue operations and also 
because we have traced a modicum of truth therein. Before our human rights 
approach is discussed, we shall explain whether the customary concept of self- 
defence has been attenuated by Article 51 of the U. N. Charter. Also, the 
Nicaragua Case and the theoretical perspectives which underpin this judgment 
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on the issue of self-defence will be contemplated. Finally, after a presentation of 
the relevant practice in this field, the contradiction between sovereignty and 
human rights in the formula of identifying personal injuries to an attack on the 
national state will be considered and whether human rights' protection 
propositions offer a commendable justification. 
II. SELF-DEFENCE: THE CUSTOMARY LAW AND ARTICLE 51 OF 
THE U. N. CHARTER 
11.1 Self-defence in a historical perspective: from naturalism to positivism. The 
concept of self-defence is established in individual and state practice because it 
is associated with a psychological element attributed to intuition in the form of 
an instantaneous reaction to injury. Legal systems, structuring behavioural 
patterns, condoned self-defence and embarked on determining its scope. The 
latitude in the exercise of self-defence measures which the legal system endows 
eventually to individuals or states is conterminous with the elaboration, 
development and effectiveness of this legal system. However, even the most 
advanced social arrangements are still defective in areas of law enforcement, 
imputed perhaps to a delay in societal authoritative interposition. The interplay 
of individual self-defence and societal disposition towards enforcement 
functions justify the sustentation of self-defence as a legal instrument within a 
societal organisation when the collective response malfunctions. The 
international community, disjunctive, disorganised and endowed with a low 
level of centralisation, has conceded to a concept of self-defence evolving from 
morality and ethics to a legal proposition. 
In ancient times, some features of war have been strongly denigrated but war in 
self-defence has been exonerated. Plato, who preaches in his Laws peace and 
goodwill, justifies wars in self-defence, although he berates statesmen "unless 
(they) legislate for war as a means to peace rather than for peace as a means of 
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war". 
2 The defence of the honour and security were perceived by Cicero as 
legitimate causes of war. 3 
At the intersection of the ancient and modem worlds, naturalism was prevalent 
in the thinking of earlier writers who encountered the crucial theme of warfare. 
Self-defence is admitted as a just cause for war. Those early writers transfer the 
institution of self-defence, accepted in domestic jurisdictions, to the law of 
nations. Gentili wrote that 
"[e]ven the brutes are given the right of defence by nature, and we are 
persuaded and convinced of this right not by argument but by some innate 
power. And it is a necessary right; for what can be done against violence, 
says Cicero, without resort to violence? This is the most generally 
accepted of all rights. All laws and all codes allow the repelling of force 
by force. There is one rule which endures for ever, to maintain one's 
safety by any and every means. Every method of securing safety is 
honourable. This has been taught to philosophers by reason, to barbarians 
by necessity, to the nations by custom, to wild animals by Nature itself. 
This law is not written but inborn". 4 
Grotius in his work De Jure Belli ac Pacis argues on almost the same line that 
"This right of self-defence, it should be observed, has its origin directly and 
chiefly, in the fact that nature commits to each his own protection, 
..... 
". 
5 
2 Plato, The Laws, A. Taylor (trans. ), Bk. I, (London, J. M. Dent & Sons, 1960), p. 5; C. Phillipson, 
The International law and Custom of Ancient Greece and Rome, (London, Macmillan & Co., 
1911) 
3 Cicero, On the Commonwealth, (Sabine and Smith, 1929), c. 23, p. 195, in M. Weightman, 
"Self-defence in International Law", 37 Va. L. Rev., (1951), p. 1095, at p. 1095; C. Phillipson, 
supra note 2, vol. II, pp. 182,315-348 
° A. Gentili, De Jure Belli Libri Tres, (1588-89), J. B. Scott (ed. ), The Classics of International 
Law, vol. 11, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1933), Bk. 1, ch. XIII, p. 59 
s Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres, in The Classics of International Law, J. B. 
Scott (ed. ), vol. II, (Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995), Bk. II, ch. 1, 
s. iii, p. 172; F. Suarez, De Triplici Virtute Theologica, Fide, Spe, et Charitate (1621), in J. B. Scott 
(ed. ), The Classics of International Law, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1933), "Disputation XIII: On 
Charity", sec. 1, para. 4, pp. 802-803: "Defensive war not only it is permitted but sometimes even 
commended 
...... 
The reason supporting it is that the right of self-defence is natural and 
necessary". F. de Vittoria, De Indis et de Jure Belli Relectiones, J. B. Scott (ed), The Classics of 
International Law, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1933), De Indis Relectio Posterior Sive De Jure 
Belli Hispanorum in Babados", p. 168, para. 424.5: "But defence can be resorted to at the very 
moment of the danger 
..... 
and so when the necessity of defence has passed there is an end to the 
lawfulness of war". 
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Self-defence in the period prior to the U. N. Charter was intermixed conceptually 
with other congeneric notions such as self-preservation or self-help. It acquired a 
concrete legal context when war was outlawed and indeed it was understood as 
an intrinsic exemption to any renunciation of war. 6 Moreover, forcible 
measures for the protection of nationals in the inter-war period were exonerated 
as an aspect of self-defence. 
11.2 The impact of the UN. Charter. At this point, the impact of the U. N. 
Charter on the traditional right of self-defence will be considered. The only 
reference to this right in the Charter is Article 51 which reads: "[n]othing in the 
present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self- 
defence, if an armed attack occurs 
..... 
". Disagreement over the exact 
interpretation is attributed to the inept draftsmanship of the article? or it is 
extrapolated from the exigencies of contemporary international order. The 
opinions of writers and governments are dichotomised between the restrictive 
literal interpretation of Article 51, underlying the assumption that, in a war-torn 
world, peace could be preserved only if the legal imperatives to forcible actions 
are absolutely prohibitive. 8 On the other hand, the traditional or contextual 
exegesis preserves a wider initiative for states whenever the international 
structure malfunctions. The policy ramification beholds to a balancing of the 
6 The General Pact for the Renunciation of War: Text of the Pact as Signed, Notes and Other 
Papers, (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1928). Also the note by Poland: "..... the pact 
does not affect in any way the right of legitimate defence inherent in each state" and that of South 
Africa: "It is not intended to deprive any party to the proposed treaty of any of its natural rights 
of legitimate self-defence". 
M. S. McDougal, F. P. Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order: The Legal Regulation 
of International Coercion, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1961), p. 237; G. 
Schwarzenberger, "The Fundamental Principles of International Law", 87 R. C., (1955 I), p. 190, 
at p. 337 
8 J. L. Kunz, "Individual and Collective Self-defence in Article 51 of the Charter of the United 
Nations", 41 A. J. I. L., (1947), p. 877; N. Q. Dinh, "La legitime defense d'apres la Charte des 
Nations Unies", XIX R. G. D. I. P., (1948), p. 223, at p. 240; H. Kelsen, "Collective Security and 
Collective Self-defence under the Charter of the United Nations", 42 A. J. LL., (1948), p. 783, at 
pp. 791-792; P. C. Jessup, A Modern Law of Nations: An Introduction, (New York, Macmillan, 
1948), p. 165; H. Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations, (London, Stevens & Sons, 1950), 
pp. 269,797-798; H. Wehberg, 'V interdiction du recours ä la force: le principe et les problemes 
qui se posent", 78 R. C., (1951 I), p. 1, at p. 81; L. Henkin, "Force, Intervention, and Neutrality in 
Contemporary International Law", 57 Proc. A. S. I. L., (1963), pp. 148-173; I. Brownlie, 
International Law and the Use of Force by States, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1963), pp. 271-275: 
J. Delivanis, La Legitime Defense en Droit International Public Moderne, (Paris, Librairie de 
Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1971), p. 49; J. Zourek, L'Interdiction de l'Emploi de la Force en Droit 
International, (Leiden, A. W. Sijhoff, 1974), p. 96; L. Henkin, How Nations Behave. Law and 
Foreign Policy, 2nd ed., (New York, Columbia University Press, 1979), ch. 7, pp. 140-143; A. 
Cassese, International Law in a Divided World, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 230 
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interests of peace and justice. 9 The legal and conceptual discord is reminiscent 
of the interpretative peccadilloes concerning Article 2(4), in particular, the 
restrictive or permissive construction. The legal arguments concentrate on the 
wording of Article 51 and in particular the words "inherent right" and "if an 
armed attack occurs". The last phrase neutralises the prefigurement which an 
inherent right to self-defence may forge. If "inherent" is a natural and 
inseparable attribute, ' 0 then self-defence is intertwined with statehood and 
armed attack describes one instance of encroaching the constitutive elements of 
that statehood. If inherent connotes the customary right, 1' its articulation has not 
been confined solely to armed attack. 
The drafting of this article and the intention of the parties as a tool for exegesis 
are deemed inconclusive, because Article 51 was inserted at a later stage and 
deliberation of its meaning was inadequate. Attached to this are the reservations 
expressed above concerning the authoritative standing of these interpretative 
tools. However, the underlying theme during the framing of the use of force 
was, interestingly, that self-defence is a self-evident and an automatic exemption 
to the prohibition on the use of force. The scant references made to self-defence 
when the prohibition on the use of force was contemplated avow a certitude 
concerning its validity. When the Norwegian delegation proposed an 
amendment to Article 2(4) that "[n]o force at all should be used if not approved 
by the Security Council", the Subcommittee took the view that "the sense of 
approval might mean approval before or after the use of force. It might thus 
C. H. M. Waldock, "The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International 
Law", 81 R. C., (1952 II), p. 455, at pp. 495-505 and "General Course on Public International 
Law", 106 R. C., (1962 II), p. 1, at pp. 234-240; J. Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict, 
(London, Stevens & Sons, 1954), p. 243 and in Aggression and World Order: A Critique of the 
United Nations Theories of Aggression, (London, Stevens & Sons, 1958), pp. 43-44; L. C. Green, 
"Armed Conflict, War and Self-defence", 6 Achiv des Völkerrechts, (1956-57), p. 387, at p. 432; 
D. W. Bowett, Self-defence in International Law, (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 
1958), ch. IX, p. 182; M. S. McDougal, F. P. Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order: 
The Legal Regulation of International Coercion, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1961) 
p. 232; J. L. Brierly, The Law of Nations. An Introduction to the International Law of Peace, 6th 
ed., H. Waldock (ed), (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1963), p. 416; D. P. O'Connell, International 
Law, 2nd ed., (London, Stevens & Sons, 1970), vol. I, pp. 316; S. M. Schwebel, "Aggression, 
Intervention and Self-defence", 136 R. C., (1972 II), p. 411, at pp. 479-483 
10 The Shorter Oxford Dictionary, vol. 1, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1933), p. 1006 
" Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, I. C. J. Rep., 
(1986), p. 14, at p. 94, para. 176, hereinafter cited as Nicaragua Case; R. L. Bindschedler, "La 
delimitation des competences des Nations Unies", 108 R. C., (1963 I), p. 307, at p. 397: "La Charte 
ne fait que reconnaltre le droit de defense existant et defini par le droit international general". 
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curtail the right of states to use force in legitimate self-defence, while it was 
clear to the subcommittee that the right of self-defence against aggression 
should not be impaired or diminished". ' 2 Committee 1 /I in its report to 
Commission I stated that "the unilateral use of force or similar coercive 
measures is not authorised or admitted. The use of arms in legitimate self- 
defence remains admitted and unimpaired" 
. 
13 
The paucity of references to self-defence disclose a certain disquietude shared 
by some states which preferred a formal articulation generated from a 
subconscious apprehension that lucidity would eventually serve the United 
Nations Organisation better. The Turkish delegation thus stated that "the 
proposals do not contain any provision on the subject of legitimate defence. 
Although this right is of an obvious nature, it would be useful to insert in the 
Charter a provision justifying legitimate defence against a surprise attack by 
another state". 14 In addition, the American Secretary of State Stettinius, in a 
memorandum wrote that 
"[l]e delegue chinois semblait satisfait de 1'explication que, excepte en cas 
de legitime defense, on ne pouvait employer la force de facon unilaterale 
sans l'approbation du Conseil de Securite. A cet egard, Victor Hoo, 
Conseiller d'Etat aux Affaires Etrangeres, voulait etre explicitement assure 
du fait que 1'emploi de la force en cas de legitime defense ne serait pas 
considere comme contradictoire avec les buts de l'Organisation". ' 5 
It is apparent from these references that self-defence followed the pre-Charter 
trend of being considered an obvious, natural right which admits certain 
procedural constrictions. 
12 Doc. 793; I/1 /A/ 19(a), 6 U. N. C. I. O p. 720 
1' Report of the Rapporteur of C/tee 1 to C/sion I as adopted by C/tee 1/I, Doc. 944,1/1/34(i), 6 
U 
14 . 
N. C. I. O., (1945), Doc. 446, p. 459 Proposals for the Doc. 2; G/14(c), "Suggestions of the Turkish Government Concerning the 
Maintenance of Peace and Security Agreed on at the Four Power Conference at Dumbarton 
Oaks", 3 U. N. C. I. O., p. 480, at p. 483 
Is Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, vol.!, (Washington, Government 
Printing Office, 1944), p. 862 cited by A. Cassese, "Article 51 ", in J. P. Cot, A. Pellet, La Charte 
des Nations Unies, (Paris, Economica, 1985), p. 769, at p. 772 
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The inclusion of an article on self-defence in the U. N. Charter purported to 
accommodate existing regional arrangements: the Act of Chapultepec, '6 the 
Arab League, 17 and certain European arrangements and aspirations-18 Latin 
American states were the most optative in maintaining a degree of autonomous 
action under the new system when the Security Council is paralysed. They were 
determined to withhold their consent unless their regional arrangements were 
adequately accommodated in the new system. ' 9A proposal was put forward by 
the U. S. delegation that 
"should the Security Council not succeed in preventing aggression, and 
should aggression occur by any state against any member state, such 
member states possess the inherent right to take such measures for self- 
defence. The right to take such measures for self-defence against armed 
attack shall also apply to understandings or arrangements like those 
embodied in the Act of Chapultepec, under which all members of a group 
of states agree to consider an armed attack against any one of them as an 
attack against all of them". 20 
16 Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance and American Solidarity, (March 8,1945). U. S.. Dep't of 
State, Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America 1776-1949, 
vol. 3, "Multilateral 1931-1945", p. 1024 
" See opinion of the Egyptian delegation, 12 U. N. C. I. O., p. 682; Doc. 2; G/7 (q), (1), 3 
U. N. C. I. O., p. 453, at pp. 460-461 8 See the opinion of the Czechoslovakian delegation, "Observations of the Czechoslovak 
Government on the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals", Doc. 2; G/14(b), 3 U. N. C. I. O., p. 282, at p. 470 
and of Turkey, Doc. 2, G/14(c), 3 U. N. C. I. O., p. 480, at p. 483. Also "Suggestions of the Belgian 
Government Concerning the Proposals for the Maintenance of Peace and Security formulated at 
the Four Power Conference held at Dumbarton Oaks and Published on October 9,1944", Ibid., 
Doc. 2; G/7(k), p. 331, at p. 334: "In the case where immediate action might be necessary, the 
application of coercive measures provided for by the special regional arrangements hould not be 
held in abeyance pending the Security Council's authorization; it would of course, behove the 
S. C to retain control at all times of the action undertaken, and it would have the right to suspend 
execution of such action". Also "Amendments Proposed by the French Government to the 
Proposals Relative to the Establishment of a General International Organisation", Ibid., Doc. 2; 
G/7(o), p. 383, at p. 387. Also "Amendments to the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, Submitted by the 
Delegation of the Soviet Union", Ibid., Doc. 2; G/14(w)(1), p. 601:..... no coercive measures 
may be taken under regional agreements without the authorization of the Security Council, 
excepting measures which are provided for in the regional agreements and directed against 
renewal of a policy of aggression on the part of the aggressor states in the war". 
19 Senator Vandenberg, who is considered to be the author of Article 51 said: '"To make a long 
story short, Latin America rebelled 
- 
and so did we. If the omission (of the right of collective 
self-defence), had not been rectified, there would have been no Charter. It was rectified, finally, 
after infinite travail, by agreement upon Article 51 of the Charter. Nothing in the Charter is of 
greater immediate importance and nothing in the Charter is of equal potential importance". 95 
Cong. Rec. 8892 (1949) 
20 R. Russell, J. E. Muther, A History of the United Nations Charter. The Role of the United States 
1940-1945, (Washington, The Brookings Institution, 1958), p. 698 
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Such an assertion was intended to reflect the Latin American system. 
Respectively, Part I of the Act of Chapultepec maintains that "every attack of a 
state against the sovereignty or political independence of an American state, 
shall 
..... 
be considered as an act of aggression against the other states which 
sign this Act". What is interesting in these statements is that "armed attack" and 
"aggression" define two different circumstances. The latter is linked to what is 
called individual self-defence, whereas "armed attack" to that of collective self- 
defence. As a matter of political logic, this is justifiable because armed attack 
amounts to the external manifestation of the incident which may trigger a 
defensive reaction by a third party. 
A British proposal to that effect omitting express reference to regional 
arrangements but containing the term collective self-defence was not well 
received by the Latin American states, suspicious that their organisation might 
become invalid. They agreed to the final draft only when assurances to the 
contrary were given by the United States 
. 
21 The United States issued a statement 
that Article 51 "recognised the inherent right of self-defence but left unaffected 
the ultimate authority of the Security Council as the paramount organ in world 
enforcement action". 22 In this statement, we can easily notice the interrelation of 
a natural truism within a positivist-consensual articulation. 
II. 3 Customary individual and contractual collective self-defence. Initially, 
Article 51 was included in Chapter VIII dealing with regional arrangements. It 
was finally removed because of the Security Council's preponderant authority in 
the allocation of power under this Chapter and because, as the Committee of 
Jurists explained, it might " 
...... 
have the effect of limiting the right of self- 
defence only to regional arrangements, thus depriving a state which was not a 
party to such arrangements of that right. Such conclusion was not to be 
23 permitted". 
21 Ibid., pp. 699-700 
22 Secretary of State, Charter of the United Nations: Report to the President on the 
Results of the 
San Francisco Conference by the Chairman of the U. S. Delegation, the Secretary of State, p. 14 
23 Doc. WD 435, Co/199, "Summary Report of the Fifty Fifth Meeting of the Coordination 
C/tee", 17 U. N. C. I. O., p. 276, at p. 287; Dean Acheson noted that the provisions of Article 
51 had 
been removed from the portion of the Charter dealing with regional arrangements so that 
"the 
inherent right of individual and collective self-defence should not 
be associated with any other 
idea whatever; it is a complete, absolute right ..... ". North 
Atlantic Treaty: Hearings Before the 
Senate Gtee on Foreign Relations, 81st Cong., Ist Sess. (1949), p. 17, in M. 
M. Whiteman. 
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Consequently, Article 51, by recognising individual self-defence and by 
allowing for collective self-defence systems, reconciled the exigencies of the 
participating nations with the priorities of the new organisation. As it was put 
forward by the U. S. Secretary of State Stettinius, " 
...... 
in thus recognising the 
paramount authority of the world organisation in enforcement actions as well as 
the inherent right of self-defence 
..... 
this article 
..... 
makes possible a useful and 
effective integration of regional systems of co-operation with the world system 
of international security". 24 
According to the above analysis, it is suggested that Article 51 effectually 
contains two norms, one for individual and one for collective self-defence. This 
interpretation takes cognizance of the two orientations prevailing during the 
drafting of this article. The first concerns the need by some parties for an 
explicit affirmation and acknowledgement that individual self-defence as an 
exemption to the prohibition of force is not abridged. The other orientation 
concerns the accommodation of collective self-defence systems. These 
predilections were finally awkwardly merged into a single article. Hence, 
Article 51 recognises individual self-defence as forming an integral part of 
customary law and, on the other hand, articulates collective self-defence. The 
latter, au contraire, forfeits the quality of inherence. Under the ordinary 
meaning of the word "inherent", it is not possible to assimilate the 
individualistic, intrinsic and spontaneous reaction to an injury with the reaction 
of a third party not itself victim of an attack. Coalitions or defensive 
arrangements are founded on political calculations or on an apprehension of 
common dangers but have heterogeneous motives from those the word 
"inherent" denotes. If the word inherent points to the customary law, as the 
I, collective self-defence has not been C. J. observed in the Nicaragua Case2S 
positively established therein, and thus Article 51 seems to expand the notion of 
self-defence by "introducing a novel concept". 26 
Digest of International Law, vol. 12, (Washington D. C., Dept. of State Publication 8586,1971), 
95 
` Secretary of State, Charter of the United Nations: Report to the president on the Results of the 
San Francisco Conference by the Chairman of the US. Delegation, the Secretary of State. p. 108 
25 Nicaragua Case, p. 94, para. 176 
26 Nicaragua Case, dissenting opinion of Judge Jennings, ibid., pp. 530-531; dissenting opinion 
of Judge Oda, ibid., pp. 256-258; L. Oppenheim, International Law. A Treatise, vol. II, 
"Disputes, 
War and Neutrality", H. Lauterpacht (ed. ), (London, Longman, 1958), p. 155; J. Delbriick. 
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The phrase "armed attack" used in Article 51, the flagship of those who 
maintain that individual or collective self-defence in customary law is reduced 
solely to such an event, did not provoke much deliberation during the drafting of 
Article 51. It merely reveals the influence of the Act of Chapultepec, which 
refers to "armed attack". 27 The U. S. proposal discussed above is consistent with 
this contention. The word "aggression" is used for individual self-defence, 
whereas "armed attack" is used to describe the circumstances whereunder 
collective self-defence is exercised. The French text, which is also an 
authoritative interpretation, employs the word "agression an-nee", whereas the 
appropriate term would have been "attaque armee". There is, in addition, no 
attempt to reconcile the discrepancies in the two texts, although interpretational 
peccadilloes have not passed unattended and have raised discussions in other 
instances. 28 Thus, in the opinion of some writers, the phrase "if an armed attack 
occurs" and in French "dans un cas" are only indicative of a particular instance 
when self-defence is exercised and was "used to express an hypothesis rather 
than a condition 
- 
which is of course, one of the natural uses of `if 
..... 
" 
29 
. 
In order to recapitulate on the issue of whether the Charter has modified the 
right of individual self-defence, it is submitted that the comportment of states at 
San Francisco and their subsequent practice suggests that in the first part of 
Article 51, they declared the customary law on self-defence as they were 
acquainted therewith. In the Nicaragua Case the I. C. J. admitted the customary 
"Collective Self-defence", in E. P. I. L., vol. 3, "The Use of Force; War and Neutrality; Peace 
Treaties", (Amsterdam/New York/Oxford, North-Holland Pub. Co., 1982), pp. 114-117; 
Statement of J. F. Dulles: "At San Francisco, one of the things which we stood for most stoutly, 
and which we achieved with the greatest difficulty, was a recognition of the fact that that doctrine 
of self-defence, enlarged at Chapultepec to be a doctrine of collective self-defence, could stand 
unimpaired and could function without the approval of the Security Council". The Charter of the 
United Nations: Hearing before the Senate C/tee on Foreign Relations, U. S. Senate, 79th Cong. 
1st Sess. 349-350 (1945), in M. M. Whiteman, Digest of International Law, vol. 12, (Washington 
D. C., Dept. of State Publication 8586,1971), p. 85; J. Stone, Legal Controls of International 
Conflict, (London, Stevens & Sons, 1954), p. 245; N. Q. Dinh, "La legitime defense d'apres la 
Charte des Nations Unies", XIX R. G. D. I. P., (1948), p. 244 27 O. Schachter, "The Right of States to Use Armed Force", 82 Mich. L. Rev., (1984), p. 1620, at 
p. 1634: "The link with the Chapultepec Treaty provides a reason for the inclusion of the words 
"if an armed attack occurs" and explains why it was not said that self-defence is limited to cases 
of armed attack". 
28 Doc. 784; 1/1 /27, "Summary Report of the Eleventh Meeting of C/tee 1/ 1 ", 6 U. N. C. I. O., p. 33 I. 
at p. 335; Doc. WD 424; CO/188, "Summary Report of the Twenty Fourth Meeting of 
Coordination C/tee", 17 U. N. C. I. O., p. 162, at pp. 164-165 29 H. C. M. Waldock, "General Course on Public International Law", 106 R. C., (1962 II), p. 1, at 
p. 235 
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character of the rules on the use of force by acknowledging that not all its 
aspects are regulated by the Charter and that the requirements of proportionality 
and necessity are conditioned in customary law. 30 Those criteria are interwoven 
with the exercise of self-defence. However, Article 51 ignores them. The 
omission of those conditions supports the view that Article 51 minors the 
customary law in the inclusive phrase "inherent right". If Article 51 was meant 
to be itself the source of this right, the limitations of proportionality and 
necessity should, as a logical consequence, figure in the article, along with the 
inserted limitation of an armed attack. Otherwise, the non-incorporation of these 
elements intimates a less restricted right which contradicts the inserted 
limitation of armed attack. Inferentially, Article 51 alludes to the customary law 
in its full extent, notwithstanding the perceived limitations stated in the 
Nicaragua Case. 
III. THE NICARAGUA CASE AND SELF-DEFENCE: THE 
THEORETICAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE DECISION AND ITS 
DECONSTRUCTION 
111.1 The irrelevance of practice for the formation of custom. The judgment of 
the I. C. J. in the Nicaragua Case31 pronounced on the subject of self-defence, 
individual or collective, that it should be preceded by an armed attack and that 
armed attack is a sine qua non condition for self-defence. 32 The ascribed 
'o Nicaragua Case, p. 103, para. 194 31 For a version of this section see N. Tsagourias, "The Nicaragua Case and the Use of Force: 
The Theoretical Construction of the Decision and Its Deconstruction", 1 J. Armed Conflict Law, (1996), p. 81; M. H. Mendelson, "The Nicaragua Case and Customary International Law", in 
W. E. Butler, (ed. ), The Non 
- 
Use of Force in International Law, (Dordrecht/Boston/London, M. 
Nijhoff, 1989), p. 85; H. W. Briggs, The International Court of Justice Lives Up to its Name", 81 
A. J. I. L., (1987), p. 78; G. A. Christenson, "The World Court and Jus Cogens", ibid., p. 93; A. A. 
D'Amato, "'Thrashing Customary International Law", ibid., p. 101; J. L. Hargrove, "The Nicaragua 
Judgment and the Future of the Law of Force and Self-defence", ibid., p. 135; F. L. Kirgis Jr, 
"Custom on a Sliding Scale", ibid., p. 146; F. L. Morrison, "Legal Issues in the Nicaragua 
Opinion", ibid., p. 160; J. Verhoven, "Le droit, le Juge et la violence. Les arrets Nicaragua c. 
Etats-Unis", 91 R. G. D. I. P., (1987), p. 1159 32 Nicaragua Case, paras. 195,237, pp. 103,122. Concerning the concept of anticipatory self- 
defence, the Court said "..... the issue of the lawfulness of a response to the imminent threat of 
armed attack has not been raised. Accordingly, the Court expresses no view on that issue". Ibid., 
p. 103, para. 194. This may leave the concept of anticipatory self-defence open to any 
interpretation, nevertheless, considering the emphatic repetition of the "armed attack' 
259 
circumscription of self-defence necessitates explication and full understanding 
of the values, policies and ideological motivations behind the decision33 instead 
of merely inviting reproaches and condemnations. 
The structural affiliations of the Court delineate its initial assumptions and 
delimit the potentiality for discretionary jurisdiction. The L CJ is an organ of 
the U. N. Charter which regulates aspects of the use of force and adumbrates its 
main purpose of preserving peace. Consequently, a restrictive view of Article 
2(4) coincides with diminishing the threshold for self-defence, containing it to 
an armed attack narrowly defined. The President of the Court in his Opinion was 
unequivocal: "[t]he Court as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations 
has to promote peace and cannot refrain from moving in that direction". 34 It 
would be inconceivable for the Court to deviate remarkably from the ideological 
premises of its formative instrument. The main task of the World Court is 
consequently to restrict the use of force in international relations by legal means 
whereas the U. N. serves this purpose politically. 
The I. CJ, as part of the U. N. system, endeavoured in this case to coalesce 
customary international law and the Charter provisions in order to avoid 
peregrination into the nebulous corpus of customary law. It determined that 
customary and U. N. Charter law, even if identical in content, have separate 
existence. 35 However, in ascertaining the content of customary law through 
practice and opinio juris, the I C. J. proceeds in a siccative evaluation of the 
Charter's norms divested from the fluctuations of international practice. Thus, 
the Court gives the impression that it is the Charter rules as such which are 
pronounced upon. 36 The I. C. J. isolates the rules on the use of force contained in 
requirement, it could not be interpreted as for this case as being sympathetic to anticipatory self 
defence. 
33 J. B. White, "Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cultural and Communal Life", 52 
U. Chi. L. Rev., (1985), p. 684, at pp. 696-98: "Any decision of law cannot be scientifically pure 
but within lies probably unconscious judgment as to the preferable policy, therefore it cannot be 
treated as neutral but one beyond the words used can fathom the policies or values intrinsic in the 
words". A. C. Hutchison and P. J. Monaham, "Law, Politics and the Critical Legal Scholars: The 
Unfolding Drama of American Legal Thought", 36 Stan. L. Rev., (1984), p. 199; D. Kairys, "Law 
and Politics", 52 Ga. L. Rev., (1984), p. 243; J. Boyle, "Ideals and Things: International Legal 
Scholarship and the Prison-House of Language", 26 Harv. I. L. J., (1985), p. 327 34 Separate Opinion of the President of the Court Nagendra Singh, Nicaragua Case, p. 153 
'S Nicaragua Case, p. 95, para. 178 Jb Nicaragua Case, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Ago, pp. 183-184 and Judge Jennings, ibid., 
p. 532. This contradicts a previous judgment concerning the role of the multilateral treaties and 
customary law: "It is of course axiomatic that the material of customary international law is to be 
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the Charter from their functional environment and records their normative 
validity in abstract. This is similar to the distinction between "Soll-Geltung" and 
"Seins-Wirksamkeit" initiated by Kelsen, which will be dealt with subsequently. 
At this point, the onerous task facing the Court should be acknowledged. A 
foray into reconstructing the prohibition on the use of force would cause a 
floodgate of particular claims. By admitting the fallibility of the rule or a 
particular exemption, the problem of accommodating divergent claims emerges. 
On the other hand, it would be hypocritical to maintain that the rules are 
impermeable. State practice is an adamant witness of a liberal construction of 
the rule on the use of force. The I. C. J., faced with this dilemma, cautiously 
affirmed the validity of the rule on the non-use of force amidst widespread 
contravention. 37 It embraced normative integrity at the expense of normative 
relevance, leaving the law as nebulous as it was before. It failed to fulfil the 
expectations of Elihu Root, who advised in the case of beclouded or 
complicated issues that: "[t]here is but one way to make general judgment 
possible in such cases. That is by bringing them to the decision of a competent 
court which will strip away the irrelevant, reject the false, and declare what the 
law requires or prohibits in the particular case". 38 
The Court should have questioned the juridical acceptance of the principle on 
the non-use of force by examining the frequent and contrary practice of the 
U. S. A, one of the contending parties whose conduct in Nicaragua, the I. C. J. 
deemed within its jurisdiction. 39 Also, it should have questioned the extent of 
self-defence. It should be admitted that in many instances the opinio juris 
underlying these practices remains cryptic; nonetheless, it has reduced the 
certainty of opinio juris pertaining to the contrary rule. 40 The L CJ befuddled 
the process for the development of customary international law by axiomatically 
looked for primarily in the actual practice and opinio juris of states even though multilateral 
conventions may have an important role to play in recording and defining rules deriving from 
custom, or indeed in developing them ". Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya/Malta), I. C. J. Rep., (1985), p. 13, at pp. 29-30, para. 27 
" Nicaragua Case, p. 98, para. 186 38 E. Root, "The Outlook for International Law", Proc. Fifth Nat 7 Conf. Am. Soc y for Jud. 
Settlement of Int'1 Disputes, (1916), p. 30, at p. 33 39 Nicaragua Case, p. 109, para. 207 
40 A. A. D'Amato, The Concept of Custom in International Law, (Ithaca, Cornell University 
Press, 1971), p. 74: "Well-established rules of custom, almost by definition, are not the subject of 
a dispute". 
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pronouncing on the illicitness of contrary practice and its accompanying opinio 
juris. Accumulation of "illegal" precedents contains the germ of a new 
customary rule. Had the I. C. J. examined thoroughly state practice, its 
conclusion could safely be controverted in view of the numerous manifestations 
of forcible measures under the umbrella of self-defence. By overshadowing state 
practice, the I. C. J. seems to occupy itself with reaffirming the existence of the 
rule 
- 
customary or conventional 
- 
on the non-use of force, absolving itself from 
the demanding task of determining its content. 41 A rigorous stand procures 
certainty and clarity, whilst it minimizes any interpretative allusions. In a 
nutshell, the decision is a poetic lecture on the prevalent spirit and ideal of the 
Charter; nevertheless, it cannot escape the impression of being surrealistic and 
irresponsive to pertinent moral and legal issues. 
111.2 Tracing customary law. The Court confined self-defence to an armed 
attack by a deficient extrapolation of customary law. It reiterates dutifully the 
identifying method for customary law which comprises of state practice and 
opinio juris according to its previous jurisprudence. 42 However, the L CJ, 
probing these two elements, satisfies itself with only the opiniojuris from which 
it deducts the conformity of state practice. 43 
As the Court has observed, customary law has a dualistic conception. It has a 
corpus, the repetitio facti and animus, the opinio juris which is merely a 
psychological element. The two elements are not in fact separate, but it is the 
acts "qui doivent temoigner, par leur nature ou la maniere dont ils ont accomplis 
de 1'existence de 1'opinio juris". 44 Thus, the opinio juris is inducted from the 
state practice or the mode of behavioural patterns, whereas state practice could 
not be deduced from the opinio juris. 45 The analysis of opinio juris involves 
41 P. M. Eisemann, "L'arret de la C. LJ du 27 juin 1986 (fond), dans 1'affaire des activites rnilitaires 
et paramilitaires au Nicaragua et contre celui-ci", 32 A. F. D. I., (1986), p. 153, at pp. 173-174 
12 Nicaragua Case, pp. 97-98, paras. 183,184; Asylum Case, I. C. J. Rep., (1950), p. 265, at pp. 276- 
277; Case Concerning Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco, I. C. J. 
Rep., (1952), p. 176, at p. 200; Case Concerning Right of Passage Over Indian Territory, I. C. J. 
Rep., (1960), p. 4, at pp. 40,43; North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, LC. J. Rep., (1969), p. 3, at 
rp 43-44, paras. 74,77 
Nicaragua Case, p. 98, para. 186 
44 L. Condorelli, "La coutume", in M. Bedjaoui (red. gen. ), Droit International. Bilan et 
perspectives, tome 1, (Paris, Editions Pedone, 1991), ch. VII, p. 187, at p. 197 
`S Case Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area, I. CJ. 
Rep., (1984), p. 244, at p. 299, para. lll: "..... together with a set of customary rules whose 
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psychological considerations in order to discern the motives behind state 
practice, whereas an accumulation of a particular state pattern could reveal a 
consolidated sentiment towards that pattern. 46 In the Nicaragua Case, the I. C. J. 
muddled the issue. It stated vaguely that practice is not in absolutely rigorous 
conformity with the rule, but the "Court deems it sufficient that instances of 
state conduct inconsistent with a given rule should generally have been treated 
as breaches of that rule". 47 
The rule is the abstention from the use of force, and the breaches involve resort 
to force. Logically, when there is an interdiction, the practice should be null and 
therefore the emphasis is on the animus, "for only if abstention has based on 
their being conscious of a duty to abstain would it be possible to speak of an 
international custom". 48 The existence of practice contrary to the alleged 
prohibition should have generated a different reaction. This practice is 
accommodated in other rules, in particular Article 51, which defies the I. C. ].. 's 
perceived context of this rule. The I 
. 
CJ declined to detect this and confirmed 
the existence of a customary prohibition by conceding unnecessary 
preponderance to the opiniojuris. It treated state practice as jurisdictionally non- 
existent by effacing any contrary opinio juris evidenced in the incontestable 
contrary practice. In its effort to eschew practice, it appears content with General 
Assembly Resolutions and mainly with that on Friendly Relations. 9 If someone 
could extract the customary law through voting patterns in the General 
Assembly, then tracing custom would be less laborious. The Court also refers to 
acceptance of the relevant resolutions which is not necessarily invested with 
opiniojuris, or the psychological conviction. As Hart explains, people or, in this 
correlation, states accept a rule either because they will experience criticism and 
presence in the opinio juris of States can be tested by induction based on the analysis of a 
sufficiently extensive and convincing practice and not by deduction from preconceived ideas". 
46 M. Sorensen, Les sources du droit international, (Copenhague, E. Munksgaard, 1946), p. 85; 
M. Virally, "The Sources of International Law", in M. Sorensen (ed. ), Manual of Public 
International Law, (London, Macmillan, 1968), p. 116, at pp. 134-135; H. Lauterpacht, The 
Development of the International Law by the International Court, (London, Stevens & Sons, 
1958), p. 380; P. Haggenmacher, "La doctrine des deux elements du droit coutumier dans la 
pratique et la Cour Internationale", 90 R. G. D. I. P., (1986), p. 5, at p. 177. Also the dissenting 
opinions of Judge Tanaka and Sorensen in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, I. 
C. J. Rep., 
(1969), p. 3, pp. 175-176,243-247 
" Nicaragua Case, p. 98, para. 186 
18 The Case of the S. S Lotus, P. C. I. J., Series A., No. 10, p. 4, at p. 28 
49 Nicaragua Case, pp. 99-100, para. 188 
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pressure if they do not, or because it is not mandatory. This, however, does not 
amount to a feeling, coupled with the volition for conformity, which springs 
only from the internal reflective attitude towards the rule. S° The General 
Assembly Resolutions, apart from their precarious legal status, are always the 
outcome of bargaining and compromises, and political considerations are not 
irrelevant. In a previous judgment 
, 
the L CJ has discarded a certain practice 
because it has been "so much influenced by considerations of political 
expediency in the various cases, that it is not possible to discern in all this any 
constant and uniform usage accepted as law, with regard to the alleged rule of 
unilateral and definitive qualification of the offence". 51 Although the I. C. J. side- 
stepped an examination of state practice (and especially that of the U. S. A) the 
fact that certain states behave contrary to what they declare their obligations to 
be in the General Assembly is evidence that the opiniojuris is in default. In the 
General Assembly, states often vote on what the law ought to be and not on 
what the law actually is. Therefore, no definitive rules could be extracted 
concerning the actual state of the law52, albeit the fact that this juristic 
disjunction coincides with the Court's jurisprudential stance of preserving the 
normative purity of the law. 
The L CJ can recite the U. N. Charter and record the General Assembly 
Resolutions, but in order to extrapolate "legiferation", it should appraise the 
so H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1961), p. 56: "There is no 
contradiction in saying that people accept certain rules but experience no such feelings of 
compulsion". Hereinafter referred to as CL S' Asylum Case, I. C. J. Rep., (1950), p. 265, at p. 277; Nicaragua Case, Separate Opinion of Judge 
Ago, p. 184 and Judge Jennings, pp. 531-533. Also Separate Opinion of Judge Read in Anglo 
Norwegian Fisheries Case, I. C. J. Rep, (1951), p. 3, at p. 191 
52 G. Arangio-Ruiz, "The Normative Role of the General Assembly of the United Nations and 
the Declaration of Principles of Friendly Relations", 137 R. C., (1972 IIl), p. 418, at pp. 471-486: 
"What would matter 
..... 
is not whether Assembly members felt legally bound to vote for the 
declaratory resolution but, whether they felt legally bound by the rules they proclaimed ..... ". 
"But the really decisive element will mostly come from elsewhere, it will come from the practice 
of states prior to, concomitant with or following the United Nations recommendatory process", 
ibid., pp. 278,279. R. Higgins, "The Role of the Resolutions of International Organisations in the 
Process of Creating Norms in the International System", in W. E. Butler (ed. ), International Law 
and the International System, (Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster, M. Nijhoff, 1987), p. 21; C. C. 
Joyner, "U. N. General Assembly Resolutions and International Law: Rethinking the 
Contemporary Dynamics of Norm-Creation", 11 Ca. W. I. L. J., (1981), p. 445, S. Schwebel, "The 
Effect of Resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly on Customary International Law", 
73 Proc. A. S. I. L., (1979), p. 380; R. Higgins, The United Nations and Law Making: The Political 
Organs", 64 Proc. A. S. I. L., (1970), pp. 37-48; D. H. N. Johnson, "The Effect of Resolutions of the 
General Assembly of the United Nations", 32 B. Y. B. I. L., (1955-56), p. 97; F. A. Vallat, "The 
General Assembly and the Security Council of the United Nations", 29 B. Y. B. I. L., (1952), p. 96; 
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effects these rules have on state practice, that is, show how reflective they are as 
originative of state behaviour. The I. C. J. deliberately eschews such an exercise 
because it is an external observer of the international interaction and, thus, 
insufficiently equipped to apprehend the so called "internal aspects of rules". 53 It 
is at this point that Hart's discussion of "internal point" should be elaborated and 
also the jurisprudential premises of the decision. Hart introduces a certain 
psychological attitude towards the rules in order to differentiate them from 
Austinian habits, or Kelsen's disassociation of "is" and "ought". Voting in the 
General Assembly may have different significance for the participant and the 
external observer. The latter cannot apprehend the particular patterns of thought 
which induces the externally observable act of voting. According to Hart, there 
is a need for an internal point of view which should be shared by all the 
members in a pre-legal society such as exists in the international society. 54 This 
attitude is evidenced in criticisms and demands for conformity55, which would 
reveal acceptance of the rule as a matter of volition and not due to other 
reasons. 
56 The circularity of this argument is solved by reference to a rule. 
Criticism towards forceful actions depends on a certain attitude towards these 
actions, which manifests itself through the criticism but presupposes a norm or a 
rule. Therefore, the I. C. J. should have investigated the attitude towards certain 
practices and the practice in order to extrapolate the rule on self-defence or the 
use of force. Declining to establish this, the Court reverts to Kelsenite 
normativity. 
111.3 The jurisprudential premises of the decision. The I. C. J. in this case appears 
deferential to Kelsen's legal theory. Kelsen's view on the normativity of 
jurisprudence was presented previously, that is, his contention that it is 
concerned with norms, the "ought" propositions. Norms are valid because they 
exist and not because they are efficacious. These two qualities are distinct and 
the validity of a norm does not necessarily depend upon its efficacy, although an 
efficacious legal system accounts in general for the validity of individual norms. 
Consequently, if a system is efficacious but a certain norm lacks efficacy, it is 
53 CL, p. 55 
54 N. MacCormick, H. L. A. Hart, (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1981), pp. 25,30-31 
ss CL, p. 56 S6 MacCormick, supra, note 54, p. 32 
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not divested from validity. 57 In the jurisprudence of the Court, it is rephrased in 
the assertion which envisages the normative validity of the rule concerning the 
prohibition on the use of force or self-defence, amidst the frequency of 
infractions. A further point relates to the criticism voiced above concerning the 
failure of the Court to consider the concretization of the rule in state practice. 
For the Court, the validity of the rule on the use of force or self-defence requires 
attestation of its existence and not of its controlling authority. In accordance 
with this legal position, the L CJ should only scrutinise the sources which will 
assist in verifying the existence of the rule and consequently establish its 
normativity. Pursuant to this theoretical position, the Court justifiably engages 
in ascertaining only the validity of the rules, instead of their efficacy. Although, 
this is presented as a juristic exercise, it is not devoid of ideological content. The 
Court, hence, traces the existence of Articles 2(4) and 51 in various texts which 
embodies their efficacy and contributes to their validity. 
Normativity, according to Kelsen, contains an internal and an external aspect. 58 
The former entails the categorisation of behaviour as lawful or unlawful. It 
encompasses a certain point of view which, nevertheless, is dissimilar to the 
naturalist conception of good or bad. The distinction is cognitive not evaluative 
and also disassociated from the facts. It presupposes in fact, the existence of a 
norm. The second aspect then comes into play, which is the descriptive 
normativity. It is presented as the result of the previous normative aspect and 
takes the form of a legal proposition. As an example, the abstract norm 
concerning the unlawfulness of coercion is concretised in the descriptive norm 
of Articles 2(4) and 51 which postulate that coercion should not be used and that 
if there is an attack, self-defence should apply. At this stage, the problem of 
identifying the normative-prescriptive and the propositional-descriptive "ought" 
is confronted. Kelsen maintains that the distinction is abandoned once the 
prescription is embodied in the description. 59 This may have the result of 
reconciling the realist position of incorporating the "ought" into "is" with that of 
Kelsen's, presuming that the "ought" contained in the proposition is an 
S' H. Kelsen, "The Pure Theory of Law and Analytical Jurisprudence", 55 Harvard L. Rev.. 
1941), p. 44, at pp. 50-57 8 N. Bobbio, "`Sein' and "Sollen' in Legal Science", LVI Archiv. für Rechts - und 
Sozialphilosophie, (1970), pp. 7-30 
59 H. Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, 2nd ed., (Wien, Denlicke, 1960), p. 77 
266 
ascertainment of a fact. Thus, the prescription of self-defence in the form of 
Article 51 would be inferred from the abstract notion of self-defence which 
materialises in the norm from the fact of exercising self-defence only when an 
attack occurs. However, Kelsen disproves any causality and adheres to "legal 
necessity" instead of "natural necessity" which means as a consequence the 
assimilation of the descriptive with the prescriptive. 
The theoretical quandary springs from the fundamental contradiction within the 
concept of sovereignty, which aggravates the tension between theory and 
practice, normative source and normative legitimacy. 60 The inconsistency 
experienced in sovereignty as equality or autonomy creates at a theoretical level 
the tension between a position which views international law as separate from 
and critical of state behaviour and another, according to which international law 
is grounded in and fused with state behaviour. A behavioural approach faces the 
problem of an independent index in order to characterise an act. This is the 
problem of normative legitimacy because any activity appears as indicative of a 
new consensus. On the other hand, preserving the normative legitimacy creates 
the problem of normative source. A norm could not acquire a context because it 
does not apply to factual situations. In the Nicaragua Caseb1 the dilemma of 
choosing between these contradictory aspects emerged, but the Court set off 
towards normative legitimacy. The reaffirmation of the norms on non- 
intervention or self-defence is an ideological exercise because it lacks substance. 
Nevertheless, the opposite view of state conduct is unsatisfactory, because no 
action could be evaluated as intervention or self-defence unless there exists an 
independent norm. Otherwise, any action may be presented as a ratification of 
any norm. An osmosis between normative legitimacy and normative source 
would provide a potential satisfactory solution. 
However, the I. C. J., having misconstrued the realities of customary rules and 
choosing normative clarity, developed a restrictive view of customary law on 
self-defence, not concurrent with the state practice because the latter, in its 
jurisdiction, has lost its autonomy and determinative force. It was pulverised in 
e0 D. Kennedy, "Theses about International Law Discourse", 23 German Y. B. I. L., (1980), 
353, at p. 383 ýý 
"Applying the Critical Jurisprudence of International Law to the Case Concerning Military 
and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua", "Note", 71 Va. L. Rev., (1985), p. 1183 
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an ex cathedra presumption that the prohibition on force is the law and the only 
derogation is self-defence under armed attack. 
Having said that, the identification of self-defence with customary law implies 
that it must satisfy the customary requirements as they have been stated in the 
famous Caroline incident62, those requirements being proportionality and 
necessity. Concerning the protection of nationals in particular, there must be (i) 
an imminent threat of injury to nationals; (ii) a failure or inability on the part of 
the territorial sovereign to protect them and (iii) measures of protection strictly 
confined to the object of protecting them against injury. 63 
IV. STATE ACTIVITY CONCERNING THE PROTECTION OF 
NATIONALS: A PRELIMINARY EVALUATION 
IV. 1 State practice as self-defence-humanitarian intervention. The bulk of the 
relevant practice relating to the protection of nationals renders necessary only a 
siccative presentation. This will cover certain typical instances, whereas their 
evaluation under the next title will demonstrate their factual, theoretical and 
legal dimensions. Consequently, the practice will be presented according to our 
previous classification of the argument describing the protection of nationals as 
either self-defence or humanitarian action. Both elements or justifications may 
be interweaved in the same action but we shall demonstrate their distinct 
utilisation. In addition, the identified interpretative guises of the self-defence 
argument proper sensu will be considered. 
It is admittedly the U. S. A which has most frequently exercised this right of 
protection. The Solicitor for the Department of State acknowledged in 1912 that 
"no nation it would seem, has with more frequency than has this government 
used its military forces for the purpose of occupying temporarily parts of foreign 
countries in order to secure adequate safety and protection for its citizens and 
62 29 British and Foreign State Papers, (1840-1841), p. 1129, at p. 1138: "necessity of self- 
defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation". 
63 C. H. M. Waldock, "The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International 
Law", 81 R. C., (1952 II), p. 455, p. 467 
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their property". 64 Milton Offutt writing in 1928 counted more than one hundred 
occasions within a hundred and fifteen years period. 65 The policy of the U. S. 
Government could be adumbrated in the statement made by the Acting 
Secretary of State Hill in 1900: "I am not designed to forgo the right which this 
government has always held and which on occasion it has exercised 
..... 
to land 
forces and adopt all necessary measures to protect the life and property of our 
citizens whenever menaced by lawless acts, which the general or local authority 
is unwilling or impotent to prevent". 66 This statement established its validity 
through repetitious practice and coincides with the identified edicts of 
customary law for the exercise of this right. 
The major cases which will be discussed in this section are the Dominican 
Republic (1965); 67 Grenada (1983); and Liberia (1990,1996), but references 
will also be made to other cases. We shall first start with two cases, Entebbe68 
and Iran69 which are reckoned to be justifiable under the rubric of self-defence 
stricto sensu. It should be emphasised at the outset that the aforementioned 
cases share analogies with cases of the same genre discussed subsequently. 
However, they are signled out because the self-defence argument was put 
forward vigorously and credibly. There is also a certain acquiescence by other 
states due to the fact that the initial action was apparently impinging on what is 
considered to be, in a state-oriented law, the attributes of a sovereign state. 
Having said that, we proceed in identifying these cases. 
IV. 2 Entebbe (1976) and Iran (1980): self-defence action with humanitarian 
dimensions. In these cases, the danger faced by nationals of the intervening state 
was due to political enmity towards their respective countries. They were used 
as a means towards further political objectives which encroached upon the 
64 J. R. Clark Jr., Right to Protect Citizens in Foreign Countries by Landing Forces, 
Memorandum of the Solicitor for the Dept. of State, October 5,1912,2nd rev. ed., (Washington, 
U. S. Government Printing Office, 1929), p. 32, hereinafter cited as Memorandum 
65 M. Offutt, The Protection of Citizens Abroad by the Armed Forces of the United States, 
(Baltimore, The John Hopkins Press, 1928) p. 1 
66 J. B. Moore, A Digest of International Law, vol. 11, (Washington, Government Printing Office, 
1906), pp. 401-402 
67 A. J. Thomas, A. V. W. Thomas, The Dominican Republic Crisis 1965, (Dobbs Ferry, N. Y., 
Oceana Publication Inc., 1967) 
68 M. Knisbacher, "The Entebbe Operation: A Legal Analysis of Israel's Rescue Action", 12 
J. Int 'l L& Economics, (1977), p. 57 
60 J. R. D'Angelo, "Resort to Force by States to Protect Nationals: The U. S. Rescue Mission to 
Iran and its Legality under International Law", 21 Va. J. I. L., (1981), p. 485 
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exercise of authority by their national states. On those grounds, the respective 
actions are considered to be defensive but we should not overlook the 
humanitarian element. Although the nationals of these states were targeted 
selectively in order to impel their national governments towards a dictated 
course of action, the life-threatening circumstances were genuine and the 
rescuing operation also addressed this element. In fact, the two aspects 
- 
defensive and humanitarian 
- 
are intermingled because it is the threat of 
annihilation which makes the demands imperative and compelling, impinging 
upon the state's compass of political independence which eventually triggers the 
defensive action. If there is no such imperious situation, the intrusion into the 
exercise of authority is reduced and the demands or the pursued action adopt a 
different allure. In a nutshell, the humanitarian motive is present and plays an 
incisive role, although discounted in the political hubbub. 
Thus, the Palestinians who hijacked the Air France plane on route to Paris on 
June 27,1976 demanded the release of Palestinians imprisoned in other 
countries. The Palestinians released some hostages and, finally, only Israeli 
nationals and people with Jewish sounding names remained aboard. Israeli 
commandos raided Entebbe airport on July 4,1976 in order to release the Israeli 
hostages. During the operation 20 Ugandan soldiers were killed and military 
aircraft in the airport were destroyed. The government of Uganda was accused 
of complicity with the Palestinians. 70 The incident was discussed within the 
Security Council where clear statements supporting the action as a measure of 
self-defence were made. The Israeli Ambassador justified the decision "to take 
military action to protect its nationals in mortal danger' as an instance of self- 
defence. 7' The U. S. A equivocally supported a right, well established "to use 
limited force for the protection of one's own nationals from an imminent threat 
of injury or death in a situation where the State in whose territory they are 
located is either unwilling or unable to protect them. The right, flowing from the 
70 U. N. SCOR, 1939th mtg., U. N. Doc. S/PV. 1939 (1976), paras. 44-45, 
71 U. N. SCOR, 1939th mtg., U. N. Doc. S/PV. 1939, (9/7/1976), p. 57, at pp. 59-60, 
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right of self-defence, is limited to such use of force as is necessary and 
appropriate to protect threatened nationals from injury". 72 
The Iranian incident shares a common property with the previous one, that is, 
they are both politically motivated in their inception and the sought after results. 
This incident started when, amid the revolutionary fervour which overwhelmed 
Iran, "Muslim Students" invaded the American Embassy on November 4,1979 
and detained as hostages 48 members of the U. S. diplomatic personnel and 2 
private citizens until January 20,1981. That day, a settlement was agreed 
whereupon they were released. 73 The Security Council discussed the incident 
first on December 5,1979 and requested the release of all hostages. When Iran 
did not comply, the Security Council occupied itself again with the issue on 
December 31,1979 by requesting the release of hostages. 74 The Security 
Council was again convened to discuss the imposition of sanctions due to Iran's 
failure to comply with the previous resolutions but a resolution to this effect was 
blocked by the Soviet Union. In the meantime, the U. S. A requested interim 
measures on November 30,1979. The I. C. J., in its order of December 15,1979, 
called for the hostages to be released and for the parties to exercise restraint in 
order not to aggravate the tension. 75 
The military option as a measure of last resort was not excluded when all the 
other options failed. President Carter said: "If this additional set of sanctions that 
I've described to you today, and the concerted action of our allies, is not 
successful then the only next step available that I can see would be some sort of 
military action which is the prerogative and the right of the United States under 
these circumstances". 76 Finally, the military operation to rescue the hostages 
was launched on April 24-25 1980, but it was abortive. In his message to the 
Congress, President Carter stated: "In carrying out this operation, the United 
States is acting wholly within its right in accordance with Article 51 of the 
72 U. N. SCOR, 1941st mtg., U. N. Doc. S/PV. 1941, (12/7/1976), pp. 31-32; Memorandum by 
the Legal Adviser to the State Department, M. Leigh, to Secretary of State Kissinger. 73 
A. J. I. L., (1979), p. 122 
" The Hostage Settlement Agreement, 201. L. M., (1981), p. 223 
74 S. C. Res. 475 and 461, in 80 Dep't State Bull., (1980), No. 2034, pp. 51-52 and No. 2035, 
ý. 68 S Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Order of 15 
December 1979, I. C. J. Rep. (1979), p. 21 
76 The New York Times, (April 20,1980), A 14 
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United Nations charter, to protect and rescue its citizens where the government 
of the territory in which they are located is unable or unwilling to protect 
them". 77 In its letter to the Security Council, the U. S. A claimed that the action 
was taken "..... in exercise of its inherent right to self-defence with the aim of 
extricating American nationals who have been and remain the victims of the 
Iranian armed attack on our embassy". 78 
IV. 3 The circumstances which justify the protective action. In the majority of 
cases, such action was prompted by precarious circumstances, when revolution, 
insurrection or any other unstable situation rendered the functions of 
government ineffective and endangered the lives of foreign nationals. In the 
cases which will be contemplated immediately, there was a degree of 
consultation between the representatives of the state whose nationals were 
endangered and the local authorities before the landing. However, such 
consultation is insufficient because of the tumultuous situation which prevails. 
The intervention in Mexico (1861) provides an instance where France advanced 
this argument. The French Foreign Minister wrote in a communication to the 
French Emissary in Washington that "[a]pres une serie d'inutiles reclamations, 
nous devions demander des guaranties contre le retour des violences dont nos 
nationaux avaient si cruellement souffert, et ces garanties, nous ne pouvions les 
attendre d'un Gouvernement dont nous avions constate en tant de circonstances, 
la mauvaise foi. "79 During an uprising on the island of Cuba (1912), the 
American Minister in Cuba was instructed to inform the Cuban President that 
"in the event of its inability or failure to protect the lives and property of 
American citizens 
..... 
the Government of the U. S., pursuant to its usual custom 
in such cases, would land forces to accord the necessary protection and that such 
action does not constitute intervention". 80 When the Cuban President Gomez 
expressed his reservations, Secretary of State Knox replied that his government 
"didn't undertake first to consult the Cuban Government if a crisis arose 
" 80 Dept State Bull., (1980), No. 2039, pp. 42-43; Case Concerning United States 
Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, (United States of America v. Iran), Pleadings. 
? 1.484-489 
U. N. Doc. S113908, April 25,1980 
79 A-C. Kiss, Repertoire de la Pratique Frangaise en Matiere de Droit International Public, 
vol. II, no. 198, (Paris, Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1962) 
B° U. S. For. Rel., (1912), p. 246 
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requiring a temporary landing somewhere to protect life and property on the 
broad principles of international practice". 81 
One of the legal justifications put forward by Japan for its action in Manchuria 
(1931)82 was the protection of its nationals. 83 The Japanese action was met with 
caution in the corridors of the League of Nations. Viscount Cecil wrote that 
there was no doubt that the Chinese, after their manner, had enormously 
exaggerated what had been happening. 84 The Council, in a unanimous 
Resolution on September 30,1931, took cognizance of the assurances offered 
by the Chinese government that it would safeguard the lives of Japanese 
nationals and also that of the Japanese Government, according to which 
Japanese troops would withdraw gradually in proportion to the protection 
afforded. 85 Moreover, the President of the Council, Briand, requested the 
Chinese Government to take measures to ensure the safety of the lives and 
property of the Japanese subjects in the evacuated area. On December 10th, the 
Council adopted another resolution calling the parties to refrain from any 
initiative which may lead to further fighting and loss of life. 86 The representative 
of Japan, commenting on this resolution, stated that he accepted it 
"[o]n the understanding that it was not intended to preclude the Japanese 
forces from taking such action as it might be rendered necessary to 
provide directly for the protection of the lives and property of Japanese 
81 Ibid., pp. 246,250 B2 Q. Wright, " Some Legal Aspects of the Far Eastern Situation", 27 A. J. LL., (1933), p. 509; H. 
Lauterpacht, "Resort to War and the Interpretation of the Covenant during the Manchurian 
Dispute", 28 A. J. I. L., (1934), p. 43; S. N. Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria: The Making of Japanese 
Foreign Policy, 1931-1932, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1964) 
83 L. N. O. J., (1931), pp. 2267,2289-90,2345 
84 Cecil to Noel-Baker, 25 Sept. 1931, in Cecil Papers, Add. 51107, cited in C. Thorne, The 
Limits of Foreign Policy: The West, The League and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1931-1933 
(London, Hamilton, 1972), p. 135 
95 It stated inter alia that it: "Notes the Japanese representative's tatement that his Government 
will continue 
..... 
the withdrawal of its troops, which has already begun in the railway zone in 
proportion as the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals is effectively assured ..... 
Notes the Chinese representative's statement that his Government will assume responsibility for 
the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals 
..... 
as the withdrawal of the Japanese 
continues and the Chinese local authorities and police are re-established". L. N. O. J., (1931), 
?. 2307 
6 Article 2, Resolution of December 10th, 1931,27 A. J. J. L., (1933 Suppl. ), p. 127 
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subjects against the activities of bandits and lawless elements rampant in 
various parts of Manchuria" 
. 
87 
In the discussions before the Council, the Chinese representative said " 
..... 
it is a 
dangerous principle to assert that, in order to protect nationals and their property 
in a foreign country, a large number of troops may occupy so many places, 
destroy so much property and kill so many innocent people 
..... 
". 
88 This passage 
affirms the right of a government to protect its nationals in conditions of 
uncertainty but disputes its limits. 
Considering now some modem incidents, American forces landed in Grenada 
on October 25,1983, as part of an OECS action, following internal turmoil 
caused by the power struggle within the ruling People's Revolutionary 
Government. According to a U. S. Government publication it was stated that: 
"..... American lives were in jeopardy and that a peaceful orderly evacuation 
would not be possible". 89 The Grenadan government, on the other hand, offered 
assurances that "..... the lives, well-being and property of every American and 
other foreign citizen residing in Grenada are fully protected and guaranteed by 
our government. ". 90 However, the U. S. government was concerned about the 
safe transportation of the U. S. students. According to the Secretary of Defence 
Caspar Weinberger, "[a]ttempts were made to get Americans out; however, the 
Military Council failed to live up to its assurances that the airport would be 
opened on October 24 and foreigners would be free to leave. Therefore, the U. S. 
was unable to get any Americans out on charter flights prior to the U. S. 
invasion". 91 
One justification for this action as proclaimed by President Reagan and 
Secretary of State Schultz, was the protection of nationals. 92 The Deputy 
87 Report on the Sino-Japanese Dispute, adopted by the Assembly on February 29,1933 in 27 
A. J. I. L., (1933 Suppl. ), p. 119, at p. 128; L. N. O. J., (1933), Spec. Suppl., no. 112, pp. 22,72 
88 L. N. O. J, (1931), pp. 2283-84 89 Grenada: A Preliminary Report, (Washington D. C., United States Information Agency, 
1983), p. 3 
" International Law and The United States Action in Grenada: A Report, 18 Int 'l Law., 
0984), p. 331, at p. 339 
Situation in Lebanon and Grenada: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on 
Appropriations, 98th Cong., Ist Sess., (1983), p. 58 
9 Grenada: Collective Action by the Caribbean Peace Force, Dep't. St. Bull., (Dec. 1983), 
pp. 67,69; See letter by D. R. Robinson, The Legal Adviser, United States Department of State, 
18 Int'1 Law., (1984), p. 381, at p. 385 
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Secretary of State Kenneth W. Dam in his testimony before the Senate said that 
this "..... U. S. action to secure and evacuate endangered U. S. citizens on the 
island was undertaken in accordance with well-established principles of 
international law regarding the protection of one's nationals. ". 93 The British 
Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe declared in the House of Commons that 
"[w]e would not dispute that a state has the right in international law to take 
appropriate action to safeguard the lives of its citizens where there has been a 
breakdown of law and order 
..... 
". 
94 
In the Dominican Republic (1965), United States forces landed in Santo 
Domingo amid conditions of anarchy on April 28,1965 and withdrew gradually 
in 1966. The rationale for the U. S. intervention was explained by the U. S. 
Representative to the Security Council Adlai Stevenson: 
"[i]n the absence of any governmental authority, Dominican law authority 
enforcement and military officials informed our Embassy that the 
situation was completely out of control, that the police and the 
Government could no longer give any guarantee concerning the safety of 
Americans or of any foreign nationals, and that only an immediate landing 
of United States forces could safeguard and protect the lives of thousands 
. 
of Americans and thousands of citizens of some thirty other counties' 9s 
The conflict in Liberia had more protracted effects and it is still unresolved. It 
started on December 24,1989 with the invasion of a group numbering no more 
than 100 men from the neighbouring Ivory Coast under the leadership of 
Charles Taylor. 96 The rebels called themselves the National Patriotic Front of 
Liberia (NPFL) and they fought against President Doe who seized power in 
1980 by a coup d'etat. The causes of the civil war are of a tribal nature. Doe 
relied on his Krahn tribe and suppressed the Gio and Mano tribes. 97 Thus, he 
eroded the political establishment in this country, dominated since independence 
93 78 A. J. I. L., (1984), p. 203 
°, 47 Hansard, H. C. Deb., (1983), col. 332: "..... We took a different view of all the 
circumstances that apply in this case". 
°S 20 U. N. SCOR, 1196th mtg, (3/5/1965), para. 67, p. 14 
°6 W. O'Neill, "Liberia 
- 
An Avoidable Tragedy, Current History", 113 US. News and World 
Report, no. 20, (23 November 1992), pp. 54-56; 36 Keesing s, (1990), p. 37174; The Economist, 
(1 September 1990), p. 39 
97 36 Keesing's, (1990), p. 37174; 3805 West Africa, (30 July -5 August 1990), p. 2200; 3808 
West Africa, (20 
- 
26 August 1990), p. 2314 
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in 1847 by the Americo-Liberians, descendants of fr ee American slaves. 98 The 
NPFL forces soon reduced Doe's power to the capital Monrovia, but the rebels 
split, with Prince Johnson establishing the Independent National Patriotic Front 
of Liberia (INPFL) and concentrating his efforts on frustrating Taylor's 
victory. ' 00 
The civil war in Liberia soon acquired savage and atrocious dimensions. The 
killing and maiming of members belonging to the infighting tribes was 
widespread. President Doe reacted to the initial incursion with attacks on the 
Mano and Gio tribes suspected of being sympathetic to the rebels, whereas the 
latter retaliated with attacks on Doe's Krahn tribe. 101 The Secretary-General of 
ECOWAS, Jawara, described the situation in Liberia as a "slaughterhouse". 102 
Africa Watch, a human rights group, said that the army responded to initial 
incursion by "indiscriminately killing unarmed civilians, raping women, burning 
villages and looting". 103 A widely reported incident was the massacre of 500 
civilians, mostly of the Mano and Gio tribes, in a church, which was attributed 
to the Doe's government. 104 Under those onerous circumstances, thousands of 
Liberians fled the country and poured into neighbouring states. According to the 
UNCHR, by August 1990,300,000 refuges had fled to Guinea, 120,000 to Cote 
d'Ivoire and 80,000 to Sierra Leone, whereas of those who stayed 5,000 were 
killed and 1,000,000 were internally displaced. The reaction of the United 
Nations was contemptible. The United Nations Secretary-General Javier Perez 
de Guellar ordered the withdrawal of all U. N. Staff members from the country, 
an action which terrified Liberians from the Gio and Mano tribes. Also, a United 
Nations food distribution program for more than 30,000 displaced people in 
Monrovia was cancelled. ' 05 Amid such circumstances, foreign nationals were 
caught in the infighting and their life was threatened for political purposes. 
Johnson, one of the rebel leaders had threatened to arrest and kill foreign 
98 J. S. Guannu, A Short History of the First Liberian Republic, (Pompanu Beach, 1985) 
36 Keesing's, (1990), p. 37644 
ß00 36 Keesing's, (1990), p. 37601 
101 US. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1990, 
S. Prt. 5, 
102nd Congress, 1st Sess., (1990), p. 192 
102 3852 West Africa, (8-4 July 1991), p. 1123 
103 The Newsweek, (4 June 1990), p. 29 
X04 36 Keesing s, (1990), p. 37601 
103 The Newsweek, 11 June 1990, p. 29 
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citizens living in Monrovia, targeting in particular U. S. citizens. 106 
Consequently, a contingent of six U. S. warships was stationed off the coast of 
Liberia to rescue and safeguard U. S. citizens. 107 
IV. 4 Request by the government or the endangered people. In some instances, 
there is a request for such landings. In the pre-Charter period there exist cases 
where the local government invited foreign troops, acknowledging the loss of its 
authority. 108 In other cases, it is the American representative who has advised 
such action, with the Dominican Republic cases of 1916-1925 and 1965 as the 
most indicative. In the former, as we shall see subsequently, the action's aims 
delineated by the American Minister were beyond any required for protective 
action. In the latter case, the U. S. Embassy was instrumental in orchestrating the 
intervention, by exaggerating the danger to American nationals. This 
intervention prevented, eventually, the adverse political power from gaining 
control of the government-109 In Grenada, the U. S. diplomats who visited the 
island on October 22,1983 confirmed the existing risk to the U. S. nationals and, 
thus, galvanised the interventionist mood. 10 This case has also another 
intriguing dimension which will be dealt with en passant because it may derail 
our current discussion. One of the justifications offered by the American 
government for this action is a request by the government of Grenada. ' 11 This 
invitation, however, was not limited to the protection of American nationals and 
it was highly disputed whether there was such request, whether the supposed 
request was made before or after the decision to intervene and, finally, whether 
the Governor-General, Sir Paul Scoon, had the authority under the Grenadan 
Constitution to make such a request. " 2 
X06 W. O'Neill, "Liberia 
- 
An Avoidable Tragedy, Current History", 113 US. News and World 
Report, no. 20, (23 November 1992), p. 216; The Newsweek, (13 August 1990), p. 28 107 36 Keesing's, (1990), p. 37601 
108 Panama (1856) and Uruguay (1858) in M. Offut, supra, note 65, pp. 37,39 
109 Ambassador Bennet in a cable recommended that Washington should give serious thought 
to "armed intervention which goes beyond the more protection of Americans" and not only 
seek to establish order but to prevent "another Cuba", if, as seems likely, the junta should 
collapse". A. Chayes, T. Ehrlich, A. F. Lowenfeld, International Legal Process. vol. 2, 
(Boston, Little Brown & Co., 1968), p. 1152, at p. 1158 
110 W. C. Gilmore, The Grenada Intervention, (London, Mansell Publishing Ltd., 1984), p. 35 
' Grenada: Collective Action by the Caribbean Peace Force, Dep't. St. Bull., (Dec. 1983), 
p. 80; See letter from D. R. Robinson, The Legal Adviser, United States Department of State, 
18 Intl Law., (1984), p. 381, at p. 382 
"2 See letter by Sir Paul Scoon to Tom Adams, Prime-Minister of Barabados: "You are aware 
that there is a vacuum of authority in Grenada following the killing of the Prime-Minister and 
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In other cases, it is the foreign or American citizens in despair who plead for 
such action. According to the State Department, the action in Nicaragua (1926) 
was taken in response to "appeals for protection being received from American 
citizens"-' 13 In recent cases, it is doubtful whether there existed a genuine 
request by the U. S. medical students in Grenada, but the pleas of foreigners to 
be evacuated from Liberia are more genuine. With the atrocities in full progress 
and the U. N. abdicating its responsibility, the foreigners and native Liberians 
turned to the U. S. A for help. It was reported that Liberian refugees and the relief 
agency MSF "were virtually begging Washington to send the Marines in to stop 
the war". 1 1a 
A case with remote similarities to a request by the government is that which 
unfolded in Larnaca, Cyprus (1978). ' 15 Egyptian commandos opened fire on an 
aeroplane in which the participants of the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity 
Organisation were hostages. The Cypriot authorities had successfully concluded 
the negotiations for their release before the Egyptian raid which was met with 
force by the Cypriot National Guard. As a result, the hostages were freed but 
some Egyptians were killed. Cyprus claimed that, although it gave its 
permission for the landing of the Egyptian plane carrying the commandos, it 
excluded any action and, therefore, the raid was a violation of its sovereignty. 
IV. 5 The duration and purposes of the action. Another important issue is the 
temporal duration of the action. The foreign troops should withdraw 
immediately after their mandate is accomplished but the duration of the 
operation is dependent upon the circumstances which determine the pursued 
action. The sooner they achieve their stated purpose, the earlier their evacuation. 
It took the Israelis 90 minutes to accomplish their mission of liberating hostages 
the subsequent serious violations of human rights and bloodshed...... Consequently I am 
requesting your help to assist me in stabilising this grave and dangerous situation", in W. C. 
Gilmore, The Grenada Intervention, (London, Mansell Publishing Ltd., 1984), Appendix 
No. 7, p. 95 and pp. 64-73; S. Davidson, Grenada, (Aldershot, Avebury, 1987), pp. 91-101 V. P. 
Nanda, "The United States Armed Intervention in Grenada 
- 
Impact on World Order", 14 Cal. 
W I. L. J., (1984), p. 395, at p. 414 
1" M. Offutt, The Protection of Citizens Abroad by the Armed Forces of the United States, (Baltimore, The John Hopkins Press, 1928) p. 138 
" The Newsweek, (27 August 1990), p. 36; Mayor Johnson of Monrovia pleaded with the Bush 
Administration "not to shrink the humanitarian responsibility of protecting civilian lives by 
refusing to intervene in the Liberian conflict 
..... 
" reminding them of the historic ties between 
both countries. 
115 36 Keesing 's, (1990), p. 29035 
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at Entebbe, whereas American troops prolonged their stay in the Dominican 
Republic (1965) in order to achieve their political ends. The number of 
American troops increased to 20,000 and stayed on the island until September 
1966. Thus, the U. S. action was not temporarily limited and there existed a 
hiatus between the stated and achieved purposes. American troops remained in 
Grenada (1983) longer than a strict rescue operation would permit and this 
incident resembles the previous Dominican incident where the protection of 
nationals is only collateral to the political purposes of the action. In these cases, 
it is possible to distinguish two stages in the pursued action. The first could be 
designated as a simple protection of nationals, whereas in the second stage the 
troops remained serving ulterior aims. 
Consequently, claims of altruism and clarity of intention were often fraudulent. 
Once involved, foreign troops could not always confine their actions to the 
protection of their nationals. The contemplated cases illustrate the 
transformation and diversification of their activities and the achieved outcome. 
In some cases they managed to retain their neutrality towards the contending 
factions, or the action was purely protective, as in Entebbe or Liberia. In other 
cases, they participated actively in the internal strife, assisting one or the other 
side. Consequently, their stated purpose, that of protection, appears only 
incidental. 116 Bonfils, commenting on the joint action by France, Great Britain 
and Spain in Mexico (1861) said: "[b]ut this action lost its primitive character 
[intervention for the protection of nationals] when England and Spain retired 
from the alliance. Napoleon tried to replace the republic by the empire of 
Maximilian of Austria. Intervention was then flagrant. "' 17 Another country 
where Europeans and the U. S. A were interfering, avowedly for the protection of 
their nationals, was China. Concerning the Boxer uprising in China (1900), the 
French Foreign Minister Delcasse referred to the duty of France as that "of 
116 Acknowledging this, the Solicitor for the State Department in his Memorandum classifies 
only twenty instances as simple protection in the period 1854-1911. J. R. Clark Jr., Right to 
Protect Citizens in Foreign Countries by Landing Forces, Memorandum of the Solicitor for the 
Dept. of State, October 5,1912,2nd rev. ed., (Washington, U. S. Government Printing Office, 
1929), p. 34 
7 H. Bonfils, Manuel de droit international public, 4th ed rev. by Fauchille, vol.!, (Pans, A. 
Rousseau, 1905), p. 160 
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protecting her citizens and obtaining for her merchants the guaranties obtained 
by others". ' 8 
A considerable debasement of the initial rescue operation occurred in the 
Dominican Republic (May 1916-August 1925). 119 The Dominican President 
was impeached by the Minister of War who rushed his troops into the House of 
Representatives. The American Minister cabled the State Department that "we 
must stand by the President at all hazards, in spite of any action of this present 
Congress" 120 
. 
Ships were gathered and the American Minister, Mr. Russell, 
cabled that 
"in view of probable landing [American] troops here tomorrow which 
may not be understood in other parts of the Republic as being for 
protection of American Legation, Consulate, American citizens, and in 
view of the fact that there are in other parts of the country Americans who 
would be in danger, I request additional ships be sent here with force 
sufficient to protect American life and property" 
. 
12' 
Accordingly, two companies of marines were landed for the protection of 
Americans and the massed foreigners in the Haitian Legation. The tide of events 
was a disappointment to Mr. Russell for, to his frustration, the Dominican 
House of Representatives elected a new President. More American forces were 
landed with clear instructions to take action only when necessary "to protect the 
U. S. forces ashore, preserve the peace, protect lives and property of American 
citizens and other foreigners, and to uphold constituted authority". 122 
The insurrection was put down with the assistance of these forces and Mr. 
Russell requested that the Dominican Republic should be put under martial law. 
President Wilson "with the deepest reluctance" gave his authorisation. ' 23 The 
Dominican Minister at Washington protested to the Secretary of State about this 
"unexampled act in contempt of the sovereignty of the Dominican People, 
119 U. S. Foreign Relations, (1900), p. 313 in J. B. Moore, A Digest of International Law, vol. V, 
(Washington, Government Printing Office, 1906), p. 483 
19 M. Offutt, The Protection of Citizens Abroad by the Armed Forces of the United States, 
(Baltimore, The John Hopkins Press, 1928), p. 127 
120 U. S. Foreign Relation, (1916), p. 223 
121 Ibid., p. 223 
122 Ibid., p. 229-230 
123 Ibid., pp. 240-243,246-247 
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which..... brought to a climax the illegal course of the forces of American 
intervention" 
. 
124 
The interventions in the Dominican Republic (1965) and Grenada (1983) 
coincided with the provision of assistance and installation of regimes friendly to 
the U. S. A. The real purpose was the overthrow of a leftist government in 
Grenada, and thus the argument of protecting U. S. nationals appears spurious. 1 25 
In the Dominican Republic the policy was emphatically put forward by 
President Johnson: "the American nations cannot, must not, and will not permit 
the establishment of another Communist government in the Western 
Hemisphere". 126 
IV. 6 Reaction: local 
- 
international. The reaction to such incursions is mixed. 
There is often condemnation either of the initial action or of its effects. In some 
instances, however, there is commendation. The Uruguayan Foreign Secretary 
sent a letter to Captain Lynch in 1855 expressing the gratitude of his 
government for the American protective action. 127 In Hawaii (1874), resolutions 
of thanks were sent by the Hawaiian Government, the Legislative Assembly and 
the Chamber of Commerce of Honolulu. ' 28 In Nicaragua (1912), the "daughters 
of this beloved soil 
..... 
celebrated with enthusiasm" their [American troops] 
arrival upon its shores. 
129 
Concerning Manchuria, the press was at the beginning sympathetic to the 
Japanese grievances against the Chinese misrule. The Times wrote that "the 
[Japanese] army has for all intents and purposes become 
- 
after its initial well 
prepared and warlike invasion 
-a military equipped police force in a disordered 
part of China where the Central Chinese Government can exercise little or no 
authority". 130 The League of Nations eventually condemned the Japanese action 
124 Ibid., 244-245 
125 J. Quigley, "The United States Invasion of Grenada: Stranger Than Fiction", 18 U. Miami 
Inter-American L. Rev., (1986-87), p. 271 
126 52 Dep't State Bull., (1965), p. 746; V. P. Nanda, "The United States Action in the 1965 
Dominican Crisis: Impact on World Order 
- 
Part II", 44 Denver L. J., (1967), p. 225 
127 Brazil Squadron Letters, M S, vol. II, (September 1854 - April 1856), No. 104, pp. 654,655 12 8 43th Cong., 2nd Sess., H. Ex. Doc., No. 1, Part 3, pp. 195,186,197 
129 US. For. Rel., (1912), p. 1061 
10 The Times, (21 Sept., 12,21 Oct., 2,7 Nov., 1931), cited in J. R. Clark Jr., Right to Protect 
Citizens in Foreign Countries by Landing Forces, Memorandum of the Solicitor for the Dept. of 
State, October 5,1912,2nd rev. ed., (Washington, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1929), 
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in Manchuria, but rather late when it was clear that there was no factual basis for 
intervention to protect nationals and also mounting evidence of a general policy 
of expansion and interference by Japan in Chinese affairs. Viscount Cecil, 
interpreting the Council Resolutions, said that "the obligation to withdraw was 
dependent upon the safety of Japanese nationals 
..... 
but no permission was 
given always to take action to defend its nationals in Manchuria". 131 
The reaction to the Israeli incursion at Entebbe was politically predictable. 
Western states were supportive whereas Non-Aligned or Communist states 
condemned the action as an act of aggression. France supported a conditional 
interpretation of the U. N. Charter. Accordingly, the action did not infringe the 
territorial integrity or the political independence of Uganda, although it might 
have infringed its sovereignty. ' 32 On the other hand, the Soviet Union saw in the 
action "...... an outright violation of the Charter especially of Article 2, 
paragraph 4...... 99 
133 
.. 
The Security Council failed to reach a decision 
condemning this action. 
The British government also conveyed her pleasure for the safe return of the 
Israeli hostages from Entebbe. It also supported the American action in Iran as a 
rescue operation which required a limited amount of applied force in 
contradistinction to a military action which requires a considerable amount of 
force. 134 The E. E. C in a communique expressed its "solidarity" with the U. S. 
government and abstained from any criticism. 135 The operation was, on the other 
hand, censured by communist and Third World countries. As for the I. C. J., it 
did not seize on the lawfulness of the action which occurred during the 
preparation of its judgment but instead claimed that it felt "bound to observe 
that an operation undertaken in those circumstances, from whatever motive, is 
of a kind calculated to undermine respect for the judicial process in international 
, 
136 
relations 
..... . 
"' L. N. O. J., (1932), p. 345 
132 U. N. Doc. S/PV. 1943, (14/7/1996), pp. 28-32 
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In the Grenada case, it is reported that the students expressed their gratitude but 
this is unverifiable and it is suggested that the real threat emerged during the 
U. S. landing. 137 In the Security Council and the General Assembly' 38 the U. S. 
action was overwhelmingly condemned but some states have acknowledged the 
legal position of protecting nationals. 
In the Dominican Republic, the reaction was politically tailored. The 
Communist and Third World States condemned the action, whereas U. S. allies 
and major European states such as France and Britain embraced the offered 
legal justification. France disproved the additional U. S. aim of "preventing 
another Cuba". 139 
The Security Council only belatedly addressed the situation in Liberia, on 
January 22,1991. Previous efforts were unsuccessful. Although the situation 
had international repercussions, with thousands of refugees pouring into 
neighbouring countries, the Security Council considered the situation as an 
internal matter for Liberia. The Security Council only "commended" the efforts 
by ECOWAS. ' 40 In that meeting, the Representative of Liberia was unequivocal 
in his sentiment of frustration with the working of the Security Council and 
emphasised: 
"[t]he imperative need to review and perhaps reinterpret the Charter, 
particularly its provisions which calls for non-interference in the internal 
affairs of Member States. Regrettably, the strict application of this 
provision has hampered the effectiveness of the Council and its principal 
objective of maintaining international peace and security. As a result, 
millions of innocent men, women and children have continued to be 
victimised by conflicts throughout the world and this world body, which 
has the moral obligation and authority, has been prevented from averting 
these human tragedies". '41 
"' J. N. Moore, "Grenada and the International Double Standard", 78 A. J. I. L., (1984), p. 145, 
at p. 162; J. H. Karas, J. M. Goodman, "The United States Action in Grenada: An Exercise in 
Realpolitik", 16 Inter-American Law Rev., (1984), p. 53, at p. 55 
138 G. A. Res. 38/7, (2/11/1983) 
19 20 U. N. SCOR, 1198th mtg., (1965), paras. 37,111,112, pp. 13,24 
140 U. N. SCOR. 2974th mtg., U. N. Doc. S/PV 2974 (1991), p. 473, (Statement of the President, 
Mr. Bagbeni Adeito Nzengeya) 
'' Ibid., (Statement of Mr. Bull) 
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The U. S. operation in Liberia happened at a time when the international 
community was preoccupied with the Gulf Crisis and it paid minimal attention 
to the suffering and destruction in that country. However, surprisingly, even the 
most vociferous critics of U. S. policies failed to comment on the action. Only 
the Cuban Ambassador to the United Nations condemned the lack of Security 
Council authorisation. 142 The disposition of the Administration was explained 
by the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. He commended the result 
of the action which implemented the U. S. policy in the region as stated by him 
earlier, which was "to make sure that the American lives are protected" 
. 
143 
IV. 7 The general humanitarian character of the action. Another important 
feature of these rescue operations, which also impinges upon their legal basis, is 
the nationality of the people to whom protection is accorded and the states 
which are involved, either actively or by providing assistance. 
According to the perspectives of this study, the effect of these actions is 
essentially humanitarian; the rescuing of people, and that on this ground there 
should be no discrimination between the endangered people. The present case 
study presents a medley of illations concerning this issue. Some actions are 
strictly limited to nationals of the rescuing state, or those of the participating in 
the operation states. Others have a wider mandate and rescue foreign nationals 
indistinguishably but only a small number are concerned with the local 
population. 
In most of the pre-Charter period, the interposing state alone or in co-operation 
with other states rescued nationals not solely restricted to members of the state 
in question. In fact, they were American or nationals of the major European 
countries. The explanation for this may be political or historical. Nationals of 
these countries were identified with their state which was a colonial power. 
Therefore, the anger and disillusionment against their policies was directed 
towards these particular nationalities. On the other hand, nationals of these 
particular states often travelled or lived in other countries, thus offering 
themselves an easy target. In modern times, where mutual communication is 
142 R. B. Lillich, "Forcible Protection of Nationals Abroad: The Liberian `Incident' of 1990", 35 
German Y. B. I. L., (1992), p. 205, at p. 212 
143 US. Policy and the Crisis in Liberia, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Africa of the House 
Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 101st Congress, 2nd Sess. 1990, p. 24 
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abundant, the protection afforded to different nationalities alludes towards the 
humanitarian character of such a measure, beyond a strictly defensive character. 
The latter, if still valid, would require the abandonment of foreign nationals to 
their destiny. An illustration of such humanitarian action in evidence is Liberia, 
where foreign nationals were rescued together with Americans. The U. S. A, 
while refuting suggestions for wider intervention, sent on August 5a contingent 
of 255 Marines to evacuate U. S. and foreign citizens from Monrovia, without 
approval from the Liberian authorities. At the first stage of "Operation Sharp 
Edge", they rescued 74 people, mainly U. S. citizens working within the 
Embassy or Communication Installations sites in Liberia. According to the 
White House, the operation was staged "to safeguard lives, to draw down the 
number of Americans at the Embassy to minimum staff, and to provide 
additional security for those who remain". It stated also that they would remain 
"as long as necessary to insure the safety of U. S. citizens in the country". 144 
During two weeks of operation, they rescued almost 2,000 foreign nationals, 
including 600 Lebanese nationals and 300 Indians as well as those from Italy, 
Canada, France, U. K, Portugal, Spain, Philippines, and Iraq, and ultimately, 
only 166 U. S. citizens. 145 The Bush Administration stated that "the U. S. action 
did not indicate or constitute any intention on the part of the U. S. Government to 
intervene militarily in the Liberian conflict". 146 The second part of the rescue 
operation occurred in April 1996 with the resurgence of internal strife. The 
operation started on April 11,1996 in which the American evacuated 2,000 
foreign nationals, including 400 Americans, to the neighbouring state of Sierra 
Leone. 
The humanitarian purpose of the initial phase of the U. S. action in the 
Dominican Republic (1965) was reiterated by President Johnson: 
"..... as we had to go into Congo to preserve the lives of American citizens 
and haul them out when they were being shot at, we went into the 
Dominican Republic to preserve the lives of American citizens and the 
'" R. B. Lillich, "Forcible Protection of Nationals Abroad: The Liberian `Incident' of 1990", 35 
German Y. B. I. L., (1992), p. 205, at p. 209 
"S 36 Keesing's, (1990), p. 37644; Wash. Post, 6 Aug. 1990, A17; "U. S. Evacuates 800 from 
Liberia", N. Y Times, (20 Aug. 1990), A9 
146 N. Y ? limes, (6 Aug. 1990), A2; Wash. Post, (6 Aug. 1990), A 1; Press Release. United States 
Mission to the United Nations, Press Release USUN 60 
- 
(90), 5 August 1990 
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citizens of a good many other nations 
..... 
We removed 5,600 people from 
46 nations, and we didn't sprain an ankle doing it". 147 
This statement reveals the humanitarian character of the action which has also 
been maintained by other decision-makers. Ambassador Bunker stated that 
"United States forces were dispatched purely and solely for humanitarian 
purposes, for the protection of the lives not only of the United States citizens but 
the lives of citizens of other countries as well". ' 48 
Natives are generally excluded from such protection. Nevertheless, the 
American troops extended their protection to native "reputable" Nicaraguans 
during their rescue action of 1912. In the same humanitarian spirit is the 
intervention of Lieutenant Nicholson to secure captured political opponents in 
Uruguay (1855) who were threatened with massacre by governmental troops 
. 
149 
This reveals the material constriction of such action which coincides with its 
legal underpinnings as a state defensive action. However, the moral dilemma it 
represents is obvious when distraught people are left behind and advocates 
towards altering the legal basis to one of a humanitarian nature as it will be 
presented later. Reports of the airlifting from the U. S. Embassy's compound in 
Liberia refer to the frustration and agony of the remaining Liberian civilians. ' 50 
A germane issue is the assistance offered by other states or their participation in 
the rescue mission. This could not transform the action to collective self-defence 
because the assistance is not necessarily military, or indeed active and, on the 
other hand, not all the states whose nationals are to be rescued offer such 
assistance. Whereas the safeguarding of particular nationals incites the mission, 
securing of non-nationals could not be regarded as incidental because it is 
prompted by considerations of humanity. 
IV. 8 A preliminary evaluation. In order to recapitulate, the discussed cases share 
in common certain significant characteristics and also comply to a large extent 
"' 53 Dept State Bull., (5/7/1965), pp. 19,20 
148 52 Dep't State Bull., (1965), p. 854. See also Senator Fulbright: "If the United States had 
really been intervening to save American lives, as it had a moral if not strictly legal right to 
do, it could have done so promptly and then withdrawn and the incident would soon have 
been forgotten". 111 Cong. Rec. (15/9/1965), 23001 
149 Memorandum, p. 60 
Aso The Newsweek April 29,1996, pp. 18-19; The Economist, 13-19 April, 1996, pp. 58-59; 
The Sunday Times, 14 April 1996, A. 15 
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with the criteria of customary law as they have been articulated by Professor 
Waldock. That is, imminent threat; inability by the territorial state to protect 
foreign nationals and proportionality of the pursued action with the objective. 
Firstly, the protective actions usually occur when the situation is hazardous. 
This assertion coincides with our previous observation concerning humanitarian 
intervention proper, whereby the propensity for humanitarian intervention 
increases when state authority declines and lawlessness reigns. There is a shared 
appreciation that sovereignty and non-intervention protect the authoritative 
function of the state. If this ceases to function, then foreign intervention is 
legitimised because it tries to contain the repercussions of such malfunction. The 
case of Somalia is indicative in that the intervention took place in a country 
without a government in order to alleviate the plight of starving and brutalised 
people. 
Secondly, concerning the factual situation and the extent of the danger, there 
may exist reservations but the interpretation of events may be approved or 
disapproved according to subjective criteria. The British Foreign Secretary, 
although supportive of the U. S. action in Grenada, disputed, nevertheless, the 
factual circumstances as presented by the U. S. A. Concerning the latter, the 
extent of the danger which U. S. nationals were facing was not well established. 
Thirdly, what some of these cases fail to satisfy is the criterion of 
proportionality which in cases such as Grenada or Dominican Republic was 
squandered by the continuation of the initial action which, as such, falls within 
the said criteria. 
Finally, although the self-defence argument was the most prominent in the 
discussion of these cases, humanitarian motives were not discounted. Thus, the 
American action in Iran has been justified as a measure of self-defence but with 
an equally prominent humanitarian aspect. The official justification for the 
action was spelled out by President Carter who referred to humanitarian 
concerns: "I ordered this rescue mission prepared in order to safeguard 
American lives, 
..... 
" and "..... the mission was a humanitarian mission. It was 
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not directed against Iran. It was not directed against the people of Iran. It was 
not undertaken with any feeling of hostility toward Iran or its people". ' 51 
Having presented the main aspects of these cases, the discussion proceeds now 
with explaining the signification of the defensive or humanitarian argument. In 
particular, how and why an attack against a national could trigger a self-defence 
action by his national state. This will be achieved by looking at the wording of 
Article 51 as an inherent or customary right and the requirement of an armed 
attack. We shall also comment on the links: political; economical; emotional 
between nationals and their respective states. Finally, the argument of 
humanitarian intervention will be presented. 
V. THE PROTECTION OF NATIONALS AS CUSTOMARY/ 
CHARTER SELF-DEFENCE OR HUMANITARIAN ACTION 
V. 1 The protection of nationals within Article 51 of the U. N. Charter: 
customary self-defence or inherent right. In the pursued analysis of the self- 
defence rule contained in the U. N. Charter, two main arguments can be 
identified: one limited in scope, restricting self-defence to a preceding armed 
attack; the other broader in scope by admitting the customary content of the 
right. In this section, the development of the customary right in relation to the 
protection of nationals shall be explored. 
Although the practice of protecting nationals abroad was established in the pre- 
Charter period, the theoretical underpinnings of this right were initially 
obfuscated. The explanation lies in the absence of any legal constriction on war 
which would have assisted in discerning and identifying lesser uses of force and 
also in the multifaceted concept of self-help. Hence, the writers of the 19th and 
early 20th century represent a medley of voices. Some justify such actions under 
the caption of self-preservation. According to Hall, one instance where the right 
of self-preservation materialises is with the right possessed by states to 
131 80 Dep't State Bull., (1980), No. 2039, p. 38 
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protecting their subjects abroad. 152 The same opinion is shared by Wheaton 1 53 
and is reiterated in the Regulations for the Government of U. S. Navy in 1913: 
"[t]he right of self-preservation, however, is a right which belongs to 
States as well as to individuals, and in the case of States it includes the 
protection of the State, its honour, and its possessions, and the lives and 
property of its citizens against arbitrary violence, actual or impending, 
whereby the State or its citizens may suffer irreparable injury". 154 
On the other hand, Westlake regards such action as the exercise of the right of 
self-defence' 55 and to the same effect is also a decision of the French Cour de 
Cassation: "..... que, pour la protection de ses nationaux, la France conserve 
toujours les droits qu'elle tient de la legitime defense..... ". 1 56 Hyde is also 
disposed towards the defensive character of the relevant action. 151 
Oppenheim regards the protection of nationals as a circumstance justifying 
intervention, ' 58 an opinion upheld by Judge Huber in the Spanish Moroccan 
Arbitration: "[h]owever, it cannot be denied that at a certain point the interest of 
a state in exercising protection over its nationals and their property can take 
precedence over territorial sovereignty, despite the absence of any conventional 
152 
"They have the right, that is to say, to exact reparations for maltreatment of their subjects by 
the administrative agents of a foreign government if no means of obtaining legal redress through 
the tribunals of the country exist, or if such means as exist have been exhausted in vain" He 
observes that "it is only when those [local] laws are not fairly administered, or when they provide 
no remedy for wrongs, or 
..... 
constitute grievous oppression in themselves, that the state to 
which the individual belongs has the right to interfere in his behalf'. W. F. Hall, A Treatise on 
International Law, P. Higgins (ed. ), 8th ed., (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1924), pp. 331,332. 
15' H. Wheaton, Elements of International Law, G. C. Wilson, (ed. ), Classics of International 
Law, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1936), p. 106, para. 76 
154 Regulations for the Government of the Navy of the United States, (Washington, 1913), 
paras. 1646-1648, cited in M. Offutt, The Protection of Citizens Abroad, (Baltimore, The John 
Hopkins Press, 1928), p. 6 
ss J. Westlake, International Law, 2nd ed., part. I., (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1913), p. 299 
116 Cour de Cassation, Ch. crim, arret du 17 mai 1839, in A. C. Kiss, Repertoire de la Pratique 
Francaise en Matiere de Droit International Public, tome I, (Paris, Editions du Centre National 
de la Recherche Scientifique, 1962), para. 10 
157 "When 
..... 
the safety of foreigners in their persons and property is jeopardised by the 
impotence or indisposition of the territorial sovereign to afford adequate protection, the landing 
or entrance of a foreign public force of the state to which such nationals belong, is to be 
anticipated" and then he qualifies it by saying that on grounds of self-defence, foreign forces may 
not unlawfully penetrate the territory of a state. C. Hyde, International Law, 2nd rev. ed., vol. I, 
(Boston, Little Brown & Co., 1951), p. 647, para. 202 
3e 
"A state's right to protect its citizens abroad, where they are being wrongfully treated, may 
justifiably lead it to intervene in order to secure their proper treatment". L. Oppenheim, 
International Law, 9th ed., Sir R. Y. Jennings, Sir A. Watts (eds. ), vol.!, "Peace", Part 1, (London, 
Longmans, 1992), p. 440 
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provisions. This right of intervention has been claimed by all states: only its 
limits are disputed". 159 
However, legal theories were of minimal value at a time when thejus ad bellum 
was unrestricted. It is essential, therefore, to consider whether this state of affairs 
has remained intact or whether it was mitigated by subsequent legal 
developments. In particular, it is necessary to examine whether the League of 
Nations and the Pact of Paris which outlawed war have constricted the right of 
self-defence to such an extent as to preclude the protection of nationals 
The primordial task of the League was to maintain international peace and in 
this respect it was "un echec total". 160 The Covenant did not contain an absolute 
prohibition on war but only certain restrictions. Whereas the Covenant referred 
to "war", the technical notion of war was controversial and ambiguous. States 
could, consequently, exploit this weakness in order to initiate ostensible wars. 1 61 
This was the most important but not the only defect of the Covenant. The 
comparison between the propitious intentions of the League and the modes of 
attaining them which are subject to lacunas, ' 62 supports, by inference, the 
argument that states retained significant liberty in the area of Jus ad bellum. 
A complementary instrument is The General Treaty for Renunciation of War as 
an Instrument of National Policy (1928). The Pact employs the ambiguous 
phrase "resort to war" whose technical determination was omitted. Implied 
within this phrase is that the use of force short of war was within state 
discretion. ' 63 It has been argued that lesser uses of force were prohibited by 
159 Claims of British Subjects and British Protected Persons against the Authorities of the 
Spanish Protectorate in Morocco, Award of 1925, R. I. A. A. II, p. 616, at p. 641 
160 J. Kunz, "La crise et les transformations du droit des Gens", 88 R. C., (1955 H), p. 1 at p. 68. It 
should also be pointed out that the League was doomed to fail for more profound reasons than 
the identified gaps or the non participation of the U. S. A may suggest. Charles De Visscher debits 
the failure to "une confiance trop grande dans la puissance de la raison"; "le caractere trop 
statique du Pact"; "1'absence de presuppositions axiologiques et sociologiques"; and "le fait que 
le droit de la S. d. N entre 1920 et 1939 s'est trouve trop en avarice sur les faits". C. De Visscher, 
Theories et Realites en Droit International Public, 4eme ed., (Paris, Pedone, 1970), pp. 69-78 
161 J. L. Brierly, "International law and Resort to Armed Force", 4 Cam. L. J., (1932), p. 308; H. 
Lauterpacht, "`Resort to War' and the Interpretation of the Covenant During the Manchurian 
Dispute", 28 A. J. I. L, (1934), p. 43; J. F. Williams, "The Covenant of the League of Nations and 
War" 5 Cam. L. J., (1933), p. 1; Q. Wright, "The Test of Aggression in the Italo-Ethiopian War" 
30 A. J. I. L, (1936), p. 45. 
162 Y. Dinstein, War Aggression and Self-defence, 2nd ed., (Cambridge, Grotius Publications, 
1994), pp. 77-83 
163 C. H. M. Waldock, "The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International 
Law", 81 R. C., (1952 II), p. 455, atpp. 471-474 
290 
virtue of Article 2 which envisaged the peaceful settlement of disputes. ' 64 
Nonetheless, at that time, measures not amounting to war were considered 
peaceful. 165 Secondly, wars in self-defence were permitted. The Pact does not 
contain any provision on this subject. The declarations of the participants were, 
however, explicit and unambiguous. Foreign Secretary Kellogg, following 
probably Talleyrand's dictum that "si cela va de soi sans le dire, cela ira mieux 
encore en le disant", declared: "[t]here is nothing 
..... 
which restricts or impairs 
in any way the right of self-defence. That right is inherent in every sovereign 
state and is implicit in every treaty 
..... 
Every nation alone is competent to decide 
whether the circumstances require recourse to war in self-defence". ' 66 During 
the deliberations in the American Senate, Senator Borah, responding to a 
question by Senator Bingham, affirmed that any military or naval action 
purporting to protect nationals is in self-defence. ' 67 The British Foreign 
Secretary stated, regarding the right of self-defence, that "I am entirely in accord 
with the views expressed by Mr. Kellogg in his speech of April 28, that the 
proposed treaty does not impair or restrict in any way the right of self- 
defence". 168 The French and Germans expressly corroborated this view. It 
appears from the claims of the principal signatories in the course of diplomatic 
correspondence that states were the sole judges of the circumstances justifying 
recourse to war in self-defence. Consequently, the contention would not be 
preposterous that, notwithstanding these developments, states retained not a 
modicum but a magnitude of freedom in the area ofjus ad bellum 
.1 
69 The most 
crucial question in this respect is whether these developments curtailed to any 
degree the customary rule of protecting nationals. 
It has been maintained that the customary law is identical with the law of the 
U. N. Charter contained in Article 51, which, supposedly, justifies self-defence 
164 Q. Wright, "The Meaning of the Pact of Paris", 27 A. J. I. L., (1933), p. 50, at pp. 51-54. 
X63 D. W. Bowett, Self-defence in International Law, (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 
1958), pp. 135-136: "..... under the accepted terminology of international law, measures involving 
the use of force but falling short of war are characterized as `pacific'...... " 
166 Note of June 23,1928, in 22 A. J. I. L., (1928, Suppl. ), p. 109 
67 P. Mandelstam, "L' interpretation du Pacte Briand-Kellogg", R. G. D. 1. P, (1933), p. 596 
168 Cmd 3153, p. 10, in D. J Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law, 4th ed., (London, 
Sweet & Maxwell, 1991), p. 820. 
169 It was observed that an interpretation which leaves to the interested state the right to decide 
conclusively whether the Treaty has been observed, probably deprives the Pact of the essential 
vincullum juris and renders it legally meaningless. H. Lauterpacht, "The Pact of Paris and the 
Budapest Articles of Interpretation", 20 Trans. Grotius Soc. 1. L., (1934), p. 178 at p. 198. 
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only in the case of an armed attack. ' 70 However, the repeated practice of states 
and the legal amplitude concerning the use of force would rather refute this 
assertion. 1 71 The intricacies of the Covenant and of the Pact justify the assertion 
that the customary law of force has not been totally modified. Only war, which 
is heavily charged in human conscience, became questionable as a relational 
method. The League of Nations, which was the first elementary step towards 
regulating force, confronted the reluctance of states, firstly, to endow the League 
with substantive powers and, secondly, to fulfil their minimal obligations. The 
Kellogg-Briand Pact was another valiant attempt in this process. Nevertheless, 
the right of self-defence was retained unaffected which, in conjunction with the 
ambiguities the term "war" conveyed, amplified more the basis for resorting to 
force. Thus, the admission of self-defence seems to legalize what the Pact 
sought to exorcize. State practice, past and present, manifests that the argument 
of self-defence is the most frequently invoked in order to justify the use of 
armed force. 172 Given this "broad limitation" on the use of force, it is not 
convincingly stated that the states have abnegated their perceived rights on this 
area. Concerning the protection of nationals, some of the legal bases 
underpinning this right have become questionable, in particular those related to 
self-preservation or even intervention, but not, however, the notion of it being a 
right exercised under the rubric of self-defence. According to this formula, the 
nationals are envisaged as an extension of the state. Hence, an injury to them is 
an injury to the state and the state resorts to self-defence in order to protect 
them. In order to recapitulate, the pre-Charter law sufficiently supports a wide 
self-defence concept covering cases of armed attack and others extending into 
the purview of self-help or even self-preservation. 173 In addition, state practice 
170 I. Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 
1963), p. 280 
"' Lord McNair, Law of Treaties, 2nd ed., (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1961), pp. 209-210: 
"The last half century has, however, witnessed a change, if not a transformation, in the attitude of 
international law 
..... 
towards the use or treat of force for the purpose of attaining national 
objectives (other than the emergency protection by a state of its nationals and its or their property 
located in a foreign country when the local authorities are unable or unwilling to give this 
protection)". 
72 Some examples in the period before the outbreak of World War II are the China-U. S. S. R 
hostilities of 1929; the Manchurian incident, 1931; the Sino-Japanese hostilities of 1937. As it 
was said somewhat intemperately but not out of context, self-defence sanctions all wars. E. 
Borchard, 1 ZaÖRV, (1929), p. 126, cited in H. Lauterpacht, supra note 169, p. 198 
1" 
"Accordingly, a legal literature which recognised a jus ad bellum still acknowledges a 
system of justifications for the use of force which included self-defence". Brun-Otto Bryde, 
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before or after the Charter, although inconsistent, has, on the other hand, 
precluded any restrictive reading of Article 51 
Be that as it may, the controversial point of whether the U. N. Charter has 
abridged or abolished the right of self-defence, or, whether a customary right 
exists apart from Article 51 should be considered. More specifically we shall 
consider: (i) the role of customary law within Article 51 and (ii) the requirement 
of an armed attack for self-defence and protective action. The latter will be 
considered in the next section. 
Article 51 betrays a certain belief in the immanence and self-evidence of this 
right by referring to "inherent" right or "droit naturel". It should be admitted that 
it cannot pride itself for effulgence and this has rendered the legitimacy and the 
confines of self-defence nebulous. Inherent right connotes a jus naturalis 
substance, an inalienable right. On the other hand, it may be construed as being 
inherent to sovereignty. The genesis of Article 51 and its deliberation satisfies 
the first construction. There was no reservation of self-defence because this right 
was considered to be "unimpaired" and "admitted". Consequently, it could be 
maintained that the understanding of the drafters concerning this right was that it 
is inalienable, non-suspensible and that even a treaty of immense importance 
such as the Charter could not derogate from it. As a natural right, it has an 
existence independent of the Charter and Article 51 simply acknowledges this 
fact. 174 A purely natural right of self-defence raises the question of its content 
and its determination. Consequently, this would direct the discussion towards 
the naturalist concept of objective values with all the criticism it conveyed. 
The second contention is that self-defence is an attribute of sovereignty, that is, 
an inherent right to sovereignty. It was recognised in the Note of the U. S. 
Government to the Pact of Paris whereby self-defence was characterised as 
inherent in every sovereign state. This interpretation could not answer the 
"Self-Defence", in Encyclopedia of Public International Law, vol. 4, (Amsterdam, North- 
Holland Publ. Co., 1982), p. 212; D. W. Bowett, Self-defence in International Law, (Manchester, 
Manchester University Press, 1958), 29-114 
174 See statement of U. S. S. R representative to the Security Council concerning the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan: "Article 51 of the Charter does not create the right of States to 
individual or collective self-defence. It merely confirms that right and particularly stresses that 
this is an inalienable right of States, and that hte Charter in no way whatsoever impairs it". 
U. N. Doc. S/PV. 2190, p. 12, para. l ll 
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question posed above concerning the extent and legality of this concept. If self- 
defence is conterminous with the concept of sovereignty it may fall victim of the 
latter's variable content. Like the concept of intervention, it may connote an 
unbridled right or a right which is proscribed and circumvented by positive law. 
Hence, the difficulty of including natural rights into positive law reappears as 
with the case of (non)-intervention. 
Acknowledging the customary character of self-defence within the term 
"inherent" addresses the question of its content. This view was accepted by the 
L CJ in the Nicaragua Case where it interpreted the word "inherent" as 
conveying the meaning of customary law. 175 Any reservations, thus, pertain to 
the substance of what is a customary right of self-defence. The L CJ identified 
armed attack as a common prerequisite in both customary and Charter law. 176 
The Court in the latter occasion referred, expressis verbis, to "collective armed 
response" and this affirms our previous observation concerning the double 
notion of self-defence: collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs; 
individual self-defence without the requirement of an armed attack. However, 
there is a tendency to relate this pronouncement with the case of individual self- 
defence. The position of the present author on this issue will be negative for the 
reasons demonstrated in the section dealing with the Court's reasoning. 
In order to recapitulate, Article 51 encompasses the customary law concerning 
the individual right of self-defence. This law is abundant with practice which, 
therefore, supports the inclusion of the right to protect nationals within the 
boundaries of self-defence. The discussion will now proceed with an elaboration 
on the concept of armed attack. 
V. 2 Protection of nationals as self-defence when an armed attack occurs. 
Nationals comprise the human component of the state 177 and there exists a 
"S Nicaragua Case, p. 54, para. 94, p. 102, para. 193 
16 Nicaragua Case, p. 122, para. 237, p. 110, para. 211: "In the view of the Court, under 
international law in force today 
- 
whether customary international law or that of the United 
Nations system 
- 
States do not have a right of "collective" armed response to acts which do 
not constitute an `armed attack"'. 
"' Deutsche Continental Gas-Gesellschaft, R. T. A. M, vol. IX, p. 336: "Un Etat n'existe qu' ä 
condition de posseder un territoire, une population habitant ce territoire et une puissance 
publique qui s'exerce sur la population et sur le territoire. ". Montevideo Convention on the Rights 
and Duties of States, (1933), Article 1, in 28 A. J. I. L., (1934 Suppl. ), p. 75: "A State as a person of 
international law should possess the following qualifications; (a) permanent population; (b) 
defined territory; (c) government and (d) capacity to enter into relations with other states". H. 
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mutual reciprocal psychological link between them. The identification of 
interests between nationals and states is concomitant with the emergence of 
modem states. It has its origins in the "lettres de marche" or "lettres de 
represailles" (reprisal letters), whereby individuals avenge and rectify any delict 
incurred with the acquiescence of the local ruler. 178 However, the consolidation 
of state power, its political, military and economic predominance caused the 
"nationalisation de 1'ancien systeme des represailles privees". 19 
The protection afforded to nationals by their state under the rubric of self- 
defence is based on the theory of social contract. 1 80 The relinquishment of 
certain rights by individuals, in particular the right to life and liberty, is 
confluent with their consensual attribution to the national state which pursues 
their redemption. 1 81 The state is instrumental in affording the necessary 
Kelsen, "Recognition in International Law. Theoretical Observations", 35 A. J. I. L., (1941), p. 605, 
at pp. 606-609; T. C. Chen, The International Law of Recognition, (London, Stevens & Sons, 
1951), pp. 54-63; P. Guggenheim, "Les principes de droit international public", 80 R. C., (1952 I), 
p. 1, at pp. 80-96; P. De Visscher, "Cours general de droit international public", 136 R. C., (1972 
II), p. 1, at p. 46; Ch. Rousseau, Droit International Public, Tome II, "Les sujets de Droit", (Paris, 
Sirey, 1974), pp. 15-17; J. Crawford, "The Criteria for Statehood in International Law", 48 
B. Y. B. I. L., (1976-77), p. 93, at pp. 111-143 and The Creation of States in International Law, 
(Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1979), pp. 31-76; Oppenheim's International Law, 9th ed., Sir R. Y. 
Jennings and Sir A. Watts (eds. ), vol.!, "Peace", Part. 1, (London, Longman, 1992), pp. 120-122 
178 C. H. M. Waldock, "The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International 
Law", 81 R. C., (1952 II), p. 455, p. 459: "...... in the absence of other means of redressing injuries 
to foreigners, it served a purpose and played an important part in the development of the modern 
right possessed by States of protecting their nationals abroad". A. V. Freeman, The International 
Responsibility of States for Denial of Justice, (London, Longrnans, 1970), p. 54: "...... an 
individual who was wronged in a strange land and who had there been unable to obtain 
reparation for his injury from the local sovereign, might with the permission of his own prince, 
initiate forceful measures to obtain that justice which had been refused to him". R. B. Lillich, 
"Duties of States Regarding the Civil Rights of Aliens", 161 R. C., (1978 III), p. 329; R. B. Lillich, 
The Human Rights of Aliens in Contemporary International Law, (Manchester, Manchester 
University Press, 1984), ch. 1, p. 5 
19 P. De Visscher, "Cours general de droit international public", 136 R. C., (1972 H), p. 1, at 
p. 155, G. Clark, "English Practice with Regard to Reprisals by Private Persons", 27 A. J. I. 
L., 
(1927), p. 694, at pp. 704-705: "As the English State through the 14th, 15th, an 17th centuries 
gradually became better organised and developed more effective authority within 
its own 
territory, it progressively encroached on the freedom of individual Englishmen to 
deal with 
outsiders as they chose 
..... . 
Thus it would appear that as the English state approached a 
condition of governmental organisation comparable in inclusiveness to that of the 
English towns 
in the 13th century, it took away from private persons, as the towns have done more than 
five 
centuries earlier, the right to use force on their own account". 
180 D. W. Bowett, "The Use of Force in the Protection of Nationals", 43 Trans. 
Grotius S. I. L, 
(1957), p. 111, at p. 116; D. W. Bowett, Self-defence in International Law, (Manchester, 
Manchester University Press, 1958), ch. V, p. 91 
18' E. de Vattel, Le Droit Des Gens ou Principes de la Loi Naturelle, appliques ä 
la Conduite et 
aux Affaires aires des Nations et des Souverains, trans. C. G. Fenwick, (Washington D. C, 
Carnegie 
Institution of Washington, 1916), in Classics of International Law, Bk. II, ch. VI, sec. 
71; 
Rustommjee v Queen, (1875-76), 1 Q. B. D, p. 487, at p. 497; Panevezys - Saldutiskis Railway 
Case, P. C. I. J., (1939), Series AJB., No. 76, p. 16: "In taking up the care of its nationals...... a 
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protection. Therefore, the contract theory explains why an injury towards 
nationals is perceived as an injury to the state, which is an instrument created 
through the consent of this particular community's members. It also explains the 
compulsion experienced by the members of this particular community to redress 
the wrong which is translated into a political imperative for the government. 
Consequently, the bearers of injuries coalesce conceptually from nationals to the 
state, which resorts to self-defence in order to rectify the damage. ' 82 In this case, 
self-defence appears as a vindication of state sovereignty, but it may 
additionally mean the vindication of human rights if the state is redefined as 
people consenting to waive certain rights which are protected now by the state. 
This issue will be presented subsequently. Returning to the state justification, it 
is also possible to trace the forcible protection of nationals as an aspect of self- 
defence in a rather utilitarian perception of the individual's function within a 
society. People are viewed as the locomotives in the development of states. 
Their economic, cultural, political engagement contributes to the particularities a 
state acquires. The loss of nationals is viewed as a material loss of the state 
state is in reality asserting its own right, the right to ensure in the person of its nationals respect 
for the rules of international law". Mavromatis Concession Case, P. C. I. J Series A, No. 12, p. 11; 
Separate Opinion of Judge Gros in Barcelona Traction Company Case, I. C. J. Rep., (1970), p. 3, 
at p. 276-277: "The damage to the company is that it is destroyed; the damage to the shareholders 
is that they are injured in respect of their property through the destruction of the investment; the 
damage suffered by the state of the shareholders is that one component element of the national 
economy has undergone spoliation". 
182 Sir C. J. B. Hurst, "Nationality of Claims", 7 B. YB. I. L., (1926), p. 163, at p. 165; P. B. Porter, 
"L'intervention en droit international modern", 32 R. C., (1930 II), p. 607, at pp. 647-650; V. H. 
Rutgers, "La mise en harmonie du Pacte de la S. D. N avec le Pacte de Paris", 38 R. C., (1931 IV), 
p. 1, at p. 69; R. Redslob, Traite de Droit des Gens, (Paris, Recueil Sirey, 1950), p. 256; B. Cheng, 
General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals, (London, Stevens 
& Sons, 1953), p. 93; D. W. Bowett, The Use of Force in the Protection of Nationals", 43 Trans. 
Grotius S. I. L, (1957), p. 111, at pp. 116-118 and Self-defence in International Law, (Manchester, 
Manchester University Press, 1958), pp. 94-105; Sir G. Fitzmaurice, "The General Principles of 
International Law Considered from the Standpoint of the Rule of Law", 92 R. C., (1957 II), p. 1, 
at pp. 172-173; C. H. M. Waldock, "The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in 
International Law", 81 R. C., (1952 II), p. 455, at p. 503; H. F van Panhuys, The Role of Nationality 
in International Law, (Leyden, A. W. Sijthoff, 1959), pp. 113-114; J. E. S. Fawcett, "Intervention 
in International Law, A Study of Some Recent Cases", 103 R. C., (1961 II), p. 347, at p. 404-405; 
C. G. Fenwick, "The Dominican Republic: Intervention or Collective Self-defence", 60 A. J. I. L. , 
(1966), p. 64; A. V. W. Thomas & A. J. Thomas, The Dominican Republic Crisis 1965, The Ninth 
Hammarskjöld Forum 1967, (Dobbs Ferry, N. Y, Oceana Pub. Inc., 1967), p. 14; D. P. O'Connell, 
International Law, 2nd ed., (London, Stevens & Sons, 1970), vol.!, pp. 303-304; J. H. W. Verzijl, 
International Law in Historical Perspective, vol. 1, "General Subjects", (Leiden, A. W. Sijthoff, 
1972), p. 242 
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because it diminishes the collective capability for progress. 183 Consequently, the 
state defends the essence of its sovereignty by protecting its nationals. 
Nonetheless, the self-defence justification is archaic and rather contumelious to 
the evolution of the individual stigma in international law because it treats 
individuals as mere objects. The development of human rights law has 
interloped into the area of protection and it is on the basis of protecting the 
human rights of nationals and non nationals that a state should justify forcible 
actions. This reasoning alters the legal basis for the relevant action but it does 
not as yet draw into disrepute the protective function of the state due to the 
inadequacies and disparities in the protection of human rights. The human rights 
development should not obscure the fact that the individual in many instances 
appears powerless and desperate. The protective power (even if forceful) of his 
state should be supportive to the realisation of the individual's human rights. It 
should be founded on the experienced abhorrence towards the violations of 
human rights which the state attempts to rectify, rather than on a 
commensuration of offences. Therefore, the protective power of the state has 
two aspects, one negative aspect of dissuasion and one positive of actual 
protection when the need arises. In the end, there must be a synthesis, an 
osmosis of the protection of human rights and that of the state's protective 
function. 
Having said that, the rationale for the theory of state imputation is not otiose. 
The individual has not escaped the identification with his national state and 
suffers occasionally for the vices attributed to his state. The selective targeting 
of nationals in acts of terrorism or hostage-taking are a flagrant violation of 
human rights. Moreover, they present an intimidation which compromises the 
183 F. S. Dunn, The Protection of Nationals. A Study in the Application of International Law, 
(Baltimore, The John Hopkins Press, 1932), p. 38. See Brief of the U. S. A in the Santa Ysabel 
Cases before the U. S. 
-Mexican Special Claims Commission of 1923: "His 
(the citizen's) 
productive power, his ability to contribute to the intellectual and social progress of the 
community, and other elements which are obvious, are under present conditions matters of 
primary importance in the national life and development and any act of foreign nation which 
destroys or impairs the productive, intellectual and social value of a citizen constitutes a material 
injury to the nation to which he belongs, entirely aside from any question of offense to the 
national honour or injury to the person himself or to those dependent upon or attached to him". 
Ibid., p. 212, note 3; F. S. Dunn, "International Law and Private Property Rights", 28 Col. L. Rev., 
(1928), p. 166, at p. 170. U. S. President Coolige said: "the person and property of a citizen are a 
part of the general domain of nation, even when abroad" in R. Quadri, "Cours general de droit 
international public", 113 R. C., (1964 III), p. 237, at p. 396 
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exercise of state sovereignty. Therefore, such actions exacerbate the protective 
potency of the state because they create a beleaguered mentality which 
politically sane governments could not ignore. The Entebbe incident is 
indicative. The hostages were Israeli nationals or people with Jewish sounding 
names who were held hostage solely due to political animosity towards their 
national state. The terrorists also demanded the release of a number of detained 
Palestinians in certain countries. Had those countries complied, it would have 
involved compromising their national sovereignty. Also in Liberia, the view of 
assimilating nationals to their states gained support. The rebel leader Johnson 
had threatened to massacre U. S. citizens within Liberia. Under circumstances of 
lawlessness, the American nationals pleaded with their state for help and the 
latter was compelled into action for humanitarian reasons coupled with political 
expediency because it did not want to appear to be discarding its responsibilities 
towards its nationals. 
In this regard, the exhortation that an attack on a national is an attack upon the 
state is not unreasonable and its further elaboration would show intrinsic 
validity. It has an internal aspect linked to the repercussions on the national 
psyche and an external, linked to the aims of the attackers. Regarding the 
internal aspect, it is beyond the purpose of this work to contemplate the 
emotional link between members of the same group. It is a sentimental bond 
which juxtaposes the national conscience. Obscure in its foundation, it is 
nevertheless pervasive. 184 This intrinsic association creates an interest in the 
welfare of members of the same national group, particularly when they are 
beyond the national boundaries. Whereas the plight of a sole national does not 
provoke concern when positioned in his home state, his predicament in a foreign 
state au contraire does provoke concern for his plight or even national 
excitation, galvanised by national fears, sensitivity, domestic sensationalism or 
political motivations. Nonetheless, even the sheer knowledge of maltreatment, 
devoid of sentimentality, may offend the level of national psyche shared 
by 
members of the same group. The external manifestation 
is that the attack on a 
84 As Fustel de Coulanges put it in a celebrated letter to the German 
historian Mommsen "les 
hommes sentent dans leur coeur qu'ils sont un meme peuple 
lorsqu'ils ont une communaute 
d'idWes, d'interets, d'affections, de souvenirs et d'esperences". C. Rousseau, 
Droit International 
Public, Tome II, "Les sujets de Droit", (Paris, Sirey, 1974), p. 27 
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foreign national purports to compromise the political independence of action in 
a particular state, which is an aspect of sovereignty. The state or group which 
perpetrates such an attack aims at impelling the state of nationality to adopt the 
dictated comportment. It is a subtle, nonetheless serious, infringement of 
political independence through the medium of foreign nationals. As such, it 
could fall within the ambit of Article 2(4), provoking a self-defence action. ' 85 
The forcible protection of nationals against deprivations and injuries serves in 
this context double interests under the rubric of self-defence. It protects a state 
on an important base of power, its nationals, and frustrates external coercion. 
V. 3 The protection of nationals as self-help. Reaffirmation of Kelsen 's legal 
theory. The writings of the 19th century international lawyers Bluntschli, 
Bonfils and Pradier-Fodere are evidence of the contention that the protection of 
nationals is a means of enforcing international law. As Bluntschli put it: "..... the 
constraint employed against a state to oblige it to fulfil its international duty is 
not an intervention". 186 Bonfils remarks: "There is no intervention either in the 
act of constraining by reprisals or force of arms a state to fulfil its international 
obligations". 1 87 Pradier-Fodere wrote: 
"C'est un devoir pour tout Etat de proteger ses nationaux ä 1'etranger par 
tous les moyens que le droit international autorise. I1 leur doit cette 
protection lorsque l'Etat etranger a procede contre eux en violant les 
principes du droit inernational...... Il doit les proteger aussi, lors meme 
que les mauvais traitement ou dommages subis par ses nationaux ne sont 
pas directement le fait de 1'Etat etranger 
. ..... 
mais des personnes ayant 
appuyes un caracere prive', et si Etat dans le quel le delit a ete commis n'a 
Tien fait pour s'y opposer". 188 
185 See Article 9 of Inter 
- 
American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (1947) which characterises 
as aggression "Unprovoked armed attack by a State against the territory, the people or the 
land, 
sea or air forces of another State". 
186 J. C. Bluntschli, Le droit international codifie, trans. by C. Lardy, 5th ed., vol.! , (Paris, Alcan, 
1895), p. 273, sec. 474 
187 H. Bonfils, Manuel de droit international public, vo1. I, (Paris, A. Rousseau, 1905), p. 160 
188 P. Pradier-Fodere, Traite de droit international public, tome 1, (Paris, G. Pedone-Laurel, 
1885), p. 614, para. 402 
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American Secretary of State Hughes in his statement at the Havana Conference 
delineated in essence this argument attacking the proposed prohibition on 
intervention. He said: 
"the rights of nations remain, but nations have duties as well as rights. We 
all recognize that. This very formula, here proposed, is a proposal of duty 
on the part of a nation. But it is not the only duty. There are other 
obligations which courts and tribunals declaring international law, have 
frequently set forth; and we cannot codify international law and ignore the 
duties of states, by setting up the impossible reign of self-will without any 
recognition on the part of a state of its obligations to its neighbours". ' 89 
If this reasoning is to be endorsed, the protection of nationals can be justified 
under the heading of enforcing the obligations of international law, which was 
also exempted from the Pact of Paris as not being an instrument of national 
policy. ' 90 This theory illuminates the defects of the pre-Charter system, which 
seems to accommodate this right. At this point, the question of sanctioning 
international law as an attribute of legal quality emerges. Customary 
international law has permitted self-help as a means of enforcement and post- 
Charter law permits, according to Kelsen, self-help in the form of self-defence, 
reprisals, and retorsion. 191 
On August 17,1937, due to the renewed tension between China and Japan, 
Secretary of State Hull ordered a regiment of marines to proceed to Shanghai. 
He said that "it is the policy of the American Government to afford its nationals 
appropriate protection: primarily against mobs or other uncontrolled elements 
...... 
It has been the desire and the policy of the American Government to 
remove these forces when performance of their function of protection is no 
longer called for". 192 The initiated action was protection of nationals but the 
rationale reveals that it was thoroughly understood that the U. S. should demand 
respect for international law. The latter fixes certain boundaries of rights and 
189 Cited in C. Hyde, International Law, 2nd rev. ed., vol.!, (Boston, Little Brown & Co., 1951), 
252. ý90 
J. Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict, (London, Stevens & Sons, 1954), p. 300. 
191 H. Kelsen, Principles of International Law, 2nd ed., (N. Y., Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 
Inc., 1967), pp. 64-87 
192 Dept. of State Press Release, (Aug. 23,1937), in 31 A. J. I. L., (1937), p. 669 at p. 670 
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action and it protects an alien in his legitimate activities. Abandoning this 
protection is to abandon not only the law, but the foundations of human 
justice. 193 
The Entebbe incident is also illustrative of the validity of this interpretation. The 
Israeli action may be seen as an act which sanctions the failure by some states to 
remove an international wrong. Uganda had failed to comply with her 
obligations under the 1970 Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Seizure of Aircraft and the general right of protection afforded to foreigners 
from the host country. Therefore, the Israeli action rectified the situation. ' 94 In 
this respect, the cryptic legitimacy of force under the U. N. Charter comes to the 
fore and contributes to the relevant discussion concerning the circularity and 
indeterminacy of legal doctrines. 
V. 4 The protection of nationals as a humanitarian action. Under the heading of 
human rights, such action protects the basic human rights' interests of 
individuals. The first aspect of self-defence, which has not been made 
inoperative, is narrowly confined to state interests and a degree of political 
exaggeration in a situation of crisis is not uncommon. What is disturbing is the 
traditional juridical understanding of the state, its personification beyond the 
societies it represents. The second view of human rights, attaching importance 
to the human values of societies, is cosmopolitan and purports to promote the 
values of human persons. In this respect, the state appears to be the 
instrumentality for the protection of individual human rights when another state 
pursues a policy of prosecution. The human rights approach which disconnects 
the identification of injuries between an individual and his national state could 
lead to the advancement of human rights also in the host state. The 
discriminatory treatment accorded to nationals because they are not linked to a 
foreign state is unacceptable. Furthermore, it could - although it is conjectural - 
depoliticize the disputes and reduce friction by diffusing tensions emanating 
from national interests and honour. 
193 C. Eagleton, 31 A. JI. L., (1937), p. 665 at pp. 667,669 
19` J. A. Sheeban, "The Principle of Self-Help in International Law as Justification for State 
Use of Armed Force", 1 The Fletcher Forum, (1977), p. 135; J. J. Paust, "Entebbe and Self- 
help: The Israeli response to Terrorism", 2 The Fletcher Forum, (1978), p. 86 
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Thus, the human rights approach' 95 embodies the second pillar of the intrinsic 
dichotomy pertinent to rescue operations. The other pillar presented above is 
sovereignty transmuted into self-defence. The human rights approach clarifies 
the values which are at stake when rescue operations occur. What is really at 
stake is the human right to life or liberty which the operation rectifies and 
therefore it should not be limited to nationals. 
This approach may additionally reconcile the positivist and naturalist aspects of 
international law because it designates consensual human rights as the rights to 
life and liberty which rely on naturalist premises. Concerning the positivist 
aspect, the protection of nationals is a remedy for the obligations a state has 
assumed relating to human rights. The problem is then reduced to identifying 
the sources of these obligations which would require elaboration on the 
development of human rights law. 196 Thus, we may start with the provisions of 
the U. N. Charter concerning human rights which "..... have become part of 
intentional customary law and are binding upon all States, whether they are 
Members of the United Nations or not". 197 The I. C. J. in the Namibia Case, 
considering the non-respect of the United Nations provisions on human rights, 
held that it consisted of "..... a flagrant violation of the purposes and principles 
of the Charter". 198 In addition, the human rights obligations were characterised 
erga omnes in the Barcelona Traction Case. ' 99 In this case the Court made an 
obiter dictum which is important for the legality of the protection afforded to 
nationals from its state, under considerations of humanity. It said that "on the 
universal level, the instruments which embody human rights do not confer on 
States the capacity to protect the victims of infringements of such rights 
irrespective of their nationality ". 200 This dictum hence confirms the extension 
of the state's protective function when the human rights of its nationals beyond 
its territory are infringed. 
195 T. Schweisfurth, "Operations to Rescue Nationals in Third States Involving the Use of 
Force in Relation to the Protection of Human Rights", 23 German Y. B. I. L.. (1980), p. 159 
196 E. Schwelb, "The International Court of Justice and the Human Rights Clauses of the 
Charter", 66 A. J. I. L., (1972), p. 337, at p. 341 
197 Y. B. I. L. C, (1976), vol. 11, pt. 2, p. 105 
198 Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the Continues Presence of South 
Arica in Namibia (South West Africa), I. C. J. Rep. (1971), p. 14, at p. 58 
Barcelona Traction Case, J. C. J. Rep., (1970), p. 14, at p. 32 
200 Ibid., p. 47 
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Another aspect of the human rights approach also concerns the relationship 
between nationals and their state, which succeeds in demythologising their 
intimacy. According to this approach, respect for human rights does not cease at 
the borders of the national state. The state cares about its nationals beyond its 
narrow jurisdiction as human beings, not as a state compendium. The natural 
law dimension of the rescue operations under the rubric of human rights is 
similar to the discussion of humanitarian intervention in the preceding chapters 
and should not be repeated here. 
Dealing above with the relevant cases, the Israeli action in Entebbe has been 
justified as an act of humanitarian intervention. 201 What was in issue in this 
instance, beyond the aims of any action, was the personal integrity of the 
hostages who were threatened with annihilation. Eventually, the Israeli rescue 
operation saved their lives. The Liberian case provides the most compelling 
arguments for enlarging the factual and legal basis of such actions. As was 
stated above, in this case foreign nationals were rescued, whereas the natives 
were left to face their dire plight. Had the initial action been a humanitarian 
intervention, it might have terminated the brutalities. The humanitarian aspect of 
the rescue operation is evident but insufficient, because it is limited only to 
foreigners. The situation in Liberia warranted humanitarian action and 
humanitarian considerations were invoked by the participating states in the West 
African Force. Thus, for the Cote-d'Ivoire it involved "l'envoi d'une force pour 
eviter la boucherie qui se deroule a ses portes". 2°2 
In order to recapitulate, the discussion of humanitarian intervention and the 
protection of nationals within the legal framework of the use of force as it has 
been constructed by the U. N. Charter has revealed the tension between the 
prevalent assumptions in this order 
- 
sovereignty and human rights - as well as 
within the wider philosophical sources of natural law and positivism. There is 
now a need to express a preference between these two interpretational 
approaches. 
201 Letter to the New York Times by Professors McDougal and Reisman, (16 July 1976). in 
B. H. Weston, R. A. Falk, A. D'Amato, International Law and World Order, (St. Paul, Minn.. 
West Publishing Co., 1990), p. 945 
202 Le Monde diplomatique, (septembre 1990), p. 24 
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VI. TOWARDS A TENTATIVE CONCLUSION 
With this Chapter on self-defence, the exploration into the legality of 
humanitarian intervention lato sensu has been concluded. The argument within 
Article 2(4) of the U. N. Charter has been presented in the previous Chapter and 
the particular instance of protecting nationals abroad in this Chapter. According 
to the traditional approach, it may seem that the protection of nationals is 
beyond the auspices of this study concerning humanitarian intervention. 
However, the reasons for a humanitarian approach have been contemplated in 
this Chapter. It has been argued that the traditional argument of treating these 
instances as a measure of self-defence is legally insufficient and conceptually 
inadequate. Consequently, it has been suggested that they should be 
incorporated into the wider genre of humanitarian actions. 
Additionally, this section fulfilled the aim of applying to existing legal argument 
the theoretical identifications made at the outset of this study, beyond the 
requirements of a purely legal exposition. It should be submitted that the 
conventional legal argument as it is formulated in the area of force by Articles 
2(4) and 51 of the U. N. Charter reproduces the theoretical controversies 
underpinning these articles and their inherent conception of a model society. 
The gist of our presentation is to show that the legal argument contains 
ambiguities attributed to the wider theoretical context where it resides. 
Consequently, it afflicts the issue of humanitarian intervention with 
indeterminacy and incommensurability. Although the general trend of this work 
is to convince the reader that determinacy is "un oiseau volant" and it is futile to 
search for something non-existent, it was necessary to deal with the legal issue 
at least as a reaction to the promotion and proclamation by the legal augment of 
the determinacy of its deliberations. On the other hand, the fatalistic and 
retreating mood which the knowledge of indeterminacy may generate would be 
inappropriate. Human mind and human nature are misspent if they withdraw 
into a position of nihilism. 
As a consequence, the next Chapters will address this issue and present a case 
for reconstruction. It is characterised, with some audacity, as reconstruction for, 
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otherwise the whole project will remain unfulfilled, oscillating between what is 
considered to be a definite and an indeterminate legal argument. We shall not try 
though to evade what already exists by imposing another inflexible principle. 
On the contrary, a dialogic model emerges where the problem which inhumanity 
presents and how to tackle it can be discussed. After presenting this framework, 
some relevant cases will be discussed. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
RECONSTRUCTION: HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AS THE 
PROTECTION OF HUMAN DIGNITY IN A DISCURSIVE MODEL 
This chapter deals with human dignity as the initial assumption which justifies 
humanitarian actions 
- 
it presents and negates the legal attempts to objectivity 
and having established relativity it also avoids declination towards nihilism 
- 
it 
projects human dignity as a communicative-discursive model which is 
facilitative in establishing the legal relevance of humanitarian intervention. 
I. THE SEARCH FOR OBJECTIVITY 
1.1 Concreteness and objectivity in legal arguments. In the previous chapters, 
we have presented the main legal theories respecting humanitarian intervention 
and have subsequently explored the function of legal doctrine concerning 
humanitarian intervention within this theoretical setting. An initial observation 
would aver to the fact that the principal legal propositions, loosely described as 
deontological or teleological, are vying to discountenance certain fundamental 
problems within their argumentative structure which concern legal certainty or 
legal promulgation. Eventually, these aspects of legal argument reproduce and 
recombine themselves within the reasoning in order to elude legal irrelevance. 
More concretely, one argumentative aspect distances law from ideas because the 
latter are deemed subjective. They are, according to Haitian terminology, "open- 
textured", general and abstract. Ideas are verified only according to the 
subjective criteria of the person who holds the pertinent views. ' This approach 
attempts to present law as depsychologised rules which apply automatically. 
' T. Hobbes, Leviathan, C. B. Macpherson (ed. ), (Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1968), ch. 4. 
pp. 109-110: "For one man callethe Wisdome, what another calleth fearer and one cruelty, 
what another justice; one prodigality, what another magnanimity; 
...... 
And therefore such 
names can never be true grounds of any ratiocination". 
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Accordingly, law enjoys normativity and procures objectivity. The idea of law is 
transformed into an objective instrument for application which excludes 
political fiat in its wider meaning and, thus, preserves individual freedom: "[a] 
free people 
..... 
obeys nothing but the laws, and thanks to the force of laws, it 
does not obey men". 2 Another approach underlines the role of policies or ideas 
in legal thinking. It has social ramifications and is presented as a panacea to the 
bifurcation of legal argument by accommodating the above considerations 
within its premises. It started with a disgruntled attitude towards formalism and 
presents law as a social phenomenon which promotes social ends. 3 Accordingly, 
an empirical study is presented as specifying legal propositions because it is 
interpreted as representing an accumulation of the actors' preferences. The 
interplay between demands, claims and counterclaims creates "mutual 
tolerances" and "uniformities of pattern" in the application of authority. This 
procedure procures "value clarification" whose inclusion in law provides the 
basis of authority. 4 In this relationship, law enjoys concreteness because it is 
intertwined with practice but it menaces normativity because practice may 
inflate law. On the other hand, it could be argued that this practice represents a 
consolidated feeling towards a superseded principle and thus it legitimates law. 
Again, it could be counter-argued that the appreciation of such feeling befalls to 
interpreting the practice which poses afresh the problem of subjectiveness. 5 
Whereas this exposition describes the traditionally antithetical positions of 
natural and positive law separately or concurrently as they submerge into 
realism, in fact, they both contain the opposite argument as well. Pure 
naturalism and pure positivism do not provide distinct answers but they 
mutually reinforce each other. As rules concerning humanitarian intervention 
2 Cited by M. Cranston in "Introduction", J. J. Rousseau, The Social Contract, trans. & intr. by 
M. Cranston, (London, Penguin Books, 1968), p. 32 
3 R. Pound, "Philosophical Theory and International Law", I Bibliotheca Visseriana, (1923), 
p. 71; N. Politis, The New Aspects of International Law, (Washington, Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, 1928); C. De Visscher, "Cour general de principes de droit 
international public", 86 R. C., (1954 II), p. 445, at p. 451: "C'est ä une conception 
fonctionnelle du pouvoir, ä une conception sociale du droit que s'attache notre ensegnement". 
M. S. McDougal, "International Law, Power and Policy: A Contemporary Perspective". 82 
R. C., (1953 I), P. 133 
4 M. S. McDougal, "The Hydrogen Bomb Tests and the International Law of the Sea". 49 
A. J. I. L., (1955), p. 356, at pp. 357-358 
s P. Allott, "Language, Method and the Nature of International Law", 45 B. Y. B. 1. L.. (1971), 
p. 79, at pp. 123-125 
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are notably absent and therefore are inadequate to answer the problem of 
intervention, the argument then resorts to certain moral ideas or to modifications 
of the pure positivist position which spring from a conception of justice. This 
fact inevitably impinges on the positivity of rules and in the words of Unger 
"[t]he greater the commitment to 
..... 
solidarity as sources or ideals of law, the 
less it is possible to distinguish 
..... 
law from ideas of moral obligation or 
propriety that are entertained in the different social settings within which 
disputes may arise. And the less importance do positive rules have in law". 6 
The presented legal articulations claim to fulfil the postulate of certainty through 
objectivity. 7 Law is perceived an automation, where the relevant rules apply 
correspondingly when certain relations take place. However, they are constricted 
between the Scylla of ideas and the Charybdis of facts. 8 Since Plato, western 
philosophy has been concerned with the substratum of ideas which exists in the 
world. This, however, has not deciphered the problem of certainty. Whereas one 
can claim that ideas are external to the observing person and thus objective, it 
raises the issue of how one can apprehend an external idea. On the other hand, if 
ideas are the projection of individual construction, they are exposed to 
subjectivity and hence disallow any intersubjective value. 
The other aspect is the relevance of facts. One can define knowledge as a 
sensorial perception of facts but again fail to produce certainty. If facts are 
presented objectively as being unconnected with phenomenology, this attitude 
fails to explain the composition of and relation between facts. It merely takes 
account of them for empirical cognition. If, on the other hand, facts are 
extrapolated from feelings or ideas, it would be difficult to deny their 
association with superseded elements. Choosing one of the two positions -ideas 
or facts 
- 
results in either apology, whereby law is collateral to state practice or 
utopia, whereby law becoming detached from the latter, is ultimately 
6 R. M. Unger, Law in Modern Society. Toward a Criticism of Social Theory, (N. Y., The Free 
Press, 1976), p. 214 
' H. Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International Community, (Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1933), p. 189; O. Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice, 
((Dordrecht/Boston/London, M. Nijhoff, 1991), chs. I, II, III, pp. 1-48 3 R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (London, Duckworth, 1977), chs. 2, 
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speculative. 9 The quest for objectivity seems again distant because the 
arguments are ingrained with subjectivity. The law as fact argument is 
implanted with the manipulable will of the state, whereas the law as idea with 
the manipulable "will" of the transcendental premises 
Thus, both positions fail to produce viable answers separately, therefore they 
reformulate, recombine and reconcile their opposing elements eclectically in 
order to overcome the mutual detachment. 1° In law, this scheme conceives of 
objectivity as something which is "out there". " This may imply a certain moral 
idea, justice, recta ratio, a Grundnorm or a rule of recognition. 12 The imprint of 
objectivity is, however, dissipated quickly when someone engages in any 
discussion concerning the modes of knowing these principles or the mere 
objects for discussion. Objectivity can also present itself as a method and thus 
external to the knowing subject. It can take the form of imputation, right 
authority or a project for the postulation of human dignity. Objectivity then is 
procured by default, through the external-objective methodology. However, it 
cannot provide an answer to the question of "why" because it cannot confine the 
explication of law hermetically within law. It needs an external foundation. 
Whereas the search for a norm may be explicated within the law, the question of 
the fundamental norm transgresses legal technique and involves conceptual or 
logical questions. The content of this fundamental norm, however sagacious, 
may be irresolute entailing questions in the field of "sein" and not "sollen", 
causality and not imputation. With certain scepticism, Kelsen has admitted that 
9 M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument, 
(Helsinki, Finnish Lawyers' Publishing Company, 1989); D. Kennedy, International Legal 
Structures, (Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1987), ch. 1, in part. pp. 11-53 
10 R. A. Falk, "The Interplay of Westphalia and Charter Conceptions of the International Legal 
Order", in R. A. Falk, C. E. Black (eds), The Future of the International Legal Order, vol. I, 
"Trends and Patterns", (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1969), p. 32, at p. 35: ....... an 
intermediate position, one that maintains the distinctiveness of the legal order while managing 
to be responsive to the extralegal setting of politics, history and morality". P. Allott, supra, 
note S, pp. 100-105,113 
R. Rorty, Contigency, Irony and Solidarity, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1989), p. 5 
1Z R. J. Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, (Oxford, Blackwell, 1983), p. 9: ....... 
distinction between the subject and the object [where] what is `out there' is presumed to be 
independent of us, and knowledge is achieved when a subject correctly mirrors or represents 
objective reality". Hereinafter cited as Beyond 
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k- 
on this matter there exists resemblance between the Grundnorm and natural 
law. ' 3 
1.2 Concreteness and objectivity in international law. In international law, the 
objectivity and autonomy of law is achieved through the test of pedigree, 
borrowing Dworkin's phrase, or a Hartian rule of recognition, which is a test of 
sources. 
14 If a certain standard meets the criteria of legal promulgation, it 
becomes a rule. Consequently, the myth that morality or politics are excluded 
and that international law is a legal science whereby rules are formulated by 
induction is sustained. This approach, aspiring for the wholeness of law, 15 is 
itself idealist and it fails to exclude the revisiting of discretionary ideas in hard 
cases or when rules are "relatively indeterminate". 16 In such cases, the role of 
courts and judges becomes instrumental and in international law could be self- 
defeating. 17 According to Justice Cardozo: "International law 
...... 
has 
..... 
a 
twilight existence during which it is hardly distinguishable from morality or 
justice, till at length the imprimatur of a court attests to its jural quality". '8 This 
implies creativity and discretion and according to Brierly: "the act of the Court 
is a creative act in spite of our conspiracy to present it as something else". ' 9 
These aspects described above as candidates towards objectivity could also be 
characterised as foundational or external because they allude to an external 
referent. However, they both involve acceptance of a certain conviction which 
presents itself as empirically shared, such as with Kelsen's Grundnorm in 
international law according to which states should behave as they customarily 
do. This restates a shared form of inter-state life as an accepted conviction 
within the system, to which all propositions of law should refer without the need 
for evidence. Whereas the latter procedure may hint at objectivity, the 
" H. Kelsen, "Justice et droit naturel", (trad. E. Mazingue), in Annales de philosophic 
golitique, vol. 111, "Droit Naturei", (Paris, PUF, 1959), p. 1, at p. 121 
R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (London, Duckworth, 1977), p. 17 
IS J. Stone, "Non-Liquet and the Function of Law in the International Community", 25 
B. Y. B. I. L., (1959), p. 124 
16 H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1961), p. 132 
" J. Raz, The Authority of Law, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1979), pp. 87-88: "Law-applying 
institutions are, 
..... 
a constant feature of law in every type of society and their existence 
should be regarded as a defining characteristic of law". 
19 New Jersey v. Delaware, 292 U. S. 361 (1934) 
19 J. L. Brierly, The Basis of Obligation in International Law and Other Papers, 
H. 
Lauterpacht, C. H. M. Waldock (eds), (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1958), p. 98 
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empirically defined proposition hints towards the opposite direction. The 
projection of human dignity by the policy school or the idea of reason by natural 
law are subjected to the same criticism. Both suggest that the embeddedness of 
these proposals into a shared "form of life" engenders other propositions 
presented as objective but this "form of life", by definition, would deny them 
the objectivity which a penumbra of deducted logicality may imply. 20 
The predominant culture presents international law as rules independent of facts, 
that is practice. The latter is external to law and dealing with it would 
compromise the normativity of rules 
. 
21 A judicial verification of this process is 
the Nicaragua Case or a normative approach to humanitarian intervention, 
whereby any such action is considered as contravening the rule on the non-use 
of force. The other facet of international law is concerned with the facts to 
which it applies the rules in order to substantiate them. 22 In this case, normative 
positivism is disowned because the possibility of modification through the facts 
is accepted. The function of sanction is thus the acknowledgement of the 
reception of a particular rule in the social reality. Whereas for the normative 
positivist, sanction is internal to law and any legal deformity is understood as a 
violation, the realist position understands the contrary practice as the formation 
of new custom. The inescapable dilemma is that, in order to correct normativity, 
law should immerse itself into facts; alternatively the purity and separateness of 
the legal science could be preserved by accepting the distinction between law 
and social observation. 
The separateness of both facets seems unjustified. One should accept the 
embeddedness of facts or ideas within each other because mere description is 
oblivious to the fact that our perception is contingent on our concepts and that 
these concepts are "internalised" through the social practices we observe. 
23 
Consequently, the "law as fact" approach should rely on ideas in order to 
20 L. Wittgenstein, On Certainty, (Oxford, Blackwell, 1969), pp. 15-16,28,35-36, paras. 102, 
105,144,274,298 
2' E. Kaufmann, "Regles generales du droit de la paix", 54 R. C., (1935 IV), p. 309, at p. 319 
22 E. Giraud, "Le droit international public et la politique", 110 R. C. (1963 III), p. 419, at 
pp. 462-463 
"The concepts we have settle for us the form of experience we have of the world". P. 
Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy, (London, Henley, 1947), 
pp. 14-15,83-91. The consciousness of society is "a product of the human society as a whole". 
M. Horkheimer, Critical Theory: Selected Essays, M. O'Connell et al. trans., (N. Y., 1972), 
p. 200 
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become normative. Those ideas categorise and characterise the facts. Thus, an 
action would be categorised as intervention due to a certain idea of intervention 
and it would be characterised accordingly as lawful or unlawful only due to this 
idea. On the other hand, the law as idea should be subjected to the arbitration of 
facts in order to be concretised. Therefore, although the two positions are 
interrelated, each can be subjected to the criticisms voiced against the opposite 
position. 
Could the "objectivity" of method decode this irresolvable problem? The policy 
school presents such a method after criticising the illusory content of rules due 
to their interpretative matrix. For the policy scientists, the method should reflect 
a social operation and not a priori schemata. Again, objectivity remains 
unfulfilled. The social matrix requires a certain conception in order to be 
disentangled and appreciated, which depends on pre-existing convictions. 
Returning to the previous example of intervention, a particular act could be 
diversely characterised as an act of force or domination, or as humanitarian 
intervention. The facts thus depend on interpretation according to conceptual 
matrices in order to become legally relevant. In a nutshell, one can see what the 
interpretation of a "fact" consists of only by applying a previous conception, 
which itself explains its significance as the final arbiter of facts by resort to 
another fundamental concept. 24 Explication of facts or ideas could consequently 
produce uncertainty because it is not based on an assured legal foundation. The 
law as fact or as idea is based on a particular conception of "man" or "society" 
which re-emerges in the interpretation. 25 
Thomas Franck introduces the concept of legitimacy and fairness in an 
attempt to avoid the positivist conundrum of requiring obeisance to 
international rules within a voluntaristic international society. Legitimacy 
according to Franck explains the issue of compliance and concerns "the right 
. 
He considers as indicators of legitimacy and fairness the element process" 26 
24 N. MacCormick, 0. Weinberger, An Institutional Theory of Law, (Dordrecht, D. Reidel 
Publishing Co., 1986), pp. 13-16,49-67 
23 S. Sur, L'interpretation en droit international public, (Paris, L. G. D. J., 1974), p. 32: "..... on 
y considere davantage les choses comme on voudrait qu'elles soient plutöt que telles qu'elles 
sont". 
26 T. M. Franck, "Legitimacy in the International System", 82 A. J. I. L., p. 705, at p. 706: 
"Legitimacy is used here to mean that quality of a rule which derives from a perception on the 
part of those to whom it is addressed that it has come into being in accordance with right 
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of determinacy; symbolic validation; coherence; and adherence to a 
normative hierarchy. 27 Consequently, rules being legitimate secure 
compliance without the need of an enforcer. However, at the international 
level, the role of the state poses an intractable problem. Whereas international 
rules or institutions may be legitimised by the right process, this conceals the 
activist role of the state or of some more prominent states. The Security 
Council, for example, appears to be a legitimate institution because its 
formation and function is contained in a legitimate organisation endowed 
with a legitimate charter. Therefore, its decisions should be legitimate. 
However, its working and power sharing affects the issue of legitimacy. 28 
In Chapters Five and Six but also throughout this study, we have presented 
the modus operandi of the world constitutive process as it is experienced 
today. In the context of humanitarian intervention we notice a strong 
preference for a multilateral implementation with the authorisation of the 
Security Council or for a genuine U. N. action under Chapter VII. The 
expectation which underlines this view is the prospect of containing 
conflicting individual interests, whereas the aspiration is that a procedural 
method within the legal confines of the United Nations Charter would confer 
legitimacy, what Franck considers as institutional legitimacy and fairness. 
This reminds us of the procedural fairness employed by Dworkin whereby 
the due process attributes legitimacy to the end result. The constellation of 
power within the Security Council is, however, unequal and the possibility of 
fairness being translated into pursuing particularised interests should also be 
acknowledged. Consequently, Franck's approach will be subjected to the 
same criticism which sustained McDougal's designation of human dignity as 
a sort of ideological imperialism enjoying now the benefit of hiding 
particularised interests behind an "objective" procedure. 
process. " T. M. Franck, "Why a Quest for Legitimacy? ", 21 U. Calif. Davis L. Rev., (1988), 
V35 
T. M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations, (N. Y., Oxford University Press, 
1990), chs. 1,3,4,7,9,10,11 and Fairness in International Law and Institutions, (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1995), ch. 2 
28 D. D. Caron, "The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security Council", 87 
A. J. I. L., (1993), p. 552 
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The difficulty with his exposition is that it is unreflective and considers the 
working of the Security Council to be ipso facto an institutionally fair 
procedure. As was observed, the constellation of power in the Security 
Council is such that it permits only certain actions whose ad hoc character 
has been discussed in previous chapters. At this occasion, it should be 
mentioned that Franck's procedural legitimacy influenced by Dworkin is 
developed in order to countenance this adhocism and shows a belief in formal 
justice. However, the contemplation of "fairness" or "reasonableness" 
introduces a degree of indeterminacy and subjectivity and it is not possible 
for the procedure as such to heal this inconsistency. 
According to Franck, fairness requires that like cases should be treated alike 
but this presupposes a standard under which the likeness will be found. 29 As 
it has already been observed, the approach of the United Nations institutions 
is "checkerboard", that is, it applies its principles in a half-coherent fashion 
and that which is coherent is attributed to a higher principle which, in the 
jargon of international relations, is peace and order. The modus operandi of 
the Security Council is to consider cases of human degradation such as South 
Africa or Rhodesia, Iraq, Somalia, or Haiti as constituting a threat to the 
peace. Following Dworkin, the half-loaf approach is not sufficient and ranks 
even below the no approach. 30 Peace and order is presented as a principle 
which can occasionally validate the "checkerboard" approach, or, finally, 
restore coherence. However, incoherence exists also within this standard. Not 
all the cases which have the potential of being a breach or threat to the peace 
are dealt with alike or have triggered the same reaction by the Security 
Council and, additionally, peace is not the only standard involved. For 
example, cases of invasion have not been treated alike because of policy 
considerations which attempt to delimit the juridical meaning of any action 
but also due to practical needs. Then come into play the standards which will 
be applied. If it is non-intervention or human rights, state independence or 
justice, the procedural fairness of treating each case alike is distorted. As it 
29 This is similar to Dworkin's discussion of "integrity". R. Dworkin, Law's Empire, (London, 
Fontana, 1986), pp. 179,190-192. The incoherent application of rules is characterised by 
Dworkin as "checker-boarding", ibid., p. 179 
30 Law's Empire, p. 182: "such "compromises are wrong, not merely impractical". 
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has been discussed in Chapter Five, Article 2(4) on the use of force does not 
convey the proposed by Franck legitimacy. 31 What is more significant is that, 
whereas Article 2(4) speaks of a prohibition, it does not state what is 
expected instead, that is, which action is beyond the bounds of the perceived 
prohibition. Hence, states acquire the benefit of interpreting themselves what 
is the expected course of action and this fact introduces a de-legitimising 
element while certain actions, humanitarian intervention included, are posited 
beyond the perimeter of this article. Additionally, the statement of the United 
Nations purposes entangles further the pursued "right course" of action. 32 
Franck, as usually lawyers do, succumbs too easily to legalism. Hence, it 
seems that, the promising language apart, the whole project is justifying and 
legitimising the status quo and, by denying any standard for adjudication 
beyond an emptied procedural one, abridges legitimacy. 
At a more general level, Franck, probably following a strong jurisprudential 
tradition since Austin, treats international law with the concepts and precepts 
of domestic law. Whereas die-hard positivists would require obedience and 
sanctions, soft positivists, Franck included, posit the validity of international 
rules on other precepts such as legitimacy, borrowed from domestic systems. 
Moreover, one can trace here a link between domestic and international law. 
Similarly, Kelsen provides a link between the two fields of law on another 
basis, that of effectiveness. The dissimilarity of links is justified because 
Kelsen's system springs from different legal and philosophical sources. 
Legitimacy may be included in the notion of effectiveness but their 
theoretical basis is different. Effectiveness resides on the sphere of Sein, 
whereas legitimacy on Sollen. However, they both share in common the 
search for the connecting thread between the two systems. Concerning 
Kelsen, we have explained that the link can be changed to one which 
envisages observance of human right norms. We should here underline that 
Franck's approach is procedural and does not necessarily satisfy the notion of 
justice or fairness. Iniquitous laws can be promulgated even according to due 
'1 L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 2nd ed., G. E. M. Anscombe trans., (Oxford, 
Blackwell, 1958), para. 201, p. 81: "No course of action could be determined by a rule because 
every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule. " 
32 The problems of discretionary power which a legitimate organ such as the Security Council 
may encounter have been discussed in Chapter Two, Section VI. 3 
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process if this process is being approached superficially, that is, technically 
and not substantially. On the other hand, the perception of legitimacy as right 
process could exert a conservative influence on international law while new 
claims would be viewed as contestable, unless they become endorsed. In such 
circumstances the lack of standards for legitimacy beyond the procedural 
ones is a hindrance. 
In the present work, we have demonstrated the half-loaf approach by the 
Security Council which involves compromises in theory and practice, and, 
also, we propose a more reflective approach under the notion of human 
dignity. Lacking such a standard, the determinations will be minimised and 
they will not satisfy substantive justice or fairness. 
1.3 Certainty disowned through criticism. The emergence of conversation. The 
critical reflection on standardised concepts may present itself as destroying 
knowledge and the certainty which accompanies it. 33 The argument could be 
summarised in the question posed by Ludwig Wittgenstein: "[w]hy should it be 
possible to have grounds for believing anything if it isn't possible to be 
certain? ". 34 It evolves a certain scepticism towards our concepts which, although 
they discard the illusion of certainty, they simultaneously project the mind 
towards justifying that which is "known". This mode does not involve a reign of 
subjectivity but indicates that beliefs and concepts may be followed or adhered 
to without attempting to present them as objective. 35 
The fabrication of subjective elements into neutralised components in legal 
discourse cannot produce certainty. 36 The method of hypostatisation implies an 
"objectification mistake". The interlocutors who objectify human interactions by 
33 36 Stanford L. Rev., (1984); J. W. Singer, "The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal 
Theory", 94 Yale L. J., (1984), p. 1, at p. 48: "..... the unstated premise behind this fear is the idea 
that we are entitled to have an opinion only if we can back it up by a method for deciding legal 
and moral questions that can compel agreement by its inherent rationality". 
" L. Wittgenstein, On Certainty, (Oxford, Blackwell, 1969), p. 48e, para. 373; C. Taylor, 
Philosophy and the Human Sciences. Philosophical Papers 2, (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1985), p. 18, para. 373: "..... uncertainty is an ineradicable part of our 
epistemological predicament". 
R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, (Oxford, Blackwell, 1979), pp. 333-4, 
hereinafter cited as Mirror, J. Fishkin, "Liberal Theory and the Problem of Justification", 
NOMOS XXVIII, p. 207, at p. 216 
36 S. Sur, L'interpretation en droit international public, (Paris, L. G. D. J., 1974), discussing natural 
law and sociological theories affirms that "n'etablit nullement un fondament assure du droit, pas 
plus qu'il n'en fournit clairement une determination objective. ", p. 32 
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transgressing the contingent matrix and perceiving it as external structure suffer from "false consciousness". 37 This is evidenced in natural law or more clearly in 
Kelsen's theory whereby something contingent to human experience is 
presented as a dehumanised supposition. It could not, however, relieve us from 
uncertainty as it was said above. The encrusted belief in certainty is not a virtue 
in itself if we disagree on what we should be certain about. 38 Certainty, 
objectivity and determinacy are presumed to anaesthetise the propensity for 
political abuse and predatory techniques which occur when that matrix is 
discarded but fail to procure these qualities to themselves. 39 
The exposition of the fallibility of the traditional doctrine provokes the fear that 
"there really is no middle ground between matters of taste and matters capable 
of being settled by a previously stable algorithm". 40 Subjectivity is viewed with 
caution while it can reify absolute power. 41 Without standards to adjudicate 
good or bad action, everyone is left to pursue their preferences and eventually 
the mightiest will prevail. 42 If law contains a restraining power and is based on 
a rational foundation, what could constrain conduct dismantling that 
foundation? It rather results in predatory conduct where as Hobbes said "every 
43 man is enemy of every man". The objectification mistake perpetrates an 
37 R. Geuss, The Idea of a Critical Theory. Habermas and the Frankfurt School, (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 14 39 B. Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, (London, Fontana Press/Collins, 1985), 
pp. 169-170: "Some people argue in favour of a certainty model by saying that we need ethical 
conviction and that only knowledge can bring it. They ignore the obvious fact that no amount of 
faith in cognitive certainty will actually bring about ethical conviction if we cannot agree on what 
we are supposed to be certain about". 39 F. Boyle, "Ideals and Things: International Legal Scholarship and the Prison 
- 
House of 
Language", 26 Harv. J. I. L., (1985), p. 327, at pp. 347-349 
40 Mirror, p. 336 41 E. A. Percell Jr., The Crisis of Democratic Theory. Scientific Naturalism and the Problem of 
Value, (Lexington, University Press of Kentucky, 1973), p. 163: "Since positivists held that 
reason could formulate no meaningful and valid conception of justice, they logically left physical 
force as the only arbiter of human affairs". (discussing Lon Fuller) 
42 Plato, Gorgias, W. Hammilton trans., (Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1960), p. 78, para. 483: 
"Nature 
..... 
herself demonstrates that it is right that the better man should prevail over the worse 
and the stronger over the weaker". Thusydides, The Peloponnesian War, Rex Warner trans., 
(Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1954), Bk 5, p. 402, para. 89: "The standard of justice depends 
on the equality of power to compel and that in fact the strong do what they have the power to do 
and the weak accept what they have to accept". 
43 T. Hobbes, Leviathan, C. B. Macpherson (ed. ), (Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1968), ch. 13, 
p. 186: M. Wight, "Western Values in International Relations", in H. Butterfield, M. Wight (eds. ). 
Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics, (London, Allen & 
Unwin, 1966), p. 89, at p. 122: "..... the health of the political realm is only maintained by 
conscientious objection to the political". F. Olsen, "The Family and the Market: A Study of 
Ideology and Legal Reform", 96 Harv. L. Rev., (1983), p. 1497, at pp. 1499-1428. "Individual self 
317 
ideological construction which installs itself between the agent and social action 
and reduces human dialogue to a monolithic description. It objectifies human 
beings by viewing them according to Sartre as existing en soi rather than as both 
en soi and pour soi, that is as both described and describing objects. 44 In the 
following sections, the argument for humanitarian intervention will be presented 
under the assumption of human dignity as a discursive model instead of a reified 
one, having first discarded the threat of relativism and nihilism. 
II. BEYOND RELATIVISM: IT PROMPTS DIALOGUE 
II. 1 The Cartesian anxiety: objectivism 
- 
relativism. As stated above, human 
dignity is the initial premise according to which the legal validity of 
humanitarian actions will be measured. Employing the previous argumentation, 
however, it abases any residue of establishing the existence of human dignity on 
an objective basis. According to Descartes, knowledge can be founded on an 
Archimedean point. 45 This objectivity should be structured on certain axioms, 
such as God, ratio or cognito, which are not themselves verifiable but which 
allow for inferences to be made. The mode of deriving these propositions 
exposes their contingency and denies their alleged ahistorical character. 
Consequently, we should dispose of the belief that human dignity could be 
assertion affects morality by splitting our moral lives in to two: we are concerned with living a 
good life and we associate this with kindness, religion, family life and friendship. On the other 
hand, we are taught to desire the good life, this is associated with public life 
- 
politics and the 
market. We expect people in those situations to be competitive, individualistic, and predatory. In 
the absence of a rational foundation for a good life, nothing will restrain people from trying to 
live the good life. Under this view, the result of giving up the idea of a rational basis for morality 
is that our public moral code of individualistic self assertion will replace our private moral code 
of kindness and altruism. 
14 Mirror, p. 378; T. W. Adorno, M. Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, (London, Verso, 
1979), pp. 3-80 
`s 
"I was convinced that I must once for all seriously undertake to rid myself of all the 
opinions which I had formerly accepted and commence to build anew the foundation, if I wanted 
to establish any firm and permanent structure in the sciences". R. Descartes, "Meditations on 
First Philosophy", in The Philosophical Works of Descartes, trans. E. S. Haldane, G. R. T. Ross, 
vol.!, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1931), p. 144; C. Taylor, Sources of the Self 
The Making of the Modern Identity, (Cambridge Mass., Cambridge University Press, 1989), 
p. 86: "For Descartes the whole point of the reflective turn [was) to achieve a quite self- 
sufficient certainty". 
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objectively grounded and accept its historical contingency and "socially context- 
bound character'. 46 
The difficulty in verifying the value of human dignity against an external form 
brings about the issue of relativity. 47 If morals or ideas can be equally good or 
important and also lack an objective basis, how could one claim that human 
dignity is the crucial factor in ordering the issue of humanitarian intervention? 
At this point, we are going to present and subsequently refute some of the 
relativist arguments. Firstly, it should be observed that relativity does not 
dispense with the need for assessment or conversation, as will be shown 
subsequently. It denies the possibility of grounding concepts, purposes or 
institutions but not the final product. 48 It involves practical and reflective 
interaction which overcomes the mistake of "monological axioms". 49 Secondly, 
it is claimed that subjectivity could only yield tolerance. Human dignity or 
human rights in general have been charged with western-specific notions and 
their application is denied in situations outside this particular environment. 
Therefore, respect for difference could only be materialised through tolerance of 
those with different views. 50 If the application of human dignity should be 
constricted to a western milieu because, it is argued, we are incapable of 
understanding other environments, how can we demarcate our limits if we are 
not capable of knowing the limits of contesting ideas? Confining the argument 
to the issue of divergent understandings just restates the problem. It implies that 
the different cultures share an understanding, although it is differently 
expressed. Consequently, a degree of common shared ground between these 
cultures is presumed, or else the potentiality for understanding would be 
forfeited. The contradiction in this argument is that it presupposes a common 
46A. Maclntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, (London, Duckworth, 1988), p. 4 
47 F. R. Tesön, "International Human Rights and Cultural Relativity", 25 Va. iLL, (1985), p. 869; 
A. D. Rentlen, "The Unanswered Challenge of Relativism and the Consequences for Human 
Rights", 7 Hum. R. Q., (1984), p. 514 
48 R. Rorty, "Pragmatism, Relativism, and Irrationalism", 53 Proc. & Addresses Am. Phil. 
Association, (1980), p. 719, at pp. 727-730 
49 D. Davidson, "Reply to Burge", 85 J. of Phil., (1988), p. 664, at p. 664 
so Absence of a scientific method for "qualitatively evaluating cultures" validates an attitude 
of "respect for the differences between cultures". Quotation from XLIX American 
Anthropologist, (1947), pp. 539-543, in R. B. Brandt, Ethical Theory: The Problems of 
Normative and Critical Ethics, (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., Prentice-Hall Inc., 1959), p. 288; J. S. 
Fiskin, Beyond Subjective Morality, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1984), pp. 1,37-41 
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substratum which vindicates the incomparability of results-51 The principal 
inconsistency in the stance of relativity is its proposition of tolerance. If 
competing ideas, independent of an algorithmic, can be accommodated through 
tolerance, it seems that tolerance becomes a normative concept contrary to the 
initial declarations of relativity. On the other hand and in order to retain the 
relativist argument, if tolerance is an option, intolerance is also an equally valid 
option. 52 Consequently, one could speak of intolerance or inhumanity and feel 
disdain towards any criticism against them, not least to intervention which 
would enforce an idea of humanity beyond its conjectural boundaries. Yet in 
fact we do not; and this happens because we have an idea of the finished product 
and through conversation opt for the results of human dignity. 
Thus, the demarcation between particular traditions is not insular but involves 
interaction and communication. As MacIntyre said: "[h]ow and under what 
conditions traditions can be 
...... 
resolved is something only to be understood 
after a prior understanding of the nature of such traditions has been achieved. 
From the standpoint of traditions of rational enquiry the problem of diversity is 
not abolished, but it is transformed in a way that renders it amenable to 
solution". 53 This makes explicit the reconfiguration, an overlapping one, 
between traditions and the idea of communal solidarity. The latter may have a 
shrinking locality in the sense that "...... the force of `us' is, typically, contrastive 
..... 
it contrasts with a `they' which is also made up of human beings". 54 This 
explains better the force of the argument concerning the protection of nationals 
abroad, whereby the maltreatment provokes a sense of solidarity towards fellow 
nationals. On the other hand, it can extend to a wider number of persons or 
humanity as a whole and this explains humanitarian intervention lato sensu. 55 
s' D. Davidson, Inquires into Truth and Interpretation, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1984), 
184 
R. B. Brandt, Ethical Theory, supra, note 50, p. 289: "..... the value of intolerance is as 
. ustified (or unjustified) as that of tolerance". 
A. Maclntyre, Whose Justice, supra, note 46, p. 10 
54R. Rorty, Contingency, supra, note 11, p. 190 
ss K. R. Monroe, M. C. Barton, U. Klingemann, "Altruism and the Theory of Rational Action: 
Rescuers of Jews in Nazi Europe", 101 Ethics, (1980), p. 103; V. Dimitrijevic, "The Place of 
Helsinki on the Road to Human Rights", 13 Vand. J. Transnat '1 L.. (1980), p. 253 
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11.2 Conspiracy, conservatism and elitism. Another aspect of relativism is "the 
conspiracy theory"56 of human rights. Human rights are considered to belong to 
what has been called "eurocentrism"57 and their promotion has been criticised as 
an ideological tool for Western expansion. Accepting moralities which coincide 
with national boundaries has been a trait of relativism and a hindrance for 
action. 58 Humanitarian intervention has constantly been subjected to the charge 
that it has been subjectively oriented and promoted. Suffice to say that 
relativism has traditionally been considered as a major obstacle to humanitarian 
intervention. In the 19th century, Pradier-Fodere condemned humanitarian 
intervention to illegality because it relates to "la justice subjective" and not "la 
justice objective". 59 
One should consider though the dogmatic nihilism of this theory, which depletes 
any action of meaning by disclosing ulterior, real or imaginary, interests. The 
Ugandan incident contains interesting insights. During the O. A. U. meeting, the 
President of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, condemned the organisation's inaction in 
relation to human rights violations occurring in Africa: "[t]here is a strange habit 
in Africa: an African leader, as long as he is African, can kill Africans just as he 
pleases"60 and added that "[b]lackness has become a certificate to kill with 
immunity" 61 In the Central Africa case, again the lack of condemnation of 
Bokassa's despicable practices was not lost from sight. The Central African 
Ambassador to the United Nations expressed his "bitter disappointment over the 
culpable silence of the United Nations and of the Organisation of African Unity" 
sb K. R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, 5th ed., vol. II, (London, Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1966), p. 94 
S' E. McWhinney, United Nations Law Making, (N. Y., Holmes & Meires/UNESCO, 1984), 
209 
8 M. Walzer, "The Moral Standing of States: A Response to Four Critics", 9 Phil. & Public 
YA/airs (1980), p. 220 
S P. Pradier-Fodere, Traite de droit international public: Europeen et Americain, tome 1, 
(Paris, G. Pedone-Lauriel, 1885), pp. 656-657, para. 427: "La justice objective se revile 
graduellement et apres de longues et penibles luttes par l'opinion publique. 
Quand eile entre 
dans la conscience generale, c'est ä dire, quant elle devient generalement subjective, eile est 
realisee sans aucune intervention, et sous la seule impulsion de la civilisation". 
60 11 Africa Contemporary Records, (1978-79), p. 394 
61 Keesing's, (1979), p. 29670A 
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and criticised the activity of those institutions in the field of protecting human 
rights. 62 
The position of relativism discharges also a conspicuous conservatism because it 
suggests that if a society such as Uganda or Kampuchea has been accustomed to 
inhumanity, so be it. An idea of nationally constrained practices, of a national 
"sort", is immanent in this argument which negates humanitarian interventions. 
If certain practices, however inhuman, are attributed to specific cultures, it is a 
prescription for their perpetuation. This is rather arbitrary because it runs against 
the relativist argument of "non cognito". If the theorist lacks knowledge of the 
culture, he cannot apprehend the practices as representing a certain culture. They 
may just be an aberration but this relativist position acknowledges the enactment 
of certain rules, even if abhorrent, as being authoritative because they are 
presumed to represent the specific legal and social context of a country. This 
extreme aspect has been called "ideological positivism". 63 It shares with 
conceptual positivism a common attitude towards the test of pedigree but it also 
believes that the morality of the system is the outcome of its being enacted 
without evaluating its content. This view was vociferously rejected after the 
horrors of Nazism, whereby the morality of procedurally enacted law clashed 
with the wider morality. Therefore, the danger of recognising an exclusionist 
relativism in a latent national context should be emphasised. 
Surprisingly, the position of positivists and Critical Lawyers coincide on the 
issue of contingency. According to Mark Tushnet: "to say that some specific 
right is (or ought to be) recognised in a specific culture is to say that the culture 
is what it is, ought to recognise what its deepest commitments are, or ought to 
be transformed into some other culture". 64 Leaving out the last statement on 
transformation which is equally problematic, his argumentative line is similar to 
that of Kelsen. There can only be a description of rights which emanate from the 
particular context of a certain society. This can be formulated accordingly: 
because the context is X, rights Y, Z ought to exist. In this way, the danger of 
62 4 U. N. GAOR, U. N. Doc. A/34/PV, (1979), p. 32, at p. 41: "Those institutions, whose basic 
principles depend on the protection of human rights and freedoms ....., will never 
be able to do 
anything useful until they stop being a syndicate of dictatorial oppressive governments". 
6 C. S. Nino, The Ethics of Human Rights, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1991), p. 11 
64 M. Tushnet, "An Essay on Rights", 62 Tex. L. Rev., (1984), p. 1363, at p. 1365 
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including personal predilections is averted because the method appears as an 
objective imputation. The proposition for change appears then arbitrary because 
a society cannot be transformed unless we have an idea of how it should be 
transformed. The contingency and relativity of rights obscures the objects of 
human desire. 
Returning now to the main argument of relativity, its inconspicuous elitism, 
clothed in the language of pluralism and tolerance, will be considered. The 
admission of compromise is inherent in liberal theories of justice, such as that of 
Rawls who proceeds from a cautious instrumentality to cautious relativism. As 
presented in Chapter One, in his book A Theory of Justice, he admits two 
principles 
- 
equal liberty and difference 
- 
which amount to "justice as fairness". 
Being concerned with economic and social inequalities, he proceeds to a 
compromise. Whereas equal liberty, which denotes political and civil rights, is 
the first principle, its application can be restricted in order to facilitate the 
effectuation of economic and social conditions which are indispensable for the 
enjoyment of this principle. 65 This argument could be characterised as relativist- 
elitist but, in fact, it is venturesome. The antipode is pronounced by Louis 
Henkin: "[h]ow many hungry are fed, how much industry is built, by massacre, 
torture, and detention, 
..... 
". 
66 The danger resides in the inherent relativity of the 
conditions whose fulfilment would ultimately determine the enjoyment of equal 
liberty. The deficient conditions may be ameliorated earnestly or they may be 
perpetuated intentionally. Before the specific problem of humanitarian 
intervention in a relativist environment is dealt with in the next section, it should 
be observed that Rawls' disavowal of comprehensive human rights has been 
developed in response to a relativist criticism against A Theory of Justice. 
67 In 
subsequent writings, he confines the application of human rights to western 
65 J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 151- 
152, hereinafter cited as TJ 
66 L. Henkin, The Rights of Man Today, (Boulder, Westview Press, 1978), p. 130; B. Barry, 
The Liberal Theory of Justice: A Critical Examination of the Principal Doctrines in 
"A 
Theory of Justice " by John Rawls, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1973), p. 77 
6 A. A. D Amato, Jurisprudence: A Descriptive and Normative Analysis of Law. (Dordrecht. 
M. Nijhoff, 1984), pp. 260-1 
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affluent societies, and by preaching tolerance and self-respect humanitarian 
intervention becomes a distant prospect. 68 
II. 3 International relativism: Rawls and Walzer on humanitarian intervention. 
In Chapter One, the main tenets of Rawls' theory of justice have been analysed 
and it was concluded that only just states participate in his comprehensive and 
exemplary principles of justice. In the "Law of Peoples"69, where his 
international law theory is adumbrated, Rawls appears relativistic and cautious 
not to promote a singular conception of societies, but also eager to recognise 
pluralistic diversity. He transmutes the conception of tolerance for illiberal 
views into international society. Consequently, there are similarities with 
Walzer's Just and Unjust Wars. 70 However, Rawls does not reach the end of his 
argumentative web and still treats tyrannical states as outlaws7' which justify 
external intervention. This statement is reminiscent of a 19th century Italian 
theorist, P. Fiore. He relates international relativism with the liberty and 
autonomy of people to develop their civilisation and, thus, in principle, he is 
opposed to humanitarian intervention. Pursuing a similar line of argument which 
is also traced in Rawls, he says that "la loi de la sociabilite nous oblige ä la 
tolerance" and that this is "necessaire de ne pas oublier". However, 
humanitarian intervention is exceptionally admitted in dolorous circumstances 
as those persisting in Greece "soumise au joug du cimeterre turc". 72 
The correlation between internal unjust circumstances which incite domestic 
resistance and external intervention has been explained in Chapter One. Walzer 
distinguishes between the two situations and though, as he says, a state may be 
illegitimate at home, it is presumed legitimate internationally and that 
intervention is not justified whenever revolution is. 73 For him, tyrannical 
governments enjoy a preassumption of legitimacy, acting as a "fit" between the 
68 J. Rawls, "Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical:, 14 Phil. & Public Af . (1985), 
223, at p. 225 79 
J. Rawls, "The Law of Peoples", 20 Critical Inquiry, (1993), p. 36, hereinafter cited as LP 
70 M. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, (N. Y., 
Basic Books, 1977), hereinafter cited as JUW 
" LP, pp. 37,66; F. T6son, "The Kantian Theory of International Law", 92 Col. L. Rev., (1992), 
53 
2 P. Fiore, Nouveau droit international public, P. Pradier-Fodere (trad), (Paris, A. Durand et 
Pedone-Lauriel, 1868), p. 226 
73 JUW, p. 89 
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government and the community. 74 Regarding tyrannical regimes, the only 
remedy offered by Walzer is revolution, whereas foreign intervention, which 
would appear under such circumstances as an equal remedy, is not justified. 
Otherwise, the citizens' rights to rebellion and a general right to self- 
determination are suspended. The legitimacy of a regime is an international 
presumption. Its standing is hypothesised, as if it were legitimate but the answer 
to a genuine imposition of legitimacy, can be given only by a domestic process 
The difference in the two approaches concerns the extent of the relativist 
argument. Walzer's reasoning is a "raw" liberal endorsement of cultural diversity 
and tolerance, whereas Rawls retreated from an exemplary articulation of justice 
in his book A Theory of Justice towards a cautious liberalism in the "Law of 
Peoples" where he respects diversification. Only on this latter point do the two 
opinions converge. Walzer pursues a "pluralistic" legitimacy significantly 
similar to relativism. Action, and particularly humanitarian action lato sensu, in 
a pluralistic society is impeded by the legitimate purpose of preserving the 
diverse concepts of justice and prudence which will otherwise be artificially 
accelerated. It is true that Walzer is permissive in certain cases, amongst which 
the massacre and enslavement of a state's citizens is included. 75 However, it is 
also true that his claim of social contingency emasculates the propensity for 
action. 
In the "Law of Peoples", Rawls sacrifices humanoid liberalism for a doubtful 
pursuit of communitarism. 76 His A Theory of Justice is enthusiastically 
individualist, whereby persons are presented as ultimate moral units" and also 
units for appraisal of societal justice. Consequently, the contingent problem of 
evaluating the justness of the states which could participate in the initial position 
is also solved. Lacking such criterion, any possibility of constructive choice is 
denied. Rawls, in his effort to apply his theory in a concrete social environment, 
is apprised of the fact that his individualist theory might constrict the 
participants in the original position arithmetically, considering the variety of 
74 M. Walzer, "The Moral Standing of States: A Response to Four Critics", 9 Phil. & Public 
A'/airs (1980), p. 209, at p. 212 
Ibid., pp. 215-217; Ideen., JUW, pp. 101-108 
76 R. Tesön, "The Rawlsian Theory of International Law", 9 Ethics & International Affairs, 
1995), p. 79 
7 TJ, p. 264-265 
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existing political institutions some of which, according to his initial articulation 
are not just but only nearly so. In the "Law of Peoples", he thinks that such a 
scheme is too narrow and, therefore, he embraces less or narrowly just societies 
in order to accomplish worthy purposes. First, he is concerned with peace, and 
under this assumption he proceeds into expanding the room for participants in 
the original position. In order to preserve peace, states should accept the main 
features of traditional international law. But which states should accept them? If 
it is only the just ones, the leverage of disagreement and conflict rises 
dangerously, for in the actual world the nearly just and the unjust states form the 
majority. Only by extending or relieving the rigidity of the original position and 
including therein "hierarchical states" which are ordered by a communitarian 
perception or an "associationist" view, does the leverage of accepting the 
principles of international law and thus preserving peace increase. This can only 
be done by abandoning individualism as an evaluator for just societies. 
The shrewd consequentialism of the argument should not be discounted because 
it appears most suitable for achieving the aim of preserving the peace and also is 
less likely to be subjected to the often heard argument of moral falsification or 
moral imperialism. Peace is presented as an aim which all humankind strive 
towards. In principle, it could not be disproved but its meaning is not finical and 
therefore indisputable. Leaving aside this practical issue, peace is a presumption 
and in a relativist philosophy also the opposite, war, should be accommodated, 
unless someone departs from a pre-ideational basis. The problem in this regard 
is more acute in relation to human rights which depend on recognition of a kind 
of common characteristic notwithstanding cultural differences. 
II. 4 A Critique of Rawls' Liberal Relativism. In the "Law of Peoples", Rawls 
states a conservative philosophy of international law and hence appears to have 
regressed from his previous comprehensive liberalism in A Theory of Justice. 
Rawls rectified the criticisms addressed to his previous postulates and moved 
towards a relativist conception of justice. His concept of justice purports to "find 
reasonable solutions to conflicts within existing practice"78 and because societal 
structures harbour diversity and pluralism, the imposition of a particular version 
'8 J. Rawls, "Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics", 60 Philosophical Rev., (1951), p. 177 
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of comprehensive justice could only be maintained by institutions which contain 
conflicting interests. The stability offered under those circumstances is 
ephemeral and subject to shifts of power. For stability and order therefore, there 
is a need to reduce the scope of comprehensive justice to "certain fundamental 
intuitive ideas viewed as latent in the public political culture of a democratic 
society". 79 Rawls appears more concerned with the stability and unity of a 
system in adjudicating incommensurable conceptions of the meaning of justice: 
"[i]n a constitutional democracy, one of its most important aims is presenting a 
political conception of justice that cannot only provide shared public basis for 
the justification of political and social institutions but also helps ensure stability 
from one generation to the next". 80 
This does not mean that he abandons liberalism, but he tries to avoid the use of 
oppressive methods in order to affirm an imposed comprehensive concept of 
justice within a society which will achieve stability and peace. 81 Stability and 
unity can only be attained by an overlapping consensual standard82 which a 
comprehensive concept of justice in a pluralistic society could not present. In 
that context, Rawls abandons a comprehensive liberalism because the minimum 
consensus requires diminishment. However, he still resides within it by stressing 
the importance of peace and toleration, asserting that no concept of justice 
should presuppose exclusive precedence over any other but inadvertently 
admitting that these preceding concepts should. 
Before explaining the function of those ideas in the theory of international law, 
two other features in his thought are worth commending. The first is Hobbesian 
in its character, without that necessary meaning that Rawls embraces Hobbes' 
theory. Contrary to its previous individualism, his later theory of justice is tied 
to order. 83 The other feature is more Heggelian, it concerns the abandonment of 
the Kantian noumenal realm and an exploration into the actual world "for the 
fundamental intuitive ideas viewed as latent in the public political culture of a 
79 J. Rawls, "The Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good", 17 Phil. & Publ. Affairs, (1988), 
25 1, at p. 252 
0 J. Rawls, "The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus", 7 Oxford J. Leg. Studies, (1987), p. I 
gý J. Rawls, "The Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus", 64 N. Y. U. L. Rev., (1989), 
233, at p. 234 e2 
J. Rawls, "The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus", 7 Oxford J. Leg. Studies, (1987), p. 1, at p. 6 
83 J. Hampton, "Should Political Philosophy be Done Without Metaphysics? ", 99 Ethics, (1989), 
p. 791 
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democratic society". 84 Thus, it is not surprising that his theory of international 
law regresses from liberal idealism to relativism. 85 Rawls proceeds with an 
investigation into the existing practices in international relations and examines 
the values embedded in them. The actual world does not contain solely liberal 
states but also those he baptised as hierarchical and tyrannical which adhere to 
certain values. Consequently, he constructs his concept of justice on the merits 
of those values. Then his concern for order and peace comes into play. Were we 
to impose a comprehensive liberal conception of justice, it would enhance the 
opportunities for instability in a pluralistic world. Consequently, we should 
restrict our perspective and abide by the liberal tenet of tolerance. Hence, his 
tolerance of less liberal societies comes into the light, a tolerance, that is, of 
restrictions on principles of justice within societies. 
Rawls' theory suffers from inherent tension in his endeavour to accommodate 
liberal ideas of human rights and justice and those who partially reject those 
same ideas. His concern with order, stability and peace distances himself from a 
comprehensive and aspired concept of justice. Toleration of hierarchical states 
could, according to Rawls, ensure stability, their exclusion, nevertheless, is not a 
carte blance for waging war. One would expect that his examination of actual 
state practice would render more prudential results on the circumstances of 
waging war. States do not resort to war intuitively but their decision depends on 
political, diplomatic, military considerations. Otherwise humanitarian actions 
would be more often than not. In fact, any humanitarian action depends on 
questions concerning the seriousness of humanitarian tragedy, the permissibility 
- 
political, military 
- 
of any action, the chances of success. Take for instance the 
case of China, a hierarchical state. Non-action in that case was not because 
China in Rawls' scheme is included in the plane of equal relations between 
liberal and hierarchical societies. It is for more important geo-strategic 
considerations which remain unaltered, were China was to be excluded from a 
status of equality with liberal states. Hence, peace could be preserved in this 
rather negative form. What the later Rawlsian theory is doing is to compromise 
84 J. Rawls, "The Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good", 17 Phil. & Publ. Affairs, (1988), 
25 1, at p. 252 ýs 
T. W. Pogge, Realising Rawls, (Ithaca, Cornell University. Press, 1989), ch. 6, in part. pp. 267- 
273 
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a substantial liberal concept of justice in order to achieve some dubious results 
which may be achieved in any case. 
His relativistic position concerning international justice is unable to answer the 
unavoidable question of assessing the international structure. How can one 
assess it and work towards its amelioration without a background concept of 
justice? As was explained in the preceding sections, there is not and there shall 
not be, at least in the foreseeable future, a criterion of justice which is neutral 
and congenial to all cultures. His proposed "overlapping consensus" is difficult 
to apply in a democratic national society with a sufficient degree of cultural 
unity among its members. This reveals how difficult such a theory would be in 
the international society with multifarious diverse elements. And even if the 
latent "fundamental intuitive ideas" were to be found, those ideas would be in 
the best of circumstances reduced to singularity. Diversification does not 
preclude a dialectic agreement for value optimisation. This would stand at the 
opposite pole of consensual value minimisation. For such an agreement, 
idealistic conviction is required. 
Furthermore, the fear of cultural diversity that induces Rawls to shrink from his 
theory of justice to more relativistic concepts has to show more than the mere 
existence of cultural diversity. It has to show lack of agreement which is actual 
and not presupposed 
- 
ipso facto. One may start from different premises and 
finally arrive at the same result but that does not mean that our initial ideal is not 
worth sustaining because others begin from a different premise. Rawls' 
arguments for the optimisation of the least advantaged were adopted by Third 
World countries which, by definition, start from different premises. Those 
demands were rejected by Western states on the claim that they are instigated 
from diverse cultures, although they corresponded to our liberal ideals or our 
domestic instantiation of the concept of justice. Such rejection of the principles 
of justice on grounds of cultural diversity is hypocritical. 
On the other hand, it is premature to cut short the chance for dialogue or 
discussion between the culturally diverse participants on the merits of the 
principles. The lack of convergence or agreement is, thus, pre-empted. Then the 
suspicion, reasonable or not, of moral 
- 
cultural disagreement, abrogates the 
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potentiality of action. We mainly act on the beliefs we hold and we should 
accept the possibility of reforming or modifying them when our praxis is tested. 
We do not start our life with an assumption of withdrawal because our ideas are 
not as radiant due to a thousand other competing ideals. If we think for a 
moment about the development of our ideas (Bill of Rights, French Revolution) 
we may become convinced that they required conviction and persistence. 
Because it is difficult to trace whether denial of any components of those 
principles is a genuine trait of a particular culture or a thin veil for justifying 
political expediencies, regressing and compromising those principles is not 
worth doing. And this presents the human conundrum: relativism is indefensible 
whereas objectivity is untenable. What is left is conversation. 
III. RECONSTRUCTION THROUGH A DISCURSIVE MODE: 
HUMAN DIGNITY AS EDIFICATION 
III. 1 A recapitulation. Legal theory concerning humanitarian intervention as it 
is presented above displays a tragic property, 86 reminiscent of the hero's 
character in ancient Greek tragedies. Legal theory presents multiple variables 
each of which is related to certain goods. These goods have been simplified as 
peace, order, justice, human dignity. Practitioners, politicians and the layman 
agonise like the tragic hero who should choose among incommensurable and 
competing `goods'. Antigone is considered the exemplary tragic persona. She 
experienced psychic and mental trepidation in making her choice. Kreon, the 
master of Thybes, was determined to impose human order without respect to the 
dictates of divine justice. The heroine was adamant that the latter prevails but 
eventually human ordering wrecked her audacity. In a certain way, Antigone as 
a play can exert a therapeutic function. It appeases both the psyche and the 
reason of the audience or the reader. It satisfies in other words the sense of 
justice but also that of order. Whereas order and formality prevails, the reader 
86 A. MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, (London, Duckworth, 1981), pp. 223- 
225; J. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1980), pp. 92-95 
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associates himself with the catharsis which the interplay with justice achieves. 
This paradigm applies also to international law. 
International law is presented as a complete system whereby rules provide 
answers and reduce the subjectivity of discretion. They emit an aura of 
objectivity because they are formulated in a legalistic milieu and the internal 
construction of the purportedly coherent rules is obscured. The exposition of the 
latter yields a sense of relativity of the pertinent positions. In order to escape the 
strictness of rule reductionism, international law is permitting a modicum of ad 
hoc justice in certain issues which is tied inexorably to the application of rules. 
The area of maritime delimitation is a prime example of such technique where 
87 equity as well as other interests are admitted. Humanitarian intervention is 
another example, although highly disputed. As observed above, international 
lawyers and state officials have referred to that modicum of justice when 
applying the pertinent international rules on intervention. This technique again 
does not save us from the quest of objectivity or the flight from relativism. 
The quest of objectivity was presented above as the Cartesian anxiety: "..... the 
right to conceive high hopes if I am happy enough to discover one thing only 
which is certain and indubitable". 88 This raises another issue related to human 
tragic character. The quest for "foundation" has not only a logical appeal but 
also an emotional one. It embodies the human drive to escape from subsuming 
into chaos and madness where the lack of a fixed point would lead. Leaving 
apart the question of whether this point is reason, God, or a point within a 
method, the quest is ontological because it relieves us from the uncertainty 
which our finite and fallible human nature is subject to. And this is the best 
defence against relativism, which denies this fixed point or presents a multiple 
of such points. If the position that there is nothing which accounts for a 
reasonable basis is accepted, we are in the position described by Descartes that: 
87 "Equity as a legal concept is a direct emanation of the idea of justice. The Court whose task 
is by definition to administer justice is bound to apply it". Case Concerning the Continental 
Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), I. C. J. Rep., (1982), p. 18, at p. 60, para. 71; 
Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada/United States of 
America), I. C. J. Rep., (1984), p. 247, at p. 292, para. 89; North Sea Continental Shelf Cases. 
L CJ Rep., (1969), p. 3, at pp. 46-50, paras. 85-90 
88 R. Descartes, "Meditations on First Philosophy", in The Philosophical Works of Descartes. 
trans. E. S. Haldane, G. R. T. Ross, vol.!, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1931), 
p. 144 
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"I can neither make certain of setting my feet on the bottom, nor can I swim and 
so support myself on the surface, 
..... 
". 
89 
Relativism on the other hand is only self-referential, self-defeating and 
paradoxical. Rejecting objectivism and promoting relativism, the truth of this 
position 
- 
relativism 
- 
is implicitly admitted. But truth is relative and can also be 
false. This argument undermines the whole position of relativism. What is 
needed in order to escape from this quandary is to liberate ourselves from the 
fixed notions of objectivity and relativism. It should be commented that these 
notions are used in their wider meaning. Thus, objectivity refers to a 
metaphysical reality where there must be an epistemological distinction between 
the "ought" and the "is". This is mainly Kelsen's method but also it refers to a 
metaphysical realism to which the subject should reflect, and this is the natural 
law method. Another aspect is a method of empirically seeking to find 
"objective truths" in a world of vicissitudes. This requires the discovery of the 
permanent features in human aspirations and practice, which becomes the search 
for human dignity in the policy school. Relativism can be viewed as a response 
to the rigorous Kantian distinction of "is" and "ought". Only if there is an 
objective and universal "ought" can we escape heteronomy. The refutation of 
this a priori deterministically brings into light the relativity of morality. 90 What 
is needed then is a new conversation which unites the theoria, praxis and 
phronesis. It shows that we can hold views, moral or political, without the need 
to ground them objectively or that they can be discussed without the need of 
universal agreement. 91 Conversing avoids also the danger of viewing legal 
matters as a competing ground of ideas which are inimical to preferences. 
Humanitarian intervention is such an area where legal argument should 
overcome its cumbered modes and idiosyncrasy and extend to a new approach. 
This approach is a conversation of deciding and choosing through the praxis of 
trying to reach the best solution. 
89 Ibid., p. 149; I. Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N. K. Smith, (London, Macmillan, 
1929), p. 257: "This domain is an island, enclosed by nature itself within unalterable limits. It 
is the land of truth 
- 
enchanting name !- surrounded by a wide and stormy ocean......... 
90 A. Maclntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, (London, Duckworth, 1981), p. 21 
9' Mirror, pp. 333-334 
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III. 2 The reconstruction. In the previous section the argument that humanitarian 
intervention could be objectively verified has been debunked. However, it has 
been argued that what is left is not chaos but conversation. At this point, an 
attempt to describe an alternative will be made by borrowing insights from 
visionary projects but in parallel maintaining the possibility of dialogue. Legal 
argument, being contradictory and devoid of foundational premises, projects the 
individual as the final arbiter, the one who will make the choice among 
conflicting values. To think differently is to decry humanity and join those who 
would like to escape the burden of making choices, preferring to nullify 
conversation by hypostatizing particular events. 
Rejecting rational reasoning does not make us agnostic about our moral or 
political values. People hold views even if they cannot derive them from 
reasonably or logically ascertained principles. Discursive theory enfranchises 
ourselves from the vain attempt to prove that values are true instead of justified. 
Thus, it enhances the dialectic by transgressing the perceived point where the 
legal argumentation is assumed as finite. 92 
The dialectic procedure kindles transformation and revision of legal concepts 
through discursive agreement. The lawyer is relieved from the argumentative 
rigidity of the legal system and can imagine a revisionary programme by an 
evaluation of the facts. 93 
Conversation challenges the view that the rules are natural or necessary and 
holds that values and morality are not a matter of reason but of conviction. 
Therefore, we should not feel ashamed of our views. By deconstructing 
foundational theories, the communal and indissociable nature of life is 
emphasised and also the quest to bring it about. 94 People live in a social, 
95 
cultural, ideological context and form opinions from within. The 
92 F. Boyle, supra note 32, p. 358: "Yet the fetishism of essences, the belief that this is how one 
showed oneself to be correct, actually subverts the commitment to enlightened rationality and 
replaces it with reified ideas, thus ruling out the possibility of real discussion". 
93 R. M. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, (Cambridge Mass., Harvard University 
Press, 1983), pp. 25-42,91-117 
94 G. Frug, "The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law", 97 Harvard. L. Rev., (1984), 
p. 1276, at p. 1368: "The alternative to foundations is not chaos but the joint reconstruction of 
social life, the quest for participatory democracy". 
95 Beyond, pp. XIV, 37: "We should be comfortable viewing both rationality and social life as 
historically and culturally situated". 
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understanding of the social context ostracises the notion of an aprionstic, 
ahistorical, atemporal foundation of our thoughts. "We need to unfreeze the 
world as it appears to common sense as a bunch of more or less objectively 
determined social relations and to make it appear as (we believe) it really is: 
people acting, imagining, rationalizing, justiEying". 96 People do not merely have 
opinions but they form opinions and their formation is a creative procedure 
within the human context. 97 The request for consensus between conflicting 
opinions is not found "but created by the same people. They form within their 
shared living a community of understanding". 98 That creative process is 
described by Bernstein in the following words: 
"Democratic politics is an encounter among people with different 
interests, perspectives, and opinions 
- 
an encounter in which they 
reconsider and mutually revise opinions and interests, both individual and 
common. It happens always in a context of conflict, imperfect knowledge, 
and uncertainty, but where community action is necessary. The 
resolutions achieved are always more or less temporary, subject to 
reconsideration, and rarely unanimous. What matters is not unanimity but 
discourse. The substantive common interest is only discovered or created 
in democratic political struggle, and it remains contested as much as 
shared. Far from being inimical to democracy, conflict 
- 
handled in 
democratic ways, with openness and persuasion 
- 
is what makes 
democracy work, what makes for the mutual revision of opinions and 
interests. "99 
96 R. W. Gordon, "New Developments in Legal Theory", in D. Kairys (ed. ), The Politics of Law: 
A Progressive Critique, (New York, Pantheon Books, 1982), p. 281, at p. 289; R. Rorty, 
"Pragmatism, Relativism and Irrationalism", 53 Proc. & Addresses of the American 
Philosophical Association, (1980), p. 719, at p. 727: "Our identification with our community -our 
society, our political tradition, our intellectual heritage -, is heightened when we see this 
community as ours rather than nature's, shaped rather than found, one among many which men 
have made. In the end, the pragmatists tell us, what matters is our loyalty to other human beings 
clinging together against the dark, not our hope of getting things right". 
97 L. Wittgenstein, On Certainty, (Oxford, Blackwell, 1969), p. 16e, para. 105: "All testing, all 
confirmation and disconfirmation of a hypothesis takes place already within a system. And this 
system is not a more or less arbitrary and doubtful point of departure for all our arguments: no, it 
belongs to the essence of what we call an argument. The system is not so much the point of 
departure, as the element in which arguments have their life". 
98 Beyond, pp. 203-204,215-216,223-224,229; M. V. Tushnet, "Following the Rules Laid Down: 
A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles", 96 Harv. L. Rev., (1983), p. 781, at p. 826- 
827 
99 Beyond, pp. 223-224 
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Therefore, we need to envisage and conceptualise a mode of doing things. The 
technique is explained by Unger: 
"You start from the conflicts between the available ideals of social life in 
your own social world or legal tradition and their flowed actualisation in 
present society. You imagine the actualisation transformed, or you 
transform them in fact, perhaps only by extending an ideal to some areas 
of social life from which it had previously been excluded. Then you revise 
the ideal conceptions in the light of their new practical embodiments. You 
might call this process internal development. To engage in it self- 
reflectively you need make only two crucial assumptions: that no one 
scheme of association has conclusive authority and that the mutual 
correction of abstract ideals and their institutional realisations represents 
the last best hope of the standard forms of normative controversy". 100 
A proposed project of attaining human worth does not depend for its validity on 
a privileged view or the transcendental objectivity of the proposal but on its 
argumentative value and its ability for making adjustments. Relieving human 
beings from distress and disadvantageous circumstances could not be dealt with 
in a uniform style. It should be evaluated under all the pertinent circumstances, 
and the arguments turned away from a rigid evaluation of legality to what is 
significant in that particular case, what is important for the achievement of those 
values. 1 ot 
The conflicting character of legal thinking mirrors the conflicting character of 
human life. There is no need therefore to reduce dialogue for the quest of 
commensuration to and propositions, but always to think of the alternative 
arguments which can be achieved by conversation. That conversation, pertinent 
to the merits of its case, should not assume that, eventually, there should be an 
agreement but it should focus on the criteria for good arguments and evaluate 
the propositions presented for the attainment of human worth. 
goo R. M. Unger, "The Critical Legal Studies Movement", 96 Harvard. L. Rev., (1983), p. 561, at 
? P. 579-580 ý A. Carty, The Decay of International Law? A Reappraisal of the Limits of Legal Imagination 
in International Affairs, (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1986), p. 114: "The potential 
task of legal doctrine is to reconstruct conflict situations in accordance with basic principles of 
understanding, a theory of knowledge based on the development of argument, rather than the 
search for objectivity or experience as such". 
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111.3 What is human dignity and its function in a conversing argumentation. /U. ' 
The definition of human dignity cannot attain comprehensiveness and it does 
not aspire thereto. The reason for declining to provide comprehensive 
determinations is that, in a discursive culture, the content of human dignity 
will be the object of debate whilst the notion of objective, impersonal 
definitions has proven to be elusive. The lack of definition coincides also with 
the stated purpose in this study of enlarging reasoning beyond the inclusive 
realms of legality and, finally, it is consonant with the other stated purpose of 
revision. Embracing the prospect of revision supplies legal argumentation 
with a certain dynamic when the legal project does not correspond to a 
reformed reality, instead of competing against the wave of change. This may 
provoke the suspicion or criticism of arbitrariness, according to which human 
dignity may connote different things to different classes of people or decision- 
makers and hence justify any action under its rubric. However, uniformity is 
not required because the participants in the discussion about human dignity 
are informed of its facets. Once it has been accepted, creativity and diversity 
are not considered detrimental. 
Although human dignity cannot enjoy a definable statement, some referents 
which might assist our perception thereof could, at least, be advised. The 
referents would be described minimally whilst it should be maintained that 
they contain an optimum mandate as well. Thus, we should speak of a 
dignified human existence and delineate its content by referring to the 
protection of life. However, although this would be the beginning, it is not the 
end of the telos of human dignity. In addition, quantitative and qualitative 
indices which dignify human life may be submitted such as freedom from 
torture, safety, the exercise of civil and political rights, social and economic 
flourishing. 
As was stated above, human dignity has been paraphrased as dignified human 
existence and this alludes to the two words which the Greeks use for life. 
There is, on the one hand, the word zoe, which is the biological life, and bios, 
102 Some of the ideas concerning the definition of human dignity, although in a 
different 
context, are taken from R. Dworkin, Life's Dominion: An Argument about Abortion and 
Euthanasia, (London, HarperCollins, 1993) 
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which is the life as lived. The first denotes the natural content of life, whereas 
the second denotes human striving. Why did we choose human dignity? 
Because we think it is important. This conveys manifold qualities: it may 
connote instrumentality or intrinsticality. It may witness them either 
disjunctively or accumulatively. We are not concerned at this point with these 
issues because they eventually refer us to our first article of importance. The 
point which should be made is that life has natural and human aspects. 
Leaving aside the human contribution to life, the frustration of the natural 
component, the biological aspect, frustrates not only the human but has wider 
repercussions to other people's lives as well. As a matter of fact, life and its 
biological sustenance is a sine qua non for any further discussion. Returning 
now to the other issue of dignity, it will be confined to self-respect and the 
respect from others. The inflicted indignity causes considerable mental harm 
because the person looses his sense of self-respect and autonomy. 
Additionally, people have invested interests in the character of their lives. 
Indignity is disrespect towards those critical interests, towards the morality of 
human beings to pursue their dignified life. Thus, we have made three 
distinctions: life as zoe (existence); dignity as critical interest; dignified life as 
valuable bios. The three of them are interconnected and dignified life cannot 
be attained if some individuals are denied the possibility of pursuing their 
interests and, above all, if they are exterminated biologically. 
Human dignity as dignified existence becomes then the guiding ideal in a 
reconstructive programme. It was said above that we need to transform legal 
argument concerning humanitarian intervention from its present confines. As 
it exists today, there is a certain theory in the form of non-intervention and 
sovereignty which surmises opinions, judgements and operations. The latter, 
though anarchically, capitulate to or redefine the social reality which this 
theory represents. In order to transform this state of affairs, we need another 
theory with its own ideal and which helps to discern which standards 
correspond therewith. The ideal of human dignity could be both visionary, 
enticing the particular historical and social conjecture, or pragmatic, capturing 
the significance of current developments which redirect legal theory and 
praxis towards human dignity. It could also be argued from the above attempt 
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into indicating human dignity that it represents a cumulation of current shared 
experiences. Life and its protection has been the aim or aspiration of almost 
all the philosophical trends. At this point, it should be again emphasised that 
our ideal of human dignity does not depend on any ultimate reason for its 
validity. This, however, does not mean that there would be no reasons which 
support this ideal for societal and legal development. Human dignity or any 
other determining ideal depends on our affective nature and, in extreme cases, 
upon the Humistic reign of passions. ' 03 It may also present the danger of 
seclusion. Instead, the reflective project pursued here whereby a discursive 
methodology will relate human dignity to actuations, knowledge or 
consequences was made explicit. Whereas it is a matter of conviction, it was 
explained above that we should overcome the fear of subjectivity and lack of 
neutrality which conviction may denote. These arguments are ingrained into 
reasoning because they offer a leeway from the domain of private ideas. As 
was commented above, lately Rawls has spoken of an "overlapping 
consensus" and Dworkin of governmental neutrality. 104 The distinction is a 
shaky one. We have reasons to act and these reasons depend on or are 
consistent with our reasons for action. How we act publicly relies on our 
private reasons. Otherwise, it would be difficult to explain that some people 
adhere to or accept human dignity privately, whereas their public persona is 
committed to the opposite, that is human indignity or vice versa. If a state 
massacres its citizens, its elite 
- 
the state here is viewed as a corporation of 
individuals 
- 
should have reasons to do so which are also private. Of course, 
not all reasons for action or inaction are made public but eventually this act of 
massacre should be justified down to the actor who is doing it. Therefore, the 
distinction could not be definite and a personal conviction about human 
dignity would consequently alter the public domain. Whatever the reasons for 
adhering to this ideal, it ultimately depicts an ideal for evaluating or 
approbating our or other people's actions. Additionally, the ideal of human 
dignity is not presented as an ad hoc criterion, but as comprehensive which is 
103 D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, L. A. Selby-Bigge (ed. ), 2nd ed., (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1978), Bk. II, pt. III, para. III, 5th para. 
104 See J. Raz, "Facing Diversity: The Case of Epistemic Diversity", 19 Phil. & Pub. Af , 
(1990), p. 3 
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disconnected from instantaneous emotive reactions. Above all, admitting the 
possibility of transformation, it justifies our ability for revision through 
discussion, instead of unquestioned adherence to obsolete and stringent 
doctrines. 
Concerning the function of law within this revisionary ideal, there should be a 
law of human dignity in international relations. Law should arise above the 
pertinent social context and should not present itself as justification or 
explication of existing outmoded practices and habits. We could also offer a 
word of prudence for those cautious to accept a revisionary legal ideal. Human 
dignity as an ideal is not a newcomer to political or legal thought, it is not an 
absolute denial of the dejä vu; it is merely a revised insight into international 
life and its acceptance as a guiding ideal. 
111.4 Conclusion. This Chapter introduces the third part of this study which 
contains the exposition of a reconstructive plan for humanitarian 
interventions. It appears as a necessary outgrowth of the preceding parts which 
dealt with the issue of legal theory and, secondly, with legal reasoning. 
Human dignity as a discursive mode provides, according to the opinion of the 
present author, a valuable answer to the acknowledged dissatisfaction with 
existing legal argument. 
In the next chapter, a more intimate exposition of the concept of human 
dignity will be pursued as it applies to certain instantations by conversing on 
their pertinent aspects. We are going also to discuss certain criteria which 
would help in our deliberations. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AS A TELOS OF A 
CONVERSING CULTURE: SOME PARADIGMS 
This chapter presents the mode of reasoning concerning humanitarian 
intervention in a conversing culture. It presents the steps for such conversing 
and finally discusses some cases accordingly. Having elaborated the legal 
premises for humanitarian intervention, human dignity looms as the most 
satisfactory criterion. 
I. HUMAN DIGNITY IN A CONVERSING ELABORATION OF 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
1.1 Conversing human dignity. In the previous Chapter, there was an attempt 
to describe the approach of this study to humanitarian intervention which 
transcends the distinction between objectivity and relativism towards a mode 
of dialectical play where there exists deliberation, judgement and choice 
among the forms of life which should be understood and evaluated. This 
method embraces certain procedures of human reasoning which realise human 
dignity. Hence, the situation should initially be identified and also the 
concurring set of alternatives. Then, the consequences which each alternative 
may produce are contemplated; at this point, the values inherent in any such 
alternative are appraised. The theorising person also tries to inform himself 
with what relevant people have said about those alternatives and thus, finally, 
he acquires the ability to make decisions in accordance with the initial 
assumption. 
The same mode of reasoning will be adjusted to humanitarian intervention. 
When a factual situation arises where people are massacred or persecuted, the 
situation should first be identified in its essence as an affront to human 
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dignity. Then, the different modes of reaction should be contemplated. One 
option is indolence, which stems from moral or political listlessness. At its 
antipode may reside acknowledgement, which peregrinates from apprehension 
to emphatic acceptance. Reaction may as well take the form of verbal 
condemnation or humanitarian intervention. The second step involves the 
articulation and appraisal of the values in each alternative. Then, when all the 
alternatives are present, the consequences of each alternative should be 
assessed. Any action entails certain effects which are internal or external in 
relation to the recipient or promulgating state. Finally, the theorising person 
could make a choice amongst those alternatives which achieve human dignity. 
This methodology assists legal argument in overcoming the futility of 
grounding ideas in something which is incommensurable. In order to avoid 
that which has been characterised as "ideological anaesthetic", we should 
provide good reasons for our preferences. This probably appears 
inconsequential because the projection of human dignity reverts to the 
previously criticised attitude of anchoring. It might again give rise to another 
"objectification mistake". It may also provoke the suspicion of ideological 
domination when it aspires to being applied in fields or subjects which may 
not share the same "false consciousness". However, the methodology 
described above provides the answer to what appears to be a recurrence of the 
"Cartesian Anxiety" because it reveals the possibility of discourse. 
This does not mean that the problem of humanitarian intervention is 
permanently resolved. It merely elucidates the constituent perspectives of the 
issue which are not confined to a deductive profferement according to the 
legalistic approach, but deciphers, conversely, the merits of the issue. The 
move away from the tradition of legal argumentation, which forces the modes 
of thinking into compartmentalised areas, raises the prospect of extending, 
through discussion, these modes into other areas which capture the essence of 
the problem. Otherwise the capacity of understanding what is really involved 
in the issue is forfeited. Thus, the argument concerning humanitarian 
intervention should not be an impersonal, insouciant debate on the aspects of 
humanitarian action and its effect on rules. It should concern the action's 
essentiality, that is, how a human tragedy could be averted; how we should 
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direct our action in order to avoid a human loss. The argument concerning 
humanitarian intervention is not a legal ping-pong match whereby principles 
and rules are confronted with counter-principles. Of more concern is the 
rationale and effect of arguments. As stated above, there should be application 
of human practical reasoning in order to find the most agreeable solution to 
the circumstances which succour human dignity, instead of applying "pret-a- 
manger" rules. ' 
Consequently, this mode of reasoning is not by itself foundational in its 
suggestions, although it panders to the ideal of human dignity and also 
evaluates state actions accordingly. The scintilla of conversing candour, 
whereby the possibilities and alternatives are conspicuously discussed, 
opposes the introverted, silent, discourse of existing legal argumentation. 
Another distinctive aspect is that it accepts the possibility for revision, that is, 
it is amenable to future arrangements and new dynamics which may endow 
human dignity with a more comprehensive substance. Such a perspective 
contrasts with the rather arteriosclerotic character of legal argument. The 
conversing argumentation purports towards producing an inter-subjective 
agreement2 which intimates a sense of community and solidarity whilst the 
participants are liberated from the constrains of "their" legal approach. In 
contrast, the scantiness of such a discursive method presupposes a 
compartmentalised community of hierarchical order, where legal argument 
provides the sense of certainty, completeness and superiority. In a conversing 
environment, individuals are capable of retaining their individuality. They are 
appreciated as units who face the future with the same fear and anxiety and 
who experience the same conflictual reality, questioning the way of human 
living. 
This technique of discursive argumentation should not be criticised for failing 
to provide an immovable, secure foundation for the result which may be 
procured. As it has been shown above, the prospect of a stable referent alludes 
1 A. Maclntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, (London, Duckworth, 1981), p. 244; 
T. A. Sprangen Jr., "Justification, Practical Reason, and Political Theory", NOMOS XXVIII. 
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R. Rorty, "Solidarity or Objectivity", in J. Rajchman, C. West, Post-Analytic Philosophy. 
(N. Y., Columbia University Press, 1985), p. 3, at p. 5 
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to the main fallibility of the legal reasoning which, however, should not de- 
legitimise it but prompt dialogue. As was observed: "The attempt to provide a 
secure foundation for knowledge is no longer a tenable enterprise. The only 
rational alternative is to submit our proposed solutions to critical examination, 
i. e., to evaluate them with a view to possible improvements, to compare them 
with alternative solutions and to search for new and better solutions". 3 
Although unanimity is not a target to be achieved easily, the dialogue exposes 
the possibility of an understanding within the vicissitudes of competing values 
and policies. The tension cannot be solved easily because human dignity is not 
a mere indicia of a certain aspect of life or, in particular, of legal-political 
achievement but it is the constituent of such an achievement. As long as legal 
reasoning is understood as "facts" which can be tested, or as "oughts" which 
can be either absolute imperatives or merely capricious preferences, then there 
is no room for such human reasoning. 
What is suggested here is that human dignity should become a rhetorical telos 
within this human reasoning, which seeks the acquiescence of people in 
general due to its dynamics and prudence. This approach is completely 
different from the hex of subjectivity and withdrawal which prompted Kelsen 
to say that "I cannot say what justice is 
...... 
I can only say what justice is to 
"4 me 
. 
As a consequence, this attitude would justify in specific cases any 
pertinent action 
- 
fortunate or disconsolate 
- 
according to the personal 
predilections of the person who passes judgement but this does not concern 
reasoning as it has been implied above. It only concerns the causes for action. 
The suggested here method assures a modicum of deliberation between the 
attractive alternatives, and although human dignity is a commitment and its 
adoption leaves other values outside the spectre of promulgation, it provides 
good reasons to choose this commitment. 
1.2 Human dignity as a commitment. Eventually, human dignity as a 
commitment outweighs its argumentative value and requires a redirection of 
state or human activities; therefore it presents the prospect of a coherent plan 
' H. Albert, "Science and the Search for Truth", in G. Radnitzky, G. Andersson (eds), 
Progress and Rationality in Science, (Dordrecht, D. Reidel, 1978), p. at p. 204 
` H. Kelsen, What is Justice, (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1957), pp. 21-22 
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for living or action. It is not subject to momentary or capricious changes of 
attitude or formations, but it requires a restatement of habits and impulses and 
a harmonisation of inclinations with practice. Also, the prospect of 
modifications cannot be disallowed because, otherwise, any benefit the 
dialogue may witness would be subsumed. However, admitting the 
perplexities of life and the unforeseen contingencies does not imply that the 
telos of human dignity is immersed in personal or statist caprices. It is a 
general telos which can be effectuated in many ways. However, it also leaves 
open the possibility that when another coherent plan emerges which, in the 
revised circumstances, presents an improvement for alleviating misery, this 
plan should be pursued. Human dignity should also have a universal 
application. Thus, it overcomes the often-heard criticism of hypocrisy, 
selfishness, and double standards. According to this position, one of the 
reasons offered to countenance the argument that the protection of nationals is 
a measure of self-defence is that it shows a special pleading tied to state 
interests. It is an egotistical and state-biased justification. It shows 
indifference to the plight of other people or the nationals of the host state who 
may be equally or more severely threatened. Therefore, a different approach 
under the heading of human dignity was proposed, which shows impartiality 
among people. This account is also at variance with John Rawls' A Theory of 
Justice. His original position guarantees neutrality, however precarious, 
between the chosen principles of justice. They are not chosen because they are 
favoured in relation to a beneficent plan of life as human dignity is. They are 
chosen because they are pre-moral. Human dignity on the other hand is a 
charged good to be pursued because it pertains to a coherent plan of life. 
Another requirement which is related to the above of impartiality is that the 
choice should be effective in bringing about human dignity. The person 
making the choice amongst the alternative ways of approaching human 
dignity should choose those practices which are fit to achieve this imperative. 
Discussing previously cases of humanitarian intervention, it was observed that 
certain actions such as those in the Dominican Republic or Grenada, failed on 
this account. Those actions, as well as promoting human dignity, also included 
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its "disvalue", either in the practices chosen or the consequences. Therefore, 
they could not be included in the discussed genre of actions. 
1.3 The revisionary program of human dignity applied to humanitarian 
intervention. In order to recapitulate, the procedure of evaluation starts, 
according to this study, with the assumption of human dignity. This is common 
to legal systems which are based on an assumption, a background theory that 
legitimises them. The difference with our assumption is that it does not claim 
objectivity and absolutism. It is the representation of a socially contested moral 
order in an abstract normative fashion and as a value-based assumption it is 
exposed to the criticism of arbitrariness. Values are derivative of individuality 
and the consensus that exists in specific instances on particular values is 
ephemeral, and mainly corresponds to the aggregate agreement of certain 
individualities. Furthermore, values reside in our psyche, and therefore they 
become less intelligible contrary to the comprehensibility of the facts. Events- 
facts are intelligible because they are apprehensible with our essences. 
Accordingly, values can be apprehended as psychic events embodied in those 
factual events. In this way they become intelligible to our essences. 5 That is the 
function of the initial assumption. It is the tracing of a psychic-value event in the 
context of factual events. 6 The repetition and cohesion of the same value event 
in similar cases advocate a redefinition of the existing assumption. Human 
dignity as a value is part and parcel of the dominant legal theory, which could be 
characterised as liberal. However, its realisation and exposition has been 
suppressed because it was estimated that other assumptions within this legal 
context should take precedence. Its promotion to the position of initial 
assumption may seem arbitrary but it is not. It is rather the quiet development of 
a principle by corresponding to the transformations of world society. 
The next step in the procedure is to evaluate the conflict and disharmony 
between the existing ideals or assumptions and their actualizations and then to 
S R. M. Unger, Knowledge and Politics, (New York, Freepress, 1975), pp. 76-81,88-100 
Professor W. Michael Reisman observes that the incidents reflect more accurately 
contemporary international law than the traditional approach of distilling norms 
from "..... 
statutes, treaties, venerable custom and judicial and arbitral opinions" because they reveal more 
about "the normative expectations of those (government elites) who are politically effective ºn 
the world community". W. Michael Reisman, "International Incidents: An 
Introduction to a New 
Genre in the Study of International Law", 10 Yale J. I. L., (1984), pp. 1,2,3 
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test those actualizations against the initial assumptions. If there is congruity 
between actualization and the initial assumption, then one should take the 
radical step of applying that assumption in the new field to which those 
actualizations refer, and thus change the existing prescriptive conception. More 
precisely, if the area under consideration is the use of force by a state to protect 
human beings (nationals and non-nationals), we begin with the disharmony 
between the present prescriptive theory of non-intervention and its deviationary 
actualizations, that is, instances of intervention. Then it should be considered 
whether those instances correspond to the initial assumption of human dignity. 
If they do, the whole area is transformed by applying this conception to the 
pertinent events instead of the flawed previous assumption. Thus, the previous 
assumptions are revised according to new embodiments. 
This scheme has the benefit of correlating social ideals and actualities. It is a 
constant process of development, enriched by reference to ideas, history, 
institutions, facts. No one can claim that it corresponds to absolute doctrines 
because that is contrary to the inner workings of the scheme. Thus, it avoids the 
normative controversy surrounding stabilised absolute doctrines and the 
tensions caused by the actual social practice. 
Finally, a point should be made concerning the connection of force with human 
dignity. It probably sounds absurd that force can be reconciled with the value of 
human dignity, because ab initio in the human mind it is descriptive of 
suffering. Human beings though are not ignorant of actual force in aspects of 
their life and they have been reconciled with and have accepted force. Law 
corresponds to physical and psychic coercion which is accepted as long as it is 
considered reasonable and if it is justified by a particularised social end. The 
same could be achieved in international society, that is, the transformation of 
pure force to moral force, through the pursuit of human dignity. 7 
D. Kennedy, "Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication", 99 Harvard L. Rev., (1975- 
76), p. 1685, at p. 1774 
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II. EVALUATION OF PRACTICE UNDER THE REVISIONARY 
ASSUMPTION OF HUMAN DIGNITY 
II.! The protection of human dignity as life or dignified existence, (Bangladesh, 
Uganda, Entebbe, Kampuchea, Panama, Liberia, Central African Republic, 
Haiti and Rwanda). The facts and the legal argumentation concerning the 
majority of these cases have been presented in the preceding chapters. Two 
cases, Entebbe and Liberia, were considered under the classical legal 
argument of rescuing nationals abroad. In this regard, our disquietude 
concerning the evaluation of these cases under the umbrella of self-defence 
has been expressed and it has been advised revisiting the doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention. The cases of Bangladesh, Uganda, Kampuchea and 
Rwanda are usually considered under the formulation of humanitarian 
intervention as it is constructed by the prevailing legal argumentation, whereas 
the remaining ones raise manifold issues. 
At this stage, there will be an appraisal of these cases under the notion of 
humanitarian intervention as the protection of human dignity. An initial 
observation is that their ambiguous legal characterisation should not obscure 
the fact that the reaction of the international community through its more 
representative institutions betrays a sense of ad hocism, entangled as it is in an 
antagonism of interests and principles. The Rwanda case adumbrates the 
sentiment of dissatisfaction and disorientation and judiciously reveals the need 
for a revised model, one that incorporates the protection of human dignity. 
The situation in Rwanda was characterised by genocidal events, 
indiscriminate and heinous killings, uprooting of populations, coupled with 
the apathy of states and the inadequacy of international institutions to respond 
satisfactorily. The French intervention between June and August 1994 was 
unenthusiastically endorsed or politely ignored by the international 
community, which, nevertheless, assuaged and tried to persuade 
her to 
prolong her operation. The reason for this hesitant approach 
is obvious and 
resides in the strong grip of abstractions, such as non-intervention and 
sovereignty. On the other hand, it is also apparent that these abstractions 
cannot offer any satisfactory answer to the situation beyond the prospect of 
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prolonging the massacres. Starting the evaluation from the prospect of human 
dignity, the French action, limited in time and nature, has provided sanctuary 
to persecuted Rwandans and assisted international agencies in the provision of 
aid. The action proceeded with considerable impartiality and avoided 
influencing the internal political struggle. It only offered security to 
Rwandans. Finally, it was the most effective measure for safeguarding human 
dignity amid international inaction and domestic massacres. 
In Liberia, the civil war which ravaged the country caused thousands of deaths 
and created thousands of refugees. Foreign nationals living in the country have 
been threatened and this prompted the United States in co-operation with other 
countries whose nationals were equally threatened to intervene twice in order to 
extricate them from the perilous conditions. Additionally, the participants in the 
ECOWAS Peace-Keeping force which intervened in the crisis offered 
humanitarian reasons. According to Salim A. Salim, Secretary-General of the 
OAU: "..... for an African government to have the right to kill its citizens or let 
its citizens be killed, I believe there is no clause in the (OAU) Charter that 
allows this. To tell the truth, the Charter was created to preserve the humanity, 
dignity, and the rights of the African". 8 
The Liberian incident has been classified under the notion of humanitarian 
intervention lato sensu as the Entebbe case, where Israeli nationals were 
threatened with killing. As is illustrated in the preceding chapters, the pertinent 
legal reasoning produces circularity and indeterminacy under the predominant 
legal doctrines. The starting point for evaluating forceful protecting actions is 
their legal determination under the U. N. Charter, in particular Articles 2(4) and 
51. Article 2(4) cannot be conclusive because its content is of manipulable 
character. It could be either an absolute prohibition on the use of force or a 
conditional one. According to the fast view, which encompasses the rather 
dominant theoretical structure of the post-Charter international legal argument, 
these incidents are illicit. They consist of a violation of the constituent elements 
8 
"Africa's Destiny", West-Africa Magazine, 22-28 October, (1990), p. 2690. The Nigerian 
Head of State declared: "We are in Liberia because events in that country have led to massive 
destruction of property, the massacre by all parties of thousands of innocent civilians including 
foreign nationals, women and children 
..... 
contrary to all standards of civilised behaviour and 
international ethics and decorum". West-Africa Magazine, 1-7 February, (1993), p. 146: 
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of state sovereignty without the state's consent. However, the second, 
conditional appreciation of the same article advocates admitting the legality of 
the action, as not impairing the political independence and territorial integrity of 
the Liberian or Ugandan state. 
The self-defence argument does not escape the criticism of indeterminacy by 
lending support to both a restrictive interpretation and a wider traditionalistic 
approach. According to the former view, the U. S. or Israeli action is condemned 
to illegality. It is an arbitrary act whilst the requirement of "armed attack" which 
triggers self-defence has not been fulfilled. On the other hand, when the attack 
on the nationals purports to change the policy of the government, it is 
recognised as equivalent to the values protected by Articles 2(4) and 51 of the 
U. N. Charter. 9 That is, sovereignty in the form of territorial integrity and 
political independence. Additionally, the customary law of self-defence is 
more permissive than Article 51 allowing for the protection of nationals. In a 
nutshell, according to this reasoning, the above actions are legal. 
The argument for protecting human dignity became crucial in the circumstances 
whereunder these incidents occurred. The interventionist action not only secured 
the human dignity of the threatened and subsequently rescued people in its 
periphery as the attributes of a dignified life but also in its essence, which is the 
preservation of life. The actions were effective in their purpose and eventually 
restored the requirement of human dignity. The only reservation concerns the 
invocation of impartiality or universality. The Entebbe incident, as it progressed, 
involved solely Israeli nationals threatened with execution, whilst other 
nationals were released beforehand. Therefore, the rescue operation was strictly 
confined to the limited subjects of human dignity. On the other hand, the 
Liberian incident should have had wider recipients of the action. The civil war 
had condemned foreigners and above all the Liberians to disadvantageous 
conditions where their mere existence was threatened with annihilation by 
ferocious acts. Hence, the operation, by rescuing the foreigners whilst leaving 
Liberians to be exterminated, was discriminatory in this respect. This incident 
9 0. Schachter, "The Extra-Territorial Use of Force Against Terrorist Bases", 11 Hous. J. I. L.. 
(1989), p. 309, at p. 312; A. D. Sofaer, "Terrorism, the Law, and the National Defense", 126 
Mil. L. Rev., (1989), p. 89, at p. 93 
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makes the flaws and inadequacies of the prevalent perception more than evident. 
Therefore, the assumption of human dignity which becomes a transformative 
force and applies equally to nationals and non-nationals should be employed. 
However, this action cannot be entirely discarded from the purview of human 
dignity, although it should have had a wider mandate 
The next case is Panama, which contains two operative aspects: a purely 
protective action and an operation with wider aims, which will be discussed 
subsequently. Starting with the first issue, the incidents which prompted the 
U. S. "Operation Just Cause" on December 20,1989, were the killing of one off- 
duty American soldier and the detention of a U. S. Navy lieutenant and his 
wife. 1° One of the pronounced justifications for the U. S. action was the 
protection of U. S. nationals: "[t]he deployment of U. S. forces is an exercise of 
the right of self-defence recognised in Article 51 of the United Nations 
Charter and was necessary to protect American lives in imminent danger 
The standard inquiry into the validity of this action would repeat the identified 
syllogistic pattern. President Bush characterised the attack against the 
American soldier as an attack on the United States and also the invasion as a 
pre-emptive action to quash "an urban commando attack on American 
citizens" in Panama. 12 As was maintained above, Article 51 which is the 
controlling rule on this occasion is ambiguous. It is maintained that self- 
defence applies only in response to an armed attack against the territory of the 
state. On the other hand, the traditional approach of equating an attack on a 
national to an attack on his national state or, additionally, accepting an 
interpretation of Article 51 which coincides with the commodious customary 
rule on self-defence, would justify the action. However, even if the customary 
law on self-defence is applied in this situation, the criteria of proportionality 
10 President Bush stated on December 20,1989 that "..... the reckless threats and attacks upon 
Americans in Panama had created an imminent danger to the 35,000 American citizens in 
Panama". Office of the Press Secretary, The White House 
" See Letter from President Bush to Congress, H. R. Doc. No. 127,101st Cong., 2nd Sess., 
(1990). Also speech to the United Nations by Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering, U. N. Doc. 
S/PV. 2899 (1989), p. 31 
12 "Fighting in Panama: Text of Statement by Fitzwater", N. Y. Times, Dec. 21,1989, at A 19, 
col. 2; "Excerpts from Statement by Baker on U. S. Policy", ibid., col. 3 
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and necessity' 3 which are intertwined therewith, are not satisfied, rendering 
the whole action legally suspicious. Assuming that the incidents were quite 
serious and that there was no guarantee that attacks on U. S. nationals would 
not be repeated, the logistics of the operation entailed the killing of 26 
American soldiers and 700 Panamanians, detaining 4,800 Panamanians, and 
there was also extensive material damage. On these grounds, the action was 
condemned by the O. A. S. which also affirmed its support for the principle of 
non-intervention. 14 In the United Nations, a Resolution deploring the U. S. 
action was vetoed in the Security Council by the U. S. A, U. K. and France but a 
similar one was adopted by the General Assembly with a considerable 
maj ority. 15 
Pursuing an evaluation under the assumption of human dignity, the 
humanitarian element of the action could not be discounted, but it should also 
be submitted that its significance was minimal in relation to the protected 
nationals. The operation as such exceeded the bounds of proportionality 
concerning the threat posed to the U. S. nationals. It has been observed above 
that effectiveness is essential for achieving the aim of human dignity but it 
should not exceed the scope of proportionality. 
The Bangladesh case presents an instance of protecting human dignity in its 
wider context. The Pakistani army had resorted to genocide in order to quell the 
nationalistic sentiment in East Pakistan. The situation not only caused hundred 
of thousands deaths but also created million of refugees. In Chapter Five it was 
observed that the official justification for the action was self-defence in response 
to the Pakistani attack on the Western Indian boarder. The international 
community and lawyers indeed justified the action as humanitarian intervention. 
It was commented that 
13 It means that apart from police harassment, there was no real danger to American citizens 
which would justify this large scale operation and that the U. S. Government could have 
exercise less dramatic measure for the protection of its nationals. See R. Wedgwood, "The 
Use of Armed Force in International Affairs: Self-Defense and the Panama Invasion", 29 
Col. J. Transn. L., (1991), p. 609, at pp. 619-628; Caroline Case, 29 British For. St. Pap., 
1137; 30 British For. St. Pap., p. 82 pi 
Serious Events in the Republic of Panama, OEA/Ser. G, CP/RES. 534 (800/89) corr. 1, 
O. A. S., Wash., D. C. (Dec. 22,1989) 
1`G. A. Res. 240,44 U. N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) p. 52, U. N. Doc. A/RES/44/240 (1989) 
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"..... India's armed intervention would have been justified 
..... 
under the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, and further 
that India would have been entitled to act unilaterally under 
this doctrine in view of the growing and intolerable burden 
which the refugees were casting upon India and in view of the 
inability of international organisations to take any effective 
action to bring to an end the massive violations of human 
rights in East Pakistan which were causing the flow of 
refugees". ' 6 
Consequently, the exact character of the action is clouded with ambiguity. This 
ambiguity can be relieved by using the perspective of human dignity. Thus, the 
purpose of the action should be the saving of threatened people, and it was 
effective in this respect. The other effects it engendered, such as the creation of a 
new state, should not be evaluated in accordance with the magnitude of the 
impact on the local authorities. Such evaluation is linked with the predominant 
argument of sovereignty and non-interference. The argument for human dignity 
transgresses this line and ponders over the real recipients of the action and its 
effects. The cases of Uganda and Kampuchea should be evaluated accordingly. 
They should not be evaluated according to the effect they had on the 
governmental structures which, in any case, were responsible for the human 
rights abuses which prompted the action. One should look beyond this towards 
the effect of securing human dignity. These cases were not totally propitious in 
this field. They stopped widespread massacres at a genocidal level and in this 
regard they secured human dignity. However, the succeeding situation did not 
correspond to the standards of human dignity. 
In this wider context, the French operation in the Central African Republic 
(April-May, 1996) presents an analogous instance of promoting human 
dignity. During an army rebellion and civil disturbances, violence erupted and 
pillages occurred which cost twelve lives and around sixty injuries. '? The 
16 The Events in East Pakistan, 1971, A Legal Study by the Secretariat of the International 
Commission of Jurists, (Geneve, 1972), p. 96 
1' According to a spokesman for the rebels: "Le gouvernement ignorait les raisons qui sont ä 
lbrigine de cette nouvelle mutinerie and c'est le gouvernement qui n'a pas respecte les 
engagements pris apres les evenements d'avril". Le Monde. mardi, 21/6/1996, p. 4. Le 
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French launched operation "Almandin 2" to protect their citizens and transfer 
them to safety. According to the French Defence Ministry, the French troops 
"ont ete deployees dans plusieurs quartiers de Bangui afin d'assurer la securite 
des ressortissants francais et etrangers". '8 The French evacuated 4,281 people 
of which 2,278 were French nationals. The Americans also sent a detachment 
in order to evacuate American citizens. 
The wider dimensions of the problem were also acknowledged and these 
involved the establishment of institutions and practices which would facilitate 
the democratic process: "[1]a France apporte son secours a an pouvoir 
democratiquement elu et respectueux des droit de 1'homme, qui serait en 
danger". ' 9 Hence, the operation was endowed with a wider mandate. It 
surpassed the traditional "extraction" of citizens and allowed for the 
"reduction" of the mutiny; that is, defend the democratically elected president 
whose demission the mutineers requested and avoid recourse to civil war as in 
Liberia or Rwanda. The French Minister for Co-operation declared that: "[i]a 
mission, c'est de maintenir un Etat democratique...... avec tous ses attributs"20 
On this account, the action was supported by African states. 21 It could, with 
reason, be claimed that, in this case, a "hands off' policy carries the 
possibility of numerous victims among nationals or foreigners and greater 
degradation. Concerning the values which are at stake, if the value of 
independence and sovereignty prevails, intervention is forbidden. The other 
course of pursued action would be intervention in order to transfer foreign 
Monde, jeudi, 23/6/1996, p. 4: "Les gens vivent tellement dans la misere que tout ce qu'ils 
trouvent dans les maisons [des etrangers], ils le volent". 
18 It has also indicated that the French soldiers "ont dejä procede au regroupement de plus de 
800 expatries sur les bases militaires de stationnement des forces francaises" and that 
"aucune victime n'est ä deplorer parmis les quelque 1800 Francais residant ä Bangui". Le 
Monde, mercredi, 22/6/1996, p. 3 
19 Le Monde, mercredi, 22/6/1996, p. 3. According to the French Foreign Minister, France 
condemns "toute atteinte a la legalite en Republique Centrafricaine et entend aider les 
institutions democratiquement Blues ä defendre fordre constitutionnel et favoriser 
l'apaisement". 100 R. G. D. LP., (1996), p. 812 
20 Le Monde, vendredi, 24/5/1996, p. 2 
21 According to the French Minister of Co-operation, Jacques Godfrain: "Les chefs d' Etats 
africains 
..... 
sont tres solidaires d'un de leurs collegues elu au suffrage universel. Donc il ya 
..... 
un fort appui ä ce que fait la France". Le Monde, vendredi, 24/6/1996, p. 2. According to 
a declaration issued by the EU, it noted with "satisfaction les mesures prises pour la 
protection des populations et, en particulier les actions enterprises par la France pour assurer 
la securite des ressortissants etrangers, notamment europeens, et aider ä ce que s'engage une 
negociation". 100 R. G. D. J. P., (1996), p. 813 
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nationals to safety or humanitarian intervention lato sensu, which will 
neutralise the danger by restoring respect for human rights and the democratic 
process. In the aforementioned case, the protected values exceeded the scope 
of a purely protective operation by assisting the rule of law. 
We are not going to pursue further the relationship between democracy and 
the enjoyment and effectuation of human dignity. 22 This is beyond the scope 
of this study. However, it is necessary to indicate our understanding thereof. It 
should be acknowledged that the two issues are interweaved but, according to 
the present author, human dignity, which contains a hard core of preserving 
life and a soft core of political and social flourishing, empowers the people. 
The notion of democracy could, hence, be realised through this empowerment. 
In the course of this study, the cases which claim the promotion of the 
democratic process will be dealt with according to their long-term and short- 
term results. Thus, two aspects of the pursued action should be distinguished: 
the incipient phase where the protected value is life as the hard core element 
of human dignity and which has been immediately threatened and 
subsequently protected; and the follow-up phase where the long term result is 
the expansion of human dignity which now contains also its soft core. 
The Panama23 case will be dealt with accordingly. In this case, there is an 
undemocratic government with General Noriega as de facto leader. It practices 
authoritarian political methods, some of which pose a threat to its citizenry. In 
1989, Noriega annulled the national elections and his "Dignity Battalions" beat 
and intimidated opposition supporters. The U. S. A, intensified the political 
pressure for his ousting by imposing economic sanctions24 and recalling the U. S. 
Ambassador. The O. A. S, condemned the annulment of the elections in a 
22 T. M. Franck, "The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance", 86 A. J. I. L., (1992), p. 46; 
L. Fisler Damrosch, D. J. Scheffer, Law and Force in the New International Order, (Boulder, 
Westview Press, 1991), pp. 143-184; A. A. D'Amato, International Law Anthology, 
(Anderson Publishing Co., 1994), ch. 15 
23 "Agora: U. S. Forces in Panama: Defenders, Aggressors or Human Rights Activists? ", 84 
A. J. I. L., (1990), pp. 494-524; J. Quigley, "The Legality of the United States Invasion of 
Panama", 15 Yale J. I. L., (1990), p. 276; A. Berman, "In Mitigation of Illegality: The U. S. 
Invasion of Panama", 79 Kentucky L. J., (1990-91), p. 735; A. D. Sofaer, "The Legality of the 
United States Action in Panama", 29 Col. J. Transn. L., (1991), p. 281; L. Henkin, "The 
Invasion of Panama Under International Law: A Gross Violation", ibid.. p. 293 
2` Executive Order 12635 (April 8,1988), "Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect to 
Panama", Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan, 1988. 
(Washington D. C., U. S. Government Printing Office, 1990), pp. 425-427 
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Resolution and asked for the peaceful transfer of power to a democratic 
government, but its mission was not successful. One of the justifications put 
forward for the U. S. action was the restoration of democratic institutions in 
Panama. Concerning this issue, the pertinent legal argument observes the 
already discussed pattern of bifurcation. On the one hand, intervention should 
be permitted in order to pursue certain values inscribed in the Charter such as 
"freedom, democracy, peace". 25 This view supports the use of force which 
would "enhance opportunities for ongoing self-determination". 26 The opposite 
view is exposed by Professor Schachter who disapproves of the use of force in 
order to "topple a repressive regime", because "[t]he idea that wars waged in a 
good cause such as democracy and human rights would not involve a violation 
of territorial integrity or political independence demands an Orwellian 
construction of those terms". 27 According to this line of reasoning, there are 
principles or values, which concur such as democracy, human dignity, non- 
interference, sovereignty and, therefore, democracy or human dignity should 
not take priority. This raises the question of why the other equally important 
principles such as non-interference or sovereignty are granted preferential 
treatment. The answer lies in our observation when analysing the interrelation 
and precedence among the U. N. purposes that "[p]eace was more important 
than progress and more important than justice 
..... 
War was inherently 
unjust". 28 
Thus, it is obvious that the argument is in a state of dissension. We shall try to 
overcome this problem by proposing the value of human dignity. However, the 
immediate effect of the U. S. action concerning the protection of life is contested 
because it depends on factually establishing the danger which the Noriega 
regime posed to its citizens. It should be submitted from the discussion pursued 
25 See U. N. Charter, "Preamble" and Chapter I. For the policy interpretation of the U. S. 
Government, see Dept St. Bull., No. 2081, (Dec. 1983), p. 74 
26 W. M. Reisman, "Coercion and Self-Determination: Construing Charter Article 2(4)", 78 
A. J. I. L., (1984), p. 642, at p. 643; J. J. Kirkpatrick & a. Gerson, "The Reagan Doctrine, Human 
Rights, and International Law", in L. Henkin (ed. ), Right V. Might: International Lam, and 
the Use of Force, (N. Y., Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1991), p. 19 
27 0. Schachter, "The Legality of Pro-Democratic Invasion", 78 A. J. I. L., (1984), p. 645, at 
p. 659. See also Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against 
Nicaragua, I. C. J. Rep., (1986), p. 14, at p. 133, para. 263 
28 L. Henkin, "Use of Force: Law and U. S. Policy", in L. Henkin (ed. ), Right V. Might: 
International Law and the Use of Force, (N. Y., Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1991), 
p. 37, at pp. 38-39 
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elsewhere concerning the danger to foreigners and in particular U. S. nationals, 
that the factual circumstances could not justify the action on the basis of its 
short-term purpose. On the other hand, it seems, with the benefit of hindsight, 
that the long-term effects of the action have assisted in fulfilling the soft core of 
the human dignity value. Thus, it assisted in diminishing the life threatening 
conditions to whatever degree they existed and also facilitated those traits of 
human dignity which would assist in the personal flourishing of the population. 
A case which shares similar aspects with those identified above but with 
different configuration and effectuation is Haiti. Since 1957, Haiti had been 
ruled by the Duvalier regime with the help of the infamous para-military 
organisation, the Tontons Macoutes. This came to an end in 1986. In 1990, 
Jean-Bertrand Aristide emerged victorious from the first democratically held 
elections with 67.48% of the vote. 29 The new government strove to improve 
the human rights situation in the country. 30 However, Aristide was overthrown 
by a military junta under Lt. Gen. Raul Cedras. Following the coup, the 
internal situation in Haiti again turned into a "human rights nightmare" 
according to the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights31 and this spawned a 
mass exodus of refugees claiming persecution. 
The international community concentrated its efforts on re-establishing the 
democratically-elected government. 32 The pressure on the military carbuncle 
escalated with the embargo and the freezing of assets in the United States. 33 
Eventually, Aristide and the junta reached an agreement, the Governor's 
Island Accord, on July 3, 1993, which provided for the restoration of 
29 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Annual Report, (1990-91), 
OEA/Ser. L/V/II. 79, rev. 1 (1991), p. 468; W. M. Reisman, "International Election 
Observation", 4 Pace U. YB. I. L., (1992), p. 1 
30 House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 102nd Cong., 
2nd 
Sess., Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1992 (1992); Lawyers Committee for 
Human Rights, Haiti: A Human Rights Nightmare, (1992) 
31 ibid., p. 8 32 G. A. Res. 46/7, U. N. GAOR, 46th Sess., U. N. Doc. A/RES/46/7 (1992); O. A. S. Res. 
MRE/RES. 1/91 OEA/SER. FN. 1 (Oct. 3,1991) (Ad hoc Meeting of Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs, Washington D. C); O. A. S. Res. MRE/RES. 2/91 OEA/SER. FN. 1 (Oct. 8,1991) (Ad 
hoc Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Washington D. C); The French Delegation in 
the Security Council urged the United Nations that "..... ne peut rester passive alors qu'est 
aujourd'hui bafou6e la volont6 des 6lecteurs haitiens". S/PV. 3011 (3 October 1991) 
33 Y. Daudet, "L'ONU et I'OEA en Haiti et le droit international", 38 A. F. D. 1.. 
(1992), p. 89 
356 
democracy and the return of Aristide. 34 The implementation of the agreement 
wavered and the United Nations imposed economic sanctions and introduced 
a naval blockade. 35 In response to the gravity of the situation and the unabated 
attitude of the military regime, the United Nations passed Resolution 940 
which authorised military action. 36 Pursuant to this Resolution, the restoration 
of the democratically-elected government was to be implemented by a 
multilateral force with the crucial participation of the United States. 37 The 
difference with the cases already discussed lies on the fact that the transfer of 
power was achieved peacefully by agreement between the junta and the U. S. 
negotiators. 
However, the perspectives of this action should be contemplated. On the one 
hand, the ideal of sovereignty emerges which advises against intervention and, 
on the other hand, human dignity which favours intervention. The line 
between the two values has already been modified. If the ideal of sovereignty 
and the legal argumentation it reproduces is characterised as the dominant 
legal perspective, it has already been argued that human rights concerns are 
sheltered thereunder. Human rights violations have been characterised often as 
a "threat to peace" which justifies a community's forcible response. 
Humanitarian intervention has been discussed within this legal order and in 
principle it has been ostracised, except for a modicum of cases where human 
rights violations are deemed to constitute a threat to the peace as in Rhodesia, 
Iraq or Somalia. Under this reasoning, the intervention in Haiti is justified 
because it was determined by Resolution 940 as constituting a "threat to peace 
and security", it was characterised by "significant deterioration of the 
humanitarian situation" and "systematic violation of civil liberties" under the 
s, Governor's Island Accord, OEA/Ser. G CP/INF. 3480/93 (July 3,1993), in particular point 
and 10 of the agreement. United Nations, The Situation of Democracy and Human Rights in 
Haiti: Report of the Secretary-General, U. N. Doc. A/47/975-S/26063 (1993) 
'S S. C. Res. 875, U. N. SCOR, 3293nd mtg., U. N. Doc. S/RES/875 (1993) 
36 S. C. Res. 940, U. N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3413th mtg., U. N. Doc. S/RES/940 (1994) 
" The multilateral force consisted of 15,000 Americans and 266 soldiers from 
different 
Caribbean countries. France has welcomed Res. 940 which ....... manifeste la determination 
ä 
mener ä bien, par tous les moyens necessaires, la täche que le Conseil s'est 
fixee". PEF 
juillet-aoüt, 1994, p. 165. France did not participate in the multilateral force, although 
"approuvant l'intervention americaine", Point de presse du M. A. E. du 15 septembre 1994, 
PEF septembre-octobre, 1994, p. 100 
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margin of Chapter VII. 38 This position is reinforced by a previous Resolution 
which explicitly refers to "threat to peace". 39 The issue, however, is neither 
this piecemeal approach to human rights violations, nor the ad hoc evaluation 
of state benevolence or opportunism. Therefore, we need to revisit and rethink 
the issue of humanitarian intervention and our proposed method of human 
dignity provides a satisfactory answer. It remedies the agony of the dominant 
doctrine which is in principle negative and only exceptionally permits 
humanitarian interventions. More importantly, it has the potential of 
ameliorating a situation of systematic violations of human rights which the 
dominant doctrine only strives to achieve. Consequently, the Haitian case may 
appear as an example of an action where the constituent channels for 
effectuating the value of human dignity in its soft or hard core have been 
sustained. The amelioration and realisation of their substance is beyond the 
scope of this study. 
Before we proceed with our next case, the evaluation pursued here has drawn to 
our attention wider issues than a search into legality would achieve. One can 
count as positive aspects the protection offered to endangered individuals and 
the empowerment of the wider population to realise the values of human 
dignity. Some actions have been derailed and attained results which synoptically 
can be included in the devaluation of human dignity. The case of Somalia which 
will be discussed immediately illustrates not only the contradictions of the legal 
arguments but also the labours of the value of human dignity. 
11.2 The protection of human dignity and its "disvalue ": Somalia. This case is 
considered separately because it contains those germane ingredients which 
became the substance of this study. Consequently, exploration into the 
character of the case would be, it is hoped, conceptually recapitulating. We 
should start by identifying the contradictions of the legal argument. This case 
originally could be genuflected to the duality of (i) collective humanitarian 
intervention, and (ii) U. N. collective enforcement action under Chapter VII. 
Another dual configuration may well be added. It may be argued that it was 
38 W. M. Reisman, "Haiti and the Validity of International Action", 89 A. J. I. L., (1995), p. 82: 
F. Tesbn, "Collective Humanitarian Intervention", 17 Mich. J. I. L., (1996), p. 323, at p. 358 
39 S. C. Res. 841, U. N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3238th mtg., U. N. Doc. S/RES/841 (1993) 
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essentially a unilateral action under a collective veil because the logistical and 
operative participation of the United States was crucial. On the other hand, it 
could be argued that it was neither a state nor a United Nations collective 
action but a suis generis action. That is, a third type of operation whereby a 
singular state or a collectivity of states are merely empowered with authority 
by the United Nations to pursue certain aims. 
The indeterminacy transgresses the legal argument and also afflicts the 
conceptual matrix. It has been explained throughout this work the fundamental 
contradiction between sovereignty and human rights, or peace and justice. The 
antithetical relationship is reconciled by an act of capitulation. Justice is 
subdued to the pursuit of peace. Hence, a monipolar objective undergirds a 
dual aspiration. Finally, this case illuminates the constituents of human 
dignity as they have been contemplated in this study and also the factors 
which may cause their devaluation. 
The factual and legal presentation of this case will elucidate the above 
observations. It should be stated at the outset that its unique national 
configuration makes Somalia a particular case. Somalia is a nomadic society 
with a hierarchical structure. The tribes abide by their own laws, although 
there is a vinculum of cultural and linguistic bonds. 40 In 1969, Siad Barre 
came into power and tried to impose a national identity amid his "scientific 
socialist" experiments. The fall of Siad Barre in 1991 created a governmental 
void which the warring parties strove to fill. The main protagonists were 
General Aideed and the interim president Ali Mahdi. The inter-clan war 
created a humanitarian crisis with thousands of refugees fleeing the country 
and the distribution of humanitarian assistance being impeded. The other 
parameters of the crisis were the endemic famine, the disastrous economy, and 
the collapse of the state apparatus. The United Nations addressed the situation 
with Resolution 73341 which is the product of an appeal launched by the 
Organisation of Islamic Conference, the O. A. U, the Arab League and the 
40 G. Prunier, "La dimension historique de la crise somalienne", 9 Relations internationales 
et strategiques, (1993), p. 89 
41 S. C. Res. 733, U. N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3039th mtg., U. N. Doc. S/RES/733 (1992) 
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representative of Somalia to the United Nations. 42 This Resolution provided a 
double mandate: (i) an embargo against the shipment of arms; and (ii) to 
facilitate the distribution of humanitarian aid. It was also accommodated under 
Article 41, within the ambit of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter 
which underlines the seriousness of the engagement. The implementation of 
this Resolution lagged behind because of disagreement between the United 
Nations and the warring clans. The Secretary-General characterised the 
situation in Somalia as a threat to the peace because of the dangers it posed to 
neighbouring countries. 43 Accordingly, the wording of subsequent Resolutions 
which addressed the situation in Somalia escalated towards the above lines. In 
Resolution 767 it was stated clearly that "the situation in Somalia constitutes a 
threat to international peace and security". 44 
Proceeding in a siccative evaluation, Somalia represents a humanitarian crisis 
of a serious magnitude which is dealt with within the matrix of the Charter 
and in particular Chapter VII. The situation is characterised as a "threat to the 
peace", a determination repeated also in Resolution 794 authorising the 
intervention. Accordingly, it seems that it fits squarely within Chapter VII 
which defines the powers of the Security Council and the United Nations. 
However, this assertion could be challenged. Concerning the factual aspect, 
one could question whether the humanitarian crisis constitutes a threat to the 
peace. This refers to the internal and/or external repercussions of a 
humanitarian disaster. Contrary to Resolution 688 concerning the persecution 
of the Kurdish population where the humanitarian operation was tied to the 
effects on the region, Resolution 794 refers to the "humanitarian 
deterioration" and the breach of humanitarian law as prompting the action. 
The determination of this issue is important in order to assess the character of 
the Security Council's action. In particular, for the assessment of whether the 
advised action would be for the restoration of human rights or the restoration 
42 Letter dated 20 January 1992 from the Charge D'Affaires A. 1. of the Permanent Mission of 
Somalia to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U. N. 
SCOR, 47th Sess., U. N. Doc. S/23445 (1992) 
43 Boutros-Boutros Ghali, "The Situation in Somalia: Report of the Secretary-General", S. C. 
Doc. S/23693, (11 March 1992), pp. 4-5 
" S. C. Res. 767, U. N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3101st mtg., U. N. Doc. 767 (1992). See also S. C. 
Res. 775, U. N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3110th mtg., U. N. Doc. 775 (1992) 
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and maintenance of peace. If we are to make an inference from the delphic 
language used, it appears that human rights issues are within the ambit of 
force which the phraseology "threat to the peace" implies. But it seems also 
that the restoration of peace entails the simultaneous restoration of human 
rights under a magic formula. The aforementioned observations refer to the 
conceptual subordination-accommodation of justice and peace. Throughout 
this work, the Somali case has been presented as an illustrative incident of the 
contemporary legal perception which religiously adheres to the principle of 
peace as the ultimate rationale, but addresses humanitarian considerations by 
legal fiat, subsuming them within the perimeters of peace. 
Hence, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 75 145 which 
established UNOSOM with a mandate to oversee the cease-fire, promote 
reconciliation and facilitate humanitarian assistance. However, instead of 
ameliorating the situation, Somalia lurched further into anarchy with General 
Aideed willing to confront the United Nations force. 46 The U. N. Secretary- 
General Boutros Boutros-Ghali played a locomotive role in this case. His initial 
plan was towards a "global approach" which contains, instead of the classical 
methods, new means and novel methods for the pacific settlement of the 
situation. These methods could be surmised as the division of the country into 
four regions, and measures towards humanitarian assistance, a cease-fire, 
disarmament and national reconciliation. Also, he did not exclude the use of 
enforcement measures under Chapter VII. Consequently, he presented five 
options in order to tackle the situation, stating also his own preference. 47 The 
first option provided for a typical peace-keeping operation; the second provided 
for the relief agencies to negotiate a peaceful solution and the withdrawal of the 
U. N. personnel. The remaining three options provided for the use of force to a 
certain measure. In particular, the third option provided for a "minimum 
regime" around Mogadishu; the fourth, which was finally retained, provided 
for a multilateral military operation under the authority of the Security Council. 
,SS. C. Res. 751, U. N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3069th mtg., U. N. Doc. S/RES/751 (1992) 
46 The situation was described by the Secretary-General as the "invasion syndrome"'. Letter 
dated 24 November 1992 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security 
Council, S/24859, p. ! 
" Letter dated 29 November 1992 from the Secretary-General to the President of the 
Security Council, U. N. SCOR, 47th Sess., U. N. Doc. S/24868 (1992) 
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It was based on a proposal by President Bush to provide 30,000 troops under 
U. S. leadership (UNITAF). Finally, the fifth option was by itself politically 
unrealistic. It was based on a revival of Article 47 of the U. N. Charter which 
has fallen into desuetude. 48 The Security Council in adopting Resolution 79449 
selected the fourth option and authorised the use of all necessary means in 
order to facilitate the secure distribution of aid. As was said above, Resolution 
79450 was adopted with the insistence and recommendation of the Secretary- 
General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. It exhibits a more active role for the position 
of Secretary-General but also the risk of discord with the implementing states. s 
Resolution 794 cites Chapter VII for the use of force and links the "human 
tragedy" in Somalia with a "threat to international peace and security". As was 
maintained above, the purely collective security option recommended by the 
Secretary-General was not adopted. Instead we have an operation by a group 
of states with the authority and oversight of the United Nations. Thus, the 
three elements stated earlier are satisfied: justice through peace; United 
Nations authority; state action. Additionally, a fourth element is surfacing. A 
more thorough view reveals that the perceived and implemented operation 
under Resolution 794 outmanoeuvres the existing legal framework for 
operations of a similar calibre. Thus, it could be classified as a suis generis 
operation, multilateral or unilateral, with the imprimatur of the United 
Nations. 52 
48 N. D. White, Keeping the Peace: The United Nations and the Maintenance of International 
Peace and Security, (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1993), pp. 100-111; H. 
McCoubrey, N. D. White, International Law and Armed Conflict, (Aldershot, Dartmouth, 
1992), chs. 8,9 
49 S. C. Res. 794, U. N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3145th mtg., U. N. Doc. S/RES/794 (1992). 
According to the Secretary-General "le Conseil de securite a cree un precedent dans l'histoire 
de I'ONU: il a decide pour la premiere fois d'intervenir militairement ä des fins strictement 
humanitaires". A/48/1, para. 431 
so M-C. Djiena Wembou, "Validite et portee de la resolution 794 (1992) du Conseil de 
Securite", 5 A. J. I. & Comp. L., (1993), p. 340 
S' 
"...... parce qu'il implique un jugement de valeur sur une situation dont la portee peut titre 
controversee, et parce que cette initiative prejuge une reponse favorable du Conseil. mais 
aussi parce que le Secretaire general risque de cautionner de son nom les mesures prises 
ulterieurement par le Conseil". Marie-Claude Smouts, "Commentaire de 1' article 99 de la 
Charte des Nations Unies", J-P. Cot, A. Pellet, La Charte des Nations Unies, 2e ed., (Paris, 
Economica, 1991), p. 1327, at p. 1329 
12 See Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the 
Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, U. N. GAOR, 50th Sess., U. N. 
Doc. A/50/60 (1995) 
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Operation "Restore Hope" started on 9 December 1992 with good signs for 
success but it turned sour due to disagreements between the heavily 
contributing U. S. Government, the United Nations, and the other participants, 
concerning the extent and purpose of the operation and the means of pursuing 
it. The operation was dominated by the Americans which caused disquiet 
among the other participants. More notably, the spokesman for the Secretary- 
General Mr. J. Sills, stated that: "[b]ien que cette operation soit hautement 
appreciee par le Secretaire general de 1'ONU, M. Boutros-Ghali, et qu'elle ait 
ete autorisee par le Conseil de securite, la force militaire unifiee n'est pas sous 
commandement des Nations Unies, et, par consequent, le drapeau de 1'ONU 
ne sera pas utilise par la force. "53 Whereas the mission's mandate was initially 
limited, the Secretary-General pursued a wider objective of nation-building 
which involved disarming the warring factions, economic reconstruction and 
national reconciliation. 54 This transformed the force into UNOSOM II with a 
wider mandate. 55 It included peace enforcement than the traditional peace- 
keeping. 56 The command arrangments were perplexing. In addition to 
UNOSOM II, there was a Joint Task Force and a Quick Reaction Force 
consisting of U. S. troops which reported directly to the U. S. government. The 
Somalis soon became hostile to the heavy handedness of the troops. As a 
result, fights erupted between local people and U. N. forces which, in one 
instance on June 5,1993,24 Pakistani Peace-keepers were ambushed, 56 
wounded and also 20 Somalis killed 
. 
57 Gradually, the operation was 
transformed into an obsessive manhunt for General Aideed who was vilified 
53 Le Monde, 10 Dec 1992; The French Foreign Minister M. Dumas stated: "Il ne faut pas 
qu'une nation, sous pretexte qu'elle est plus forte qu'une autre, s'arroge le droit d'aller faire 
le gendarme, de remettre de fordre". Le Monde, (8 Dec 1992) 
sa Report of the Secretary-General submitted in pursuance of paragraphs /8 and /9 of 
Security Council Resolution 794 (1992), S/24992 (19 December 1992); J. R. Bolton, "Wrong 
Turn in Somalia", 73 For. Af 
, 
(1994), p. 61 
ss S. C. Res. 814, U. N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3188th mtg., U. N. Doc. S/RES/814 (1993) 
56 Further Report of the Secretary-General submitted in pursuance of paragraphs 18 and 
19 
of resolution 794 (1992), proposing that the mandate of UNOSOM II cover the whole 
country and include enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the Charter, 
S/25354,3 
March 1993, and addenda: S/25354/Add. 1,11 March 1993 and S/25354/Add. 2,22 
March 
1993. The U. S. Representative to the Security Council characterised UNOSOM 11 "an 
unprecedented enterprise", S/PV. 3188 
s' Executive Summary of the report prepared by Professor Tom Farer of American 
University, Washington, D. C., on the 5 June 1993 attack on United Nations 
forces in 
Somalia, U. N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U. N. Doc. S/26351 (24 August 1993) 
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for all the ills of the situation. 58 Consequently, the multilateral force under 
U. S. leadership was interfering in a partisan manner in the civil war, causing 
as much havoc and distraction as that which they were intended to stop. The 
Italians who participated in the operation voiced strong reservations and 
demanded its mandate be changed. France and the Islamic countries were 
uneasy and hinted towards withdrawal. The U. S. announced that they would 
withdraw by March 1994 and the United Nations in their turn decided to 
withdraw by March 1995. Amid much destruction and confusion the operation 
was moderated to a traditional peace-keeping one. 59 
As this operation unfolded, other aspects thereof became palpable. The 
participants in the multilateral force were reluctant to participate in or 
distanced themselves from extending the mandate of the operation, 
humanitarian or otherwise. Only the United States pursued the neutralisation 
of General Aideed and his clan. Thus, there was a certain stage where the 
implementation of the operation was transformed into a unilateral action. 
Trying to assess the achievements of this operation, one can not overlook the 
fact that it facilitated the distribution of food, and saved millions, but it also 
dragged the country into deeper civil war and exacerbated passions. Political 
stabilisation and propitiation of democratic institutions which this operation 
aimed for have not materialised. The pursued evaluation exposes its 
contradictory character, similar to its polymorphic legality. On the one hand, 
the human tragedy was deteriorating by the inaction or inefficiency of the 
international community to reach those in need. Under such circumstances, 
the pursued action seemed necessary and indeed facilitated the distribution of 
food at its initial stage. Subsequently, this action received a wider mandate of 
installing democratic institutions, relieving the victims of famine and 
installing national reconciliation. These aspirations coincide with or are 
prerequisites for the enjoyment of human dignity. A narrow operation to 
5' S. C. Res. 837, U. N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3229th mtg., U. N. Doc. S/RES/837 (1993) 
59 S. C. Res. 897, U. N. SCOR, U. N. Doc. S/RES/897 (1994); Further report of the Secretary- 
General submitted in pursuance of paragraph 19 of resolution 814 (1993) and paragraph 5 
of resolution 865 (1993) on the situation in Somalia, including the 3 October 1993 incident 
in Mogadishu, and presenting three options for the continuation of UNOSOM 11, 
S/26738, 
12 November 1993; Further report of the Secretary-General submitted in pursuance of 
resolution 886 (1993), reviewing the options for the future mandate of UNOSOM 11. 
S/1994/12,6 January 1994 
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"feed" the population would have been inadequate and famine would have 
recurred in the absence of a secure environment. Therefore, the motives and 
objectives of the wider operation correspond to the vision of conditions which 
safeguard the human dignity of the population. However, the implementation 
was deficient and indeed it discarded any such purpose. Conventional wisdom 
may coagulate around the belief that the operation failed because of a power 
antagonism between the U. S. and U. N. on the one hand and General Aideed 
on the other. We submit that it floundered because it ignored the requirements 
of universality, impartiality and effectiveness which demarcate the purpose of 
human dignity. It should be acknowledged that the building of a secure order 
may require a certain confrontation with the recalcitrant participants. There 
exists a line to be crossed between a purely facilitative and a facultative 
operation. The confrontation though, if need be, should entail those issues 
which aspire towards securing human dignity. In Somalia, it started from a 
misconception and misunderstanding of the society's tribal structure. It 
proceeded towards an unreasonably obsessive vilification and exclusion of a 
particular powerholder and his clan. It is difficult to imagine how a viable 
political environment could be established with exclusion, monomaniac 
persecution, and polarisation. Consequently, the action lost its impartiality. 60 
At this point, it should be pointed out that with "impartiality" we do not mean 
indifference and insensitivity. We mean definition of aims and understanding 
of ground realities and means to pursue these aims. The Somali action had 
defined ends but lacked in the assessment of the situation. In a nutshell, it 
promoted both the value of human dignity in its hard core as protection of life 
but also its devaluation by creating conditions in its operative phase which 
were life-threatening. Concerning the soft core of human dignity, it should be 
maintained that it failed. 
11.3 Conclusion We have already presented some cases which prompted 
intervention on humanitarian grounds either as a restricted action for rescuing 
60 I Lewis, J. Mayall, "Somalia", in J. Mayall (ed. ), The New Interventionism 1991-1994: 
United Nations Experience in Cambodia, former Yugoslavia and Somalia, (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 94; Report of the Commission of Enquiry established 
pursuant to resolution 885 (1993) to investigate armed attacks on UNOSOM 11 personnel, 
S/1994/653,1 June 1994 
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nationals61 or as a comprehensive operation for securing the human dignity of 
the wider population. It has been indicated that the analysis of these incidents 
under the conventional legal argument could only reproduce the controversies 
immanent to that argument and its intrinsic conception of societal organisation. 
The dominant style of legal reasoning with its asseverated tendency of 
generating objective solutions induces towards hermetic modes of interpretation 
in the style of "either/or". It frustrates any attempt to enfranchise ourselves from 
the deductive patterns of the received form of doctrine. Additionally, it 
overlooks the fact that legal rules are the outcome of specific circumstances 
which are not unchangeable. Social knowledge is relative and Articles 2(4) and 
51 were the foundational principles of an order perceived at its inception as 
relatively ideal; however, they do not accord absolutely any more with the 
present historical context. Rules show inner growth and unexpected or 
unpredictable alterations force the rules to adopt new imports. The attempt to 
portray them as immunised from new trends will be self-defeating. In order to 
progress beyond this point, we should assess what is important in this process of 
facts and ideas and what is considered important or significant by those who 
create decisions and by those who are affected or concerned by them. Therefore, 
human dignity has performed a central role as a commitment which directs 
human or state actions. It is above all a reflective stance concerning the 
importance of the goods to be realised. Being a reflective standpoint, it avoids 
the criticism of subjectiveness because, although it assists us in distinguishing 
among the heap of received information what is relevant and important, 62 it 
accepts modifications and allows for reconceptualisation. 
The objective of securing human dignity in its multiple manifestations has made 
steady progress since its initial inception, and the present social environment is 
ripe for human rights issues to become the foundational principles of a 
restructured international society. Otherwise it would be prosaic to classify these 
incidents by the conventional legal reasoning of justifying actions' legality 
through the matrix of the legal rules. The purpose of this study has been to open 
6' "The Unites States frequently employs armed forces outside this country - over 200 times 
in our history 
- 
for the protection of American citizens or national security". United States v. 
Verdugo-Urquidex, 110 S, Ct., (1990), p. 1056, at p. 1065 
62 A. MacIntyre, "The Indispensability of Political Theory", in D. Miller, L. Siedentop, The 
Nature of Political Theory, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1983), p. 17 
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the hermetic legal rules to rendition by disburdening legal argumentation. The 
contingency of events affects the coherence of legal argument. Thus, we have 
tried to discover the conformity of events with the realities of life and detecting 
discord between actual and ideational social life, we transformed the format of 
that theoretical matrix by proposing the perspective of human dignity. The 
conventional arguments of non-intervention, self-defence, or U. N. collective 
action secure indeterminacy in the evaluation of these actions because there is a 
contradiction between the received legal posture and the wider socio-legal 
evaluation of the event. By integrating law into a social whole, the evaluation is 
different from these arguments and that was the original aim of this study. Rules 
should not be applied only as directives to particular facts without 
contemplating the results of their mutual interaction. By looking at the whole 
action, one can trace the moral tendencies and value elements one has linked 
with the action. This comprehensive evaluation is different from the 
opportunistic interest in "hard cases", where important values are at stake, and 
also form the automation of the legal argument which cannot look far beyond 
the legal context. Consequently, the appreciation of those values and their 
coherent application in a set of events becomes a guiding principle or the 
principal assumption that directs our evaluation of events in that area, probably 
contrary to the existing preconception. 
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EPILOGUE 
Reaching the end of this study, the question of its value and of its contribution 
to the literature of humanitarian intervention is encountered. Is this study 
different from the mainstream literature on humanitarian intervention or is it a 
reproduction of already existing knowledge? Has our aim of presenting a 
novel approach been fulfilled or has it been dissipated under the weight of 
legal tradition? 
Our aim has been to provide a unison of the mind with the situation whereby a 
reflective argument is constructed. This can only be achieved by elucidating the 
interrelations of theory and praxis, that is to say, the theory and praxis of 
humanitarian intervention which, eventually, induces the theorising person into 
presenting his own perspective. 
The motivation for this approach has been the status of legal reasoning which 
oscillates between objectivity, relativism and nihilism. ' We have identified in 
the course of this study certain legal traditions. The mainstream or traditional 
argumentation claims objectivity by alluding to superseded ontologies or 
objective procedures and, also, excludes non-legal elements. It has been 
criticised for rigidity and alienation from practical interests. Legal realism 
introduced the study of other disciplines and it attempted to influence policy. It 
has been, however, criticised for reducing law to politics. The Critical Legal 
Studies are more generous in their attitude towards other disciplines and they 
endeavour to provide a holistic view of legal phenomena. They have failed 
because they did not distance themselves from a certain legal "technology". That 
is, a legal methodology which produces "objective" legal results. Hence, 
whereas the mainstream legal argument "legalises" phenomena, Critical Legal 
Lawyers use deconstruction as a methodology which eventually becomes the 
means and the end. 
We have explained at the outset of this study that the followed methodology 
springs from a sense of dissatisfaction with the existing legal argument. There, 
1 0. Korhonen, "New International Law: Silence, Defence or Deliverance? ", 7 E. J. l. L.. 
(1996), p. I 
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we identified a sense of dejä vue in the works concerning humanitarian 
intervention. The thrust of their argument is a more or less legalistic approach. 
They may differ in the pursued aims or results, however, they do not distance 
themselves from "legal technology" and fail to see the gist of the matter, that 
is, they fail to see what is involved when a humanitarian intervention takes 
place. 
In more detail, the legal position which considers humanitarian intervention as 
illegal per se, observes, strictly, the letter of the relevant U. N. Charter rules, 
opinions of publicists, pronouncements of states in formal gatherings and 
decisions of courts. Thus, any action which could be characterised as 
humanitarian intervention is condemned to illegality under the force of the 
aforementioned indices. This creates a sense of complacency within the legal 
profession because it appears as succeeding, eventually, in containing and 
evaluating a situation within the relevant legal context. However, it does not 
address the real question. The situation 
- 
action and reaction 
- 
is not an 
arithmetic condition, whereby the outcome is a definite conclusion. This 
approach fails to address or side-steps a common human question: "what 
should be done" in a situation of mass killings. 
On the other hand, the legal approach has also a positive aspect not distanced 
again from the letter of the law. Now, this letter is being expanded, extended 
and, thus, contains a residue for humanitarian actions. What this approach 
avoids remarkably is to explain why this same law appears to be more 
permissive of humanitarian actions. The answer to this question is only hinted 
at, dressed in a legalistic language. It lies in the pressure which a humanly 
intolerable situation puts on the norms which, thus, grow cracks in their 
interpretative orthodoxy. 
We could characterise these approaches as unreflective. They are unreflective 
because, by legalising the different aspects of any action, they produce legal 
arguments which do not correspond to the essence of the action. 
2 An example 
from the cases discussed in the preceding Chapters would be illustrative and 
would make our point more comprehensible. In Rwanda, there is a state, 
2 A. Carty, "Introduction: Post-Modem Law", in A. Carty (ed. ), Post-Modern Law, 
(Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1990), p. 1 
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sovereign and independent, whose two main national components have vowed 
to eliminate each other. Due to international lethargic reaction, France sends 
troops which create a safety zone and assist in terminating the massacres. This 
action has also been acknowledged by the United Nations. 
The identification of those components which would assist in legalising the 
evaluation of the situation, comprise of: (i) state; (ii) sovereignty; (iii) foreign 
troops; (iv) intervention; (v) authorisation; (vi) consent; (vii) mass massacres. 
As said above, these components could direct the theorising person towards 
different outcomes. The first four, coupled with the lack of consent and 
authorisation, would produce a negative view of illegality. It appears that the 
seventh element of mass killing becomes of a minimal value. But is this the 
real issue? Isn't it that those killings have disturbed our conscience? 
The other approach takes cognisance of the element of mass killings but 
dissipated within the other identified components. It, however, reaches a 
different conclusion of accepting the legality of the initiated action. This 
approach, which seems to be more permissive, sometimes becomes 
procedurally inflexible. It introduces criteria which automatically attribute or 
deny legality to the action such as a time limit; mode of the pursued action; 
and disinterest. These criteria provide a rule of thumb approach but it would 
again be naive to consider that states can be put on the psychiatrist's couch 
where their hidden motivations will be revealed. The mass killings criterion is 
included but without any further elaboration. 
The above argumentation shows that international lawyers disagree and lack 
understanding on the principles which should apply in a particular case. They 
also disagree on the constituents of a chosen principle, i. e. on what standards 
should be applied to the use of force. Hence, legal argument can take the often 
repeated and less courageous form of a verbal tirade against the means and 
silence towards the ends, or the opposite of embracing the ends and 
overlooking the means. If the action fulfils certain criteria, then it is legal or 
illegal irrespective of results. It also seems that lawyers are satisfied with this 
mode of reasoning and pursue a piecemeal approach to "hard cases" where the 
answer is not so obvious. 
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In order to avoid the perpetuation of this dilemma, we should choose within a 
discursive framework where alternatives are considered and in this aspect the 
dominant legal argument which would condemn the action as illegal is 
deficient because of its formality and unreflectiveness. Consequently, we 
proposed a mode of evaluating interventionist actions by beginning with an 
assumption of securing human dignity and then examining the contribution of 
these actions to this direction as well as speculating the formative course of the 
law. The premise of human dignity provides strong reasons for the use of force 
and its conditionment. There should not be much reliance on legalistic 
principles which are used in a "juristic push-button devise"3 fashion but one 
should appraise the different variables, policies, their interrelations and weight 
in certain contexts. 
In contradistinction to the traditional approaches, the suggested approach 
which promotes human dignity delivers a spherical view of the situation. It is 
prospective and perspective, overcoming the sterile and unreflective 
evaluation towards a more comprehensive approach. Under the auspices of 
this study, there have been illustrations of how human dignity is increased 
when endangered individuals are saved or partially effectuated when only the 
nationals of the interfering state are rescued. Also, how human dignity is 
decreased when other interests are promoted. We also have had the 
opportunity to see the immediate effects of the action which is the protection 
of life or the long term effects which is the promotion of a dignified life. An 
example discussed above will be more illuminating. In Liberia, amidst the 
civil war which cost the life of thousand Liberians and ransacked the country, 
endangered foreigners were rescued by the intervening Americans. The one- 
sided and incomplete approach which the existing doctrine produces is more 
than evident. The action is characterised as protection of nationals and, thus, 
legitimised according to a certain interpretation of the self-defence argument 
or, it is characterised as illegal under another interpretation. According to the 
prevalent position, the action does not satisfy the criteria of a humanitarian 
action and, thus, the crucial issue of indiscriminate killings is overlooked. 
' J. Stone, Aggression and World Order: A Critique of the United Nations Theories of 
Aggression, (London, Stevens & Sons, 1958), p. 1 l 
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According to the approach of this study, the issue of savageries cannot be 
evaded. The action, thus, is partly characterised as a humanitarian action 
because, rescuing foreigners, saves their life and restores their human dignity. 
However, this action is incomplete because it did not ameliorate the situation 
as for natives as well as foreigners to enable them live in conditions of 
dignified existence. Hence, the inquiry is directed towards the essence of the 
case and observes that it has been deficient. This involves an intellectual 
redirection, whereas the existing argument would produce a sense of fake 
completeness by addressing only one issue, that of intervention, on an elusive 
legal basis. 
This consists of the innovative character of the present research for it opens 
the horizon towards a more human-centred and comprehensive encounter. As 
was said at the beginning, this study presents an attempt to indicate the 
connectedness of the mind with the situation and expose what is significant in 
each case. This is the only method for producing meaningful arguments and 
influencing reality. Because, only by developing a personal argument and 
applying it to concrete situations can the theorising person influence and 
ameliorate the situation. A reflective attitude towards conditions of genocide or 
mass killings may influence the situation because it entails the personal 
responsibility of the theorising person. Personal responsibility and reflective 
argumentation arise from the interrelation and influence between the situation, 
the theory, and the personal stance of the individual person. It is both ways. The 
theorising person, lawyer or politician, who starts from the theory of human 
dignity approaches the situation accordingly and, of course, this new relation 
affects other relations as well. It creates, thus, awareness for other relevant 
instances. Another important aspect is that the claim of one-sided responsibility 
- 
scientific, legal or political 
- 
vanishes. And this has been the sombre character 
of international argument. It self-indulged in the legal world and became 
alienated. By opposing the influences of the situation and of the salubrious 
mind, legal scholars seemed to evade the world and just appeared to be the 
human personnel in the vast factory of law. The situation in Rwanda, Burundi, 
Liberia, Kampuchea, to take some examples, do not need a "technological" 
approach of legality or illegality. This is insignificant and, above all, it hides the 
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personal responsibility of the international lawyer. He influences the situation 
even in the case of a "technological' approach but this is insignificant and 
indifferent. Personal responsibility and meaningful influence comes only when 
there is reflection on what is significant and how to achieve it. In order to 
achieve this, it would be necessary to include in our thinking the whole cadre of 
indices and also the modes of influencing practice. It is unfruitful to only 
"lawyerise". 
Consequently, the approach of human dignity pursued in this study contains 
responsibility, reflection, openness, account for the results, but above all a belief 
in the strength of the theorising person to stand above the thrust of tradition. 
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